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This thesis presents an investigation into Babylonian society, focusing on the priestly 
community of the city of Borsippa during Neo-Babylonian (ca. 620-539 BCE) and early 
Persian rule (ca. 538-484 BCE), a period known in the literature as the Neo-Babylonian 
period. The political changes affecting Babylonia – the area of present-day central and 
southern Iraq – during that time provide the backdrop for my study. I will investigate a 
complex of social interactions that took place among the priestly families of Borsippa in 
this period and attempt to reveal and dissect the underlying dynamics. I will draw on 
sociological theories and studies of anthropology, especially those concerned with 
historical and present-day Hindu society, which exhibits parallels with ancient Babylonia. 
In addition, a range of procedures taken from social network analysis will be applied in 
order to examine and interpret the mechanics of these social events. The aim of this thesis 
is to contribute towards a better understanding of the Babylonian priesthood as a distinct 
social group and to investigate how its members interacted among themselves and within 
society at large. At the same time, while my focus is primarily on the priest, this study 
will hopefully result in a more sophisticated appreciation of the organisation of ancient 
Babylonian society as a whole. It goes without saying that in order to fully unravel past 
societies, a social perspective is indispensable, yet, and this should be stressed, such an 
approach is still largely missing in Neo-Babylonian studies and related fields.  
 
0.1. State of the art 
With an estimated 50,000 archival documents surviving from the Neo-Babylonian period, 
conditions for studying Babylonian society at that time seem auspicious.1 However, this 
potential has not yet been realised to its full extent. Existing studies on Neo-Babylonian 
                                                






society can be divided into three (not mutually exclusive) types, each with its own 
limitations.2  
First, there are the so-called ‘archival studies’, like that of the Ea-ilūtu-bani archive by 
F. Joannès (1989) or those of the Egibi archive by C. Wunsch (1993, 2003) and K. 
Abraham (2004).3 These publications present close analyses of individual family archives 
and their protagonists. Their focus commonly lies on providing transliterations, 
translations, and commentaries of the archival texts and on studying the genealogies, 
property portfolios, investment strategies, inheritance practices, legal procedures etc. 
documented in these texts. The resulting micro-narratives of individual Babylonians and 
their families are indispensible for writing a social history of first millennium Babylonia 
from the bottom up, yet few authors have attempted to transcend the boundaries of the 
individual archive and situate its protagonists within their larger social fields.4     
Second, there are the prosopographical studies that assemble data on the human 
resources of particular Babylonian institutions during the Neo-Babylonian period, such as 
the Ebabbar temple of Sippar and the Eanna temple of Uruk.5 These studies provide an 
invaluable pool of data on collective career trajectories, professional associations and 
social networks, yet their potential for structural analysis has remained untapped so far.6  
                                                
2 This overview does not include the large numbers of medico-ritual, religious, literary, and royal texts that 
can be added to the corpus and on which much research is being done. The following survey only pertains 
to studies of the legal administrative texts. 
3 Other examples include Kessler 1991, Jursa 1999, Baker 2004, Frame 2013, Waerzeggers 2014, Abraham 
[forthcoming]. A number of articles can be added to this list, including Beaulieu 1991, Beaulieu 1993, 
and Beaulieu 2000 on archives from Larsa; Jursa 2005b for a text group from Nippur; Joannès 1980 and 
Wunsch 2005 for material from Babylon. 
4 E.g. Waerzeggers 2014 studies the archive of Marduk-rēmanni in the conventional way, while linking this 
man’s biography into the Achaemenid imperial politics of that time. An early example is Jursa 1999: 111-
125, where the credit partners of Bēl-rēmanni, a priest from Sippar, have been examined in light of their 
institutional affiliations to the temple and their professional contact with the protagonist. Cf. Abraham 
[forthcoming] for a study of the Atkuppu archive from Borsippa, which makes an effort to examine the 
social background of the family’s contacts. 
5 Kümmel 1979, Jursa 1995, Bongenaar 1997, Da Riva 2002, Janković 2004, Zawadzki 2006, Kleber 2008, 
Waerzeggers 2010, Zawadzki 2013, and Kozuh 2014 some of which put particular effort in reconstructing 
the cultic organisation.  
6 The study by J. P. Nielsen 2011 presents an exception, although the focus is not on a particular institution 
but on the formation and distribution of kin-groups in the early Neo-Babylonian period in general. Taking 






Third, there are studies that approach Neo-Babylonian society from a functional-
economic perspective.7 Tracing the development of the fiscal, monetary, and agricultural 
systems during the Neo-Babylonian period, these works are generally interested in larger 
economic trends. Another major concern is with the operation and development of 
Babylonia’s major institutions – the palace and the temple8 – and their economic and 
juridical impact on society. Making use of a much larger and more diverse set of primary 
sources compared to the archive studies, these works have developed useful typologies 
and arrived at significant generalisations.9 However, in my opinion, these typologies are 
often too static, as they focus on the object or content of social interactions and disregard 
the identities of those brought together by these encounters. In recent years, interest in 
these matters has risen, but these efforts remain on a small scale.10 
Apart from the limitations of each of these approaches to Babylonian society, current 
scholarship suffers from insufficient awareness of the emic value of the labels used to 
describe historical actors and social groups. Individuals, families, and entire segments of 
society are described as lower class, upper class, bourgeoisie, nobility, urban elite, 
nouveaux riches, citizens, burghers, aristocrats, patricians, rentiers or entrepreneurs.11 
                                                                                                                                            
professional affiliations and careers of individual Babylonians and the social standing of their families. 
While he uses a much larger (and geographically diverse) section of the available data, and presents a 
much more structural analysis compared to other publications of this type, it is still predominantly 
descriptive. 
7 E.g. Jursa 1995, Da Riva 2002, van Driel 2002, Kleber 2008, and Jursa et al. 2010 among others. 
8  The publications listed in note 5 should be mentioned again as they have provided much of the 
groundwork. 
9  The works by Govert van Driel (2002) and Michael Jursa (et al. 2010) in particular deserve to be 
mentioned here. Among their multiple insights one could mention the reconstruction of the fiscal 
apparatus by van Driel (2002, part III), or the typologies of private archives and the generalising remarks 
on the business profiles of their owners found in Jursa et al. 2010, chapter 3. Of particular importance 
here has been the application of two contrasting socioeconomic ideal types known as ‘rentier’ and 
‘entrepreneur’ to our sources (e.g. Jursa et al. 2010: 282-195; see for these typologies and their 
implications Ch. 5.3). Important generalisations have also been formulated for Babylonia’s agriculture 
and economy, in terms of regional and diachronic agricultural trends (e.g. Jursa et al. 2010, chapter 4), the 
development and monetisation of the Neo-Babylonian economy (e.g. Jursa et al. 2010, chapter 5) and the 
role of the ‘market’ therein (van Driel 2002). 
10 See notes 4 and 6, above.  
11 E.g. van Driel 2002, Abraham 2004, Kleber 2008, Zadok 2009, Jursa et al. 2010, Waerzeggers 2010, 






While these labels can help us to get to grips with the wide social range and substantial 
economic inequality that existed within Babylonia’s heterogeneous population, many of 
the above-mentioned classifications derive from scholarship on pre-modern and modern 
Europe. It remains far from clear what they imply in the specific context of the Neo-
Babylonian period, or whether they can be applied at all. Moreover, in Neo-Babylonian 
studies these classifications have so far been primarily based on economic and/or legal 
criteria. Failing to offer a more socially informed underpinning is, in my opinion, to 
ignore the complexity of this ancient society. Did Babylonians also identify themselves as 
aristocrats or entrepreneurs, and did they organise in distinct groups? This issue raises the 
questions of where exactly different social groups or segments should be located within 
Babylonian society, to which extent they overlapped and were considered distinct from 
each other, and whether or not they can be distinguished and reconstructed on the basis of 
more than their economic profile and/or legal status.  
The aim of this thesis is to begin to answer these questions by taking a particularly 
well-documented segment of Babylonian society as a case study. 
 
0.2. Research questions  
It would be far too ambitious to attempt a study of the entire Neo-Babylonian society. In 
this thesis I will focus on one particular group – the ‘priests’. This does not mean that my 
investigation is not concerned with society as a whole. A better understanding of the 
internal dynamics of the priestly stratum and the interactions it maintained with the out-
group will hopefully provide a perspective on the layout of Babylonian society at large 
and the social mechanics that were in operation at the time. Moreover, the priests are by 
far the best-represented group in our documentation and their occupational association to 
the temple will form a further frame of reference for understanding their motivations, 
relationships, and activities. 
Much has been written about the Neo-Babylonian temple and its personnel.12 This 
scholarship will serve as point of departure for the present investigation. Priests were 
responsible for the execution of the time-honoured worship of the gods inside the temple. 
As explained in more detail below, the Babylonian priesthood was a thoroughly 
                                                                                                                                            
Babylonian studies, more objectionable labels such as ‘burgher’ (Jursa 2005: 8) or ‘patrician’ (Beaulieu 
2006: 193) are found rarely and usually put within inverted commas. 
12 See e.g. Kümmel 1979, MacGinnis 1995, Bongenaar 1997, Da Riva 2002, Beaulieu 2003, Kozuh 2014, 






hierarchical institution, divided into multiple professional groups, including brewers, 
butchers, oxherds, reed-workers etc., each with its own time-, area-, and task-related 
concerns.13 Unexplored so far is the question how these priests interacted outside of the 
temple, within the larger Babylonian society.  
In this thesis I will attempt to reconstruct the social world of the Babylonian priest, 
through a close analysis of their social interactions. In doing so, this study seeks to realise 
two principal research aims:  
 
1. To assess the influence of the temple fabric on the behaviour of priests within 
the larger society. In other words, to examine to what extent the temple-based 
hierarchy and the professional organisation of the priests influenced or shaped 
their lives outside of their cultic activities.  
 
2. To firmly locate the priests in Babylonian society. In other words, to 
investigate, by closely analysing the patterns of their interactions, whether 
priests can be identified as a distinctive social segment in society and how 
they related to, or interacted with, other social groups. 
 
I will argue, firstly, that temple-based hierarchies informed the social interactions of the 
priesthood in daily life to a significant extent, and secondly, that the priesthood should be 




My investigation is built around four types of social relationships:  
• Marriage 
• Landholding 
• Silver lending 
• Friendship  
The choice to investigate these spheres of interaction is based on the fact that they cover a 
good part of the priest’s daily life, representing key and recurring events in which 
individuals, families and groups came into formal contact with each other. Moreover, 
                                                






while there are various domains that are left undocumented, these four types of 
interaction can be captured adequately in the available documentation.  
I will analyse these four types of interaction in a two-pronged approach. The first 
step will be to examine the personal relationship and social background of the actors 
involved in the documented social interactions – in other words, how were the people 
involved in a transaction connected? Did a person interact with for example kin, 
colleagues or people from other social groups in society? By systematically asking this 
question I will generate comprehensive profiles of the individuals interacting in particular 
social events. Straightforward as it may seem, this procedure will inform us in descriptive 
and quantitative terms about the type of society we encounter in the Neo-Babylonian 
period. Was it for example an open society, in which different people interacted freely, or 
was it made up of closed, self-segregating groups and thus stratified?  
These statistics will form the point of departure for the next phase of my investigation. 
On the basis of the quantitative results I will attempt to uncover more fundamental 
dynamics, norms or social customs that regulated these social events and thus patterned 
Babylonian society. I will also examine whether interaction was driven by more than just 
economic motivations, but was inspired by, for example, ideological or religious 
considerations. It is in this phase that complementary concepts of the social sciences will 
be introduced, concerned with, among others, kinship, tie strength, social boundaries, and 
identity. Studies of anthropology will provide a useful frame of reference and offer 
examples of how dynamics of interaction may have worked. Special attention will be 
given to ethnographies of Hindu society on the Indian subcontinent, which show parallels 
with our material from ancient Babylonia. Finally, by adopting a network approach and 
carrying out a range of procedures from the field of social network analysis, I will 
explore how some of these social mechanisms operated in practice, while reinforcing my 
interpretation with a methodologically sound foundation. The present investigation is 
among the first to apply social network analysis to ancient Babylonian society.14 
 
0.4. Case study: the priestly community of Borsippa 
I will take the priestly community of Borsippa as the principal level of analysis. While 
my investigation may therefore be classified as a meso-level analysis – located between 
                                                
14 Other studies that have applied network analysis to cuneiform texts are Waerzeggers 2014b and Wagner 






the archival and functional-economic studies reviewed above – it will still be informed by 
individual archives (micro-level). Moreover, as my analysis becomes more abstract 
towards the end, I will be able to link my findings to larger trends in Babylonian society 
(macro-level).  
The sources used in this thesis are the private archives of the priestly families that 
lived in the city of Borsippa during the Neo-Babylonian period.15 Located on the side-
branch of the Euphrates River, not twelve miles southeast of the capital, Borsippa was the 
political and religious sister-city of Babylon at the time.16 Its tutelary deity was Nabû, the 
Babylonian god of writing and patron of scribes.17 He had taken up residence in the 
Ezida, the city’s main temple, towards the end of the second millennium BCE when he 
was called ‘king of Borsippa’ for the first time.18 By then Nabû was commonly identified 
as the son of Marduk,19 the god of Babylon, who had been elevated as head of the 
Babylonian pantheon at around the same time. Together, father and son became the 
primary gods in Babylonia during the first millennium BCE; their temples, the Esagil and 
Ezida in Babylon and Borsippa respectively, became the most important cultic centres in 
the country. Throughout this period both native and foreign rulers made sure to show 
proper reverence towards these temples and acknowledge their privileged positions.20 
Nearly 3,500 cuneiform tablets have been excavated in the late nineteenth century at 
Birs-Nimrud, the ancient site of Borsippa – unfortunately without any documentation.21 
As a consequence, the tablets appeared on the antiquities market from where they were 
bought by museums and private collectors all over the world; the lion’s share can 
nowadays be found in the British Museum in London, the Vorderasiatisches Museum in 
Berlin and the Musée du Louvre in Paris.22 Although the archaeological context of these 
tablets is lost, their original interconnections can be reconstructed on the basis of museum 
registers; this, together with prosopographical considerations, enabled scholars like G. 
                                                
15 Zadok 1998, Jursa 2005: 76-94, Waerzeggers 2005, Zadok 2009 and Waerzeggers 2010.  
16 See for the history of Borsippa during the second and first millennia BCE, Unger 1932 and more recently 
Waerzeggers 2010: 4-10. 
17 See for the history of the god Nabû in Babylonia, Pomponio 1978 and Pomponio 2001. 
18 Pomponio 1978: 61. 
19 In the early second millennium BCE Nabû was classified as minister and scribe of Marduk, and only 
venerated in the Esagil temple in Babylon. Cf. Pomponio 2001. 
20 Waerzeggers 2011. 
21  E.g. Waerzeggers 2010: 15-16. 






van Driel, C. Waerzeggers and R. Zadok to reconstruct more than twenty individual 
family archives.23 This corpus has remained largely unpublished. 
Most of these archives belonged to the families who owned priestly titles in the Ezida 
temple or one of Borsippa’s secondary sanctuaries dedicated to Nabû’s consort Nanāya 
and minor gods of the local pantheon.24  They include the archives of the following 
families: Ahiya’ūtu (16), Atkuppu (133), Bēliya’u (375), Ea-ilūtu-bani (325), Ibnāya A 
(41), Ibnāya B (22), Ibnāya C (4), Ibnāya D (3), Iddin-Papsukkal B (6), Ilia A (269), Ilia 
D (57), Ilšu-abūšu A (25) (+ the slave Balāṭu (18)), Ilšu-abūšu B (15), Kudurrānu A (38), 
Lā-kuppuru (30), Mannu-gērûšu (30), and Rē’i-alpi (400+). 25  Large parts of these 
archives are concerned with the management of cultic duties in Ezida and other local 
temples. These affairs have been the subject of an extensive study by C. Waerzeggers 
(2010). But the archives also contain ample information on everyday affairs outside of 
the temple. An important preoccupation of these families was the management of urban 
and landed real estate, such as the acquisition of new property (including slaves), harvest 
estimates and house rent collections. Liquid capital was often used in silver lending or 
invested in small-scale business enterprises such as, for example, beer brewing. Besides 
letters, memoranda, and lists of various sorts, these archives also contain information on 
more momentous and exceptional (family) affairs such as marriage, adoption or legal 
disputes. The archives from Borsippa can in these respects be compared with other 
priestly archives from Babylonia.26  
But the corpus also has its drawbacks. Particularly frustrating is the fact that it sheds 
light almost exclusively on the group of priests. Babylonian priests were an integral part 
of a larger segment of urban society, yet the study of this larger segment is problematic, 
as families with different professional profiles have remained largely outside of the 
documentation. There are thus far only three archives from Borsippa that lack a priestly 
                                                
23 Van Driel 1989, van Driel 1992, Waerzeggers 2005, Jursa 2005: 76-94, Zadok 2009, and Waerzeggers 
2010: 15-16.  
24 See Waerzeggers 2010: 20-32 for the local pantheon of Borsippa. 
25 This list is taken from Waerzeggers 2010: 16. The numbers in brackets refer to the number of texts 
attributed to the archive. See for an overview of these archives, Jursa 2005: 77-94.  
26 E.g. The archive of Bēl-rēmanni (Jursa 1999), the archive of Marduk-rēmanni (Waerzeggers 2000/2001, 






or temple background: Banê-ša-ilia (11), Gallābu (59), and Iddin-Papsukkal A (22).27 
Even if the protagonists of the latter two archives belonged to families that performed 
cultic functions in the Ezida temple, the evidence suggests that these particular members 
engaged in different lines of work and were – unlike their relatives – not enrolled in the 
local priesthood.28 Still, we should be aware that they belonged to a similar, if not the 
same, social circle as the priestly families under investigation. Moreover, the fact that 
texts from these archives entered museum collections together with other priestly 
archives, with which they also share prosopographical connections, further suggests that 
these individuals belonged to the same milieu and perhaps lived in the same 
neighbourhoods, as did the priests. 29  It remains unclear, therefore, how far the 
protagonists of these three archives were actually removed from the priestly group. 
Various methods and abstractions have to be made in order to delineate the priestly core 
in the larger urban elite population more comprehensively (see, Ch. 0.5.). 
The priestly families documented in this corpus occupied the highest echelons of local 
society during Neo-Babylonian and early Persian rule.30 Not only did these men occupy 
lower/mid-ranking positions, such as judge, notary scribe or tax collector,31 but the two 
most senior posts in Borsippa, that of chief temple administrator, or, ‘bishop’ 32 
(šatammu) and city governor (šākin-ṭēmi), were customarily drawn from among the 
members of the city’s most prominent priestly families too.33 The latter often managed to 
                                                
27 Waerzeggers 2010: 16. However, one has to maintain the possibility that their temple affiliations are 
lacking due to accidents of recovery rather than due to a historical absence, seeing that the archives in 
question are relatively small. 
28 Jursa 2005: 82-85, Waerzeggers 2010: 79. The Gallābu family in Borsippa is known to have performed 
the homonymous barber’s service (gallābūtu) in the Ezida temple; the Iddin-Papsukkal is a well-known 
temple-enterer’s family in Borsippa. The Banê-ša-ilia family can so far not be connected to the local 
temple institution at all.  
29 Waerzeggers 2005. 
30 In the new order that came into existence after the failed revolts of 484 BCE, these priestly families had 
lost their privileged standing in society to a group of people whose loyalty to Persian rule was warranted, 
see e.g. Waerzeggers 2003/2004, Kessler 2004, Pirngruber [forthcoming].  
31 E.g. Wunsch 2000, Baker & Wunsch 2001, Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009.   
32 Based on the šatammu’s religious authority as head of the priesthood or his administrative and judicial 
powers, scholars have proposed the translation ‘bishop’ or ‘chief temple administrator’ respectively. Cf. 
Bongenaar 1997: 12+25 and Waerzeggers 2010: 43+222 for references.  
33 See Waerzeggers 2010: 65-73 for a prosopography of the šatammu of Ezida and šākin-ṭēmi of Borsippa. 






maintain their positions in religious as well as civic institutions over multiple generations 
and clearly played a leading role in the government of their town.34 
Recent study has demonstrated that the average income range of these families was 
between three and thirty times the minimum household subsistence requirement.35 Even 
if the majority of the local families will have fallen between five to nine times minimum 
subsistence level, and only few will actually have generated a thirty times subsistence 
income, it is important to realise that in this thesis we are dealing with well-to-do 
families. With their middling to high income these families generally belonged to the 
urban upper stratum. Moreover, affiliation to this stratum was expressed through the use 
of three-tier genealogies (‘PN, son of PN, descendant of FN’), i.e. the use of family or 
clan names.36 These functioned as indisputable markers of descent and qualified their 
bearers as the traditional and native Babylonians par excellence. It should be realised that 
individuals lacking this nominal affiliation presumably constituted the greater part of the 
Babylonian population. 
The Borsippa corpus covers the entire so-called ‘long sixth century’,37 between the 
rise of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty under Nabopolassar in circa 620 BCE and the failed 
revolts against the Persian king Xerxes in 484 BCE, when the majority of archives from 
northern Babylonia, including Borsippa, abruptly break off. 38  It offers the largest 
collection of (medium to large) private archives from Babylonia during the first 
millennium BCE. While direct contact between the individual archive holders is 
documented rarely, there are clear prosopographical links between the archives, as 
protagonists share a fair amount of direct and indirect contacts. With circa 7,000 
individuals mentioned in the course of the Neo-Babylonian period in the above-listed 
private archives alone, this corpus offers a unique insight into the functioning of a 
                                                                                                                                            
šākin-ṭēmi was being curtailed in the reign of Xerxes, and presumably abolished later, cf. Joannès 1990a: 
180, Waerzeggers 2004: 161-162, Jursa 2005: 50+296, Kessler 2006: 40. 
34 Note, however, that this local authority was checked to some extend by the appointment of royal officials 
inside the temple administration. The most common titles are the qīpu (‘royal resident’) and the ša rēš 
šarri bēl piqitti (‘royal courtiers’), which were brought in from outside the community. See on these royal 
officials, Jursa 2005: 49-51. Cf. Kleber 2008 (Uruk) and Bongenaar 1997 (Sippar).  
35 Jursa et al. 2010: 296-305. 
36 Nielsen 2011. 
37 This term was coined by M. Jursa in Jursa et al. 2010: 5.  






community in first millennium BCE Babylonia.39 Moreover, this corpus further differs 
from corpora of other cities in that it pertains to a much wider section of temple 
personnel. In Borsippa, like in other cities, the temple’s middle stratum – made up of 
brewers, bakers and butchers – is best represented, but a number of archives pertain to 
families of the very highest and lower priesthoods (see below). This corpus thus presents 
us with an opportunity to investigate the social interactions of a local community of 
priests in relatively complete terms. 
 
0.5. The Babylonian priest  
In this thesis, I will use the term ‘priest’ to denote a person who actively participated in 
temple worship; however, I will often use the term ‘priestly’ in an extended meaning, to 
include inactive members of a priest’s paternal family or clan. This usage is warranted by 
the particular workings of the prebendary system that underpinned the division of cultic 
labour in Babylonian temples.  
Assyriologists have defined the term ‘priest’ in two different ways. On the one hand 
there are scholars who apply it to ritual specialists functioning as mediators between 
human and divine realms.40 This definition is based on a modern, western perception of 
the priest as a privileged interlocutor of the divine. According to this definition, the 
Mesopotamian priesthood includes ritualists such as diviners, exorcists, and prophets, 
while it excludes more mundane cultic workers such as temple brewers or gate-keepers. 
On the other hand, a more inclusive use of the term priest has been advocated by C. 
Waerzeggers (2010: 34ff.), who defines a priest as ‘a person who enjoyed the right to 
partake in the temple worship on account of his possession of the required legal title and 
on account of his ritual qualifications’. This definition – which I follow in this thesis – 
emphasises two dimensions, a legal and a practical one. The legal dimension refers to the 
                                                
39 This number is based on an on-going project to assign each individual in the Borsippa corpus a unique 
number. This is a crucial step towards the creation of a prosopographical database and will facilitate the 
application of modern research methods, such as social network analysis. Thus far the Gallābu, Ea-ilūtu-
bani, Ilia A, Ilia C, Ilia D, and the Rē’i-alpi archive have been submitted to this ID processing. These 
archive amount to some 2881 texts in which ca. 4642 unique individuals are mentioned. This gives an 
average of 3,95 unique individual per text. The archives listed above amount to some 1,899 texts and thus 
give an estimation of 7,501.05 unique individuals. If the various temple files, the smaller archives or 
dossiers and the large number of unassigned texts are included in this analysis, this number of individuals 
that are mentioned in the Neo-Babylonian corpus of Borsippa can be raised to well over 11,000. 






ownership of a so-called isqu  (‘share, lot’), a term customarily translated in the literature 
as ‘prebend’.41 A prebend gave its owner the rights to enjoy an income from the temple –
 usually in the form of sacrificial remainders and other raw materials – in exchange for 
the performance of a time-, task- and area-specific cultic service, such as baking bread, 
gate-keeping, basket-weaving, fishing, cultic singing, etc.42 Passed down from father to 
son, prebendary titles forged long-lasting connections between families and certain 
priestly tasks. However, possession of a legal title did not automatically mean that a 
person was able to participate in temple worship. In order to be initiated to the active 
priesthood, strict rules of purity had to be observed relating to all aspects of the person, 
including descent, mind and body.43 As a result of these regulations, prebend-ownership 
and active priesthood could be dissociated in practice, as ritually unfit prebend-owners 
were allowed to hire suitable substitutes to perform the temple service attached to their 
prebend. However, the heritability of prebends, the recruitment of substitutes within the 
circle of prebend-owners, and the general reluctance to sell prebends outside of the 
paternal clan were all factors that worked together to ensure a far-reaching association 
between the prebend-owning family and the actual performance of the priestly task.  
This mechanism allows me to make a delicate but crucial simplification of the data, 
which involves taking families as the principal object of analysis, rather than individual 
persons, and using clan names as indicators of particular priestly identities. In particular, 
this procedure is based on the following two observations.  
Firstly, it is a valid simplification to connect families with specific priestly professions 
(e.g. considering the Ilia family as a clan of brewers, the Ibnāya family as a clan of 
butchers, etc.). The recent prosopographical study of Borsippa’s main temple by C. 
Waerzeggers has shown that most priestly families in this city specialised in one 
particular profession (2010: 78-80). This stands in sharp contrast to smaller Babylonian 
temples such as the Ebabbar temple in Sippar, where priests were often engaged in more 
than one trade.44 While in Borsippa the traditional relationship between priestly offices 
                                                
41 See Cocquerillat 1955: 39, van Driel 2002: 33 and Waerzeggers 2010: 34+190 for the background of the 
term in Ancient Near Eastern studies. 
42  Recent studies on the Babylonian prebendary system include MacGinnis 1991, Bongenaar 1997, 
MacGinnis 1999, Jursa 1999 van Driel 2002, van Driel 2005, Corò 2005 and Waerzeggers 2010. 
43 On the requirements and procedures to enter the Mesopotamian priesthood see Sallaberger & Hubert 
Vulliet 2005, Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008, Löhnert 2007 and Löhnert 2010.  






and families is thus generally well established, there are some families for which this 
relationship is more ambiguous or poorly expressed, if not lacking altogether.45 In these 
cases I will make artificial simplifications. The evidence for each ‘ambiguous’ family (or 
family branch) will be considered individually in the following analysis whenever 
possible, but there are only two possible outcomes: either the family is classified as 
temple-based and attributed to a specific priestly group, or it is perceived as a non-
member of the priesthood, hence as an outsider.46 
Secondly, it is a valid simplification to attribute an individual’s documented priestly 
profession and the correlating (priestly) status to all members of his family, even if for 
these members no positive evidence of their involvement in temple worship or in the 
prebendary system is present. As the prebend system of the sixth century BCE was 
established in the early part of the first millennium, and given the reluctance to alienate 
prebends outside of the paternal family, it follows that most prebends existed within a 
community of heirs.47 
 
0.6. The temple hierarchy 
The various priesthoods of a Babylonian temple were ordered in a rigid hierarchy along 
an all-embracing axis of relative purity and physical proximity to the gods.48 This meant 
that priests who worked in close contact with divine statues had to comply with more 
stringent purity rules than those working in more peripheral areas of the temple. In the 
abstract sense we could imagine the hierarchy in the temple assuming the form of a 
ladder (Fig. 1, next page). 
Located at the very top of the temple hierarchy was the group of so-called ērib-bītis, 
literally ‘temple-enterers’. Both the chief temple administrator (šatammu) and the city 
governor (šākin-ṭēmi) – the foremost positions in the local religious and civic institutions 
– were traditionally recruited from this group. 49  The temple-enterers enjoyed a 
                                                
45 See Waerzeggers 2010: 16 for a list of archives from Borsippa with the professional affiliation of their 
protagonists.  
46 See, for example, p. 183 concerning the protagonists of the Gallābu archive. 
47 Van Driel 2002: 67-75, Waerzeggers 2010: 8, Jursa 2010: 162 and Nielsen 2011: passim. 
48 Sallaberger & Hubert Vulliet 2005: 620-621, Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008, and Waerzeggers 2010: 42-49.  






particularly privileged position in the temple and were allowed access to the most sacred 
areas, in particular the cellae of the gods.50 
The temple-enterers embodied the gods’ most intimate servants who took care of their 
primary needs. Their individual tasks could vary considerably, as singers, exorcists, and 
artisans such as goldsmiths or jewellers could all have ērib-bīti status.51 It stands beyond 
dispute that these men, due to their intense contact with the divine, had to observe the 
strictest rules of purity; they were therefore submitted to consecration and ritually shaved, 




Below the temple-enterers we find the purveying priesthoods. Brewers, butchers, 
bakers, oil-pressers, fishermen and oxherds belonged to this group, which had a dual 
assignment in the temple service. 52  On the one hand they were responsible for the 
production of specific sacrificial commodities such as beer, milk, or bread, which usually 
happened in the temple workshops. On the other hand they assumed a more ceremonial 
role when they presented the finished products in the temple courtyard (kisallu) during a 
                                                
50 E.g. Kümmel 1979: 163, Bongenaar 1997: 147-148, van Driel 2002: 88, Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 14-
15 and Waerzeggers 2010: 46. 
51 Van Driel 2002: 89, 123-124. See also Lambert 1957 for an edition of VS 1 15, a text from Hellenistic 
Uruk that informs us about the traditionally perceived composition of the ērib-bītis. 
52 Van Driel 2002: 117-123. 
 
 







daily ceremony.53 The courtyard has been identified as an area of restricted access and 
only the consecrated, ritually shaved priesthoods could participate in this ritual.54 It is 
clear that among the food purveyors the brewers took precedence. They are mentioned 
first in lists of cultic personnel, before the butchers and the bakers.55 After these three 
professions no strict hierarchy can be established, although the oxherds seem to have 
ranked below the brewers, bakers and butchers. While purveying priests thus belonged to 
the consecrated priesthoods, they were denied access beyond the inner courtyard into the 
living quarters of the gods, which was the prerogative of the temple-enterers alone.56 
The next group is made up of service personnel. This group consisted of prebendaries 
that had a supportive role in the daily management of the liturgy, like measurers, 
doorkeepers, scribes and barbers. I follow C. Waerzeggers’ interpretation that this group 
was not so much ranked above or below the food purveyors but rather in a parallel 
hierarchy.57 It is not clear whether all the priests in this group were consecrated and 
shaved. However, it stands to reason that this depended on the specific duty determined 
by their prebend. A doorkeeper on duty at the entrance of the divine cella must have been 
obliged to meet high standards of purity and was presumably submitted to shaving 
whereas a measurer active in the temple storerooms did not have to fulfil these criteria. 
The final group is made up of ‘minor’ craftsmen, including potters, builders, and reed-
workers. 58 In contrast to the previous groups, these priests were not engaged in the 
sacrificial system; instead they were responsible for its maintenance and protection, by 
for instance baking earthenware containers, repairing brick walls, fixing reed structures, 
etc. There is no evidence that these craftsmen were consecrated or had to comply with 
any rules of purity beyond a minimum degree of hygiene. However, as we have seen, 
artisans belonging to the more important crafts like the goldsmiths were consecrated and 
had to meet standards of purity, especially when their tasks brought them in close contact 
to the gods, in which case they belonged to the section of the temple-enterers.59 
                                                
53 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 14-17, Waerzeggers 2010: 113-118.  
54 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 15-17. 
55 See Waerzeggers 2010: 48+252 for various examples. It should be noted that the relative status between 
bakers and butchers is not always clear. 
56 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 14-17. 
57 Waerzeggers 2010: 49. 
58 Waerzeggers 2010: 49. 






0.7. Main protagonists of this study 
In the following pages I will introduce the most important priests who will feature in this 
study. Starting with the top ranking prebendaries of Ezida, the temple-enterers, I will 
subsequently address their lower-ranking colleagues, viz. the brewers, the bakers, the 
oxherds and the reed-workers, thereby following the Babylonian temple hierarchy as 
outlined above. The same order of discussion will be adopted in the analyses in ensuing 
chapters. After listing the local families known to have been enrolled in the individual 
priesthoods, I will give a brief overview of the most relevant archives and pay special 
attention to the business activities, family position and major life events of the principal 
protagonists. While many more archives and texts will be used throughout this study, the 
following individuals and families form the cornerstones upon which this book is built.  
 
0.7.1. Temple-enterers 
In Borsippa temple-enterers (ērib-bīti) came from the following families: Ahiya’ūtu, 
Aqar-Nabû, Arad-Ea, Arkāt-ilāni-damqā, Ēdu-ēṭir, Iddin-Papsukkal, Ilī-bāni, (Ea-)ilūtu-
bani, Kidin-Nanāya, Naggāru, Nappāhu, Nūr-Papsukkal.60 Our main source is the cluster 
of archives of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family, which was the subject of a study by F. Joannès in 
1989. I refer to it as a cluster because this text group, consisting of some 325 documents, 
is made up of the independent archives of three families: Ea-ilūtu-bani, Ilī-bāni and 
Nanāhu. Their archives merged as a consequence of intermarriage and they were 
eventually deposited together.61 Covering an unusually long period of time (ca. 687-486 
BCE), this archive cluster informs us on six successive generations. The texts are 
distributed evenly and often report on the activities of siblings and in-laws. While it thus 
provides us with a relatively broad account of the families, it lacks the density of 
information found in some of the other archives discussed below. Here, I will only 
introduce the main representatives of the three families in the briefest of terms. For a 
more detailed account, the reader is referred to the study of Joannès 1989. 
With forty-six and sixty-five attestations, Zēru-Bābili (fourth generation, ca. 580-545 
BCE) and his son Mušēzib-Bēl (ca. 561-509 BCE) are the best-attested individuals of the 
Ea-ilūtu-bani family branch. Of particular importance for the formation of this text group 
                                                
60 See Waerzeggers 2010: 79, 73-76 for a prosopography of temple-enterers in Borsippa.  






was the marriage between Mušēzib-Bēl and fHubbuṣītu//Ilī-bāni,62 the sister of the two 
protagonists of the Ilī-bāni archive: Nādin (aka. Dadia, attested thirty-seven times 
between ca. 555-539 BCE) and Širiktu (attested thirty-five times between ca. 555-521 
BCE). Besides being intermarried, the Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Ilī-bāni families were further 
connected through shared contacts and overlapping business interests. The Nanāhu family 
branch is almost exclusively represented by a man called Ahušunu (attested thirty-two 
times between ca. 522-492 BCE). His texts entered the archive cluster as a result of his 
marriage with fLurindu (sixth generation, ca. 494-492 BCE), the daughter of Mušēzib-
Bēl//Ea-ilūtu-bani and his wife of the Ilī-bāni family. 
There is only circumstantial evidence that the main family branches of this archive 
cluster were involved in the cult. First, both Mušēzib-Bēl and his father are attested as 
temple craftsmen, more specifically as goldsmiths. 63  Secondly, the archive contains 
various texts belonging to a certain Zēru-Bābili/Šumā/Ea-ilūtu-bani (ca. 587-550 BCE), 
who is commonly identified as temple-enterer of Nabû. Even though F. Joannès (1989: 
37-3864) has shown that, despite the onomastic similarities, he should not be equated with 
Mušēzib-Bēl’s father, this Zēru-Bābili was obviously closely related to the archive-
holding branch of the family. Finally, while the Ea-ilūtu-banis and the Ilī-bānis are well-
known temple-enterer clans in Borsippa, the Nanāhu clan is thus far only attested as 
cultic ‘entertainers’ (kurgarrû), a prebendary profession whose status in the temple 
hierarchy is not entirely clear. Yet, the fact that this task was performed in close 
proximity to the gods and the additional fact that the Nanāhu family received a temple-
enterer’s daughter in marriage, suggest that this family was of comparable priestly 
status.65 Hence, in the following study I will subsume the information of the Nanāhus 
under the category of temple-enterers. 
                                                
62 She was previously married to Mušēzib-Bēl’s older brother. After fHubbuṣītu’s death, Mušēzib-Marduk 
preserved the alliance between the two families by marrying his late wife’s niece, fAmat-Sutīti//Ilī-bāni. 
See Waerzeggers 2002 for other examples of affinal endogamy in the Neo-Babylonian period. 
63 See Waerzeggers 2010: 39 for the temple goldsmiths in Ezida. Cf. Bongenaar 1997: 363ff. for the same 
profession in the Ebabbar temple of Sippar. While there is so far no evidence that the service of the 
goldsmith was integrated into the prebendary organisation, it is very likely that these craftsmen working 
in close proximity of the statues of the gods were temple-enterers.  
64 Following an earlier observation by San Nicolò 1947: 155. Cf. van Driel 1992: 34. 







One has to realise that our knowledge about temple-enterer families from Borsippa is 
restricted. While references to individual temple-enterers – many of which were šatammu 
or šākin-ṭēmi – can be found in the documentation,66 these give insight into the upper 
reaches of the temple administration and the circle of leading families but do not assist us 
in reconstructing (and contextualising) the functioning of these priestly families in their 
community. Besides the archive cluster discussed above, there is only one more archive 
in the corpus belonging to a temple-enterer, the Iddin-Papsukkal (B) archive. 67 
Unfortunately, this ‘archive’ consists of less than ten texts and does very little to alleviate 
the gap in our documentation.  
 
0.7.2. Brewers 
Families identified by C. Waerzeggers as belonging to the ranks of the brewers (sirāšu) 
include Ahiya’ūtu, Ardūtu, Huṣābu, Ilia, Ilšu-abūšu, Kudurrānu, Lā-kuppuru, Mannu-
gērûšu and Šikkûa.68 
With up to ten private archives the brewers are the best-represented priesthood in 
Borsippa.69 Totalling nearly 300 texts, the so-called Ilia (A) archive is our foremost 
source on this prebendary group.70 Not only does it provide a unique glimpse into the 
organisation of the prebendary brewers, it also informs us in great detail about the 
family’s marriage alliances and genealogy, indeed resulting in one of the largest and most 
complex family trees reconstructed for the Neo-Babylonian period so far.71  
The archive spans 119 years (ca. 520-489 BCE) and covers five successive 
generations. However, the vast majority of the texts relate to Marduk-šumu-ibni (aka. 
Ardia)/Šulā, who was active for no less than fifty-four years. As he was the first son of 
Šulā’s second marriage, Marduk-šumu-ibni (together with his two younger siblings) saw 
the paternal estate being divided in favour of his older (half-)brother, who received a 2/3-
                                                
66 See note 49, above. 
67 Jursa 2005: 85, Waerzeggers 2005: 361. 
68 Waerzeggers 2010: 79. There are several more families that might have been affiliated to this priesthood, 
but the evidence remains weak so far: Aqar-Nabû, Allānu, Kinia, Naggāru, Ninurta-ušallim, Šēpê-ilia, 
and Zērūtu. See Waerzeggers 2010: 188-195 for a full prosopography of the brewers. 
69 Jursa 2005: 76-94. 
70 The following information on the Ilia (A) archive can be found in Jursa 2005: 85-87 and Waerzeggers 
2010: 372ff. 






share in accordance with the Neo-Babylonian law of inheritance.72 To some extent this 
disadvantageous position determined the course of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s professional life.  
Much of his energy went into the service of the gods. Besides the prebends inherited 
from his father, Marduk-šumu-ibni often helped other relatives discharging their 
prebendary obligations; this occasionally allowed him to assume ownership over 
additional service days. Marduk-šumu-ibni also owned various plots of land, but his 
shares were often fragmentary and much of the property was managed on a communal 
basis with his younger brothers. Rather than buying additional land, Marduk-šumu-ibni 
usually resorted to exchange in order to improve his inherited estates. That this may have 
been a result of a shortage of liquid assets is suggested by the fact that silver lending 
plays only a very minor role in his business affairs. 
While his family maintained close marriage ties with the fellow brewer clan of the 
Ilšu-abūšu, Marduk-šumu-ibni himself was married to fInṣabtu//Ša-nāšišu, a clan that 
would rise to considerable power in Babylon and Sippar in the course of the reign of 
Darius I.73 The couple had three daughters and a son. Even if Marduk-šumu-ibni could 
not be counted among the richest individuals of Borsippa, he nevertheless enjoyed 
considerable prestige in the community. One of his daughters was married to the 
šatammu of Ezida, while the other wed the son of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, a former overseer 
(šāpiru) of the temple bakers (see below). Marduk-šumu-ibni was also closely associated 
to Nabû-zēru-ušabši//Ilia (D), the governor of Borsippa, with whom he held a prebend in 
joint ownership. Finally, towards the end of his career Marduk-šumu-ibni was also active 




Not far below the temple brewers ranked the priesthood of the bakers (nuhatimmu). 
According to C. Waerzeggers’ estimation, up to one hundred individual bakers might 
have been employed by the Ezida temple at any given moment. They were recruited from 
the following families: Bēliya’u, Esagil-mansum, Kidin-Sîn, Nabû-mukīn-apli, Šēpê-
ilia.74  
                                                
72 Roth 1995: 148. 
73 E.g. Waerzeggers 2014 and Waerzeggers [forthcoming]. 






The oldest and most prominent among these families were the Kidin-Sîns and the 
Šēpê-ilias. Not only did their involvement in this trade go back to at least the eighth 
century, they still accounted for 55% and 29% of all known bakers towards the end of the 
long sixth century. By contrast, the Nabû-mukīn-apli clan did not achieve such stability: 
while this family still owned a considerable share of the baker’s service in the seventh 
century, their patrimony was almost completely lost to the Bēliya’us in the course of the 
sixth century BCE. This last family is not attested until the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II 
and might only have settled in Borsippa around the 550s BCE. It has been argued that the 
Bēliya’us (perhaps together with the Esagil-mansum family75) were part of a larger group 
of families that moved from the capital of Babylon to the burgeoning provincial towns 
during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II.76 The old and native Kidin-Sîn and Šēpê-ilia 
families did not associate much with the immigrant families of the Bēliya’u and the 
Esagil-mansum, practically dividing the ranks of bakers in two contrasting camps (see 
Ch. 3.3. and Ch. 4.2.3.). 
Today most of our attention goes to the Bēliya’u family, which has left the only 
baker’s archive from Borsippa recovered so far.77 It consists of circa 375 documents 
belonging to Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, second son of Balassu and fQunabātu//Esagil-mansum, 
who can be followed for over fifty years (between ca. 536-484 BCE). Šaddinnu was 
married to fNanāya-Damqā//Ṣillāya, whose family had no obvious ties to the temple. The 
couple got at least one son, who was married to the daughter of the local brewer Marduk-
šumu-ibni//Ilia (see above). 
Even if his family lacked roots in the locale and could therefore not call on a particular 
family tradition as bakers of Nabû, Šaddinnu was nonetheless able to make a career in 
this line of business. Besides inheriting a number of service days from his father, he 
acquired additional prebends from various colleagues early on in his career. Moreover, 
from 518 BCE onwards, Šaddinnu assumed greater responsibility within the ranks of the 
bakers as supervisor of specific service units (bēl-šapatti), and more importantly, by 
occupying the position of overseer (šāpiru) of all the bakers of Nabû, a post traditionally 
held by the Kidin-Sîn family.78 
                                                
75 Zadok 2005b. 
76 See for more on this trend of immigrating families Waerzeggers 2014. 
77 The following information can be found in Jursa 2005: 81-82, Waerzeggers 2010: 475ff. The edition of 
this archive is in preparation by J. Wojciechowska. 






Besides the substantial part that concerns Šaddinnu’s activities as temple baker, the 
archive reflects the usual interest of first millennium priests in real estate, slave 
ownership and silver lending. Yet, in many ways Šaddinnu differed from his fellow 
priests as he more successfully engaged in entrepreneurial activities alongside his priestly 
functions. One of his particular enterprises involved the acquisition of vacant or 
dilapidated houses and urban plots, with the aim of subsequently renting them.79 He 
invested a considerable amount of silver in this niche, as the archive contains evidence 
for over a dozen of such acquisitions, some from insolvent debtors. Even if other priestly 
families made money with similar activities too, their involvement was usually modest 
compared to Šaddinnu’s. That his entrepreneurial aspirations could at least in part be 
understood against his immigrant background and lack of historical roots in Borsippa is 
suggested by the business profile of other migrant families in first millennium Babylonia, 
like for instance the Ṣāhit-ginês from Sippar, who were also able to gain a foothold and 




The prebendary oxherds (rē’i-alpi) stood on a lower echelon of the large and diverse 
subdivision of the purveying priesthoods.81 While these priests were in the first place 
cattle breeders who looked after the bulls destined for the offerings, they were also 
responsible for dairy production. In Borsippa, over the course of the long sixth century, 
the homonymous Oxherd, or, Rēʾi-alpi family exercised a near-monopoly on this trade. 
This at least can be drawn from the Rē’i-alpi family archive. 82  With over 400 
documents this is the largest archive from Borsippa, and the third largest private archive 
from first millennium Babylonia. While it attests to five consecutive generations (ca. 620-
484 BCE) the majority of the documents concern Nabû-mukīn-zēri/Aplā (ca. 560-500 
BCE) and his son Rēmūt-Nabû (ca. 525-492 BCE) of the third and fourth generation 
respectively. Nabû-mukīn-zēri (aka. Murašû) was married to fNanāya-bulliṭiš//Mubannû, 
with whom he had two children: a daughter named fInbā, who married into the Šarrahu 
                                                
79 Jursa et al. 2010: 170f. 
80 Waerzeggers 2014. 
81 Information on this prebend in Ezida can be found in Waerzeggers 2010, Ch. 7. 
82 Jursa 2005: 93f. For a discussion of the prebend-related dossiers, see Waerzeggers 2010: 553ff. An 






family, and a son named Rēmūt-Nabû, the second protagonist of the archive. Rēmūt-
Nabû was married twice: first to a woman of the Ardūtu family, a minor brewer clan, and 
later to fAhattu//Arad-Ea. The latter assumes an active role in the archive, especially 
when after her husband’s death she temporarily took over the family’s affairs.  
Besides a large number of title deeds, loans and some slave texts, the archive informs 
us in great detail about the management of the temple service and provides us with a 
unique insight into the organisation of the Oxherd clan at large. The clan managed its 
prebendary patrimony with great fluidity and ease, reflecting a general attitude of co-
operation and solidarity that transpires equally in business affairs outside of the temple. It 
has been suggested that it was exactly this principle of solidarity that allowed Nabû-
mukīn-zēri and Rēmūt-Nabû massively to expand their prebendary portfolio and acquire 
a highly influential position among the oxherds of Ezida.83 Moreover, the family was 
very rich, as can be seen from the fact that the value of Rēmūt-Nabû’s property portfolio 
amounted to well over a talent of silver by 502 BCE.84 
Even if the Rē’i-alpi family qualifies as a genuine priestly family, we will see 
throughout this study that the oxherds often did things their own way. They distort the 
overall picture and complicate attempts to generalise larger sets of data on more than one 
occasion. While according to the communis opinio the oxherds are to be situated on a 
medium-low rung of the temple hierarchy, the family manifests itself as a major player in 
the priestly community of Borsippa. Is this due to the efficient family organisation, their 
wealth, or was their status in the temple simply more significant than previously thought? 
The Oxherds had (ab)used their influence in the past, as can be seen in SAA 10 353, 85 a 
letter written to the Assyrian king Esarhaddon (680-669 BCE) by the royal agent Mār-
issār reporting that the oxherds86 of Borsippa had refused to draw up accounts of their 
live-stock, withheld various offerings and bribed the city governor and chief temple 
administrator, who are said to do the oxherds’ bidding. Moreover, around the same time 
the oxherds seem to have forged a marriage alliance with the chieftain of the Gambūlu 
                                                
83 Waerzeggers 2010: 287. 
84  Although he might have been forced to sell much of his property by the end of that year, see 
Waerzeggers 2010: 646-649. 
85 Parpola 1993: 289-291. 
86 While the letter mostly refers to rē’û (lúsipa), lit. ‘shepherd,’ it uses at least once the full term rē’i-alpē 
(lúsipa-gud.níta.meš, see l. 24). Moreover, that both terms were interchangeable has been shown by C. 






tribe according to the reports in SAA 18 56,87  which should further underline their 
prominent social standing in the community. 
 
0.7.5. Reed-workers 
Located at the lowest fringes of the temple hierarchy were the minor craftsmen, among 
which we find the reed-workers (atkuppu). Usually mentioned after the prebendary food 
preparers and the temple’s support staff, the reed-workers were responsible for making 
cultic baskets and presumably keeping up the reed structures in and around the temple 
precinct. As I have said earlier, there is no evidence that reed-workers belonged to the 
consecrated priesthood, or participated in the daily ceremony on the temple courtyard, or 
had to comply with any rules of purity beyond a minimum degree of hygiene. As was the 
case with the previously discussed priesthood, the service of the reed-workers in Ezida 
was in the hands of the homonymous Reed-worker, or Atkuppu, family. 
The Borsippa corpus is unique in that it offers us the possibility to study a family of 
minor temple craftsmen through the Atkuppu family archive.88 It spans some 120 years 
(between ca. 608-485 BCE) and attests to five successive generations. However, with 
only 110 documents it is limited in size compared to the archives discussed above, and its 
textual coverage is rather shallow. To some extent this is mitigated by the fact that the 
majority of the texts pertain to the third and fourth generations. The third generation is 
represented by Marduk-šumu-ibni (aka. Sūqāya)/Nabû-ēṭir. He married fKāribtu//Adad-
nāṣir, whose family held no cultic occupation. The fourth and best-attested generation is 
represented by their four sons: Nabû-šumu-uṣur (aka. Nabû-uṣuršu), Nabû-iddin, Murānu 
and Iqīša. The four brothers worked in close co-operation and seem to have managed the 
archive in close succession between circa 534 and 494 BCE.  
While property and family documents are largely missing, the available evidence 
indicates that the family had modest financial means compared to, for example, the 
Bēliya’u or Rē’i-alpi families. Besides a small share in the reed-worker’s prebend, the 
Atkuppus owned not more than two small date gardens. Moreover, their business 
ventures were of relatively humble proportions, and while occasionally engaging in 
                                                
87 Reynolds 2003: 42-43. Note, however, that the father of the groom is referred to as ‘chief shepherd of 
Nabû’ (lúgal-sipa.meš ša Nabû) and not as ‘oxherd’, but that this is meant seems likely in the light of the 
previous letter. 
88 Jursa 2005: 80. An edition of this archive is currently in preparation by K. Abraham, who kindly allowed 






moneylending, they were usually indebted for higher sums than they themselves extended 
– all of which points to limited cash reserves. 
Even if there is no doubt that the Atkuppus were part of the priestly community of 
Borsippa, it will be demonstrated that the family represents the edge group in our data 
sample, located at the fringes of the social unit under investigation – not only in terms of 
temple status but also in social standing, social behaviour and interaction. 
 
0.8. Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into two parts. In PART ONE (Ch. 1–4) I will investigate specific 
social events and interactions of the priesthood of the Ezida temple in Borsippa. Chapter 
1 is devoted to the marriage practices of the priests. With the help of social network 
analysis I will reconstruct the marriage alliances of the Borsippean priesthood, and reveal 
that this community observed a complex marriage system known as hypergamy. 
Functioning as a building block in society, marriage deeply affected the social 
organisation of participating families as well as the execution of their cultic duties. 
Chapter 2 will explore various aspects of landownership. I will first look into the history 
and origins of so-called hanšû land, which had been granted to Borsippean families by 
early first millennium kings. Based on the naming patterns of these landed estates I will 
reconstruct the range of original beneficiaries. Finally, I will assess which value this land 
held for the descendants of the original beneficiaries, during the long sixth century BCE. 
The second part concerns the sales of property, which will be examined in the light of 
existing marriage ties and professional affiliations. An examination of the patterns of 
tenancy and agricultural collaboration will conclude this chapter. By taking a closer look 
at the background of tenants it will be possible to determine on whom the priests relied 
for the management of their landed property. Chapter 3 investigates credit operations. 
By looking into the various prebendary groups individually, it can be shown that the 
patterns of silver lending, while depending on personal circumstances, were equally 
influenced by professional affiliation and faintly follow the temple-based hierarchy. 
Chapter 4 reconstructs circles of trust and intimacy. In the first part I will subject the 
various archives to a quantitative examination. A comparison between the numbers of 
individuals mentioned only once in the archives and those attested more often will inform 
us about the structure of the personal networks of trust and intimacy on a general level. 
At the same time, it will be examined whether or not different social and economic 






on the concept of tie strength developed in the social sciences it will be possible to 
complement this quantification with a more qualitative analysis. Focusing on the most 
frequently attested individuals, I will take a closer look at the personal networks of the 
priests, the kinds of individuals that may be classified as ‘friends’ and their role in the life 
of the protagonists. 
In PART TWO (Ch. 5–6) I will take a step back and examine the interactional pattern 
of the Borsippean priests as a whole. It will be approached from a more theoretical 
perspective and linked up with broader social phenomena of Neo-Babylonian society. 
Chapter 5 will start by evaluating possible causations behind the pattern of interaction 
reconstructed in PART ONE. Drawing on the concept of homophily, I will propose an 
interpretation that allows for a reasonable degree of agency and choice on the part of the 
priests, while leaving room for limiting factors of interaction, such as geographic space 
and demography. Moreover, by further developing the concept of homophily it will be 
shown that the interaction of the priests is in line with the economic motivations nurtured 
by this social group as so-called rentiers. At the same time it will be argued that 
classifications like rentiers and entrepreneurs are characterised by more than economic 
criteria. Finally Chapter 6 is concerned with reconstructing the collective social identity 
of the Babylonian priest. The outlines of the interactional pattern points to the existence 
of a social boundary that separated the social group of the priests from the rest of society. 
I will try to reconstruct the symbolic and material resources on which Babylonian priests 
drew to create and maintain their social in-group by investigating a series of identity 
markers, including property ownership, historical consciousness, literacy, and language.  
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Since the emergence of Assyriology in the 19th century scholars have taken only limited 
interest in Babylonian marriage practice of the first millennium BCE. Investigations 
tended to approach the subject from a rather asocial and ahistorical perspective. Most 
studies are products of an academic tradition that strongly focused on philological 
aspects and legal implications on the matter. Many scholars were in the first place 
Rechtshistoriker who analysed Babylonian marriage for its legal implications, the 
particular contract types, and specific formulae and clauses used in these agreements.89 
On the other hand, scholars were also concerned with the material aspects of the dowry, 
mostly from a philological perspective in trying to identify the semantic meaning of the 
various components of the marriage settlement. 90  As said before, Neo-Babylonian 
studies suffer from a general negligence of social approaches and this is also apparent in 
the study of marriage practice.91  
The following investigation sets out to remedy this by investigating the social 
implications of marriage in Babylonian society. More precisely, in this chapter I will 
attempt to reconstruct the pattern of marriage in the priestly community of Borsippa. 
This is the first attempt to map a Babylonian marriage network on any scale. At the 
basis of this endeavour lies a quantification of the data, which will tell us what kind of 
                                                
89 See for example the entry ‘Ehe’ in RLA 2 by Korošec 1938 and the entry ‘Inzest’ by Petschow 1976/80, 
in RLA 5. More recent studies on marriage during the first millennium BCE include Roth 1989, Roth 
1989b, Abraham 1992, Wunsch 2003 and, Oelsner, Wells & Wunsch 2003: 933-948. For the Old 
Babylonian marriage, see Westbrook 1988. 
90 E.g. Wunsch 1995/1996, Roth 1990 and Roth 1991. 
91 Exceptions being the study by Roth 1987 on the household type in first millennium Babylonia, and an 
article on a particular case of consanguine endogamy in Sippar by Waerzeggers 2002. 
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marital unions the prebendary families arranged for their male and female members in 
practice. This ‘descriptive-quantitative analysis’ can be found in the Appendix 1. It 
serves as a data set that can be analysed with regard to the social implications of 
marriage among the local priesthood and will help us to determine how, and to what 
extent, marriage alliances configured the social organisation of this community. I will 
make use of social anthropological studies and theories in order to further our 
understanding of the dynamics of these marriages. By converting marriage ties into a 
directed graph I will reveal that the priestly families from Borsippa observed a complex 
marriage system known in anthropological literature as hypergamy. This system, which 
is observed in some parts of the Indian subcontinent, involves the marriage of a lower-
status bride to a higher-status groom. Moreover, I will show that the purity-based 
hierarchy of the temple served as the central guiding principle in the arrangement of 
alliances in Borsippa. In this study, marriage will thus be appreciated as a fundamental 
building block of Babylonian society, which allowed individuals and families to 
consciously shape their social environments, by organising elements within their in-
group and keeping the out-group effectively at bay.92 
 
1.1. Marriage in Borsippa: sacerdotal endogamy 
A most remarkable marriage in the history of Borsippa took place on April 14, 559 
BCE93 – the first day of the first month of the first year of king Neriglissar. On this 
symbolic day, the king gave his daughter, fGigītu, in marriage to the temple-enterer and 
recently appointed šatammu of Ezida, Nabû-šumu-ukīn of the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā clan.94 
While the marriage contract is damaged and most of the details are now lost, we are left 
with little doubt that this alliance had strong political motivations. Neriglissar was a 
                                                
92 Similar strategies were and are still used to great effect by (religious) communities across the globe, see 
e.g. Broekman 2010 (Egypt, priesthood of Amun), Hebrew Bible, Leviticus 21:10 and Ezekiel 44:22 
(Judaism), Dumont 1970: 125-129 (classical India), Fuller 1984: 26 (modern India).  
93 Julian dates in this study have been reconstructed on the basis of Parker & Dubberstein 1956. 
94 This union is recorded in Ner. 13 (Roth 1989: 49-50), a text written in the capital of Babylon, and 
found either there or in the Ezida temple of Borsippa, which owned this copy according to the 
postscript. Cf. Waerzeggers 2005: 345. For the person of Nabû-šumu-ukīn/Širikti-Marduk/Arkāt-ilāni-
damqā see, Zadok 2005a: 642 and Waerzeggers 2010: 72. 
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usurper king who had seized the Babylonian throne after murdering his predecessor.95 
He was also of Aramean origin, which meant that he came from a distinctively different 
background than the old-stock Babylonian families that dominated the urban centres in 
the alluvium.96 By publically allying with Nabû-šumu-ukīn, who was not only chief 
temple administrator but also the son of the former governor of Borsippa and a 
descendant of an old and illustrious local clan, Neriglissar was clearly making an effort 
to conciliate or, indeed, reward an influential faction of the local Borsippean elite.97  
While this alliance is an indisputable testimony to the influence, authority and 
prestige enjoyed by the priesthood of Nabû in Borsippa (if not also to Neriglissar’s 
vulnerable political position), such political marriages are most uncommon in first 
millennium Babylonia.98 The marriage alliances found in the Borsippa corpus suggest 
that the priestly families pursued an alliance policy that was not only geared almost 
exclusively towards the local community but involved a well-defined and highly 
restricted social group. It will become clear in the course of this chapter that outside 
political elements, let alone the royal family itself, are hard to accommodate in this 
priestly marriage system – a system which was ideologically informed, exceptionally 
complex and subject to strict conventions. 
A total of 81 marriages from the long sixth century BCE have been incorporated in 
the descriptive-quantitative analysis (Appendix 1).99 While it seems that the prebendary 
groups in Borsippa kept different marriage agendas if taken in isolation,100 considering 
the information as a single data pool and quantifying the entire set, the general marriage 
                                                
95 According to Berossos, Neriglissar was married to the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar and before seizing 
the throne had killed his king and brother-in-law, Amēl-Marduk, cf. Verbrugghe & Wickersham 1996: 
60.  
96 Jursa 2014b: 127-130. 
97 Waerzeggers 2010: 72. 
98 E.g. the Neo-Assyrian royal letter SAA 18: 5 reports on the alliance between the daughter of the 
chieftain of the Gambūlu tribe and a local temple-enterer of Nabû sometime during the mid-seventh 
century BCE, see Reynolds 2003: 42-43. For Bēl-iqīša/Bunanu, the chieftain in question, see Radner 
1999: 315f. s.v. Bēl-iqīša 7; Frame 1992: 81, 111, 199ff. 
99 Note that there are far more attestation of marital unions in the Borsippa corpus. However, in this 
analysis only the unions for which both the family name of the bride and groom are available are used, 
see Appendix 1. 
100  E.g. whereas some groups, like the brewers, engaged predominantly in intra-prebendary unions 
(Appendix 1.2), the Oxherds did not at all (Appendix 1.5). 
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preferences become immediately clear. The preferential marriage among the priestly 
families of Borsippa is the one within the prebendary group. Almost half (43%) of all 
the marriages were arranged among prebendary families of the same professional 
affiliation. This type is closely followed (37%) by marriage with prebendaries from 
other priesthoods. Finally, marriage with non-prebendaries families accounted for only 
20% of all unions.101 
The conclusion that the priesthood of Borsippa constituted a highly endogamous 
group is inevitable. Priests most often engaged in occupational endogamy, i.e. marriage 
within their own prebendary group.102 The evidence becomes even more telling if we 
combine the data of the first two marriage types (i.e. intra- and inter-prebendary 
unions): 80% of all the marriages were arranged with fellow priestly families, and this is 
only the minimum. The remaining 20% consists of unions with families from different 
social backgrounds: families with prebendary ties in neighbouring cities,103 clans who 
may have had links to the Ezida temple but are not covered by the available sources 
etc.104 They are all classified as ‘non-prebendary’ here, not so much out of conviction 
but due to the lack of concrete information. It is not unlikely that additional information 
on the Ezida temple and its community would show that many families were in one way 
or another related to the religious establishment of Borsippa. Evidence for unions 
between priestly families and individuals from the lower strata of society – identified by 
the non-usage of three-tier genealogies, i.e. family names – is as yet entirely missing. 
To sum up, marriage within the own prebendary group seems to have been the 
preferred form according to the quotient generated by the evidence from the descriptive-
                                                
101  This concerns families whose involvement in the prebendary system of the Ezida temple is not 
specified in the extant documentation. 
102 Other scholars speak of ‘group-specific endogamy’, e.g. Jursa et al. 2010:  29. 
103 E.g. Bēl-eṭēru (Appendix 1.1c), Rišāya (Appendix 1.2c). 




Figure 2: marriage type in Borsippa 
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quantitative analysis. The fact that almost as many marriages were arranged across the 
prebendary pool as within particular groups undermines the idea that marriage among 
the Borsippean priesthood was rigidly governed by concerns of temple ranking. 105 
Clearly, the purity-based hierarchy did not compel priests to look for marriage partners 
within their own prebendary group. Still, it would be wrong to dismiss the importance 
of the temple hierarchy altogether as I will show that it influenced the dynamics of 
marriage in a particular way. At this point, I propose that with 80+% of all the 
marriages arranged within the wider prebendary circle the marriage pattern of the 
Borsippean priesthood can best be designated as sacerdotal endogamy. 
 
 
Having said this, portraying the priesthood merely as endogamous would 
oversimplify the matter. Endogamy, or rather the endogamous unit, is not a static entity 
of equal participants but quite the opposite; it has proven to be very dynamic and 
permeated by hierarchical chains in many societies.106 Moreover, it has been suggested 
that endogamy is not an independent principle that imposes hierarchy, as much as a 
corollary and an expression of an existing hierarchy.107 What then was the hierarchical 
principle that governed sacerdotal endogamy in Borsippa? 
In the following pages I will draw on sociological theories and ethnographic studies 
to argue that the marriage pattern in Borsippa can best be understood by using the 
concepts of wife-giver and wife-taker. According to this principle, marriage alliances 
give rise to asymmetric relations between the two parties, which have consequences for 
                                                
105 See Ch. 0.6. 
106 Dumont 1970: 112-124, Black 1972, Dumont 1983: 41-52, Parkin 1990, Goody 1990, Ch. 4. 





Figure 3: sacerdotal endogamy 
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their choice of marriage partners in succeeding generations. It seems that in the case of 
Borsippa wife-givers were usually inferior in status with respect to their wife-takers, a 
situation called hypergamy in anthropology. The specific layout of this system in 
Borsippa can be explained once it is placed in its historical context. At the end of this 
section I will show that the wife-givers/wife-takers hierarchy also affected the execution 
of the temple service, thus showing that marriage was not only influenced by the temple 
fabric, but that in turn marriage affected the temple’s internal dynamics. I will use social 
network analysis as a tool to illustrate and substantiate the above argumentation. 
 
1.2. The concept of wife-giver & wife-taker 
The work that should be mentioned first is Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté 
(1949) by Claude Lévi-Strauss.108 This monograph has been a major influence in the 
study of family, kinship and marriage and brought about a shift in anthropological 
thinking about society. Lévi-Strauss proposed an overarching theory of kinship using 
various ethnographic records of societies in Asia, Australia and elsewhere. 109  This 
theory, which became known as ‘alliance theory’ and polarised the field of kinship 
studies in mid-twentieth-century anthropology,110 was based on the taboo of incest and 
the fundamental notion of reciprocity – for Lévi-Strauss the prohibition of incest was in 
fact a fundamental rule of reciprocity since it forced men to exchange their women and 
thus form the basic structures of society. Although the taboo of incest is clearly a 
negative rule, he emphasised that it was accompanied by positive ones, namely in the 
form of exogamous rules (defining a group outside which marriage was arranged) and 
endogamous rules (defining the group within which marriage was arranged). 
Reciprocity lay at the basis of Lévi-Strauss’ theory on kinship organisation and he 
consequently proceeded to study the elementary structures of various forms of marital 
exchange.  
                                                
108 First translated into English by James Harle Bell in 1969 under the title The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship. 
109 Cf. Dumont 1971 and Uberoi 1994 for a general overview of this theory and its broader implications 
for the studies of kinship as well as marriage in rural India. 
110 Lévi-Strauss’ alliance theory became opposed to the so-called ‘descent theory’ developed mainly by 
British anthropologists, most notably Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, among others, working in 
African societies. Cf. Barth 2005: 1-57. 
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An important case study in Les Structurse Élémentaires was the common type of 
marriage known as unilateral cross-cousin marriage, in which the man preferably 
marries his mother’s brother’s daughter.111 This form of marital exchange represents, in 
Lévi-Strauss’ theory, the ‘generalised exchange’ and needs a minimum of three and a 
maximum of n involving parties: group X gives a wife to group Y, who gives a wife to 
group Z etc. This form is ‘indirectly reciprocal’ since group X, which initiated the 
transaction chain will have to wait until it receives a bride, in this case from group Z. It 
is thus ideally perceived as a cycle and presupposes a concept of speculation or credit – 
in the end group X can only hope that the chain of transaction will be closed by 
receiving a wife from Z. We find here a point that has been criticised by later 
scholars. 112  First of all, Lévi-Strauss’ concept of kinship is thoroughly structural; 
secondly, his types of exchange were ideal types, and arguably overemphasised and 
idealised the principles of reciprocity at the expense of details in the field.113 
However, Lévi-Strauss was duly aware of this problem and he observed that in 
‘generalised exchange’ all involved parties adopt two functions vis-à-vis each other, that 
of wife-givers and wife-takers. In the case above, group Y is the wife-taker of X and the 
wife-giver of group Z, consequently group Z is a wife-taker of Y and wife-giver of X. 
Without going very deep into this matter, he already suggested that these unilateral and 
continuous relations might give rise to a hierarchy between wife-givers and wife-takers. 
While, in his words, this type of intermarriage ‘supposes equality’ it also is ‘a source for 
inequality’.114  
A champion of the alliance theory was Louis Dumont, who refined it and applied it 
to Indian society. He argued that ‘affinal alliance’ was a fundamental principle of Indian 
society and showed with various ethnographic examples that one can often discern a 
tendency for ‘hierarchisation’ within the endogamous group.115 In his comprehensive 
and seminal monograph on the caste system, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System 
                                                
111 See Bourdieu 1977: 30-71, for a comprehensive critique of earlier anthropological approaches to this 
idealised form of marriage.  
112 The main critics of Lévi-Strauss’ theory can be found in Leach 1961 and Needham 1962. See also 
Dumont 1971 for a general overview. 
113 Cf. Coelho de Souza 2009, Parkin 2005: 208-228. 
114 Lévi-Strauss 1949: 306. See more recently Parkin 1990: 473ff. 
115 Dumont 1983: 48. 
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and its Implications,116 Dumont described various forms of marriage, in particular the 
so-called hypergamous marriage. It is the norm in this marriage pattern that the man’s 
family takes a wife from a lower status family, i.e. women marry up in the hierarchy.117 
This form, observed Dumont, is congruent with the classical Brahmanical ideal of 
marriage as being a ‘gift of a maiden’: a lower status family gives a daughter in 
marriage to a Brahmin family in exchange for spiritual goods.118 For the gift to be 
meritorious it is paramount that that the family receives no payment for the girl.119 
Brahmins occupied the highest rung in traditional Hindu society, above the so-called 
varṇas of warriors (kṣatriya), farmers (vaiśya), serfs (śūdra) and ‘untouchables’.120 The 
Brahmin caste was privileged, enjoyed legal immunity and thanks to its high state of 
purity was invested with religious authority. Brahmins are the Hindu priests par 
excellence.121 In a non-Brahmanical hypergamous marriage the motives are the same, 
only does the lower family not give up a daughter for spiritual benefits, but for a similar 
reason, namely the prestige of being affiliated to the higher status family of the groom. 
The hierarchical relations established (or indeed reaffirmed) by marriages were 
maintained over time and often accompanied by additional obligations in gift-giving 
and ceremonial matters that were transmitted to succeeding generations, ideally 
perpetuating this one-way traffic.122 Communities were very cautious never to inverse 
and never to breach a certain direction of intermarriage. 
It has been demonstrated that communities practicing hypergamy display more 
fundamental traits than simply the acknowledgement of the wife-takers’ superior status 
over wife-givers. As a rule, the hypergamous system exists in communities that do not 
proclaim preferential marriages with specific relatives, in Indian frequently the cross-
                                                
116 Dumont 1970, translated from the original 1966 French edition, Homo Hierarchicus: Le Système des 
Castes et ses Implications. Note, however, that this work has been rightly criticised for giving an overtly 
static, idealised, and in a certain sense very Brahmanical account of India’s caste system, cf. 
Heesterman 1985, Inden 1990, and Dirks 2001. See Quigley 1993: 21-53 for a concise overview of 
Dumont’s reconstruction of the caste system and its critique. 
117  As opposed to hypogamy where the wife’s family is generally of superior status vis-à-vis the 
husband’s (see below). 
118 Dumont 1970: 117. 
119 Dumont 1970: 117. 
120 Dumont 1970: 66-75, Flood 1996: 58-61. 
121 Fuller 1984. 
122 Dumont 1970: 122-123. 
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cousin. Additional characteristics of this system are a transitive hierarchy and a non-
reciprocal structure (see Ch.1.4.).123 More contemporary examples of communities that 
practice hypergamy can be found in various parts of India e.g. Kashmir, Gujarat and 
Kerala.124 
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that hypergamy is only one of 
several hierarchical marriage systems. Another model, found for example in the Gilyak 
society in eastern Russia125 or the Kachin people in highland Burma,126 is the so-called 
‘reversed hypergamy’ or hypogamy. In this system it is the wife-giver that is perceived 
as superior to the wife-taker.127 This system too involves a distinct set of underlying 
implications. Hence, the hypogamous model occurs with preferential marriage 
ideologies, an intransitive hierarchy and a marriage alliance that is at least indirectly 
reciprocal.128 A marriage system that is non-hierarchical is usually called isogamous. 
Communities that adhere to this model require that marriage alliances be arranged 
between parties of equal status and rank.129  
One has to bear in mind that the characteristics associated with these systems are of 
course idealised and prone to a higher degree of variability and complexity in practice. 
An extreme example is found in Mamboru, in eastern Indonesia, where both marriage 
systems (hypogamy and hypergamy) co-exist in the same society.130 Nonetheless, these 
ideal types function as frames of reference, which can help us to detect the presence of 
such marriage systems in a community like the ancient one we are investigating right 
now. 
 
1.3. Visualising the marriage network  
After having established that the priestly families from Borsippa engaged in sacerdotal 
endogamy based on a simple quantitative survey, and having discussed relevant theories 
                                                
123 Parkin 1990: 473-475. 
124 Pocock 1954, Gough 1961, Pocock 1972, Madan 1975, Fuller 1976, Parry 1979. Cf. Goody 1990: 214-
219 and Quigley 1993: 87-101 for a brief overview of hypergamy in India. 
125 Black 1972. 
126 Leach 1954. 
127 See also Sprenger 2010, for a study on the ritual superiority of wife-givers among the Rmeet (Lamet) 
up-landers in northern Laos. 
128 Parkin 1990: 475-477. 
129 Dumont 1970: 116, Quigley 1993: 101-111. 
130 Needham 1987, Parkin 1990: 478. 
C H A P T E R  1  
 38  
on marriage and kinship, the analysis of the 81 marriage alliances from Borsippa should 
now be addressed. While the number of marriages is relatively modest, for the purpose 
of further analysis it is already too large to be conveniently represented in a list or table. 
Hence, in order to lay bare more fundamental dynamics of marriage in Borsippa and 
examine how these fit in with the insights gained from the anthropological literature, it 
is necessary to find a way to structure the data more efficiently. Social network analysis 
is a helpful tool to plot the alliances conjointly and reassemble them into an interlocking 
marriage system. Before I will convert the data into a graph, a short introduction of 
social network analysis is in order.    
 Social network analysis (SNA) uses, in broad terms, a combination of mathematics 
and social sciences to examine relations and structures in a quantifying manner. 
Launched in the 1960s it has proven to be one of the most rapidly growing academic 
sub-disciplines, equipped with its own terminology, handbooks and technical 
toolbox. 131  SNA has been applied in numerous studies covering subjects from 
occupational mobility, diffusion and adoption of innovations, exchange and power, 
belief systems, spreading patterns of contagious diseases, computer viruses, trade, 
happiness, friendship, emotional contagion and telecommunications to ancient 
societies.132  
SNA was initially used to examine contemporary social phenomena. From there it 
slowly made its way into historical investigations. A pioneering study in this respect is 
Padgett & Ansell 1993, in which the authors successfully apply SNA to examine 
political mobilisation in fifteenth century Florence. 133  In her study of the personal 
network of Theophylact, an influential archbishop in Byzantine Bulgaria, Mullett 1997 
showed that it could equally be used for ancient societies. Another, more exhaustive 
application of SNA on the ancient world, in this case Byzantine Egypt, can be found in 
Ruffinni 2008. Finally, the introduction of SNA in cuneiform studies is owed to 
Waerzeggers 2014b.134 In this article she describes how it could be applied to the first 
                                                
131 Scott 1991: 7-37. 
132 For a selection of studies that approached the subject from an SNA perspective, see Wasserman & 
Faust 1994: 5f. 
133 Other earlier examples are Rosenthal et al. 1985 and Carpenter 1994. 
134 Note that Schloen 2001 uses the concept of networks (without applying actual network analysis) 
throughout his study. 
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millennium cuneiform data and outlines its potentials for improving our understanding 
of Babylonian society.135 
SNA attempts to study the relations between actors in a given context. The web that 
connects all these actors via their interrelationship forms the network. One of the basic 
aims of SNA, which is also one of its greatest assets, is to depict social networks 
comprehensibly as a matrix, sociogram or graph. The simplified structure can then be 
investigated as to how it governed and influenced the actors that make up the network. 
The illustrative power of SNA proves to be adequate enough for our purpose, and 
besides plotting the marriage network as a 2D representation, only a limited number of 
theoretical concepts from SNA will be applied in this study.136 
 
 
 Figure 4: simple graph 
The principles used in the visualisation of networks, i.e. graphs, are straightforward. 
Networks are made up of actors represented by nodes (also called vertices), and their 
interrelationships are represented by lines (or edges); this results in simple 2D 
representations like Fig. 4, above.  Let us now turn to the data from Borsippa. Rather 
than taking the individual brides and grooms as actors, which would result in a densely 
populated and exceedingly tangled web, I will follow the methodology applied by 
Padgett & Ansell 1993 and take the various Borsippean families as actors. The 
individual families or clans thus serve as principle object of analysis. The marriage 
alliances represent the interconnecting lines between the clan of the husband and the 
clan of the wife. This results in the graph depicted in Fig. 5 (below): 
                                                
135 See also Wagner et al. 2013 in which a quantitative network analysis is used to reconstruct the 
chronology and textual clusters in cuneiform archives. 
136  See Scott 1991, Wasserman & Faust 1994, Newman 2010, and Prell 2012 for comprehensive 
handbooks of SNA; the application of SNA in social-anthropology can be found in Hage & Harary 
1983. The following remarks can be found in these works. The following networks have been visualised 
using the freeware program NodeXL (http://nodexl.codeplex.com) on a PC platform.  
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It is important to realise that this alliance network depicts the accumulation of the 81 
marriages of the priestly families from Borsippa. Since these were arranged over a 
period of more than 100 years, the network does not capture one particular moment in 
time.137 Instead, in this network the assemblage of all the marriages during the long 
sixth century have been collapsed, so that it depicts the culmination of the alliance 
system until 484 BCE, when the documentation breaks off. It does therefore not present 
any historical development and the network can be characterised as diachronically ‘flat’. 
 
While this is an obvious downside, it should be noted that a diachronic examination 
is fruitless. The available evidence on marriage alliances grows in conjunction with the 
Borsippa corpus, which, like the Neo-Babylonian corpus in general, is ‘top-heavy’ i.e. it 
accumulates towards the end of the period.138 Hence, while the evidence from before the 
reign of Nabonidus (until ca. 555 BCE) accounts for less than a dozen marriages, more 
                                                
137 The earliest securely datable union was arranged before 590 BCE (EAH 203, Nbk 14); the latest 
marriage may have been arranged as late as 485 BCE (BM 29021, Xer 01). 
138 Jursa 2005: 1ff. 
  
Figure 5: Borsippa marriage network (undirected) 
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than half appears during for the reign of Darius I (521-486 BCE). I was not able to find 
any evidence indicating that the marriage system in Borsippa was profoundly affected 
by any historical event of the time; quite the contrary, it was robust and altogether static 
(see, e.g. Ch.1.4.).139 
Returning to the network proper, it may appear rather messy at first glance. Yet, 
upon closer scrutiny several patterns can be observed. One can see, for example, that the 
Ilia family is well embedded and takes up a central position in this network.140 On the 
other hand, the Rēʾi-alpi and Ea-ilūtu-bani families – which both occupy edge positions 
in the temple hierarchy – form a kind of bridge, connecting a range of clans to the rest 
of the network. Moreover, the graph shows that by the early fifth century all the 
participating families were indirectly related by marriage. This highlights the great 
cohesion between the priestly families and demonstrates that the degree of endogamy 
was extremely high. 
So far, I have depicted the network as an undirected dichotomous graph. This means 
that a certain tie between two actors is binary: either it is present or not. However, many 
social relations are directional, i.e. directed from one actor to another but not necessarily 
the other way around. The classical example concerns friendship.141 When asked to 
name three friends one might name X, Y, and Z. However, when in turn they are asked 
the same question the affection is not necessarily reciprocated. In networks representing 
friendship patterns, ties are therefore usually directional and a graph consisting of these 
directional ties is called a directed graph, or short digraph. It is the convention in such 
networks to use arrows to indicate the orientation from the sender to the receiver of a 
given relation. I will show that in Borsippa the relationship between the family of the 
wife and the family of the husband, which in accordance with the earlier reviewed 
theories will be labelled ‘wife-giver’ and ‘wife-taker’ respectively, was also a 
directional one. In Fig. 6 (next page), I have converted the undirected graph of Fig. 5 
into a digraph. The arrows indicate the movement of the bride in a given marriage.  
                                                
139 While the marriage of Neriglissar’s daughter with the šatammu of Ezida may have temporarily upset 
the alliance system and its internal hierarchy, the consequences seem to have affected only the family of 
the groom and not the marriage circuit in general (see, pp. 64-65).  
140 Note, however, that this is a direct result of the generous amount of data on the marriage alliances of 
the Ilia clan, found especially in the Ilia (A) archive. It remains to be seen whether this family would 
assume a similar position in case we had the complete marriage system. 
141 E.g. Wasserman & Faust 1994: 121ff., Prell 2012: 10-11. 
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1.4. Wife-givers & wife-takers in Borsippa 
Having defined the components of the network and applied the necessary concepts, this 
section presents a close analysis of the digraph in Fig. 6. In particular, I will explore 
what the abstract features of this network can tell us about the nature of the marriage 
system in the priestly community of Borsippa. 
Relative Hierarchy. The most striking feature of this network is that in the 81 
marriage alliances found over a period of 140 years, or roughly five generations, the 
direction of intermarriage was never reversed. In other words, once family A received a 
wife from family B, family A never returned a wife to B; their roles as so-called wife-
giver and wife-taker vis-à-vis each other were never violated once established. Marriage 
alliance in Borsippa was thus strictly asymmetrical or unilateral. It has been suggested 
that in societies in which brides move in one direction only, there is a possibility that a 
relative status difference arises between the two alliance partners.142 There are two 
possibilities; either the wife-giver is inferior in status to his wife-taker, or vice versa. 
The following evidence suggests that in the case of Borsippa it was the wife-taker who 
assumed the superior position.  
The first argument can be inferred from the asymmetrical character of Neo-
Babylonian marriage agreements. It was the custom in Babylonia that the bride was 
transferred to the household of the groom upon marriage.143 Marriage was therefore 
patrilocal, i.e. located at the husband’s residence. In addition to a bride, the household 
of the husband also received a dowry (nudunnû). It was the absolute rule that the bride’s 
family made some kind of wealth available, however modest. Bridewealth, a 
(compensatory) payment made by the groom to the family of the bride – a custom well-
known from the earlier Old-Babylonian period and still common in some parts of the 
globe144 – is only very rarely attested in the Neo-Babylonian period, if at all.145 Among 
                                                
142 Parkin 1990: 347ff. and above Ch. 1.2 
143 Or his father, depending on whether or not the husband had been emancipated from his father’s 
potestas, Oelsner, Wells & Wunsch 2003: 938-944. Cf. Wunsch 2003. 
144 The use of bridewealth, previously known also as bride-price, has been studies most extensively for 
the African continent, cf. classical studies such as Evans-Pritchard 1951, Goody & Tambiah 1973, and 
Kuper 1982. The custom is however not restricted to this part of the world. See Goody 1990 for a work 
that addresses this and other marriage phenomena across time and space. For bridewealth in the Old-
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the more than fifty marriage agreements from first millennium Babylonia one can only 
find very few references to payments or gifts made by a groom to the family of his 
bride.146 However these cases confirm rather than contradict the rule. The first three 
instances of such payments refer to it as biblu, ‘(marriage) gift’. This term is found in a 
dowry receipt from the Ṣāhit-ginê family from Sippar, dated to the early reign of Darius 
I,147 and then resurfaces in two rather exceptional marriage agreements from fourth 
century Susa, the Persian royal court in Elam, involving Egyptians couples.148 These 
biblus consisted of silver and/or jewellery, and were transferred to the agent of the 
bride. Yet, at least two of these texts149 clarify that this payment did not remain with the 
family of the bride but was transferred to her (and her husband) upon marriage, together 
with the dowry. The biblu does therefore not qualify as bridewealth. Rather, it should be 
seen as a personal endowment to the bride and her new household, and represents a 
marriage gift that is referred to as ‘indirect dowry’ in anthropology.150 Lastly, it is not 
impossible that the presentation of the biblu, perhaps as betrothal gift, was part of a 
marriage celebration, in which case these endowments could have had a distinct 
symbolic character. This may also have been the case in the marriage contract of 
fNanāya-kānat, written in the Judean settlement of Āl-Yahūdu, and published by K. 
Abraham 2005/2006. The text states that her husband will cover his mother-in-law with 
a garment worth of five shekels of silver (ll. 19-22). While this gesture is found in only 
one other marriage agreement – the lack of family names and the absence of a dowry, 
allows us to situate this alliance among the lower stratum of Sippar’s community – it is 
                                                                                                                                          
Babylonian marriage, see Westbrook 1988: 101f. An extensive study of marriage practices, and in 
particular the use of marriage gifts, in ancient Palestine can be found in Lemos 2010. 
145 Waerzeggers 2001. 
146 See Roth 1989 for a study of Babylonian marriage agreements. 
147 BM 64195+ has been published in Waerzeggers 2001. See for a full edition and study of the Ṣāhit-ginê 
family archive Waerzeggers 2014. 
148 TEBR 93/94 and TEBR 78a edited by Joannès 1984: 71ff., and re-edited by Roth 1989 no. 34 and no. 
35 respectively. Cf. the discussion of these contracts by Abraham 1992, Waerzeggers 2001, and 
Abraham 2005/2006: 204. See Joannès 1990c for two further texts concerning the Egyptian community 
of Susa. 
149 Unfortunately, the critical passage in TEBR 78a is broken. 
150 The term was first coined by J. Goody in Goody & Tambiah 1973: 2, and refers to a marriage gift 
presented by the (family of the) groom to the bride, or her agent who subsequently returns it to her as 
part of, or, as supplement to her dowry. See also Lemos 2010 for a survey of this practice in Ancient 
Near Eastern marriage.   
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occasionally found in other legal transaction such as adoptions and house sales.151 
Abraham offers two interpretations. Based on the endowment of garments in other legal 
contexts, she suggests that the provision in fNanāya-kānat’s marriage contract may 
signify ‘a symbolic act whose purpose was to motive the bride’s mother to relinquish 
the rights over her daughter’.152 Alternatively, the garment might have functioned as 
indirect dowry (similar to the biblu), which was only presented to the bride upon 
marriage. This interpretation may be supported by the fact that the garment is referred to 
as the ‘ZI-IN-DI’ of fNanāya-kānat (l. 21). While its exact meaning escapes us, 
Abraham’s different interpretations of the term all imply that the gift was ultimately 
destined for the bride.153   
A final text that should be mentioned here is Nbk 101 – the marriage contract of 
Dāgil-ilī and fLā-tubāšinni. 154  It is said that the latter’s mother, who came from 
established Babylonian descent, received a slave, worth 30 shekels of silver, and an 
additional 30 shekels as compensation (kūm) for her daughter. This time there are no 
allusions that the gift was destined for the bride upon marriage. While it therefore 
appears that Dāgil-ilī offered bridewealth to his mother-in-law, C. Wunsch has come up 
with a different solution (2003/2004: 189). Placing this contract in its archival context, 
she showed that we are not dealing with a genuine marriage agreement as much as a 
‘Quasi-Verkauf zur Sklavin’. 155  fLā-tubāšinni was an adoptive daughter who was 
supposed to take care of her mother in old age. By offering a slave and silver (worth a 
total of 1 mina of silver), Dāgil-ilī not only bought out fLā-tubāšinni, 156  but also 
provisioned his mother-in-law with sufficient funds and manpower to see to her 
maintenance in future years. Moreover, the fact that some thirty years later fLā-tubāšinni 
went to court to contest the (unfree) status of her children, suggests that by the time of 
her marriage she was considered unfree herself.157 
                                                
151  The marriage agreement BM 59584 has been published by Wunsch 2003: no. 1. For the act of 
presenting a garment in other legal contexts see, e.g. Wunsch 2003: 9f., Abraham 2005/2006: 204. 
152 Abraham 2005/2006: 204. 
153 Abraham 2005/2006: 205. 
154 Edited both by Roth 1989: no. 4 and Wunsch 1997/1998: no. 1. 
155 Wunsch 2003/2004: 189. 
156 Note that according to BM 61737, 1 mina of silver is exactly the amount an adoptive daughter needs to 
pay when leaving her mother, see Wunsch 2003/2004: no. 8. 
157 For a discussion and edition of fLā-tubāšinni’s court case, see Wunsch 1997/1998: 62-67, 75-77. 
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To sum up, even though marriage gifts presented by the groom to the family of the 
bride, and perhaps even genuine bridewealth, were not unknown among Babylonia’s 
lower strata and foreign minorities, it seems to have played no part at all in Babylonian 
priestly or elite marriages. In these social circles marriage was fully asymmetric and 
only knew a one-directional transfer of brides and property in the form of a dowry, to 
the household of the groom.158  
The second and more important argument concerns the (temple) status of marriage 
partners. If one compares the status of intermarrying families with the religious 
hierarchy of the temple, an interesting pattern emerges. From the 81 marriages 
incorporated in this study, it transpires that priestly families of lower rank often 
provided brides to families affiliated to more senior priesthoods. Hence, daughters of 
the oxherd family married sons from barber and temple-enterer families, 159  while 
prebendary bakers and butchers provided wives to families belonging to the ranks of 
brewers and temple-enterers.160 The same pattern prevails in marriages with families 
outside of the prebendary circle; non-priestly clans usually acted as wife-givers of 
priestly ones: e.g. the Nūr-Papuskkals (temple-enterer) married a daughter from the 
Barihi clan, the Bēliya’u (baker) family received a bride from the Ṣillāyas, and a man 
from the Atkuppu (reed-worker) family married a woman from the Adad-nāṣir clan.161 
All this points to a tendency among the well-born women of Borsippean to marry men 
of higher (temple) status. However, I showed at the beginning of this chapter that there 
are many alliances between families with the same professional affiliation (43%). This 
happened, for example, within the ranks of bakers (e.g. Bēliyaʾu ∞ Esagil-mansum), 
brewers (e.g. Ilia ∞ Ilšu-abūšu) and temple-enterers (e.g. Arkāt-ilāni-damqā ∞ Iddin-
Papsukkal). While this is at odds with what has been observed so far, taking a closer 
look at the families concerned and examining their role in the temple (and civic) 
                                                
158 Note that the use of dowry has been associated with societies that knew a high levels of stratifications, 
while bridewealth is often found in societies with minimal social stratifications, according to the 
ethnographic record, cf. Goody & Tambiah 1973, Goody 1990, Lemos 2010. 
159 E.g. the Rē’i-alpi family provided wives to the Gallābu (barber), Kudurrānu (brewer), and Arkāt-ilāni-
damqā (temple-enterer) families, see Appendix 1.5b. 
160 E.g. both the Ibnāya (butcher) and Kidin-Sîn (baker) families gave daughters in marriage to Kidin-
Nanāya (temple-enterer), see Appendix 1.1b. The Ilias (brewers) received a wife from the Esagil-
mansum family (baker), see Appendix 1.2b. 
161 Nūr-Papsukkal ∞ Barihi (Appendix 1.1c), Bēliyaʾu ∞ Ṣillāya (Appendix 1.3c), Atkuppu ∞ Adad-nāṣir 
(Appendix 1.6). Other instances include  
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institution(s) reveals that this distinct marriage pattern was usually maintained in one 
way or another. Hence, the Bēliya’u family held the prestigious position of overseer 
(šāpiru) of the bakers, while the Esagil-mansums remained of subsidiary importance in 
this line of work.162 Whereas no less than four city governors (šākin-ṭēmi) and four chief 
temple administrators (šatammu) had risen from the ranks of the Ilia clan, the Ilšu-abūšu 
family had only occupied the post of royal commissioner (qīpu) once.163 A similar story 
holds true for the last marriage partners: with no less than seven city governors – 
including an alliance with the royal family of Neriglissar, and five temple-enterers – the 
Arkāt-ilāni-damqā family can be identified as the ranking marriage partner compared to 
the Iddin-Papsukkals, who could only boast one city governor and one chief temple 
administrator during the long sixth century.164 It is thus possible to conclude that in the 
marriage system of Borsippa lower status brides married higher status grooms. In other 
words, wife-givers were of lower status vis-à-vis their wife-takers. The status difference 
between marriage partners conforms to the purity-based hierarchy of the temple, which 
served as guiding principle in this local alliance system. While these assertions apply to 
most parts of the network, there are some notable exceptions to the rule. Hence, one can 
find various marriages between lower status men and higher status women, as well as 
alliances between families of seemingly identical (temple) status.165 
The third (and much shorter) argument pointing to a status difference between wife-
giver and wife-taker involves what might be called the reiteration of hierarchy. We have 
just seen that once a certain hierarchy was established between a wife-giver and wife-
taker family this was never violated. However, there is evidence that some families 
repeated the marriage alliances in succeeding generations, thus reaffirming the status 
difference over a longer period of time.166  
And finally, there is also evidence from outside the realm of marriage proper that 
testifies to the wife-givers’ subordinate status in Borsippa. Following several well-
                                                
162 See Ch. 0.7.3, above.  
163 Waerzeggers 2010: 65ff. The qīpu from the Ilšu-abūšu family is mentioned in two texts: VS 6 155 
(Dar 29), and TEBR 80 (Dar x). It should be noted that, while the qīpu did enjoy a great authority in the 
temple as royal representative, he stood outside of the priesthood and did not enjoy religious authority, 
see Bongenaar 1997: 34ff. and Kleber 2008: 26-27.  
164 Waerzeggers 2010: 65ff. 
165 These inconsistencies in the marriage system will be dealt with below.  
166 Ea-ilūtu-bani ∞ Ilī-bāni 3x (Appendix 1.1a) and Ilia ∞ Ilšu-abūšu 4x (Appendix 1.2a). 
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documented cases, it appears that the family of the wife-giver took up a supporting, 
perhaps even subservient role in the temple service of the clan to which it had given a 
bride.167 Moreover, this dynamic also affected the patterns of tenancy among some 
prebendary groups (Ch.2.3.3). 
The features of the network observed so far would suggest that we are dealing with a 
hypergamous marriage system. In its ideal form, however, this system dictates that 
individuals, families or groups giving brides are inferior to those receiving them, i.e. 
women have to marry up. Since this is not always the case in our data we cannot speak 
of a strict form of hypergamy in Borsippa. We shall return to this matter later in this 
section. 
Transitivity. While reciprocity was the key to Lévi-Strauss’ alliance theory, scholars 
have shown that some communities adhere to marriage systems of a fundamentally non-
reciprocal nature – and so did the Borsippean priesthood.168 I have already explained 
that the marriage settlement itself was asymmetric, and that there were no cases of 
direct reciprocity between two intermarried families, i.e. wife-exchange. However, the 
network carries a more fundamental quality. If we take a closer look at the network, 
pick a random family as starting point and follow the chains of alliances as indicated by 
the arrows, we will soon realise that not one single chain goes back to its starting point. 
Hence, cycles – also referred to as close loops or walks – are completely absent. In 
keeping with social network analysis we can describe this network as acyclic.169 This 
implies that the marriage system of our priests was strictly and entirely non-reciprocal. 
This, I will argue, results from the transitive nature of the hierarchy established between 
wife-givers and wife-takers upon marriage.  
                                                
167 The effects of the wife-givers and wife-takers relation on the cultic organisation of the temple will be 
examined in detail in the final part of this section. The phenomenon of rendering services in exchange 
for a bride is called ‘brideservice’ by anthropologists, see Goody 1990: 347ff. The concept of labour in 
return for marriage is not unknown in the Ancient Near East, though usually involves an obligation 
from the side of the husband, i.e. the wife-taker. Examples of this can be found in Genesis 29: 15-30 
where Jacob has to work seven years for each of his two wives, Lea and Rachel. Similarly, I Samuel 
18:25 tells us that Saul promised to give his daughter in marriage to David on the condition that he will 
fight in his army and collect one hundred Philistinian foreskins. It should be noted, however, that 
brideservice was not a common marriage gift in ancient Palestine, see Lemos 2010: 45. 
168 E.g. Parkin 1990, Hage & Harary 1996. 
169 E.g. Hage & Harary 1983: 80ff., Wasserman & Faust 1994: 119, 234-248, Newman 2010: 6.4.2. 
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary a (logical or mathematical) relation is 
described as transitive ‘if [a relation] holds between a first and second item, and also 
between the second and a third, it necessarily holds between the first and the third’. To 
give a basic example, if A is smaller (taller, smarter, faster, etc.) than B, and B is 
smaller than C, then A is automatically smaller than C too.170 I will show that the 
marriage system of the priests was regulated by this concept of transitivity and illustrate 
its impact on the choice of marriage partners by considering a specific alliance cluster, 
involving the Ilī-bāni (‘A’), Ea-ilūtu-bani (‘B’) and Huṣābu (‘C’) families.  
The first marriage in this cluster was arranged between the Huṣābu and Ea-ilūtu-bani 
families;171 since Huṣābu received the bride it became the wife-taker and the superior 
party. In subsequent years the Ea-ilūtu-bani family widened its horizon and started to 
ally with the Ilī-bānis.172 The Ea-ilūtu-bani family secured altogether three wives from 
this clan and their alliance became one of the strongest in our network. As a result, Ilī-
bāni was the wife-giver of Ea-ilūtu-bani, and Ea-ilūtu-bani wife-giver of Huṣābu, which 







In the final marriage of this cluster, which happened some years later, the Huṣābus 
received a bride from the Ilī-bāni family.173 The latter had thereby ‘jumped’ over the 
Ea-ilūtu-banis while abiding by the correct marriage direction up the established 
hierarchy. This example shows that in Borsippa the sense of inferiority was imputed not 
only to direct wife-givers but also to a family’s wife-giver’s wife-givers. In other words, 
the marriage hierarchy was of transitive nature.  
                                                
170 See for the application of this form of transitivity in human society, Hage & Harary 1983: 71ff. and 
Hage & Harary 1996. It should not be confused with the concept of transitivity usually found in SNA 
literature where it refers to the measure of the completeness of relational triads, cf. Wasserman & Faust 
1994: 243ff., Newman 2010: 7.9. 
171 BM 82640 = AH XV no. 45 (534 BCE), see Appendix 1.1b. 
172 TCL 12/13 174 (524 BCE), see Appendix 1.1a. 
173 NBC 8404 (518 BCE), see Appendix 1.1b. 
      A                   B                 C 
Figure 7: relative marriage hierarchy 
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The transitive hierarchy made it impossible, and presumably inappropriate for the 
Huṣābu family to present a bride to the Ilī-bānis, a family of lower marital status, but it 
was possible to receive one, since this did not violate the established hierarchy (see, fig. 
8). The marriage cluster I just discussed is only one example in a network that is in fact 
made up of a number of overlapping acyclic sub-structures; families could be and often 
were involved in several of these chains simultaneously. Note for example the series of 
marriages between: 
Esagil-mansum    Pahhāru   Arkāt-ilāni-damqā    Ilia    
From the latter’s perspective this entire chain of families was excluded as potential 
wife-takers, but not as wife-givers. Hence, the Esagil-mansum family could and 
eventually did ally with the Ilia by giving them a daughter in marriage.174 The Ilia and 
the Esagil-mansum families were also involved as wife-givers in an acyclic marriage 
chain with Bēliyaʾu. 
In conclusion, we can remark that from the viewpoint of the wife-taker it was 
undesirable to give brides to any direct or indirect wife-giver, i.e. to marry against the 
hierarchy. While this is clearly a negative rule, transitivity also had a positive side: 
families were in general free to arrange marriages with any party as long as it was 
oriented up the established hierarchy. A marriage system of this kind unavoidably 
assumes the form of a ladder, yet a ladder in which it was possible to jump over the next 
step as long as it was a higher one. It should be noted that the concept of transitivity is, 
again, one that is usually associated with hypergamous marriage systems in the 
anthropological literature.175 
 
                                                
174 Appendix 1.2b. 
175 Parkin 1990. 
      A                   B                 C 
Figure 8: transitive hierarchy 
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1.5. Hypergamy in historical context 
In the previous paragraphs I demonstrated that the marriage system of wife-givers and 
wife-takers involved status differences and relative hierarchies. Wife-takers took 
precedence over wife-givers but were themselves outranked by their own wife-takers. 
We came across various features that encourage an interpretation of this system as a 
hypergamous marriage system: the superior position of the wife-taker, the asymmetric 
matrimonial flow, a non-reciprocal alliance system and a transitive hierarchy. However, 
while the status difference between wife-givers and wife-takers often conformed to the 
purity-based hierarchy of the temple, not all priestly marriages seem to have followed 
this example. Is there a way to explain these exceptions? 
One of the best-known examples of a hypergamous marriage system is found in the 
Kangra District in northwest India.176 Research has shown that communities in this 
region were (and often still are) strongly divided along caste lines and ranked according 
to a principle of relative purity (or impurity). An important stimulus in this alliance 
system is the desire to give an unsolicited gift – the most prestigious one being the ‘gift 
of a maiden’ (see above, Ch.1.2) – to a spiritual (caste) superior, in order to improve 
one’s own status in the present and the following life as well as that of one’s children. 
As in the marriage system of Borsippa’s priestly community, the hierarchy in this Indian 
society assumes the form of an open-ended ladder. Scholars have, however, not failed to 
note that this ideal hypergamous system entails some serious (demographic) flaws that 
can only be neutralised by a violation of the preferential rules of marriage and its 
hierarchy.177 
It is unavoidable that in a system of obligatory and pervasive hypergamy, in which 
women are obliged to marry up, an excess of ‘unmarriageable’ men forms at the foot of 
the hierarchical ladder and of women at its summit: whom do daughters of the highest 
group marry and where do the sons of the lowest group find their brides? Hypergamy 
gives rise to so-called bottlenecks. In order to neutralise these congestions, communities 
must and have been known to resort to various compromising strategies. Several 
ethnographies show that a breaking down of the endogamous unit by marrying inferior 
women from outside the caste system is often detected among the lower fringes, 
whereas superior groups at the top of the ladder preferred polygamy or resorted to more 
                                                
176 Parry 1979. Cf. Quigley 1993: 87ff. 
177 E.g. Parkin 1990, Goody 1990: 216-127, Quigley 1993: 87-101. 
C H A P T E R  1  
 52  
drastic measures like female infanticide – other examples include prolonged celibacy 
and marriage among equals.178  I will argue that these dynamics of adjustment can 
account for exceptions apparent in the Borsippean marriage network. In order to do this 
we need to take into account the historical context of this community and its alliance 
system. 
Among Ancient Near Eastern historians there is the general idea that the first quarter 
of the first millennium was a formative period for Babylonian society presented in the 
documentation from the long sixth century BCE, the period subject to our study.179 Not 
unlike various long-term economic and social processes – most notably, the widespread 
adoption of family names – also the religious, purity-based hierarchy of the temple 
originated in the centuries prior to our documentation, presumably when families were 
presented with land rights and specific temple functions by various early kings.180 That 
these rights could be renegotiated, reshuffled and reinstalled by royal involvement, is 
exemplified by the reinstallation of the priesthood of the oxherds in the seventh century, 
probably by the Assyrian king Esarhaddon. 181  However, evidence from Borsippa 
suggests that the Ezida temple already knew an elaborate administration and 
organisation, and thus a religious hierarchy during the eighth century BCE.182 It seems 
only reasonable to develop this line of thought and argue that the marriage system 
reconstructed in this chapter was already in place for a considerable amount of time 
prior to our documentation – the network therefore represents a well-developed stage of 
the marriage system. If so, one might think that in the early days the priestly community 
of Borsippa practiced a ‘clean’ form of hypergamy, but before long, the priestly clans 
must have faced the inevitable bottlenecks inherent in the system.  
The unions between temple-enterer women and men from brewer clans represent the 
first series of marriages that contradict the rules of a clean hypergamous marriage model 
                                                
178 Dumont 1970: 118, Parry 1979: 214, 218, 244, Parkin 1990: 475, Goody 1990: 214-219. 
179 E.g. van Driel 2002, Jursa et al. 2010, Nielsen 2011. 
180 E.g. van Driel 2002: 67-75, Paulus 2014: 79ff., Nielsen & Waerzeggers [forthcoming]. 
181 Parpola 1993: no. 353, Waerzeggers 2010: 281-283. King Nebuchadnezzar also praises himself in his 
inscription for having appointed new fishermen for the regular offerings of the god Marduk in Babylon 
(Langdon 1912: Nbk nos. 19, ll. 14-17).   
182 VS 1 36, a mid eight century kudurru, is our primary source on the organisation of the Ezida temple 
and the composition of the priesthoods during that time. It mentions various temple-enterers, a temple 
administrator, a cultic singer, and the overseers of the brewers, bakers and butchers, cf. Thureau-Dangin 
1919, and Paulus 2014: 683-688. 
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in long sixth century.183 Not unlike various high caste families in India, it seems that 
relatively early on the temple-enterers of Borsippa had troubles finding suitable partners 
for their daughters and had to make a concession. The temple-enterers’ reaction was 
apparently to marry their daughters to the group that occupied the rung just below them 
in the temple hierarchy, i.e. the brewers. A seemingly natural consequence of this 
intermarriage was that the relative status of the brewers increased over time.184 The 
positions of the chief temple administrator (šatammu) and city governor (šākin-ṭēmi) 
can be used as status indicators of the families concerned. While in the earlier periods 
these positions were manned solely by temple-enterers, 185  already during the early 
seventh century the position of governor was occupied by a descendant of Ilia, a family 
of brewers pur sang, just like the position of the šatammu in the late seventh century.186 
Not only did the (relative) position of the brewer increase over time, but, by marrying 
their daughters to lower status groups the temple-enterers were in a sense placing 
themselves on the same level – this resulted in a flattening of the top of the hierarchy. 
One might imagine that it changed from Fig. 1 (Ch.0.6., above) into something like the 
‘status ladder’ of Fig. 9 (below).  
 
 
     Figure 9: flattening of social relative hierarchy 
 
                                                
183 Appendix 1.1b. 
184 Note again that Parry 1979: 204ff. observed a very similar dynamic among the highest Rajput castes in 
the Kangra region.  
185 Waerzeggers 2010: 66-73. 
186 Frame 1984. 
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That this dynamic did not only affect the position of the brewers but also of the 
butchers and perhaps the bakers can be deduced from the fact that in the sixth century 
the position of city governor was temporarily in the hands of Ibnāya, a prominent 
butchers family.187 It goes without saying that this marital counter-measure clearly had 
more profound ramifications in the community. 
More extreme examples of inverse hierarchical marriages, like the union between the 
relatively low ranking oxherds and temple-enterers or brewers, can be explained by 
considering the position of the families in question. Hence, while the latter were 
ideologically of superior status, the specific families who acted as wife-givers seem not 
to have had a very strong tradition in Borsippa or had lost their standing in society and 
their influence in the temple organisation. For instance, by the time they allied with the 
Oxherds, the Arad-Ea (temple-enterer) and the Ardūtu (brewer) families were no more 
than minor clans of peripheral status in Borsippa’s priestly community.188 
Another trend that might reflect an adjustment of the ideal hypergamous system 
involves intra-prebendary marriages. I have said at the beginning of this chapter that 
most marriages (43%) were arranged within the professional prebendary group. While 
these speak against a strict hypergamous model, I was able to show that a relative 
hierarchy was still maintained in marriage alliances, at least judging from a number of 
well-attested cases.189 However, the status difference between wife-givers and wife-
takers is certainly not always clear-cut. Again, I believe that Indian caste society can 
help us come to grips with this state of affairs. Traditional Indian society was 
theoretically and on a scriptural level hierarchised according to four varṇas, but reality 
has revealed that communities were (and often still are) hierarchised in castes (jāti), 
sub-castes, sub-sub-castes etc.190 Perhaps one should envisage a similar reality for the 
Borsippean priestly community. While on an ideological level it was hierarchised 
according to professional groups and their relative status of purity in the temple, 
                                                
187 Zadok 2005a: 638, Waerzeggers 2010: 68. 
188  Appendix 1.5b. Note that while a member of the Arad-Ea family occupied the post of royal 
commissioner (qīpu) of the Esagil temple in Babylon around Dar 29 (VS 6 155), and another member 
had been appointed as gugallu-official of Borsippa around the same time (VS 6 160), the family had 
married their daughter to the Rē’i-alpis at least three decades earlier. Moreover, this family is only very 
rarely attested in the Borsippa corpus.  
189 See Ch. 1.4. 
190 E.g. Flood 1996: 58ff. 
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hierarchy permeated the individual priesthoods too, pinning every prebendary group, 
clan and if necessary even individual lineage on its place on the ladder. Indeed, if the 
status difference between two clans from the same prebendary group was not clear, it 
seems to have been the marital union itself that triggered the relative status, and thus 
established a hierarchy between wife-giver and wife-taker. This will be further 
explained in the final section of this chapter. 
An alternative explanation of the widespread intra-prebendary marriages could be 
that it constituted a sort of collective policy. Marrying a higher-ranking family did not 
only determine one’s own status but also that of the professional group at large. While 
marriage within the prebendary group presumably increased the stratification of the 
internal hierarchy, it left the status of the group with regard to others untouched. The 
same applies to marriages within the clan, be it on an even lower level.191 This strategy 
in a sense stabilised the overall hierarchy. It might not be a coincidence that we find a 
repetition of intra-prebendary marriage alliance precisely among temple-enterers and 
brewers, the two highest prebendary groups.  
A final strategy that may have been introduced to alleviate the constraints of the 
hypergamous model was intermarriage with outsiders. While this can be observed 
throughout the prebendary group,192 it is perhaps most distinctive among the lower 
ranking priesthoods. Hence, the only family known to have given a wife to the Reed-
workers is the Adad-nāṣir family, a clan with no priestly affiliation. At least three of the 
marriage partners of the Rē’i-alpi family can be designated as outsiders: whereas the 
Šarrahu and the fMaqartu families lacked a temple background, the Rišāya family is so 
far only attested as priests in the neighbouring town of Dilbat – the latter may therefore 
also have been outsiders in a real geographical sense. 193  While the evidence is 
admittedly limited, it might indicate that there was a (greater) tendency among lower-
fringe families to welcome outsiders into the alliance system. This is supported by the 
ethnographic record from India, were a similar dynamic is found especially among 
lower-caste families.194 
                                                
191 Endogamous alliances within the kin-group are attested for the Banê-ša-ilia (VS 4 150), Basia (BM 
21975), Ibnāya (VS 4 176), Ilia (BM 26544), Ilī-bāni (e.g. TuM 2/3 1), Kidin-Sin (e.g. BM 94697), Lā-
kuppuru (BM 29385), and Nanāhu (e.g. VS 6 95) families. 
192 Appendix 1. 
193 For the Rišāya family from Dilbat, see Appendix 1.2c. 
194 See Ch. 1.2, above. 
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In the end, if we take into account the fact that status differences existed not only 
between prebendary groups but also within, then the overall ratio of hypergamous 
marriages vs. contra-hypergamous marriages is ca. 70% to 30%. Hence, the marriage 
pattern I have reconstructed for Neo-Babylonian Borsippa seems to have developed out 
of a traditional hypergamous alliance system, of which the basic outlines are still 
visible. One should also remember that the alliance system represents an organic entity 
that was maintained during the (of-times turbulent) centuries of the first millennium 
BCE. The repeated wars, political alliances and dynastic changes on the one hand and 
the later economic growth on the other, must all have had their effect on the established 
social hierarchy more than once. Moreover, the prosperous times of the Neo-Babylonian 
Empire created ample possibilities for the entrepreneurial (middle) strata of society to 
rise in status,195 while every change of leadership meant the potential end of a clan’s 
leading position.196 Finally, adherence to the hypergamy ideal depended also on local 
demography. Not everyone could hope to marry off his or her daughter in this way, and 
it might at times have been difficult to find a suitable wife-taker or wife-giver in the 
immediate vicinity. No system could have persisted throughout the first millennium 
without adaptation and in this light it is all the more remarkable that the hypergamous 
model is still very much intact in the Borsippean temple community of the long sixth 
century.  
 
1.6. Wife-givers & wife-takers in the cult 
While the temple hierarchy influenced the dynamics of marriage within the community, 
serving as an important guiding principle in the alliance system, I already hinted that the 
relative hierarchy between wife-givers and wife-takers also had consequences for the 
organisation and execution of the temple service.  
The usual practice concerning the temple service was that the priest who had certain 
duties in the liturgy performed this himself. In the case of the purveying priesthoods, the 
temple service included a preparatory assignment like brewing or baking, as well as 
participation in the daily sacrificial ceremonies performed in more holy spaces near to 
the cellae of the gods. 197  However, a priest had the possibility to discharge the 
obligations resting on his prebend, and was forced to do so in case of sickness and other 
                                                
195 Beaulieu 2000. 
196 See pp. 64-65, below. Cf. Jursa 2007. 
197 Waerzeggers 2010. 
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physical or mental impairments that made him unsuitable to perform his temple 
service.198 For this purpose priests could lease parts or the entirety of their prebend to 
deputies in exchange of a fixed rent.199 This employment was regulated with a legal 
contract whose formulary could be easily adapted to specific circumstances and 
needs.200 A recurring characteristic in these contracts is the use of the expression ana 
ēpišānūtu, literally ‘for the performance of’, and I will therefore speak of ‘performance 
contracts’.201  
Assyriologists have often approached these performance contracts from a purely 
economical perspective. Deputies are perceived as entrepreneurs who welcomed the 
opportunity to assist in the temple service in return for an additional source of income, 
while priests are characterised as prebend owners who had little interest in performing 
the cultic task themselves.202 However, it has been argued recently by C. Waerzeggers 
that cultic collaboration was not governed by opportunistic economic behaviour (2010: 
180-185). By taking a closer look at the social profile of those involved in the temple 
service of the brewers of the Ezida temple, she showed that deputies were 
predominantly recruited from within the group of prebendary brewers; participation of 
outsiders was restricted to peripheral and menial tasks.203 Hence, collaboration was 
largely based on professional affiliation. However, in the following I will show that the 
specific dynamics of cultic organisation were also influenced by existing marriage 
alliance. It is in the context of these performance contracts that we can detect the effects 
that marriage had on the organisation of the temple. In order to do this I will examine 
several pairs of families for which we are particularly well informed in terms of both 
their marriage alliances and their collaboration in the cult.  
                                                
198 Waerzeggers 2010: 291f. 
199 Jursa 1999: 44-52, van Driel 2002: 138-140, Waerzeggers 2010: 173-185. 
200 Jursa 2005: 34-35, Waerzeggers 2010: 176f. 
201  Note that the term ēpišānūtu is not found in all service contracts. Internal information in these 
contracts on for example the required duties and fixed terms reveal however their true nature as 
performance contracts, ēpišānūtu contracts. Cf. van Driel 2002: 135-140 and Waerzeggers 2010: 173-
185 for examples of formulaic variations. Performance contracts among the oxherds of Ezida usually 
refer to manzaltu izuzzu, ‘to stand service’, see Waerzeggers 2010: 191f. 
202 E.g. San Nicolò & Ungnad 1929: 495, McEwan 1981: 106-109, MacGinnis 1991: 76-78, Jursa 1999: 
45, van Driel 2002: 138 and Jursa 2011: 163-164. 
203 For a similar observation, see Kessler 1991: 62, writing that ‘Die Berechtigung zur Durchführung der 
Dienstschichten scheint … einen kleinen Kreis privilegierten Personen übertragen gewesen sein’.  
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The first case concerns the arrangements between the Ilia and Kudurrānu families, 
both prominent members of the brewers of Ezida. Taking a look at their history as 
collaborators in the cult it seems that from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II (604-562 
BCE) until 509 BCE the Ilia family always called upon the Kudurrānus for support in 
the temple service.204 This relationship however suddenly reversed in 507 BCE. From 
that moment, until the end of the documentation, the Ilias always performed the temple 
service of members from the Kudurrānu family.205 An explanation for this change can 
be found once the performance contracts and their marriage alliance are placed side by 
side (see, fig. 10).  
 
 
This swapping of roles coincided with a marriage between the Ilia family (wife-
giver) and Kudurrānu family (wife-taker), arranged in the reign of Darius (521-486 
BCE).206 While its precise date is unknown, a hint is provided by a contract dated to 512 
                                                
204 Jakob-Rost 1985 (between 604-562 BCE), BM 94738 = AH XV no. 11 (540 BCE), BM 94791 = AH 
XV no. 12 (between 555-529 BCE) and BM 94984 (509 BCE). 
205 BM 95187 = AH XV no. 32 (506 BCE), Berens 106 (after 506 BCE), BM 82804 (503 BCE), BM 
17695 = AH XV no. 38 (500 BCE), BM 26758 = AH XV no. 39 (499 BCE) and BM 94699 = AH XV 
no. 43 (between 506-486 BCE).  
206 Appendix 1.2a. 
 
Figure 10:  marriage ties vs. temple service (1) 
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BCE which records the sale of two slaves between the father of the bride and his 
(future?) son-in-law.207 Slaves were common dowry components and it could therefore 
be argued that the marriage took place in that same year. The Ilia family would then 
have assumed the role of wife-giver in 512 BCE; yet, the Kudurrānus only gave up their 
role as deputy in the temple service after 509 BCE, suggesting that they performed the 
temple service of their (inferior) wife-giver for three years or so. On the other hand it 
should be noted that the sales contracts make no mention of the bride. This business 
affair might, for all we know, have been an early business encounter that eventually led 
to an alliance between these families. Moreover, performance contracts were legally 
binding contracts that bound the parties sometimes for a period of several years – one 
could not simply withdraw from this commitment. Some time could thus have elapsed 
before the role of wife-giver was mirrored in the performance contracts.  
This is not the only case where a marriage prompted a family of brewers to perform 
the temple service of its wife-taker (fig. 11, below). It has been said earlier that the Ilia 
and Ilšu-abūšu clans engaged in repeated marriage alliances.208 The first union was 
arranged in the early years of Nabonidus (555-539 BCE). The daughter from the Ilšu-
abūšu family is mentioned in the Ilia archive in 554 BCE, probably in relation to a field 
or house belonging to her dowry. 209  Although there is little documentation, it is 
significant that some ten years later the Ilšu-abūšu family performed the Ilias’s temple 
service.210 Another example involves the Kudurrānu and Ahiyaʾūtu clans (fig. 11). In 
505 BCE the latter gave a daughter to the Kudurrānus in marriage.211 Turning to their 
relationship in the context of the temple service one finds that it was always the 
Ahiyaʾūtu, i.e. the wife-giver family that lent a helping hand, never the other way 
around.212 
                                                
207 BM 26543//BM 102293. 
208 Appendix 1.2a. 
209 BM 87267. 
210 BM 24480 = AH XV no. 10. 
211 Appendix 1.2a. 
212 BM 94638 = AH XV no. 3, VS 6 115 and BM 82721. 
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Figure 11:  marriage ties vs. temple service (2) 
While information on performance contracts for other priesthoods of Ezida is far less 
generous, the existing evidence points in the same direction. In 485 BCE, a member of 
the Esagil-mansum family received wages for having performed one full day of the 
baker prebend of the Bēliyaʾu clan.213 Turning to their marriage records, it appears that 
the Bēliyaʾu family received a wife from the Esagil-mansums in the reign of Nabonidus, 
more than fifty years earlier (fig. 11).214 The Esagil-mansum family was thus not only 
the wife-giver but also the ‘cultic-support-giver’ of the Bēliyaʾu family. 
The available evidence is relatively modest but suggestive nonetheless. There is no 
evidence that a wife-taker family ever performed its wife-giver family’s temple service 
after they arranged a marriage alliance. The opposite is however attested more than 
once. It seems that the unidirectional flow between wife-giver and wife-taker not only 
entailed a transfer of a bride and her dowry, but it could also result in a kind of service 
obligation. Once again one can turn to the ethnographic record of rural India for 
parallels. In Pandit society in northern India, the initiation of the relative status between 
wife-giver and wife-taker also gave the former specific ritual obligations regarding his 
wife-takers.215 
                                                
213 BM 29234. 
214 Appendix 1.3a. 
215 Madan 1975: 304-305, Dumont 1983: 86-104, Parkin 1990: 477. 
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A final aspect that should be mentioned here is the tentative confirmation of the 
transitivity of wife-giver/wife-takers hierarchy in the temple service. We have seen 
earlier that the entire marriage network was essentially made up of chains of wife-givers 
and wife-takers. A wife-taker took precedence over its direct and indirect wife-givers, 
which were all excluded as potential wife-takers. Reversely, as these relations were 
transitive, it was possible to jump over one’s direct wife-taker and ally with the wife-
taker’s wife-taker. This mechanism created the acyclic paths seen in our network. Let us 
take a final look at the relationship between the Ilšu-abūšu, the Ilia and the Huṣābu 
families as presented in the directed marriage graph of Fig. 6 (above). In light of the 
transitive wife-giver/wife-takers hierarchy, the two former families were inferior to the 
latter. The Ilia family was an indirect wife-giver of Huṣābu via the chain:  
Ilia    Gallābu    Kidin-Sîn    Ea-ilūtu-bani    Huṣābu 
The Ilšu-abūšu family via the same chain as well as via: 
Ilšu-abūšu    Siātu    Iddin-Papsukkal    Ea-ilūtu-bani    Huṣābu 
Turning to the performance contracts, it can hardly be a coincidence that precisely Ilšu-
abūšu and Ilia are found performing the temple service of Huṣābu, and never vice 
versa. 216  The second example concerns the Ahiya’ūtu family, which is found 
performing the service of both the Ilšu-abūšu and the Ilia clans.217 As is shown in the 
alliance network, the Ahiya’ūtu was an indirect wife-giver to both families, via the 
chain: 
Ahiya’ūtu    Nūr-Papsukkal    Ilšu-abūšu    Ilia    
Once again, the evidence is modest but indicative: not only the relation between direct 
wife-givers and wife-takers but also the wider transitive mechanism of the marriage 
network influenced the cultic organisation of the Ezida temple. This would also explain 
why the Naggārus, a family with no links to the profession of the brewer, are attested as 
taking on performance duties of the Ilia clan.218 For if we check the marriage alliance 
network one last time, it appears that the Naggāru family was indeed an indirect wife-
giver of Ilia: 
Naggāru    Ilšu-abūšu    Ilia    
 
                                                
216 OECT 12 A 109 (Ilšu-abūšu) and TuM 2/3 207 (Ilia).  
217 BM 96179 = AH XV no. 54 (Ilšu-abūšu) and BM 94793 (Ilia). 
218 VS 6 139. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated the first type of social interaction in the priestly 
community of Borsippa – marriage alliance. It offers the very first attempt to map out a 
Babylonian marriage network on any scale. Existing studies on marriage in Assyriology 
focus primarily on its philological and legal implications. However it is apparent from 
the approach in this chapter that there is much to discover once we appreciate the social 
dynamics that surround Babylonian marriage.  
The evidence that can be gathered from the descriptive-quantitative analysis (see 
Appendix 1) portrays the priesthood of Borsippa as a highly endogamous community. 
With more than 80% of the attested marriages arranged within the prebendary circle, it 
is clear that the Borsippean priests actively used marriage alliances to keep their ranks 
closed. A very important observation for the following investigation and the eventual 
reconstruction of this community is the fact that marriages with families from the lower 
strata of society – identified by the lack of family names – is completely lacking. This 
gives us a first and very clear indication of how these priestly families perceived of and 
maintained themselves as an exclusive social unit in wider society. 
In this chapter I investigated the underlying social mechanisms of this sacerdotal 
endogamy. In order to handle the complexity of the marriage alliances, I used social 
network analysis and converted the 81 unions into a directed graph. This resulted in a 
network that illustrates properties of a marriage system that are overlooked when 
considering the unions in isolation. In the jargon of graph theory, the marriage network 
appears to be entirely acyclic and transitive, thus revealing an alliance system that was 
non-reciprocal and hierarchised. In order to understand how these dynamics functioned 
in practice I borrowed the concept of wife-givers and wife-takers from the 
anthropological literature on kinship. This concept supposes that at the event of 
marriage the parties adopt two functions vis-à-vis each other, i.e. that of wife-giver and 
wife-taker. Ethnographic studies have revealed that in communities adhering to a non-
reciprocal marriage system there is a probability that a relative status difference arises 
between wife-giver and wife-taker, a dynamic that I was also able to detect in 
Borsippa’s priestly community. 
The evidence from Borsippa suggests that wife-takers assumed the superior role. In 
marriages that exhibit a clear status difference between the family of the husband and 
the family of the wife, it is the latter, the wife-giver that was of lower status according 
to the temple hierarchy. Another important feature of the priestly marriage system is its 
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transitive mechanism. Once a wife-taker family received a bride, it never returned one 
to the wife-giver family. Moreover, not only the direct wife-giver was ruled out as 
receiver of brides but also the indirect wife-givers. Contra-hierarchical marriages seem 
to have been avoided. On the other hand, a wife-giver could ally with a once or twice 
removed wife-taker, since this did not run counter to the established transitive pecking 
order. 
All the properties of the priestly marriage system that I was able to reconstruct, 
match a specific type of alliance model, practiced for example in contemporary 
communities in northern India: hypergamy. In this system, which is highly informed by 
the religious Vedic ideology, (a) wives should be of lower status than their husbands, 
i.e. wife-givers are inferior and women marry upward; (b) marriage alliances involve a 
unilateral flow and are non-reciprocal; and (c) there exists a transitive hierarchy that can 
be conceived as an open-ended ladder. In an ideal Vedic hypergamous system, marriage 
does not so much trigger a relative hierarchy in itself but rather follows an existing 
hierarchy independent of the alliance system. In Borsippa, the likely candidate for such 
an external pecking order is the purity-based temple hierarchy. That this is indeed the 
conceptual context for the observed marriage pattern seems to be confirmed by placing 
the marriage system in its historical context and considering the practical shortcomings 
inherent to a hypergamous marriage model. The marriage system of the Borsippean 
priesthood came into being sometime in the early first millennium BCE, when the 
priestly families received their cultic rights in the form of royal sponsorship. I suggested 
that in the early phase of the alliance system, marriage would have neatly followed the 
established temple hierarchy – priests offered their daughters in marriage to more senior 
colleagues. However sooner or later the community faced the flaws of any hypergamous 
system when the daughters of the highest prebendary group had problems finding 
suitable husbands of superior status. Evidence suggests that they were married to men 
from the second highest group, thereby violating the desired hierarchy but limiting the 
damage to a minimum. This compromising marriage strategy resulted in a flattening of 
the hierarchy as the second highest group moved to the highest status level. There is 
evidence that the same dynamics affected the third-highest group. It should be stressed 
that this did not affect the purity-based temple hierarchy itself. Rather, it meant that high 
administrative offices at the temple and in the city became available to lower-ranking 
groups when they had previously been open only to the highest group of temple-
enterers. Other marriage strategies have been observed too. While some groups 
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contracted marriages within the prebendary group – resulting in an increasing internal 
stratification while stabilising the overall hierarchy at the same time – there is some 
evidence that among the lower priesthood outsiders were welcomed in the alliance 
system. The marriage network reconstructed for Neo-Babylonian Borsippa thus presents 
a well-developed stage of the original marriage system. This makes it all the more 
remarkable that the outlines of this traditional praxis are still very much visible in spite 
of the turbulent history of first millennium Babylonia. 
For now, I conclude that the marriage practice of the Borsippean priesthood was in 
the first place regulated by the purity-based temple hierarchy. The quantitative analysis 
shows that following this hierarchy was the preferred direction of marriage. However, 
this was not done consistently. In case the families did not contract a hypergamous 
marriage, either because a suitable partner could not be found or because they were 
pursuing a different alliance strategy all together, it seems that the act of marriage itself 
triggered a relative status difference. There were thus essentially two different 
hierarchies in practice: 1) the temple hierarchy, independent of marriage (but presenting 
the ideal blueprint); and 2) the wife-giver/wife-taker’s hierarchy, dependent on 
marriage. While ideally governed by the ideology of ritual purity, marriage also left its 
mark on the temple organisation itself. Marriage did not only entail a movement of 
brides and property in the form of the dowry, but also of labour in the form of cultic 
support. This was exclusively and without exceptions provided by the wife-giver.  
It is in the light of the relative inferiority of wife-givers and the obligations assigned 
to them that the marriage mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, the marriage 
between king Neriglissar’s daughter and the šatammu of Ezida, becomes even more 
controversial. Not only was a marriage alliance between the royal house and the local 
urban population unheard of in the first millennium BCE, this royal favouritism, in this 
case towards the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā family, will surely have upset the social 
stratification of the local priestly community in unprecedented ways. But more 
importantly, it might have raised some serious ideological questions. By offering his 
daughter in marriage to the chief administrator of the temple, king Neriglissar entered 
the local alliance system as a wife-giver. Did this not make the royal family inferior to 
the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā and all its wife-takers according to the customs and regulations of 
this hypergamous system? If really so, how was this being expressed? It is unlikely that 
we will ever be able to solve these questions, but the puzzling circumstances of 
HYPERGAMOUS MARRIAGE SYSTEM 
 65
Neriglissar’s son-in-law soon after the wedding219 and the high-profile case in which he 
was forced to give up property immediately following the fall of this royal dynasty,220 
suggest that the new administration of king Nabonidus and perhaps the local community 
were eager to undo the arrangements of this controversial alliance. The whole affair will 
be studied in greater detail elsewhere. 
 
                                                
219  Only several months later a certain Rēmūt-Bēl//Ilia had replaced him as šatammu of Ezida, see 
Waerzeggers 2010: 72.  
220 For the text in question, HSM 1895.1.1, see Zadok 2005a: 649-650. A committee of judges, a palace 
scribe and an agent of the sukallu-official attended the transaction. Note that his brother, Mušēzib-











This chapter deals with land ownership in the priestly community of Borsippa. In 
Michael Jursa’s words, land constituted the ‘second pillar of the subsistence strategy 
of priests’ after prebends,221 representing a major income-producing asset for this 
social group. In the following, I will examine the complex relationship between the 
priestly families and their landholdings. Rather than its economic and monetary 
value, however, I will explore the function of land ownership in the social 
organisation of this community.  
How should we imagine the rural environment of Borsippa? Based on the 
information contained in the private archives, Ran Zadok (2006) described the local 
countryside as a fertile and water-abundant region, featuring a belt of marshes 
surrounding the city, fed by several branches of the Euphrates river, such as the 
Arahtu, Pallukkatu, and Borsippa canals. 222  These conditions allowed for an 
intensive agricultural regime, geared largely toward date palm cultivation, while the 
marshland provided pasture for raising cattle.223 Concentrated mainly in the north, 
around the Borsippa-Babylon axis, the city’s hinterland was divided into various 
agricultural sub-sectors and irrigation districts, dotted with a large number of farms 
and villages, and crisscrossed by a network of watercourses and land roads.  
Besides the occasional references to crown and temple estates,224 the archives 
inform us above all about privately owned land. Private land in Borsippa can be 
                                                
221 Jursa 2011: 187. 
222 Zadok 2006. Cf. Cole 1994a, Cole & Gasche 1998: 51, Jursa 2004b, Jursa et al. 2010: 360ff. 
223 Zadok 2006: 391. 
224 Zadok 2006: 447-449. 
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divided into two types: on the one hand, non-specified land that was identified on the 
basis of its geographic features or location, and on the other hand, land that was part 
of a so-called hanšû, ‘fifty’. Much of the land owned by priestly families belonged to 
such hanšû units, which structured large parts of the green belt around the city. This 
chapter will therefore primarily be devoted to a study of hanšû land. 
My investigation will unfold in three parts, each part focusing on a different 
aspect of land ownership in Borsippa’s priestly community. Part 2.1. will start with a 
discussion of the historical origins of hanšû land in Borsippa. Based on 
administrative documents as well as literary texts, I will show that hanšû land had a 
long history in Borsippa and originated as royal land grants in the eighth century 
BCE. After discussing the historical roots of the system, I will reconstruct the 
identity of the schemes’ first beneficiaries on the basis of the naming patterns of the 
hanšû estates. This will shed light on a large number of non-priestly families that 
have remained largely outside of our purview so far. Finally, in the last section of 
part 1, I will assess which value the hanšû estates held for the descendants of the 
original beneficiaries, during the long sixth century BCE.  
In part 2.2. of this chapter I turn to sales of hanšû land and rural property more 
generally. The primary aim is to examine whether any limitations of a social kind 
rested on selling and buying land in the priestly community of Borsippa. In 
particular, I will reveal the subtle ways in which two major principles of social 
organisation in this priestly group – marriage and solidarity – influenced the 
circulation of land.  
In the final part 2.3. of this chapter I will take a closer look at tenancy and 
agricultural collaboration. Since most of their energy was devoted towards their 
cultic duties in town, the priests outsourced cultivation to others. By analysing the 
identity of tenants in conjunction with the identity of the landowners, new light can 
be shed on interfamily relations and the social organisation of the priestly 
community. 
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2.1. Hanšû estates and the ancestral family 
Evidence from various cities in the alluvium suggests that hanšû land, literally 
‘fifty’-land,225 came into the possession of Babylonian families, and to a lesser extent 
into that of the temple institutions, as a result of land allotment schemes and related 
agricultural projects implemented by various kings of the past. The venerable history 
of this land, its distinct mode of identification, and its exceptional visibility in our 
sources suggest that it formed a crucial component in shaping the urban (priestly) 
elite in first millennium Babylonia. While it provided its owners with a stable source 
of income, hanšû land, perhaps more importantly, helped to underpin the social 
identity of the land-holding clans. It allowed them to lay claim to a share in the local 
topography, while at the same time tying them firmly into a shared local history.  
In the following pages I will trace the historical origins of land ownership in 
Borsippa to the eighth century BCE, and consider possible motivations behind the 
royal land grants. In order to better understand the function and impact of these 
grants on the local community, I will closely examine the evidence about the 
schemes’ first beneficiaries contained in the naming patterns of the estates. This will 
reveal that at the time when the institution came into being, not only priests but a 
much larger segment of the urban elite benefited from these royal endowments, 
which had the effect of turning the local countryside into a stage where priests had to 
interact, cooperate, and compete with other sections of society that are too often left 
invisible in our priest-centred documentation. Interestingly, the hanšû institution 
turns out to constitute the single most important source of information on a large 
number of families that, while belonging to the local upper stratum, have remained 
largely outside of our purview. Based on their distinct type of family names, I will 
argue that these families had a ‘secular’ (and at times more specifically, a military) 
background. I will close this part by asking what role the estates played, and which 
value they still had, for the descendants of the original beneficiaries in the long sixth 
century BCE.  
 
                                                
225 Written 50e, 50ú or 50e/ú.meš. 
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2.1.1. The nature of hanšû land 
Relatively little has been written on the subject of hanšû land, mainly because 
information is scarce and difficult to interpret.226 However, hanšû estates are found 
in most Babylonian towns that produced cuneiform texts, including Borsippa, 
Babylon, Dilbat, Kiš, Nippur, Sippar and Uruk.227 The picture that can be drawn 
from this dispersed evidence suggests that hanšû land came into existence as land 
allotments granted by various kings to individuals and temples at different times 
during the first half of the first millennium BCE.  
Some scholars have argued that hanšûs represent a kind of feudal land allotment 
system in which designated plots were manned by groups of fifty individuals (in 
which case hanšû is held to refer to the unit size) and presided over by a headman 
called the ‘commander of fifty’ (rab hanšê) responsible for the communal 
obligations encumbered on the land.228 While this led scholars to believe that the 
designation hanšû was related to ‘military’-like organisation and occupation of the 
land by groups of fifty – reminiscent of the land-for-service system known from the 
later Murašû archive229 – this does not seem to apply to all the hanšû schemes in the 
Babylonian alluvium or, alternatively, the original (military) organisation became 
obsolete over time. Whereas various early documents from Uruk attest indeed to 
hanšû land being allotted to large groups of people,230 sometimes designated as rab 
hanšês,231 no such evidence is available for other cities like Babylon and Borsippa. 
And while a handful of references to rab hanšês are known from various towns 
                                                
226 E.g. Cocquerillat 1968, Peat 1983, Brinkman 1964, Brinkman 1995, van Driel 2002, Zadok 2006, 
Zadok 2009, Jursa et al. 2010, Nielsen 2011, Janković 2013, Nielsen & Waerzeggers [forthcoming]. 
227 For an overview of the attestation of hanšû, see van Driel 2002: 300-305. For a more detailed 
discussion of the early attestations of hanšû, see Nielsen 2011: 46-49 (Babylon), 86-97 (Borsippa), 
113-115 (Dilbat), 144-147 (Kish).     
228 See e.g. CAD H, which designated hanšû for the Neo-Babylonian period as ‘a field held in feudal 
tenure by 50 men’, or Brinkman 1984: 32-33, who understands it as a ‘local agricultural 
administration … presided over by the ‘Commander of the Fifty’ (rab hanšê), who seems to have 
been … assigned responsibility for the unit and liable for the equivalent of feudal obligations for the 
land’. Cf. Peat 1983 and Beaulieu 1998: 315. 
229 Stolper 1985: 70-103, Jursa 2005: 113-114. 
230 Ninety-one in AnOr 9 1 and NBC 4848, forty-five in YBC 11566, and thirty-two in BIN 1 159. See 
Janković 2013: 364-373 for a discussion of these texts and the structure of hanšû land in Uruk. 
231 E.g. AnOr 9 1. 
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(usually as recipient of silver payments),232 the small text group concerning Zēru-
ukīn/Pir’u, a commander of fifty from Nippur, suggests that he was a true military 
official who went on campaign (or performed corvée service) himself and bore the 
responsibility of mobilising his men when called up for service or collect 
compensatory payments on behalf of the tax unit.233 He is not mentioned as owner of 
hanšû land. Moreover, well-to-do men, like priests, usually did not perform the 
corvée obligation that rested on their landed property, but paid silver as 
compensation for substitutes.234 Perhaps in this context the rab hanšê can best be 
seen as a military official and tax collector on behalf of the state, whose connection 
to the land in question was all but obliterated through the practice of substitution. 
Hence while in some cases there seems to be a link between the rab hanšês and the 
land called hanšû on the one hand and the (military) group designated by the same 
term on the other hand, more evidence is needed to accept it as a general rule.  
Another idea is that the designation hanšû or fifty is related to the physical size of 
these plots, or alternatively to the number of plots per land unit. This theory has 
found wider support.235 As can be expected from lands originating in centralised 
division schemes, which presumably safeguarded fairness and equality, hanšûs 
belonging to the same unit share a fairly regular size. In contrast to normal land, 
defined by both the length of the front (pūtu) and the side (šiddu), in dealing with 
hanšû land it sufficed the Babylonian scribes to give the frontage length only, usually 
bordering on a canal. In a transaction from Babylon recorded in TCL 12 11 and 
dating to the reign of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn (667-648 BCE), a hanšû unit with a frontage 
(pūtu) on the canal of 250 cubits is sub-divided into ten units (ešertus) of 50 
                                                
232 See van Driel 2002: 297. Only three texts from Borsippa mention the official: BM 27781 (Cam 04) 
and BM 26693 (Dar 12) from the Atkuppu archive, and the private account BM 29230, undated and 
so far unassigned. See also Kleber 2008: 115f, for the role of rab-hanšês in the organisation of the 
Eanna’s building projects.  
233 Jursa 2005: 115, Jursa et al. 2010: 649-650. This is also suggested by the text PSBA 7 148, from 
Babylon and dated to Dar 24. It reports on an individual who is said to have done one month of 
corvée work with his rab hanšê, who will not call on him again before the end of month VII, cf. van 
Driel 2002: 297. 
234 E.g., Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009, Jursa et al. 2010: 647ff. 
235 E.g., Unger 1932: 412, San Nicolò 1951: 16, Weidner 1952: 37, Cocquerillat 1984: 67, van Driel 
2002: 298, Jursa et al. 2010: 321+1864. Cf. Janković 2013: 365f. 
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cubits.236 This seems to suggest that on principle the basic building block of hanšû 
divisions were ‘units of fifty’ cubits.237 Perhaps the larger landholdings called līmu, 
‘thousand’ – granted to institutions in the course of similar land allotment schemes – 
should be understood in similar terms.238 However, even if hanšû land was originally 
at least occasionally allotted in standardised units of fifty cubits, the dynamics of 
inheritance and land alienation through sales and pledging, as well as the regrettable 
silence on the part of the Babylonian scribes in recording dimensions, make it 
generally impossible to substantiate the connection between the designation hanšû 
and the physical size of actual, documented plots. 
More recently G. van Driel tried to merge these two ideas by arguing for a 
connection between the hanšû schemes and the development of the Babylonian 
corvée and taxation system. 239  Family units of ten (ešertu), which could be 
established on the bases of residence patterns, professional affiliation and/or social 
background, would have formed the basic component from which the state drew its 
resources.240 What we see in these standardised hanšû schemes, according to van 
Driel, was an attempt by the Babylonian state to organise the taxable population on a 
higher level that is in standard blocks of fifty households/men.241 This idea ties in 
neatly with the information found in texts such as TCL 12 11 (see above), which 
organised hanšû land in units of ten and fifty. Even if evidence for a connection 
between the ownership of hanšû land and taxation based on units of ešertus and 
                                                
236 Exceptionally, in this text also the length of the plot is given: one bēru, 21,600 cubits or 10.8 
kilometres! While this extremely narrow plot is suggestive of centralised intervention it should 
perhaps not be ruled out that we are dealing here with some kind of legal/administrative fiction, not 
unlike the legally fragmented shares in the prebendary services, cf. Waerzeggers 2010: 201ff, for the 
calculation of prebendary shares in the baker’s service in Ezida. 
237 As has been noted by Janković 2013: 365+1350, while none of frontages recorded for hanšû units in 
Uruk are exactly 250 cubits, most of them are multiples of 50 (e.g. 400, 300, 150). 
238 Van Driel 2002: 298, Jursa et al. 2010: 422+2413. See Janković 2013: 357-358, 364+1348 for the 
allotment of līmu units (most of them feature a frontage of over 1000 cubits) to the temple in Uruk. 
239 Driel 2002: 295-300. 
240 See e.g. Jursa 1999: 101-105, van Driel 2002: 295-305, and Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009: 294. 
241 Van Driel 2002: 297f. 
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hanšûs remains scarce,242 van Driel’s hypothesis so far best explains the nature of 
these hanšû schemes throughout Babylonia.243 
In the end we have to realise that hanšû probably had different implications in 
different contexts; its usage and operation were subject to local practice and might 
have changed over time. Land allotment schemes in Babylonia were created at 
various moments by various kings, presumably in an attempt to win over, and cater 
to the needs of, various elements in society: in Sippar hanšû estates were allotted to 
the local temple institution,244 the main recipients in Borsippa were urban families, 
whereas in Uruk there might be evidence that hanšûs were assigned to groups from 
the lower (perhaps rural) stratum of society. 245  It seems only likely that these 
allotments were subject to somewhat different arrangements.  
 
2.1.2. The historical origins of hanšû land in Borsippa246 
Regrettably little is known about Babylonian society during the early centuries of the 
first millennium BCE. Most of our information comes from a scattering of kudurrus, 
‘boundary-stones,’ that commemorate the endowment of land and prebends to state 
or temple officials by individual kings, or from later (mainly) sixth-century 
chronicles.247 The early second quarter of the first millennium BCE, is somewhat 
better known thanks to the large letter corpus from the Assyrian state archives.248 
According to these sources, Babylonia witnessed a period of turmoil and disunity 
caused by internal as well as external political strife and ‘ethnic’ friction. Not only 
was the country repeatedly threatened by its powerful Assyrian neighbour, and at 
times incorporated into it, but Babylonia also had to deal with two influential foreign 
                                                
242 Janković 2013: 369. 
243 Jursa et al. 2010: 247+1455. 
244 Jursa et al. 2010: 336+1957, 338-340, 356.  
245 Although a connection to the temple cannot be excluded, see Jursa et al. 2010: 421-422. Note that 
the city governor (šākin-ṭēmi), Nā’id-Marduk/Ūm-19-uṣur, is mentioned among the beneficiaries of 
hanšû land in two texts, Janković 2013: 368f. 
246 A very similar investigation has been done by Nielsen & Waerzeggers [forthcoming]. 
247 For studies on politics, society and documentation from this period see e.g., Brinkman 1968, 
Brinkman 1984, Brinkman & Kennedy 1983, Frame 1992 and Nielsen 2011. For a brief and critical 
overview, see Von Dassow 1999a. 
248 See, e.g., Cole & Machinist 1998 (SAA 13), Fuchs & Parpola 2001 (SAA 15), Dietrich 2003 (SAA 
17), Luukko 2012 (SAA 19). 
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populations – the Chaldeans and the Arameans – that had settled in various parts of 
the alluvium during the late second and early first millennium BCE.249 Due to a 
major dearth of everyday documentation, Assyriologists still lack a firm grasp of this 
period of Babylonian history. Nonetheless, some crucial innovations were introduced 
in Babylonia at this time, innovations that would turn out to characterise later Neo-
Babylonian society. 
It was in this period, in the late eighth and seventh centuries, that the basis for the 
typical, intensive form of agriculture of the sixth century was laid.250 It was also in 
this period that the regular field systems, i.e. the hanšû schemes, were created on 
initiative of the state.251 This agricultural restructuring was one of the beneficial 
factors that led to the economic growth that is documented in the long sixth century 
BCE.252  
The earliest attestation of the term hanšû in the Borsippa corpus dates from the 
reign of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn (667-648 BCE).253 The picture we can draw from this and 
other early texts is, however, not as static as one would expect to find in case of a 
newly installed land scheme.254  Rather, the landscape appears dynamic and already 
in an advanced stage of fragmentation. Hence, the inference that Šamaš-šumu-ukīn 
was not the ruler who created a new land division scheme in Borsippa is inevitable. 
His reign only serves as the terminus ante quem based on the available local 
documentation. However, texts from other Babylonian towns provide more 
information on the existence of hanšûs pre-dating his reign. 
Apart from Sippar, where hanšû land was introduced relatively late, 255  the 
material from most other towns in central Babylonia broadly corresponds to the 
picture seen in Borsippa. In Babylon, Kish and Nippur, hanšû land is not attested 
                                                
249 See, e.g., Brinkman 1968, Frame 1992. For more on the presence and the role of these Aramean 
and Chaldean groups in Babylonia, see below and Chapter 6.3.  
250 E.g. van Driel 2002: 297. 
251 E.g. Jursa et al. 2010: 647. 
252 See e.g. Jursa et al. 2010: 437-443, 754-772. 
253  OECT 12 A 83 (Ššu 24-II-04). The earliest reference to hanšû land in the first millennium 
Babylonian documentation is found in cadastral text AnOr 9 1 written in Uruk and dated circa 50 
years before it appears in Borsippa (l. 98: makallê ša 50meš). 
254 RA 10 no. 46 (Ššu 04), TCL 12 9 (Ššu 07), TuM 2/3 12 (Ššu 10), TuM 2/3 14 (Kan 13), VS 5 140 
(Npl/Nbk?), OECT 12 A 163 (r. Ššu – Nbk?), BM 26493 (ca. Nbk 08), BM 87239 (Nbk 11). 
255 See Jursa et al. 2010: 355-360 
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before Šamaš-šumu-ukīn, the period that roughly forms the starting point of the 
oldest Neo-Babylonian family archives.256  The term is however attested slightly 
earlier in three property deeds from Dilbat, a town circa 15 kilometres southeast of 
Borsippa. Two texts are dated to the second regnal year of Bēl-ibni, an Assyrian 
puppet king appointed by Sennacherib between circa 703–700 BCE,257 and one text 
is dated to king Esarhaddon, in 674-3 BCE.258 
Earlier attestations of hanšû come from the southern town of Uruk. AnOr 9 1 and 
NBC 4848 259  record how the Chaldean king Marduk-aplu-iddin II, 260  in power 
between circa 721 and 710 BCE, restructured land on his eponymous canal into 
hanšû units and allotted it to ninety-one rab-hanšês.261 The oldest explicit reference 
to the institution of the hanšû thus dates to the 710s BCE. And unlike the mature 
state of hanšû land found in mid-seventh century Borsippa, the late eighth century 
divisions in Uruk seem to represent the system’s inception.  
The evidence from Uruk has led scholars to believe that the hanšû schemes in the 
south were generally older than those in the north.262 But is this really so? The two 
texts from Uruk dated to Marduk-aplu-iddin II were official records,263 a text type 
generally missing from northern Babylonian towns. The Uruk texts were probably 
                                                
256 Babylon: TCL 12 11 (Ššu 14); BM 64162 (Ššu 19); VS 5 3 (Kan 01). Kish: OECT 10 3 (Ššu 10); 
OECT 10 7 (Ššu 19). Nippur: TuM 2/3 132 (Asb 36).  
257 OECT 10 391 and OECT 10 392. For these texts belonging to the small archive of Marduk-šāpik-
zēri//Egibi, see Jursa 2005: 100-101, Nielsen [forthcoming]. 
258 OECT 10 395 (Esh 07). For other somewhat later references to hanšû land in Dilbat, see Nielsen 
2011: 112-115 and Nielsen [forthcoming]. 
259 This seems to be a later copy as the scribe mentioned in the colophon is the same scribe who wrote 
BIN 1 159, a text concerning another hanšû scheme division during the reign of Kandalānu some 
fifty years later, see Jursa et al. 2010: 421+2410 and Janković 2013: 364-373. 
260 Better known as Merodach-Baladan from 2 Kings 20:12 and Isaiah 39:1. 
261 AnOr 9 1 tells us that the kerdippu, a high royal official, was responsible for organising these land 
allotments; the same person is mentioned in NBC 4848 without title. See Janković 2013: 367-368, 
for this official. Note that at least on two occasions a later king would emulate Marduk-aplu-iddin’s 
intervention in the countryside of Uruk. In his fourth and fifteenth regnal year king Kandalānu, in 
power between 647-627 BCE, allocated hanšû land to 42 and 45 individuals (BIN 1 159 and YBC 
11566), cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 421+2410.   
262 E.g. Jursa et al. 2010: 321-322. 
263 See also van Driel 2002: 304-305. 
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kept in the local temple archive264 and copied repeatedly.265 Similar types of texts 
were still composed in Uruk in the later Achaemenid and even Hellenistic periods.266 
Moreover, private documents from Uruk referring to hanšû only start from the reign 
of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn, if not later, hence following the same pattern observed for the 
northern towns.267  
In addition to the administrative record, there is evidence of a more vivid nature 
suggesting that land divisions took place in the Borsippa region in the late-eight 
                                                
264 Or in the archive of local temple scribes. BIN 1 159 and NBC 4848 have been copied by Nergal-
ina-tēšî-ēṭer/Marduk-šākin-šumi who was a descendant of Sîn-leqe-unninnī, a prominent scribal 
family. 
265 Note that NBC 4848 was copied perhaps 50 years later by the scribe of BIN 1 159. And according 
to Goetze 1947: 352, who published parts of text NBC 4848, this text also has a duplicate, so-called 
‘fragment Crozer 201’. 
266 AUWE 12, 223 presents a list of hanšû plots in the Uruk area presumably assigned to eleven 
individuals. This text was found in square U 18 in the southeast area on the site of Uruk/Warka. This 
find spot has been labelled the ‘house of the exorcist’, after the two consecutive families of exorcists 
who lived there in the early fourth (Šangû-Ninurta family) and late fourth to early third century BCE 
(Ekur-zakir family) respectively. Cf. Frahm 2002: 78-84 and Clancier 2009: 47-81. The two text 
assemblages consist of a large number of scholarly texts and a small number of private 
administrative documents. So far no convincing dating has been suggested for AUWE 12, 223. 
Oelsner 1995: 386 assumes an earlier date and assigns it to the Šangû-Ninurta family, based on the 
fact that hanšû can only be traced to the early fifth century BCE. Moreover the fact that none of the 
individuals mentioned in the text bear ‘Anu’ names, common in the Hellenistic period, also suggests 
an earlier date. On the other hand, Beaulieu 1998: 315 believes that AUWE 12, 223 belongs to the 
archive of the Ekur-zakir and that it was kept out of an antiquarian interest. As we will see later, 
both families came from the urbanite circles that received hanšû lands in the early first millennium 
BCE, and both did potentially have a stake in this land. Hanšû might therefore have existed for over 
five hundred years in Uruk, if only in the memory of the scribal elite. 
267 TCL 12 8 (Ššu 01). This seems to be a sale of an (entire?) ugāru (an irrigated sub-district of 
considerable size; Zadok 2006: 390) for 190 shekels of silver. However it is doubtful whether one 
can really classify this transaction as ‘private’. The land was sold and said to be ‘regarded as hanšû 
land of the Urukeans and added(?) to the Rudāya area (kīma 50ú.meš ša Urukāya ana <garim>Ruddāya 
uraddu,  ll. 9-10). According to Zadok 1985: 262, Rudāya was situated to the southwest of Uruk. 
Note also that the text is said to have been written ‘at the time (ina ūmišuma) of Nabû-ušebši, the 
governor of Uruk’. Other private texts from Uruk that mention hanšû land date to Nbk 17 (FLP 
1533), Nbk 18 (Mich 9) and an unknown year (Bir 36).  
LANDHOLDING 
 77  
century as well.268  VS 1 37 is a monumental stele composed at the occasion of a 
land grant to a high ranking individual in 715 BCE.269 In the introductory narrative, 
king Marduk-aplu-iddin II describes his endeavours to expel intruders from the 
countryside of Babylon and Borsippa, and restore the land to its rightful owners: 
 
‘[Marduk-aplu-iddin] whose attention is set on restoring the 
lands to the sons of Sippar, Nippur and Babylon, and (all the other) 
cities of Akkad; and the old parcels of the Babylonians, ruined by 
an invading army, grazed off by foreigners like sheep – their 
borders were forgotten, their boundary marks were out of place, 
their estates were uncultivated and left unploughed – he restored 
the parcels and returned them to the sons of Babylon and Borsippa, 
not omitting a single person – he determined the parcels and made 
them take possession’ 
                                                             (VS 1 37: col. iii 10-29) 
 
Admittedly, this text does not make any explicit reference to hanšû land. But can 
one really expect the use of a legal-administrative term in this literary historical 
account? The manner in which it describes the king’s effort – determining the 
boundaries of parcels, restoring them to the citizenry – is in keeping with a 
systematised, large scale land (re-)division project, the very context in which one 
expects to find the creation of hanšû schemes.  
Moreover, the picture can be further adjusted if a related term of division is taken 
into consideration: (šu)zu’uzti šarri, ‘royal (land) allotment’, a term only attested a 
few times so far.270 TuM 2/3 132, a text from Nippur dated to the 630s BCE, records 
a donation of a share in a hanšû unit located ina zu’uzti šarri, ‘within the royal 
allotment’. 271  This passage shows that zu’uzti šarri and hanšû were not only 
compatible terms, but that hanšûs were developed and made available in the course 
of royal land allotments.272 
                                                
268 Note that both VS 1 37 and ABC 24 (below) have been discussed in relation to the origins of hanšû 
estates by Nielsen & Waerzeggers [forthcoming]. 
269 For a discussion of this text see Leemans 1945: 444-448. For a recent edition of VS 1 37, see 
Paulus 2014: 693-703. 
270 Van Driel 2002: 297ff. Cf. CAD Z: 169 ‘field(s) apportioned by the king’. 
271 See also van Driel 2002: 299. Note that BM 46799+ (courtesy J. Nielsen), written in Ššu 12 at the 
city of Kish, mentions two hanšû plots located in the zu’uztu of Marduk-aplu-iddin (ll. 1-2). 
272 Cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 248, 321+1866. 
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The earliest evidence for the zu’uztu ša šarri dates from the reign Erība-Marduk, a 
king of Chaldean origin who ruled over Babylonia in the 770s BCE.273  A first 
reference is found in VS 1 37, the text discussed above. One of the two fields granted 
by Marduk-aplu-iddin II (who, as a matter of fact, proclaims to be a descendant of 
Erība-Marduk274) is said to border on the ‘royal allotment of Erība-Marduk, king of 
Babylon’.275 A second reference is found in an unpublished legal text, BM 36479, 
written in the capital of Babylon and dated to year 13 of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn (ca. 665 
BCE).276 The text mentions two shares of hanšû land that are situated in the ‘royal 
allotment of Erība-Marduk, the king’.277 
The correlation between hanšû and zu’uzti šarri makes it possible to trace the 
origins of the hanšû system back to the early eighth century BCE, over a hundred 
years before it first appears in private administrative documentation. This early date 
is furthermore supported by the fact that the sacerdotal families of Borsippa 
themselves traced the origins of their (hanšû) landholdings back to the time of king 
Erība-Marduk. 
In a recent article C. Waerzeggers has argued that at least one of the genres of the 
Babylonian scribal lore was compiled in Borsippa – the chronicles.278 While the 
capital city of Babylon had always been considered as the centre of chronicle 
writing, she demonstrates that many of the accounts of important historical and 
religious events were actually archived by the priestly families of Ezida in Borsippa. 
The chronicles usually reveal a particular orientation towards the god Marduk and 
his city Babylon, yet, there is at least one text that is clearly centred on Borsippa. 
Running from the Isin II period 279  (ca. eleventh century BCE.) to some point 
following the reign of Shalmaneser V (ca. 720s BCE), the so-called ‘Eclectic 
                                                
273 Brinkman 1964. For zu’uztus of the later kings Sargon II and Marduk-aplu-iddin II, see van Driel 
2002: 300, Brinkman 1984: 49+227. 
274 Brinkman 1964: 29-30, see also n. 15 and n. 18. In VS 1 37, col. ii 40-44, Marduk-aplu-iddin II 
calls himself the ‘eternal royal scion who makes illustrious the name of his father who begot him, 
the offspring of Erība-Marduk’. 
275 VS 1 37, col. iii 51-52: zu’uztu ša Erība-Marduk šar Bābilī. 
276 This document is mentioned in Brinkman 1964: 38+12. I thank John Nielsen, who kindly brought 
this to my attention. 
277 BM 36479, ll. 17-18: zu’uztu ša Erība-Marduk šarru.  
278 Waerzeggers 2012. 
279 Pomponio 1978: 61. 
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Chronicle’ (ABC 24)280 zooms in on kings that have shown particular piety towards 
Nabû and the citizenry of Borsippa.281 The following passage – reminiscent of VS 1, 
37 – portrays how the Borsippean priests themselves understood the origins of their 
landholdings, which makes it an invaluable testimony for the present study:  
 
‘Erība-Marduk, son of Marduk-šākin-šumi took the hand of Bēl 
(i.e. Marduk) and the son of Bēl (i.e. Nabû) in his second year. He 
slew with the sword the Arameans who had taken by murder and 
insurrection the fields of the inhabitants of Babylon and Borsippa and 
brought about their defeat. He took the fields and orchards away from 
them and gave (it) to the sons of Babylon and Borsippa’ 
                                    (Grayson 1975: 182-183; ABC 24, rev. 9-13) 
 
2.1.3. The motivations behind the land allotment schemes 
Incidentally, the passages in ABC 24 and VS 1 37 tell us more about the historical 
background and the motivation behind the creation of these land allotment schemes. 
During the first half of the first millennium BCE Babylonia witnessed an 
exceptionally turbulent time. Weakened by political unrest, rebellion, and at times 
open war, the autochthonous population in the urban centres was economically 
paralysed and the country in a general state of decline. The kings that seized the 
Babylonian throne were not of old Babylonian stock, 282  but of Chaldean and 
Assyrian descent or indeed groomed at the Assyrian court, and could therefore not 
call on an established royal dynasty for legitimacy.283 There can be little doubt that in 
this highly volatile political climate, rulers needed to consolidate their positions 
rapidly and for this the support of the local population was indispensible. The 
episodes in ABC 24 and VS 1 37 seem to describe exactly such attempts. After a 
period of turmoil and encroachments, both kings claim (or are claimed) to have 
liberated the country from evil and returned the land to its rightful owners and 
                                                
280 Grayson 1975: no. 24 and Glassner 2004: no. 47. 
281 See Waerzeggers 2012: 296-297, for the particular kings and their connection to Borsippa. 
282 A very short-lived exception might have been Marduk-šākin-šumi II (ca. 703 BCE). If Brinkman is 
correct in identifying him as the bēl pihāti mentioned in VS 1 37: col. v. ll. 2-3, he apparently came 
from the well-known Arad-Ea clan (1964: 24+137). Marduk-šākin-šumi was dethroned after only a 
few weeks.  
283 Note however that Marduk-aplu-iddin II did make an attempt to legitimise his position by claiming 
direct descent from the Chaldean and former king Erība-Marduk, see Brinkman 1964: 7+5, 29f. 
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original state. The analogy between them and Marduk, the divine king and conqueror 
of cosmic evil, who divided the fields and shares for the gods, is unmistakable.284 
Since Erība-Marduk and Marduk-aplu-iddin II both belonged to the Bīt-Yakīn,285 the 
Chaldean people based in the very southeast of Babylonia on the Persian Golf,286 it 
makes sense that much of their exploits were directed towards cities in central 
(Nippur) and northern Babylonia (Sippar, Babylon, and Borsippa). This area was far 
away from their natural power base in the south and close to the Assyrian border, and 
the need to win local favour there was arguably greatest.287 Even if their self-serving 
claims to have ‘re-established the foundation of the land’ 288  must be viewed 
critically, their initiatives were received favourably – at least by later generations289 – 
and are to some extent corroborated by more contemporary references in the 
administrative record discussed above. One might think of a similar scenario 
concerning the zu’uztu allotment named after the Assyrian king Sargon II,290 most 
likely brought into existence some time between 710 and 707 BCE. During a three-
year stay in Babylonia, right after he pushed Marduk-aplu-iddin II from the throne 
and defeated him at his capital of Dūr-Yakīn in 709 BCE,291 Sargon II went to great 
lengths to present himself as a true Babylonian king and win the favour of the 
autochthonous population. His plan of action did not only involve the redistribution 
of land and related agricultural developments like the reopening of the Borsippa 
                                                
284 There are various references to Marduk as organiser of land in the Epic of Creation (Enūma Eliš), 
especially among his divine names, e.g. ‘Asarre, giver of arable land who established plough-land’ 
(Lambert 2013: 125; see also the German translation of Kämmerer & Metzler 2012: 281 as ‘der die 
Grundrisse (Feldfluren) fest gesetzt hat’), ‘Gil…[t]he creator of grain and flocks, who gives seed for 
the land’ (Lambert 2013: 129), and ‘Zulum, who assigns meadows for the gods and divides up what 
he has created’ (Lambert 2013: 129). 
285 Brinkman 1964, Brinkman 1968: 221-224, Brinkman 1984: 15+61, 46-47.  
286 Frame 1992: 40-42, Lipiński 2000: 419, Beaulieu 2013a: 44-45. 
287 Although, one has to bear in mind that the geographical scope depended at least in part also on the 
place of redaction: Babylon and Borsippa respectively.   
288 See VS 1 37 Col. ii: 41-44. 
289 Brinkman 1964, Brinkman 1968: 221-224. 
290 See above, note 273. 
291 Brinkman 1984: 50-54. 
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canal, but he also adopted traditional Babylonian royal titles, donated lavish temple 
gifts and participated in the New Year’s festival among various other measures.292 
While certainly motivated by a wish to conciliate the local population, these royal 
land allotment schemes also served a greater, economic purpose. Repeated wars, 
military campaigns and incursions took a heavy toll on Babylonia’s countryside. 
Remembering that the foundation of the Babylonian economy was at all times 
agrarian, the old urban centres were doomed without a solid basis in agriculture. 
Following G. van Driel, there can be little doubt that an important purpose of the 
land allotment policy of the kings of this period was the ‘creation, or, minimally, 
strengthening of a town-based land holding group of people’. 293  Royal land 
allotments, including the hanšû schemes, were meant to reinvigorate the economy 
and spur the production of Babylonian cities. This can also be inferred from the fact 
that land schemes were not created in isolation but were usually part of much larger 
redevelopment projects, which beside (re)structuring (existing) estates also involved 
ambitious expansions of the hydraulic network and large-scale canal building. This 
allowed for the dual effect of opening up large areas of unexploited land as well as 
giving new impetus to local and national trade, which could thrive by the improved 
waterway infrastructure. I already mentioned the canal named after Marduk-aplu-
iddin II, which served as the main water supply for newfound hanšû land in Uruk294 
and the opening of the Borsippa canal by Sargon II. A better example, however, is 
the major redevelopment in the hinterland of Sippar under Nabopolassar and 
Nebuchadnezzar II (ca. late seventh - early sixth centuries BCE), which can be 
examined in exceptional detail thanks to the Ebabbar temple archives.295 As has been 
                                                
292 Brinkman 1984: 53. 
293 Van Driel 2002: 297. 
294 Mentioned in AnOr 9 1, Dietrich 2003: no.140 and YOS 3 74. 
295 Jursa et al. 2010: 322-360. Another interesting case outside of Babylonia, although the political 
motivations behind it may have been different, is the massive agrarian development project at the 
Assyrian capital of Nineveh by Sennacherib, described in the following words: ‘to plant gardens, I 
subdivided the meadowland upstream of the city into plots of two pānu each for the citizens of 
Nineveh and I handed (them) over to them … I cut with iron picks a canal straight through mountain 
and valley, from the border of the city Kisiru to the plain of Nineveh. I caused an inexhaustible 
supply of water to flow there for a distance of one and a half leagues from the Husur River (and) 
made (it) gush through feeder canals into those gardens’ (Grayson & Novotny 2012: no 1. ll. 88-90). 
Perhaps worthy of note is that this passages, is followed by the following lines in inscription no. 16: 
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shown by M. Jursa, these royal projects involved the (re-)opening of various major 
canals, the reclamation of new land, the creation of hanšû units and the allotment of 
landed estates to the temple administration and sacerdotal groups – in the city’s 
immediate vicinity but also further afield.296 This royal intervention did not only set 
the parameters for general agrarian expansion and growth after a period of 
destruction caused by Nabopolassar’s ‘war of liberation’ against the Assyrians, but it 
also played an important role in launching the trend towards a more intensive form of 
agriculture.297 Moreover, the expanding agriculture and commerce in Sippar drew 
many newcomers to the city, who further contributed to the region’s prosperity.298 
Besides gaining the support of the local population and boosting the economy, the 
land schemes generated tax income for the state.299 As has been suggested by van 
Driel, the creation of regular field systems resulted from an attempt by the 
Babylonian state to (re)organise the taxable population in a more efficient way.300 
There is increasing evidence to suggest that the possession of land in hanšû schemes 
was indeed subject to tax and service obligations.301 Moreover, the state coffers were 
                                                                                                                                     
‘I provided irrigation for 500 seeded field[s] in the high fields of Nineveh with (that) water (and 
thereby) [I made] grain and cereals grow high and luxuriantly on … an in furrows’ (vol. viii. ll. 24-
28). Not only is this clear evidence for the creation of regular size land schemes in the local 
countryside of Nineveh, the size of two pānu mentioned in the first passage coupled with the 
irrigation provided for five hundred fields in the latter invites for a comparison, if not of a 
identification with so-called līmu, ‘thousand’ land mentioned earlier. For the full-scale of 
Sennacheribs building activities and development project, see Frahm 1997: 275-276 and Grayson & 
Novotny 2012: 16-22 with references to the texts. 
296 Jursa et al. 2010: 355ff. 
297 The fruit of which could only be reaped by later generations, Jursa et al. 2010: 358-360.  
298 Waerzeggers 2014. See especially Ch. 4, in which she discusses the early activities of the Ṣāhit-
ginês and other clans who migrated to Sippar in the first half of the sixth century BCE. 
299  Note however that the evidence comes predominantly from the later Neo-Babylonian and 
Achaemenid periods. While the taxation system developed further in the course of the long-sixth 
century and continued to do so afterwards, we can be sure that a rudimentary structure of taxation 
already existed before and assume that right from the beginning these holdings were encumbered 
with service and tax obligations. How this relates to the status of kidinnūtu (i.e. exemption from 
taxation and corvée labour) one often hears of in this early period is still in need of investigation. 
300 Van Driel 2002: 294ff. 
301 See the evidence presented by van Driel 2002: 297ff. This proposition has been embraced more 
recently by Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009: 240-251, Jursa et al. 2010: 167, 247-249+1471, 461+2543, 647, 
where new conclusive evidence from Borsippa can be found. 
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replenished by fees for the use of hydraulic infrastructures, 302  and tolls on the 
commercial transportation of goods on the waterways. 303  The expanded canal 
network was thus turned into a source of revenue. 
Finally, we have to realise that besides a fiscal dimension the creation of land 
allotments allowed the king to bind the population on a more conceptual level. The 
king showed that he had the resources to undertake the construction of major new 
canals and other large-scale hydraulic complexes. Only he could make use of corvée 
labour on an appropriate scale to maintain the whole system but equally to shut it 
down.  
 
2.1.4. The identity of the beneficiaries 
Unlike other (‘normal’, or non-hanšû) type of land, which was typically identified on 
the basis of its geographic features or location alone, hanšû land was named after a 
person or a family. 304  Although there are a few units that were identified 
otherwise,305 the vast majority of the hanšûs in Borsippa were known as hanšû ša bīt 
(PN//)FN, ‘fifty of the house of family so-and-so’.306 The dual application of family 
                                                
302 In this respect the gugallūtu should be mentioned. It was a payment made on the basis of land 
ownership (found most often in harvest estimations, i.e. imittu texts) for the services of the gugallu 
official. This office is usually translated as ‘canal inspector’ and the evidence, especially from Uruk, 
shows that he was responsible for the maintenance of canals and related hydraulic structures (van 
Driel 2002: 179ff., Janković 2007). New evidence from Borsippa presented in Jursa & Waerzeggers 
2009, suggests that from the reign of Darius I onwards, these gugallus turned into genuine tax 
collectors on behalf of the governor, and put in charge of specific agricultural (hanšû) domains in 
return for a fixed payment. 
303 Note that similar payments will have applied for the transportation via land routes. A number of 
related terms, including kāru (harbour tax), miksu (levy on goods), mūṣû (exit dues), as well as 
nēbiru and maṣīru (levy for…), can be mentioned in this respect (cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 251f.). This 
complex cluster of taxation has been studied by van Driel 2002: 274-282. 
304 Zadok 2006: 420-447. Cf. van Driel 2002: 298-300, Nielsen 2011: passim. Note that some other 
geographical features could be called after a person or family, e.g. the ‘canal of the Damēqu clan’ 
(harru ša bīt-Damēqi, BM 103458), ‘village of Marduk-šumu-ibni(//Ilia)’ (ālu ša Marduk-šumu-
ibni, BM 25794) or ‘irrigated district of Ša-Nabû-damqā’ (tamirtu ša Ša-Nabû-damqā, BE 8 111). 
305  E.g. ‘50ú ina garim ba-he-e’ (TCL 12 11), ‘50ú i-na ugu íd kiški’ (TCL 12 11), ‘50meš šá 
lútinr.tirki.meš (RA 83: 153) ‘50ú ra-bu-ú’ (CT 56 44+), ‘50meš šá urudu6 gub-bu’ (BM 79746), ‘50ú qab-
lu-ú’ (BM 74422). 
306 See the list of hanšûs below. 
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names for both local kin groups and their hanšû estates was especially deep-seated in 
Borsippa. Names were firmly attached to the land and there is no evidence that 
estates were ever renamed, also not after the original ‘eponymous’ family let go of its 
property. 307  In roughly 170 years period covered by the private archive from 
Borsippa, circa fifty-four different hanšû units are mentioned: 
hanšû ša (bīt, henceforth: b.) …308   
 
b. Abunāya b. Bēlāya  
Nabû-remēni//Abunāya b. Bēliya’u309 
b.  Apkallu b. Bibbê 
b. Ašgandu (or: Šukandu) b. Bitahhi310 
b.  Atkuppu Kāṣir//Edu-ēṭir 
b. Bābāya b. Esagil 
b. mār Bā’iru b. Esagil-mansum 
b. Banê-ša-ilia b. Gallābu 
Šumā//Banê-ša-ilia tamirtu humamātu 
Nabû-šumu-iškun//Bārû Ahu-ēreš//Huršanāya 
b. Basia b. Huṣābu 
                                                
307 Contra Zadok 2006: 426, 449. His only example of a hanšû changing its denomination and bearing 
the family name of the new owner (interchangeably: Rē’i-alpi, Mubannû, Kidin-Sîn), is based on a 
misreading and wrong interpretation: 1) the dowry of fNanāya-bulliṭiš//Mubannû, wife of Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi mentioned in BM 101980 is located in the hanšû Mubannû (like in the 
duplicate BM 82607, published in Roth 1990: 53f.) and not in the hanšû Rē’i-alpi. 2) Contrary to 
Zadok 2006: 426, who claims that it subsequently changed from the hanšû Mubannû into the hanšû 
of the Kidin-Sîn family, this in fact concerns a second and different plot all together. These 
additional 4 sūtu of land are said to be on the Canal (harru) of Nabû-šumu-līšir (or -ukīn?) in BM 
26514, which in turn is said to be located in the hanšû of Kidin-Sîn in BM 26492//BE 8 108. Note 
incidentally that if the personal name should be read Nabû-šumu-ukīn, he might be identical with the 
individual who attached his name to parts of the hanšû of Kidin-Sîn described in e.g., BM 94697 
(Cam 07), BM 82654 (Dar 01) EAH 212 (Dar 02). 
308 For the annotated lists of references see the Appendix 2. 
309 This area is not explicitly designated as hanšû, yet the context in which it is mentioned and the fact 
that it is referred to as bīt-Bēliya’u strongly support such an assumption, see Appendix 2. 
310 Note that this might be an alternative spelling for the better-attested family name Barihi. While the 
family name Bitahhi is only found twice in the entire corpus, one of these individuals, Nabû-mukīn-
zēri/ Nādin/Bitahhi (TCL 12/13 189), occurs on two other occasions with the family name Barihi 
(BM 85562 and BM 26635). 
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Iddin-Amurru311 Nabû-mutakkil(?) 
b. Iddin-Papsukkal b. Naggāru 
Saggillu//Iddin-Papsukkal Nummuru//Naggāru 
b. (Ea-)ilūtu-bani b. apil Nappāhu 
Illûa//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani b. Nikkāya 
Nādin-ahi//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani b. Pahhāru 
Suppê-Bēl//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani mār Pa-ni-a-su-šu-du312 
b. Iššakku Nabû-ēṭir//Purattāya 
b. Kidin-Sîn Rabî 
Nabû-šumu-līšir//Kidin-Sîn b. Rē’i-alpi 
PN]//Kidin-Sîn Nabû-zēru-ibni/Nabû-aplu-iddin/Rē’i-alpi 
b. Kudurru u b. fLe’itu b. Rē’i-sisê 
b. Kurgarrê b. Rīšāya 
b. Lahāšu b. Ṣillāya 
b. mār Lāsimu Ša-Nabû-šū 
b. Mubannû b. Ṭābihu 
 
At first glance this list contains many of the families we have encountered in the 
previous chapter on marriage in Borsippa. Families like the Atkuppu, Edu-ēṭir, 
Esagil-mansum, Gallābu, Huṣābu, Iddin-Papsukkal, Ea-ilūtu-bani, Kidin-Sîn and 
Rē’i-alpi all owned prebendary rights in the temples of Borsippa. They make up circa 
25% of the list. Also found among the hanšû denominations are families whose 
prebendary status has not been revealed in the present state of the corpus (ca. 15%). 
As they were related to priestly families through marriage, however, it is not unlikely 
that they did enjoy a professional connection to the temple. This applies to, for 
example, the Bā’iru, Bārû, Kurgarrê, Pahhāru and the Rišāya families. The fact that 
                                                
311 Contrary to Uruk, where the Iddin-Amurru clan is represented among the highest temple ranks – 
notably as kalûs, or cultic singers of the Lady-of-Uruk (Kümmel 1978: 147, 157), the family name is 
not found in Borsippa. Besides the geographic designation, Iddin-Amurru is found only once as a 
personal name in the corpus, VS 4 180 (Dar 36). That this specific hanšû derived its name from a 
personal rather than a clan name is also suggested by the lack of the designation bīt, “house of”. 
312 This is probably an occupational family name because of the use of māru, ‘son’, in front of the 
name; cf. hanšû ša mār Bā’iru (fisherman), hanšû ša mār Lāsimu (express messenger/scout) and 
hanšû ša apil Nappāhu (smith). According to R. Zadok, Pa-ni-a-su-šu-du is a name or term of 
Kassite origin (personal communication, 5-12-2012).  
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all these families had hanšû land named after them has led to the belief that, at least 
in Borsippa, the principal beneficiaries of this type of land were local priestly 
families.313 
While this assertion is not wrong as such, it does fail to appreciate the complete 
landscape of hanšû names. The remaining families (ca. 28%), including the Abunāya 
(or Adnāya), Ašgandu, Babāya, Bēlāya, Bibbê, Bitahhi, Huršanāya, Iššakku, Lahāšu, 
Lāsimu, and Nikkāya do not belong to the circle of prebendary families attested in 
the long sixth century, nor do they seem to have been closely related to them.314 
Moreover, with attestations totalling eleven for Ašgandu, ten for Iššakku, nine for 
Abunāya, six for Purattāya, four for Bibbê, three for Lāsimu and only one for 
Huršanāya, these families occur strikingly little at all. Nonetheless, these clans seem 
to have been native to the Borsippa region, as they remain mostly absent from 
corpora of other Babylonian towns.315   
It thus seems that the range of families that traditionally attached their names to 
hanšû land in Borsippa can roughly be divided in two groups: sacerdotal families and 
closely allied clans who are generally well attested in the Borsippa corpus, and 
families who have remained largely unrecorded. As a consequence this second group 
of families has escaped attention in the literature on hanšû land so far. Is it possible 
to illuminate their background despite the scarce documentation? 
The most tangible evidence we have of their existence is their names and I will 
use this as a starting point. The majority of priestly families boasted a clan name that 
was in line with their professional identity. The Arkāt-ilāni-damqās, Ea-ilūtu-banis, 
Iddin-Papsukkals, Ilias, Ilī-bānis, Ilšu-abūšus, Kidin-Sîns and Nabû-mukīn-aplis, for 
instance, all bear names with theophoric elements that reveal an explicit devotion to 
the gods in whose service they were enlisted as priests.316 Other sacerdotal clans 
                                                
313  E.g. van Driel 2002: 297-298, Nielsen 2011: 8-9, and Jursa et al. 2010: 322. But note the 
awareness in the latter publication that this picture might be a distorted one due the overall priestly 
nature of the Borsippa corpus.   
314 I only deal with hanšû estates identified after families here. The remaining 32% is made up of 
hanšûs named after institutions (h. ša Esagil), irrigation districts (h. ša tamirtu humamātu), personal 
names (e.g. h. ša Iddin-Amurru and h. ša Ša-Nabû-šū), or physical dimensions (h. rabî). 
315 See Wunsch 2014 for the distribution of the most common Babylonian family names. 
316 Note, however, that not all of the prebendary families from Borsippa bear names referencing a god. 
Think for example of the Huṣābu, Ahiya’ūtu or the Mannu-gērûšu families. For the documented 
professions and their families in Borsippa see Zadok [forthcoming]. 
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derive their names from a professional occupation: e.g. Atkuppu (reed-worker), 
Bā’iru (fisherman), Gallābu (barber), Itinnu (doorkeeper), Mubannû (‘arranger-of-
the-sacrificial-table’), Naggāru (carpenter), Nappāhu (smith), Rē’i-alpi (oxherd) and 
Ṭābihu (butcher). While some of these occupations could certainly be found in the 
secular domain outside of the temple, evidence from Borsippa and other temple cities 
like Sippar and Uruk has revealed that these jobs – and the families performing them 
– were well integrated into the prebendary system.317  
If we now turn to the second group of families, important distinctions in naming 
practice can be observed. The first discrepancy is found in the evocation of the divine 
in these names, or rather the lack of it. The Ašgandu, Babāya, Bibbê, Bitahhi, 
Huršanāya, Lahāšu, Nikkāya, Purattāya among other families from this cluster lack 
theophoric elements in their names. This, in my opinion, is a first clue that these 
families did not traditionally insist on a particular veneration of the gods. This finds 
further support if we examine the occupational family names in this group: Ašgandu 
(‘messenger’), 318  Lāsimu (‘express messenger,’ or ‘(military) scout’), 319  Iššakku 
(originally meaning ‘(city-)ruler’ but also used as a designation for a ‘class of 
privileged farmers’), 320  Pa-ni-a-su-šu-du (meaning unknown but presumably of 
Kassite origin)321 and Rē’i-sisê (‘horse-herder’). Contrary to the professions of, for 
example, the mubannû or the atkuppu that were integrated in the temple cult, these 
occupations are not attested as prebendary crafts but rather seem to belong to the 
army and state organisation.322  
                                                
317 Kümmel 1979, Bongenaar 1997, Waerzeggers 2010: 38-42 and Zadok [forthcoming]. 
318 Ašgandu is an Iranian loanword, Powell 1972 and Zadok 2006: 440. It should be noted that a 
certain Gimil-Gula//Ašgandu is mentioned in a catalogue of texts and authors from the library of 
Assurbanipal, bearing the title lúmaš.maš lúum.me.a tin.tirki, ‘exorcist, scholar of Babylon’ (K 9717+, 
col. VI: 8), see Lambert 1962: 66-67. 
319 CAD/L: 106-108. 
320 CAD/I-J: 262-266. Cf. Paulus 2014: 173. 
321 Personal communication R. Zadok (05-12-2012). 
322 Note that the occupation of lāsimu is often found in a royal context, for example among court 
officials in early Babylonian kudurrus. For references see CAD/L: 106-108. Another case at hand 
might be the Bibbê (or Bibbûa) family, which attached its name to the homonymous hanšû (TuM 
2/3 137). As we have seen above, this family is only attested four times in the entire corpus (BM 
29180, BM 94872, BM 26633, VS 5 92 dated between Nbk 17 and Dar 20). This suggests that the 
Bibbûa family was not part of the traditional priestly stratum of Borsippa, or at least not sufficiently 
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Apart from their name types, there is further evidence to support classifying the 
social or professional backgrounds of the families from the second group as not 
being tied to the temple. BM 28826, a text from Borsippa of unknown archival 
context,323 presents a list of at least 44 individuals bearing full filiation, including 
ancestral names, who are said to be, do or give ‘ša šarri’, of/for the king (rev.: 9’).324 
The following family names are preserved in order of attestation:  
 
Adad-nāṣir, Barihi, Ap-pa-en-na (?), Nabû-šemê, Rē’û, Huršanāya, 
Maṣṣār-abulli, Kidin-Nanāya (2x), Gallābu, Ea-bēl-ilāni, Nūr-
Papsukkal, Pahhāru, Iddin-Papsukkal (2x), Ēdu-ēṭir, (Ea-)ilūtu-
bani, Nikkāya, Iššakku, Naggāru, Ṣillāya, Bā’iru (2x), Huṣābu, 
Ninurta-ušallim, Kidin-Sîn, Mudammiq-[…], Rē’i-[…], Kidin-
[…], Arkāt-ilāni(-damqā), Iddin-[…], Patāya, Ilšu-abūšu, Siātu, 
Nappāhu. 
    
As one can see from this list, many of the recorded individuals were members of the 
well-known sacerdotal families: Kidin-Nanāya, Nūr-Papsukkal, Ilšu-abūšu, Huṣābu 
etc. However, the individuals that did not belong to these temple clans are of more 
interest to us. We encounter at least three ‘hanšû families’ of the second group in this 
text, i.e. Nikkāya, Iššakku and Huršanāya – perhaps even four if my assumption is 
                                                                                                                                     
integrated to appear in its archives. According to Wunsch 2014: 304, the family is recorded in 
Babylon, Kish and Sippar. While highly speculative, I wonder whether there is a link with Bibea, the 
leader of the Dakūrus who is mentioned among the royal magnates in the so-called Hofkalender of 
Nebuchadnezzar II (Nbk 07; see Beaulieu 2013a: 34). The Dakūru people were located southeast of 
Borsippa (Lipiński 2000: 419) and a link to this city can thus be expected. The name was not 
uncommon among the Chaldean population, as indicated by the Assyrian letter ABL 1030 which 
mentions a certain Šumāya son of Bibê in the same breath with the notorious Merodach-baladan II 
(Radner 1999: 342). A group of Dakūreans might have been rewarded by the king with a share of 
hanšû land and named the property after its original beneficiary. The descendants might later have 
adopted the denomination as a family name, in a similar scenario as the one described by Nielsen 
2011:  278. 
323 It belongs to the Borsippa sub-collection designated as 98-11-12, which is a mixture of texts 
belonging to the ‘Bēliya’u’ group and ‘Rē’i-alpi’ group according to Waerzeggers 2005. 
324 The pertinent operational passage is lost.  
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correct that Barihi is the more common spelling for the name Bitahhi.325  Other 
families in the list bear names that share the same characteristics as those of families 
of the second group (Ap-pa-en-na, Barihi, Pattāya, Rē’û among others): names 
lacking theophoric elements or describing non-prebendary professions. 
A curious feature of BM 28826 is that none of its individuals is attested elsewhere 
in the Borsippa corpus. This either suggests that the text is of an early date, or, 
perhaps more likely, that it deals with a segment of the community that is not well-
represented in our corpus. Even if it mentions priestly as well as non-priestly 
families, many of the latter individuals occur in the first part of the text, which, 
following Babylonian scribal conventions, should point to their relative importance 
in the transaction. BM 28826 can thus be taken as a piece of evidence in support of 
my proposal to label the families of the second group as ‘secular’. 
The final testimony I would like to discuss here is perhaps the most compelling 
affirmation that the families of the second group came from a different social 
background than the priestly families. It concerns the remarkable rise of the Babāya 
family. As said before, in the years 485 – 484 BCE large parts of the population 
supported two pretenders who challenged Xerxes’ rule over Babylonia.326 While they 
were successful for a short time, Xerxes prevailed over the rebels and retaliated by 
targeting the sacerdotal circles, bringing to an end a large part of the Neo-Babylonian 
documentation.327 After the events of 484 BCE the well-known priestly clans of 
Borsippa all but disappear from the scene and only very few individuals bearing 
family names occur in the post-484 BCE documentation. 328  Yet there are some 
pertinent exceptions. In the late Achaemenid governor’s archive from Babylon, 
known as the Kasr archive, one finds a small dossier pertaining to a certain Bēl-
uṣuršu and his father Ahušunu of the Babāya family.329 Additionally, the only known 
                                                
325 See above note 310. 
326 Kuhrt & Sherwin-White 1987, Rollinger 1998, Kessler 2004, Waerzeggers 2004, Oelsner 2007, 
Baker 2008, Kuhrt 2010, Henkelman, Kuhrt, Rollinger & Wiesehöfer 2011, Kuntner, Heinsch & 
Allinger-Csollich 2011, and Kuntner & Heinsch 2013, 
327 Waerzeggers 2004. 
328 For a study of the socio-economic situation in Babylonia post-484 BCE, readers are referred to the 
dissertation from Vienna University by J. Hackl, [forthcoming (b)] 
329 See e.g. Stolper 1990, Jursa 2005: 61, Clancier 2009: 156-157. A study of the Kasr archive is the 
subject of the forthcoming dissertation by A. Dix, Chicago University. 
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governor (šākin-ṭēmi) of Borsippa after 484 BCE, who is known to have boasted a 
family name, is a descendant of the same Babāya clan. 330  These circumstances 
suggest that the Babāya family, attested in Borsippa some thirty times between 614 – 
484 BCE, had a profile and political agenda that contrasted strongly with that of the 
priestly families, as they were left untouched by the Persian retributions. Quite the 
opposite, the Babāyas seem to have profited from the new political constellation and 
must have enjoyed the goodwill of the king, without which they would not have won 
the post of governor. 
 
2.1.5. The value of hanšû land in the sixth century BCE 
How did families in the sixth century relate to the hanšû estates that their forebears 
obtained by royal favour in the eighth century BCE? It is not hard to imagine that 
being in possession of an ancient estate that bore one’s family name might have 
heralded proof of an established history and successful cross-generational continuity, 
while acquiring land in a hanšû named after another family might have been felt as 
an act of infringement, appropriation, and a likely source for resentment. In the 
following pages I will examine the bond between families and their ancestral hanšû 
lands.  
The evidence on hanšû land in Borsippa reveals traces of continuity as well as 
discontinuity of ownership. Of the forty-one hanšûs named after a family, thirty-
three were alienated at one point or another,331 while only five estates remained in 
possession of their ‘eponymous’ clans. 332  This sobering picture can in part be 
explained by the nature of the sources at our disposal. Documentation on hanšû land 
(and real estate in general) typically comes into existence when the property is sold 
or otherwise transferred, giving rise to a rather unstable picture. However, there is 
additional evidence that helps us to put the data into proper perspective. While thirty-
                                                
330 Waerzeggers 2010: 70. 
331 In eighteen instances (over 50%) of the known sales of hanšû from the original beneficiary family 
this predates the reign of Nabonidus (555 BCE). 
332  The following hanšû estates are mentioned in e.g. inheritance divisions or sale transactions within 
the lineage: h. ša bīt Banê-ša-ilia, h. ša bīt Basia, hanšû Illûa//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani, h. ša bīt Kidin-Sîn 
and h. ša bīt Rē’i-alpi. The h. ša Nikkāya is mentioned only once as a neighbouring estate (TCL 12 
30, Nbk 11) and since no owner is mentioned we cannot know whether it was still kept in the family 
at this point. 
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three hanšûs were alienated by their original beneficiaries, this divorce was seldom 
absolute. Only once was a hanšû unit sold in its entirety.333 Families often held 
multiple hanšû plots in different areas that were named after them. A good example 
is found in the property portfolio of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family, which owned land in 
the hanšû ša Illûa//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani, hanšû ša Nādin-ahi//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani and hanšû ša 
Suppê-Bēl//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani, 334  in addition to land in the hanšû named after the 
ancestral house, the hanšû ša bīt (Ea-)ilūtu-bani.335  
Even if hardship and misfortune forced some families to sell their land, the 
emotional value attached to this type of property is illustrated by the fact that 
attempts were made to redeem lost estates, sometimes many generations later. The 
first case in point can be found in the archive of the above-mentioned Ea-ilūtu-bani 
family. The hanšû ša Nādin-ahi//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani was sold to the Iddin-Papsukkal 
family around the 660s BCE,336 only to be passed on to an individual of the Nappāhu 
clan a short time later.337  The next episode remains undocumented but the land 
eventually ended up in the possession of the Gallābus. In the reign of 
Nebuchadnezzar II, at least half a century later, members of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family 
re-assembled parts of their patrimony,338 and the land then remained in the family’s 
possession.339  
Another, perhaps less successful, attempt of reclamation relates to the hanšû ša bīt 
Gallābu. This land was already lost to the eponymous family during or before the 
reign of Nebuchadnezzar II, at which point it is found in possession of the Ea-ilūtu-
banis. 340  After being divided and partly sold to the Iddin-Papsukkal family, a 
                                                
333 RA 10 no. 46 (Ššu 04) the hanšû ša Nummuru//Naggāru seems to have been sold as a whole to the 
Ilia family. 
334 E.g. YBC 11426 (Ššu 12), TuM 2/3 12 (Ššu 10), .TuM 2/3 23 (Ššu 12). 
335 NBC 8362 (AmM 02). While families could own multiple hanšûs named after individual family 
members, there existed only one hanšû named after the ancestral house, i.e. ‘hanšû ša bīt AN’. 
Perhaps these estates represent the clan’s original allotment from the 8th century BCE. Hanšûs 
named after individuals might have came into being later, after inheritance, acquisition and 
fragmentation. 
336 E.g. TuM 2/3 17, TCL 12 9, and TuM 2/3 11.   
337 TuM 2/3 12. 
338 OECT 12 A 163 ([-]), A 98 (Nbk 08). 
339 E.g. NBC 8360 (Nbk 41) and TuM 2/3 153 (AmM 01) 
340 YBC 9158. 
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member of the Gallābu family was able to reclaim a portion of this hanšû in the time 
of king Nabonidus.341 However, the Gallābus were forced to sell again under king 
Cambyses, only a decade later.342  
There is more evidence of families attempting to regain their ancestral land 
through purchase or exchange, or simply showing a keen interest in it. One example 
is the scribe of the Babāya clan who recorded a cultivation contract for a plot in the 
hanšû ša bīt Babāya. 343  Other examples involve individuals holding shares, 344 
owning neighbouring land,345 and acting as witnesses346 in documents relating to 
their eponymous land.  
A further illustration of the emotional attachment to these ancestral hanšûs is 
found in dowry transactions. We have seen in the previous chapter that the 
presentation of the dowry was an essential feature of Babylonian marriage. Among 
priestly families it typically consisted of slaves, silver, jewellery, household goods, 
furniture and real estate, usually in the form of land.347 In the majority of documented 
dowries in Babylonia this did not concern hanšû land,348 but in Borsippa this was on 
the contrary quite often the case. 349  We know of ten hanšû estates that were 
transferred through dowry transactions. 350  This seems to indicate a limited 
attachment to this land. However, once we take a closer look at these transactions, 
the opposite seems true. In the majority of the endowments the hanšû plot did not 
bear the ancestral name of the bride’s family. There is in fact only one example in 
                                                
341 BM 96351. 
342 BM 29401. 
343 BM 96291. 
344 E.g. VS 3 91 hanšû ša bīt Basia. 
345 E.g., TCL 12 30 h. ša bīt Atkuppu; BM 17599 h. ša bīt Ēdu-ēṭir; AB 241 h. ša bīt Iddin-Papsukkal; 
BM 82656 h. ša Nabû-šumu-ukīn//Kidin-Sîn.  
346 E.g. BM 25630//BM 25630 h. ša bīt Naggāru. 
347 Roth 1989b, Roth 1990 and Oelsner, Welsch & Wunsch 2003: 940-944.  
348 For relevant sources, see Roth 1990: 10-12. 
349  This is in all likelihood thanks to the widespread existence of hanšû land in the Borsippean 
countryside. 
350 I.e. BM 82629 (AfO 36/37 nr. 13), BM 96313, BM 96186, BM 26487, AB 241, BM 26576 = AH 
XV no. 192, Roth 1989: no. 22, BM 101980//BM 82607, BM 96315, BM 29375, BM 103458. Note 
that five more ambiguous transfers might be added. See the appendix 2 for: h. ša bīt Basia, h. ša bīt 
Nabû-šumu-iškun//Barû, h. ša bīt Esagil-mansum, h. ša Saggillu//Iddin-Papsukkal and h. ša bīt 
Ṣillāya. 
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which land was named after the wife-giver’s family.351 This suggests that families 
preferred to endow their daughters with hanšû land that did not belong to their 
original allotment.  
Hanšû land thus was meant to stay in the patrimony to be passed on to future 
generations. Evidence suggests that families held on to their ancestral land for a long 
time indeed. A case in point is the hanšû ša bīt Lāsimu. A member of the Lāsimu 
family sold part of it to the Bēliya’u family in the reign of Darius I (ca. 512 BCE), 
implying that the family had been able to hold on to their ancestral property for over 
two hundred years, since its supposed endowment in the eighth century BCE.352 The 
same is true for the Iššakku family. While evidence on their hanšû also came into 
being at a moment of crisis (it was being held as pledge), BM 29007 dates to the 27th 
year of Darius I (ca. 495 BCE), thus showing that the land had probably been handed 
down within the family for as many as three hundred years. Yet, a note of caution 
should be voiced here. The evidence reviewed above suggests that the hanšû 
schemes in Borsippa originate from the late eighth century BCE, yet one should 
allow for the possibility that some schemes were created at a later date. If my 
understanding of the land described as bīt Bēliya’u in BM 28904 (Nbk 33) is correct, 
it shows that new hanšû units could be created out of existing ones well into the Neo-
Babylonian period.353  
 
 
                                                
351 This might be deduced from text BM 101980//BM 82607. Early in the reign of Darius I (ca. Dar 
05-09) Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi tried (the attempt was later contested and nullified) to assign the 
dowry field in the hanšû ša bīt Mubannû of his wife fNanāya-bulliṭiš//Mubannû to his daughter and 
grandson. This suggests that fNanāya-bulliṭiš brought part of her family’s land into the conjugal 
household when she married into the Rē’i-alpi family. 
352 BM 96289. The hanšû name is not mentioned in the sale contract, but restored from a follow-up 
document (BM 96299). 
353 See Appendix 2. 
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2.2. Land sales and the circulation of property 
Land was an essential component of the subsistence strategy of priests. Yet, despite 
its economic value, the devolution of landed property can and should not be 
interpreted in terms of maximisation of profit alone.354 Beneath the apparent ‘market’ 
functioning of land sales lie social mechanisms of, for example, patronage, charity, 
power, reciprocity, neighbourhood networks, political affiliation etc.355 This raises the 
question whether any limitations of a social kind rested on selling and buying land in 
Borsippa’s priestly community. In this part I will examine whether two major 
principles of social organisation in this group – the hypergamous marriage system and 
professional solidarity – somehow influenced the circulation of this kind of property 
within the community. In both analyses I will add the sales of other immovable 
properties (i.e. non-hanšû land and urban real estate) in order to determine whether 
hanšû land was treated differently from other types of real estate. 
 
2.2.1. Marriage alliances 
Earlier in this thesis I demonstrated that the hypergamous marriage system of 
Borsippa’s priests assigned all participating families a certain set of rights and duties 
vis-à-vis each other. Did these arrangements regulate other types of interactions as 
well? In this section I will examine the relation (if any) between marriage alliances 
and the ways in which families managed their hanšû estates. More specifically, I will 
analyse whether marriage ties regulated the patterns of sale and purchase of this 
property.  
So far the Borsippa corpus references a total of twenty-eight sales of hanšû land.356 
While this number is relatively modest, the diachronic distribution is quite 
satisfactory: three sales (10%) date before the advent of the Neo-Babylonian empire 
                                                
354 Very inspirational in this respect has been the pioneering study by the Italian micro-historian G. 
Levi 1985, L'eredità immateriale: carriera di un esorcista nel Piemonte del Seicento. In this work he 
attempts to reconstruction the ‘peasant-specific rationality’ in 17th century CE Italy, based on the 
study of a specific individual (a local exorcist) and his locality. Of special interest for the present 
study is his endeavour to do away with the widespread misconception among medieval historians 
(and historians in general) that all transactions of land should be interpreted in terms of economic and 
profit-oriented motivations.  
355 Levi 1985: 113-132. 




(ca. 620 BCE), six (21%) before the reign of Nabonidus (555 BCE), ten (36%) until 
the end of Cambyses’ rule (555-522 BCE), and nine (32%) in the final phase of the 
documentation (until 484 BCE). The information about marriage ties of the clans 
involved in these transactions is also reasonably good. In sixteen cases, there is 
information on marital alliances of both parties (ca. 57%); in eleven cases there is 
information for one of the parties (39%). Only once are we completely ignorant on 
marital ties of both parties.  
In the following analysis I adopt the same methodology as in Chapter 1 and use the 
individual clan as basic unit of analysis. This means that the clan or family will be 
understood as a corporate entity whose individual members were to a certain extent 
subject to the same rights, obligations, social agenda and professional identity, and, 
following the alliance system, shared a collective disposition towards the rest of the 
community.  
Let us compare the constellation of wife-givers and wife-takers (Fig. 6, above) and 
the dissolution pattern of hanšû land. The transactions most relevant here are those 
from the first category, where information on the marriage ties of both parties is 
available. In 44% of these transactions, no marital tie between the parties is attested 
so far. Sales of hanšû by a wife-taker family to a wife-giver family are attested in 
31%, or five, instances. In three instances a wife-giver sold hanšû property to his 
wife-taker.  
This does not seem to suggest a particular preference when it comes to finding a 
suitable buyer of hanšû land. However the picture changes once we take the 
chronological arrangement of the transaction vis-à-vis the marriage into consideration. 
The following re-evaluation suggests that the priestly families tended not to engage in 
land transactions anymore once they established a marital tie among them. Of the five 
land sales by a wife-taker to his wife-giver (2x direct, 3x indirect), four transactions 
predate the marriage settlement. 357  The fifth wife-taker was involved in the 
                                                
357 1) In Ššu 07 (TCL 12 9) the Ea-ilūtu-bani family sells hanšû land to the Iddin-Papsukkal family, 
whereas the marriage alliance between these two families was established around Dar 25 (VS 5 96). 
2) In Cyrus 06 (AB 241) an individual from the Aqar-Nabû family and his wife from the Huṣābu 
family sell a piece of hanšû land to the Ahiya’ūtu family, but only in the reign of Darius did the latter 
give a daughter in marriage to the Nūr-Papsukkal family, making the Huṣābus indirect wife-givers of 
both sellers. 3) In the 14th year of Nabonidus (BM 96351), a piece of land in the hanšû of the Gallābu 
clan is sold by the Ea-ilūtu-banis to an individual of the Gallābu clan. It is however only by marrying 
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transaction only as proxy.358 The same is true for sales by wife-givers to wife-takers. 
Two of the recorded transactions were settled long before the marital tie was 
established.359 There is only one instance where a wife-giver sold hanšû land to his 
direct wife-taker after arranging a marriage alliance. But here the sale did not stand on 
its own, being part of a belated dowry transaction, inter-family property transmission, 
or debt settlement.360  
This closer assessment of the evidence thus reveals that 94% of hanšû land 
transactions were concluded between parties that were not related by close or more 
distant marriage. Whether we can talk about a genuine pattern or preference is hard to 
                                                                                                                                      
a daughter to the Kidin-Sîn family circa 30 years later (BM 85447, Dar 06) that the Gallābu clan 
became indirect wife-givers of the Ea-ilūtu-banis. 4) According to BM 82656, the Kidin-Sîn family 
sold a plot of hanšû to the Rē’i-alpi family at the beginning Darius I’s reign. Only several decades 
later did the Rē’i-alpi family become an indirect wife-giver of the Kidin-Sîn family (via the 
Gallābus). 
358 According to BM 25627 (Nbn 00) Nabû-mukīn-apli/Apla/Rē’i-alpi bought land in the hanšû ša 
Rē’i-alpi from an individual of the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā clan. While the families were intermarried, the 
text explains that the seller had previously bought it from fAmat-Ningal//Rē’i-alpi, on behalf of 
Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi (the eventual buyer). It thus represents a sale within the Oxherd family. 
359 1) According to the available evidence the Naggāru family only became an indirect wife-giver of 
the Ilia clan (via Ilšu-abūšu) at the beginning of Nabonidus’ reign (BM 28863 = AH XV no. 115). 
The sale of hanšû land, following the direction of marriage, took place almost 100 years earlier (RA 
46: no. 10, Ššu 07). 2) OECT 12 A 163, dated to the early Neo-Babylonian period (ca. Npl – early 
Nbk), records a transaction of land sold by Gallābu to (Ea-)ilūtu-bani. The former only became a 
wife-giver of the (Ea-)ilūtu-bani family (via Kidin-Sîn) during the reign of Darius (ca. 520s BCE).  
360 The issue at hand concerns the Rē’i-alpi and the Šarrahu families, more specifically fInbā/Nabû-
mukīn-apli/Rē’i-alpi and her husband Rēmūt-Nabû/Nabû-šumu-uṣur/Šarrahu. While the exact date of 
their marriage is unknown it must be dated between the reigns of Nabonidus and Darius I since they 
already had two children by Dar 05. In that year an extensive property transfer was initiated. Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi (father of fInbā) bequeathed his two grandchildren (by fInbā and her husband of 
the Šarrahu family) with large parts of his property, thereby effectively bypassing his own son, 
Rēmūt-Nabû (Waerzeggers 2010: 561-562). While the date of the sale of hanšû land by a certain 
Nabû-râm-nīšīšu//Rē’i-alpi to Nabû-šumu-uṣur//Šarrahu (father-in-law of fInbā//Rē’i-alpi) is missing 
(BM 94552), it is very likely that it was concluded in the same period of property transmission. 
Nabû-râm-nīšīšu was involved in several transactions with Nabû-mukīn-zēri and his son (BM 94653 
= AH XV no. 160, Cam 01; BM 26671, Dar 00; BM 94676 = AH XV no. 171, Dar 01; BM 26535 = 
AH XV no. 199, Dar [x]). This whole dossier is quite complex and it is not unthinkable that this last 
transaction of hanšû land represents the settling of debts between Nabû-râm-nīšīšu, Nabû-mukīn-zēri 




decide, however. The amount of data is too meagre to support a compelling 
quantitative analysis. Nonetheless the same pattern is obtained after we incorporate 
more data into our analysis. In the following statistics all eighty property sales from 
Borsippa, including hanšû land sales, non-hanšû land sales and house sales, have been 
subjected to the same examination.361 This shows that property was sold sixty-two 
times (77,5%) between families not related by marriage; ten times (12,5%) by a wife-
taker to his (in-)direct wife-giver; eight times (10%) by a wife-giver to his (in-)direct 
wife-giver. The number of sales in the latter two categories can be further reduced 
once we take the time of sale into consideration. In eight out of ten cases in which a 
wife-taker sold property to his wife-giver the transaction predates the marriage 
alliance.362 This also applies to at least four of eight occasions when property was sold 
by a wife-giver to his wife-taker.363 Finally in two out of three cases in which one can 
say with confidence that a family sold property to his wife-taker (in all three cases the 
Rē’i-alpi family is involved),364 the transactions were part of a larger property transfer 
                                                
361 See Appendix 3 for a list of sales of housing plots and non-hanšû land. In the following analysis I 
left out those transactions that took place within the same clan (e.g. Bēliya’u: BM 25100; (Ea-)ilūtu-
bani: OECT 12 A 131, TuM 2/3 14, YBC 11426 Gallābu: BM 96343; Lā-kuppuru: VS 5 91; Rē’i-
alpi: BM 82632) and those in which the names of the parties have not been preserved. 
362  For the hanšû sales see above. For the other types of property sales, see the following instances: 1) 
the Gallābu family sold property to the Ilia family early in the reign of Nabonidus (BM 82679); the 
latter is only attested as wife-giver of Gallābu in Nbn 15 (BM 85570). 2) Ea-ilūtu-bani sold a house 
to Ilia D (BM 82740); based on prosopography this took place between Nbn 04 and the reign of 
Cambyses. According to the available documentation the Ilias only became wife-givers of the Ea-
ilūtu-bani clan in Dar 25, via the Iddin-Papsukkal family (VS 5 96). 3) According to BM 85542, 
dated Nbn 16, the Ea-ilūtu-bani family sold land to the Gallābu family. It was however only by 
marrying a daughter to the Kidin-Sîn family circa 30 years later (BM 85447, Dar 06) that the 
Gallābus became indirect wife-givers of the Ea-ilūtu-banis.  
363 For hanšû sales see above. For the other types of property sales: 1) BM 87358 (Nbn 13) records the 
sale of a house by the Nūr-Papsukkal to the Ilia (D) family. It was only some eighty years later that 
the Nūr-Papsukkal family became an indirect wife-giver of the Ilias via the Ilšu-abūšu family (Smith 
Coll. no. 92, Dar 30). 2) In Dar 12 the Gallābus finalised their payment to the Ša-nāšišu family for 
land they had received from the latter. The Ša-nāšišus only became wife-givers of the Gallābus a 
couple of years later through an alliance with the Ilia family (BM 85570).  
364 In the case of the Arad-Ea and Ilia families this cannot be answered with certainty. While the former 
became an indirect wife-giver of the Ilias (through Rē’i-alpi) around Dar 01 at the latest, the date of 
the transaction is lost (BM 94557). There are no prosopographical leads that help us date the text 
more precisely. 
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presumably caused by debt and cannot be seen as ordinary sales.365 Hence, in the vast 
majority, sales took place between parties that were not related through marriage. One 
can thus propose, as a general rule, that in the priestly community of Borsippa 
marriage alliances usually excluded property sales.   
A possible rationale behind this restriction may be sought in the hypergamous 
alliance system. I demonstrated in the previous chapter that by intermarriage two 
clans engaged in a mutual alliance that involved specific rights and obligations 
towards each other. Marriage re-confirmed or indeed triggered a relative status 
difference in which the wife-taking family assumed a superior position. Yet, this 
(marriage) hierarchy was not always clear-cut and perhaps rather fragile. Hence, if 
two clans related through marriage sold land to each other, this could have set a new 
flow of property in motion, compelling the parties to re-evaluate and renegotiate their 
relative status. It is in my opinion precisely the avoidance of this effect that underlies 
the pattern of property sales. Families ranked by marriage did not want to disturb the 
established hierarchy by entering into a new contract. Moreover, buying each other’s 
property might have been perceived as an unfriendly act or an infringement on the 
patrimony; it could easily lead to friction and legal contestation between related and 
befriended clans. The priestly families from Borsippa preferred to preserve the status 
quo established by direct or indirect marriage,366 and searched for a neutral buyer 
instead. This accentuates the cardinal importance of marriage in this sacerdotal 
community, as its repercussions reached well outside of the temple fabric – 
effectively modulating the dissolution of property among the local families. The 
above evidence also confirms that the phenomenon not only had an impact on direct 
marriage partners but also on families that were related by indirect marriage, through 
the principle of transitivity. One can only hope that more evidence on sales, but also 
on marriages will come to light to substantiate, or annul, this hypothesis.  
                                                
365 BM 25712//BM 82790 and BM 26656//BM 26687. These texts belong to a dossier discussed by 
Waerzeggers 2010: 555-556. It concerns the insolvent Nabû-ušebši/Marduk-šākin-šumi/Rē’i-alpi 
who relinquished property to several relatives to pay off his debts.  
366 This is perhaps further supported by the fact that when intermarried clans did engage in property 
sale, it was sold more often than not by the wife-giver to the wife-taker family, thus following the 




2.2.2. Professional solidarity 
In addition to marriage ties, it seems that professional affiliation, perhaps better 
described as group solidarity, may have had an effect on the circulation of property in 
this community. Beginning my analysis with hanšû land, it appears that of eighteen 
instances367 in which a priestly family sold such land, four buyers (22%) belonged to 
the same prebendary group,368 eleven buyers (61%) to another prebendary group,369 
and three buyers (17%) to non-priestly clans. 370  This suggests that there was a 
tendency among Borsippean priests to sell this type of land outside their own 
prebendary group but within the circle of prebendary families. 85% of all sales were 
realised within the broader prebendary circle. If we now change the focus and 
examine the purchase of hanšû land by priestly families, an interesting facet is 
revealed. Out of twenty-two cases in which a sacerdotal clan acquired hanšû land, 
seven sellers (32%) belonged to a non-prebendary family. 371  This suggests that 
sacerdotal families from Borsippa more often bought hanšû land from ‘outsiders’ than 
that they sold it to them: once this land entered into the possession of the sacerdotal 
families, it rarely left their social circle.  
This trend was not restricted to hanšû property, but applies to all types of real 
estate.372 Based on the entire data set it appears that in 55% of cases real estate 
circulated within the larger prebendary group,373  but almost as much (45%) was 
bought from outside families. Only 20% of property sales (perhaps as little as 13%) 
were made by priestly families to non-prebendary outsiders.374 It is also interesting to 
                                                
367 See Appendix 3 for a list of hanšû land sales. 
368 Group specific: 1x baker, 1x brewer, 2x temple-enterer. 
369 More specific, land sold by Baker: 2x oxherds; by Barber: 2x temple-enterers, 1x brewers; by 
Brewer: 1x oxherds; by Butcher: 1x baker; by Temple-enterer: 2x brewers, 1x barbers.   
370 Land was sold to a member of the Adad-ibni, Mudammiq-Marduk, and Šarrahu families. 
371 Ša-ṭābtišu (VS 5 140), Lāsimu (BM 96289), Šagimmu (BE 8 43), Damēqu (TuM 2/3 15), Asaluhhi-
mansum (VS 5 48), individual without clan affiliation (BM 26510) 
372 See appendix 3 for a list of all property sales from Borsippa. 
373 Of the 55 transactions in which sacerdotal families were involved as buyers: 7 times (13%) was 
intra-prebendary, 23 times (42%) inter-prebendary and 25 times (45%) extra-prebendary (i.e. from 
outsiders). 
374 Of the 40 transactions in which sacerdotal families are found as sellers: 7 times (18%) was intra-
prebendary, 25 times (63%) inter-prebendary and 8 times (20%) extra-prebendary. But note that at 
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note that the Rē’i-alpi family was involved in most sales in the last category. As I 
have shown earlier, this prebendary group occupied a lower rung in the temple 
hierarchy and in comparison to the other (higher ranking) priestly families adopted an 
outward-looking attitude in the local alliance system by marrying with outsiders. 
These figures suggest that the priestly stratum in Borsippa worked as a centripetal 
force, steadily acquiring new property and releasing only very little from its control. 
This may be seen as a form of solidarity, not per se within one’s own professional 
group, but towards the prebendary circle at large. But a note of caution is at place 
here. The numbers drawn from this quantitative analysis are likely to be a result of the 
biased nature of our documentation, consisting mainly of archives of priests. While 
the patterns of dissolution among priestly families may well be representative, this 
cannot be said with the same degree of certainty for sales outside the prebendary 
circle. Babylonian archival practice dictates that, together with the sale of property, all 
documents relating to the sold property were transferred.375 This renders the 20% of 
property sales made by priestly families to non-priestly families questionable, since 
most of the property that was sold in such transactions has become largely 
untraceable. One has to maintain the possibility that there were much more 
transaction from this category. In order to validate these findings we will need 
additional archives of at least some outside families to see whether their dynamics of 
dissolution agree with the ones reconstructed above for the prebendary circles. 
                                                                                                                                      
least three sales from this last category were between direct marriage partners. It is thus perhaps not 
entirely correct to label these as ‘extra-prebendary’. 
375 Oelsner, Wells & Wunsch 2003: 923-924. 
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2.3. Tenancy and agricultural collaboration  
Land ownership was not only a marker of wealth and prestige but it also guaranteed a 
livelihood for its owner. In the waterlogged region of Borsippa, agriculture was 
geared largely towards date palm cultivation.376 Besides the yearly harvest of dates, 
owners could extract a set of by-products from the trees, among which various 
baskets, processed dates, palm-fibre and firewood.377 In order to reach and maintain 
productivity of the land, continuous labour and care were required.378 Besides the 
obvious tasks of planting and harvesting, the sources inform us about a range of 
activities such as maintaining the irrigation channels, watering, breaking up soil clods, 
weeding, tending to palm-trees, palm-shoots and the subculture, erecting fences and 
walls, and the protection of the land in general.379  
Since much of their attention was centred towards their cultic duties in town, 
priestly families did not usually cultivate their own land, but, with a few exceptions, 
outsourced agricultural labour to others. 380  This practice has left an extensive ‘paper 
trail’ in the archives of Borsippa’s priests, in the form of cultivation contracts, harvest 
estimations, field-rent payments, debt notes and receipts.381 On the basis of these 
                                                
376 Jursa et al. 2010: 360-385. While there is evidence for the cultivation of barley, and to a lesser 
extent also sesame (e.g. NBC 8362 (AmM 02), BM 29473 (Dar 19) and Bellino Q (Dar II 14)), wheat 
(e.g. BM 94716 (Dar 10)) and emmer are underrepresented in Borsippa. The latter is so far only 
attested in the cult (e.g. BM 96320 (Dar 15)). The trend towards a more intensive form of date-palm 
horticulture, partly at the expense of arable farming, was well advanced in sixth century Borsippa, cf. 
Jursa et al. 2010: 437-443. 
377  For secondary products from date-palm cultivation, see Landsberger 1967: 42ff. It was not 
uncommon to grow other fruits and vegetables in separate tracts or as subculture between the palms. 
In Borsippa one hears occasionally of grapevines (e.g. BM 29004 (Dar 10), RA 10 no. 40 (d.l.)), figs 
(e.g. BM 103637 (Dar 13)), pomegranates (e.g. BM 102012 (Dar 08)) and onions (e.g. BM 94688 
(Cam 02), BM 82660 (Cam 03), BM 17683 (Dar 06)).  
378  See Ries 1976, van Driel 1990 and Jursa 2004a, for Neo-Babylonian cultivation and its 
technicalities. Extensive references and bibliography can be found in these publications. 
379 Cf. Jursa 2004a. 
380 There are a few attestations in which young members of prebendary families are found working on 
their patrimonial land, or, at least assuming management over it. It has been suggested by Jursa et al. 
2010: 182ff., that this might have been a temporary occupation for individuals of priestly families 
before they were enrolled in the priesthood.  
381 Of particular interest are those debt notes and receipts that that mention typical agricultural terms 
like imittu, sūtu, šibšu, ebūr eqli or sissinu. On these terms, see Jursa 1995. 
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sources, patterns of tenancy can be reconstructed. While some information on tenants 
of private land can be found in the literature,382 existing studies are usually concerned 
with economic matters, technicalities of agriculture, and the legal position of the 
tenants in terms of income rights and contract durations – social aspects of tenancy 
have received little attention thus far.383 
In the following pages I will take a closer look at the tenants who were employed 
in the cultivation of the landholdings of our priests. By analysing the identity of these 
tenants in conjunction with the identity of the landowners, new light can be shed on 
interfamily relations in the agricultural sphere and the social organisation of the 
priestly community vis-à-vis other social groups in Borsippa. Tenants can be divided 
in three groups: tenants of unfree status, free tenants without family names, and free 
tenants with family names. These three groups will be discussed in said order.  
 
2.3.1. Unfree tenants 
The first group of tenant employed by our priests – the group that appears least 
frequently in their documentation – are unfree individuals, to know širkus and private 
slaves. A širku, literally ‘oblate,’ was a serf bound to the temple.384 While usually 
retained by the institution, širkus did enjoy some freedom as they were, for example, 
allowed to marry and to acquire property, which they could dispose of freely. Even if 
they never became fully independent actors, some širkus were able to acquire 
personal wealth.385 
Tenants of širku status are attested a dozen times in Borsippa. They occur as 
debtors of harvest estimates (perhaps as seasonal workers),386 as well as fully fledged 
                                                
382 Specific prosopographies of tenants can be found in archival studies, e.g. Joannès 1989: 65-96, 
Wunsch 2000: 54-58 and Baker 2004: 65-68. One finds general statements concerning the use of free 
labour in Neo-Babylonian agriculture, e.g. ‘the labor of free farmers and tenants was the basis of 
agriculture’ (Dandamaev 1996: 208), or ‘[t]he urban upper class tended to lease their land to free 
tenants rather than farm it themselves or with slaves’ (Jursa et al. 2010: 31). 
383 Management and tenancy of temple land have received more thorough analysis. Note especially 
Jursa 1995: 7-47 where the social status and background of the temple farmers are examined.  
384 On the status of the Neo-Babylonian širku, see e.g. recently Kleber 2011. 
385 A well-known example is Gimillu, a high-profile širku from Uruk, recently discussed by Jursa 
2004c. 
386 E.g., BM 85649 (Cam 05), BE 8 111 (Dar 16), VS 3 128 (Dar 21). 
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gardeners in cultivation contracts.387 Normally they seem to have been employed 
independently, but on at least one occasion a širku was hired for the cultivation of an 
onion field in addition to a well-established tenant of the Naggāru family.388 Most 
širku tenants occur only once in the documentation, which suggests that they were 
hired on an ad hoc basis, perhaps only when the temple could spare their labour and 
temporarily allowed them to work elsewhere. Yet, there is at least one instance where 
a širku enjoyed a longer relationship to the land and its owner. The case in question 
comes from the Bēliya’u archive. In Dar 20, Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u bought an orchard 
located in the hanšû ša bīt mār Lāsimu.389 The three ensuing harvest estimations, 
dated to Dar 21, 22 and 23, were all due from Haddā/Guzānu, a širku of Nabû.390 He 
thus tended to this garden for at least three years. There is one further imittu text 
concerning the same plot, which dates to Xer 01, some fifteen years later. In BM 
28972 the debtor is not Haddā, however, but a certain Šamaš-ibni//Arad-Nergal. Even 
so, two details suggest that Haddā was still associated with this land. First, Šamaš-
ibni//Arad-Nergal witnessed all previous imittu estimations due from Haddā, raising 
the possibility that he had always superintended Haddā. Second, BM 28972 is written 
by a certain Bēl-ēṭir/Haddā. While he is not identified as a širku, it seems likely that 
he was the son of Haddā. Not only does this indicate that Haddā’s tenancy spanned 
well over a decade, but also that he passed some of his charges on to the next 
generation.391 
Another point of interest is the fact that temple oblates are only found on land held 
by members of the Bēliya’u, Iddin-Papsukkal, Ilia, and Gallābu families – all of 
whom were priestly families.392 Although this could be a coincidence of discovery, in 
                                                
387 E.g., BM 94688 (Cam 02), BM 29499 (Dar 14), BM 26524 (Dar 15). 
388 The cultivation contract in question is BM 94688 (Cam 02) and belongs to the Ilia (A) archive; one 
year earlier the same Lābāši//Naggāru leased a field from the Ilia family (BE 8 79). 
389 BM 29113. 
390 VS 3 128 (Dar 21), BM 96299 (Dar 22), BM 96221 (Dar 23). 
391  Also note that in BM 96303 (Dar 10) Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u rented a house to a širku named 
Guzānu/Nergal-iddin. If this person should be identified as the father of Haddā the association 
between the two families spanned three generations and as many decades. 
392 The latter does not concern the non-prebendary Gallābu family whose archive we have. Note, 
however, that the above-mentioned Haddā or his brother might also have cultivated the land for the 
Lāsimu family before it entered the Bēliya’u archive. This idea is based in the fact that he received 
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the archive of the non-priestly Egibi family from Babylon, which is our most 
extensive source on private landowning in Babylonia, temple oblates are not attested 
as tenants.393 Perhaps thanks to their association to the temple, priestly families were 
more likely to profit from (or, perhaps, had better access to) this source of 
institutional manpower. 
The second group of unfree tenants is made up of privately owned slaves. Virtually 
all prosperous urban families owned slaves.394 They were the absolute property of 
their masters and could thus be disposed of freely, but slaves did occasionally enjoy a 
greater degree of freedom.395  We find them married, running important business 
affairs of their masters, and acquiring property, while some slaves were allowed to set 
up businesses of their own.396 However, slaves are mentioned only infrequently in 
relation to agricultural activities – less than a dozen times in the Borsippa corpus, in 
keeping with the general trend.397 While most of them are found as debtors of imittu 
estimates, suggesting that they were put to work during harvest time when extra hands 
were required,398 at least one slave was responsible for the actual cultivation of a 
field.399 In seven out of ten known cases of slaves being employed as tenants, they 
were working land of their own master, sometimes in tandem with a free gardener.400 
                                                                                                                                      
part of the purchase price. Yet, the background of this compensation is not made explicit in BM 
29113 (Dar 20). 
393 Wunsch 2000: 54-58. 
394 Jursa et al. 2010: 233ff. 
395 See Oelsner, Wells & Wunsch 2003: 928-93 on the Neo-Babylonian (chattel) slave, including 
previous bibliography. 
396 In which case they were obliged to pay their owner a quit-rent (mandattu). Best-known in this 
respect are the agent-slaves of the Nūr-Sîn and Egibi families, see e.g. Dandamaev 1984: 345ff., 
365ff. and Wunsch 1993: 42-50. An interesting example from the priestly circles from Borsippa is 
the slave Balāṭu. Besides being active as agent for his masters of the Ilšu-abūšu (A) family, Balāṭu 
helped him with the brewing of beer for the offerings, thereby clearly making a small profit of his 
own. Interestingly, the documents from Balāṭu seem to have been discovered separately from those of 
his master, suggesting that he kept his own archive. See Jursa 2005: 88-89 and Waerzeggers 2010: 
437-441, including the publication of some of his documents.  
397 Dandamaev 1984: 252ff., 277; Jursa et al. 2010: 234-235. 
398 E.g., A 92 (Nbk 34), TuM 2/3 156 (Ner 01), BM 26548 (Dar 13). 
399 BM 29489 (Cyr 05) from the Ibnāya archive. 
400 E.g. TCL 12/13 52 (Nbk 35), TuM 2/3 156 (Ner 01), BM 102178 (Dar 02), BM 94816 (Dar 22). 
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Families, who used their own slaves for agricultural purposes, are the Ea-ilūtu-bani, 
Ilī-bāni, Ilia (A) and Ilia (D) families. 
 
2.3.2. Tenants without family names 
The use of a family name functioned as a marker of established descent and affiliation 
to the urban elites. Individuals lacking this nominal affiliation presumably constituted 
the greater part of the Babylonian population. In the Borsippa corpus there are, 
however, only slightly over fifty references to such individuals – some of who may be 
of foreign (West-Semitic) extraction401 – employed on the land of priestly families. 
This group of tenants accounts for less than 20% of the entire (recorded) labour force. 
The labour of these tenants was often secured on a contractual basis by means of 
(short-term) cultivation contracts. While generally employed for unspecific 
‘gardening’ (ana nukuribbūti) 402  and ‘cultivation’ (ana errēšūti), 403  some tenants 
obtained the lease of a field against a fixed rent (ana sūti).404 The latter is suggestive 
of a more professional, business-oriented enterprise from the perspective of the 
gardeners.405 
Without the help of family names it is difficult to keep track of these tenants in the 
documentation. The widespread use of nicknames and the at times lacunal 
documentation make it often impossible to establish whether references concern the 
same person or not. The initial impression is that priests, who needed their services 
mainly around harvest time or as seasonal workers, employed these tenants only 
periodically. However, taking a closer look at the available evidence enables the 
identification of priestly families who did enjoy more stable business relations with 
tenants of lower strata. The first clue comes from the cultivation contracts mentioned 
above. While the duration of employment is usually not specified in these cultivation 
contracts (a lease duration of minimum one year is to be expected), at least five 
agreements were made for either three or five years, all of them belonging to the 
                                                
401 E.g., Digiria in TEBR 74 (Dar 21), Napsānu in BM 17648 (Cam 07), Šenduri in YBC 9191 (Nbk 
[x]). 
402 E.g., TuM 2/3 133 (Kan 04), BM 29487 (Dar 12), BM 29020 (Xer 02). 
403 E.g., NBC 8362 (AmM 02), BM 28954 (Dar [x]). 
404 E.g., TuM 2/3 137 (Cam 02), BM 94826 (Dar 11). 
405 For the different types of cultivation contracts, see Jursa 2004a. 
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Bēliya’u archive. 406  Another example of a long and stable tenant–landowner 
relationship is found in the Ilia (A) archive. Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia inherited a plot 
located in the so-called tamīrtu Hamar area, which he kept undivided with his two 
younger brothers. The first harvest estimation (imittu), dated to Dar 03, was due from 
a certain Šumu-ukīn/Nabû-ēṭir, who also delivered the dates in Dar 07 and Dar 09.407 
While Šumu-ukīn was replaced by another tenant in Dar 16, 408  he was back in 
business together with a colleague two years later.409 His final attestation as tenant 
dates to Dar 26 when he is identified by his full name, Nabû-šumu-ukīn.410 Other 
examples can be found in the Ea-ilūtu-bani, Ilī-bāni and Rē’i-alpi family archives.411  
Finally, it is worth considering which of the priestly families employed lower-
stratum individuals. Although such tenants were employed by all of the priestly 
families – from the highest temple-enterers to the lowest reed-workers – there is one 
priest who seems to have availed himself of their labour on a much larger scale. 
Whereas in most priestly archives these individuals represent around 20% of the 
tenants,412 in the archive of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u they are found almost half of the time 
(twenty out of forty-two instances). Whether this should be explained in the light of 
Šaddinnu’s particular background needs further study. 413  One should, however, 
                                                
406 BM 29004 (Dar 10), BM 29487 (Dar 12), BM 96190 (Dar 20), BM 28954 (Dar [x]) and BM 29020 
(Xer 02). 
407 BM 109868 (Dar 03), BM 87275 (Dar 07), VS 3 105 (Dar 09). 
408 VS 3 121 (Dar 16?). 
409 BM 27797 (Dar 18). 
410 KVM 59 (Dar 26). 
411 Ea-ilūtu-bani: In BM 94600 (AmM [x]) a certain Nabû-ahu-iddin has to deliver the harvest of a 
field, to Zēru-Bābili//Ea-ilūtu-bani. By Nbn 13 Zēru-Bābili was succeeded by his son Mušēzib-
Marduk and the same seems to have happened to Nabû-ahu-iddin. TCL 12/13 105 (Nbn 13), BM 
94780 (Nbn 13), NBC 8347 (Nbn 13) and BM 94851 (Nbn [x]) report on the agricultural activities of 
Rēmūt and Kalbā, sons of Nabû-ahu-iddin. It stands to reason that these are indeed the sons of the 
former tenant. Ilī-bāni: L 1637 (Nbn 09) is an imittu debt that was due from Itti-Nabû-
balāṭu/Bullissu. 20 years later we meet the same tenant cultivating a different field for the same 
family (TuM 2/3 127, Cam 02). Rē’i-alpi: BM 94684 (Dar 12) is a debt note for dates and palm-
fibres, which had to be delivered by Nabû-ittannu/Arrabi to the Rēmūt-Nabû//Rē’i-alpi. The same 
tenant was responsible for imittu six years later in BM 94675 (Dar 18). 
412 Ilia (A +D): 13 out of 66 tenants; Ea-ilūtu-bani, Ilī-bāni and Nanāhu: 16 out of 65 tenants; Atkuppu: 
3 out of 9 tenants; Rē’i-alpi: 3 out of 12 tenants. 
413 For Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u see Ch. 0.7.3. 
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remember that Šaddinnu was the only priest who according to the available sources 
employed these tenants explicitly for three to five years through binding cultivation 
contracts. 
 
2.3.3. Tenants with family names 
The second group of free individuals employed on the land of priests is made up of 
persons identified by a three-tier genealogy (‘PN, son of PN, descendant of FN’), i.e. 
individuals with family names. With close to two hundred attestations, they make up 
the lion’s share (75%) of the tenants. 414  Just like lower stratum tenants, these 
individuals are found both engaging in prolonged cultivation by contract and 
delivering the produce of the field around harvest time. While usually operating 
alone, they could also team up with colleagues to perform the work in pairs 
(sometimes alongside tenants without family name or slaves). 
Taking a look at the clans whose members assumed agricultural responsibilities, it 
appears that a very wide range of names is represented. Once again, these can be 
divided into roughly two groups. On the one hand, there are families that did not 
belong to the priestly circle of Borsippa, like the Agru, Babūtu, Hunzû, Hulamišu, 
Itti-enši-Nabû, Maṣṣār-abulli, Raksu, Ṣilli-ahi, Ša-haṭṭu-ēreš and Zērāya families. 
Besides being underrepresented in our priestly corpus, these names are found 
predominantly in documents relating to land management, frequently drafted in the 
countryside itself. This suggests that these families did not belong the core of 
Borsippa’s urban elite, but concerned themselves primarily with (agricultural) 
activities outside of town.415 On the other hand, most of the tenants were affiliated to 
temple-based families, such as temple enterers (e.g., Aqar-Nabû, Ilī-bāni), brewers 
(e.g., Ilia, Ilšu-abūšu,), butchers (e.g., Ibnāya, Eppēš-ilī), bakers (e.g., Esagil-mansum, 
Kidin-Sîn), and reed-workers (Atkuppu). These tenants, like their non-priestly 
                                                
414 In comparison tenants without family names make up circa 17%, and unfree tenants only 8%. 
415 BM 28933 (AmM 01) might serve as a case in point. In this contract an individual of the Ša-haṭṭu-
ēreš family is found leasing the office of gugallu – an agricultural office often translated as ‘canal 
inspector’ – from the governor of Borsippa for the yearly sum of two minas of silver, see Jursa & 
Waerzeggers 2009: 242f. Yet, the lucrative post of gugallu was equally coveted by local families 
with a temple-based background, cf. BM 29035//BM 96285 (Ner 00). 
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counterparts, seem to have lived outside of Borsippa.416 Whether these individuals 
performed the labour in person or hired tenants and/or employed unfree labour is 
something we cannot determine from the present documentation, but the latter seems 
not unlikely.417  
Let us now have a look at the families who cooperated in the agricultural sphere. 
This is best done by looking at our main sources individually, notably the Ea-ilūtu-
bani, Ilia (A), Bēliya’u and Atkuppu archives.418 The Ea-ilūtu-bani archive cluster 
provides us with evidence pertaining to families of the highest temple status.419 Many 
different families were engaged in the cultivation of their private land, both priestly 
and non-priestly in nature. The overall impression is that of fairly stable tenancy 
relations. Several individuals are repeatedly found in their employment: e.g. in Ner 
03, Zēru-Bābili//Ea-ilūtu-bani hired a certain Nādin/Nabû-šumu-ibni/[x]-matu for the 
cultivation of a field for the duration of five years.420 In Nbn 04 this contract was 
extended for another three years. 421  There are at least five other individuals, 
respectively from the Ibnāya, Iddinā, Siātu, Šangû-Ninurta and Širikti-Nabû families, 
who were hired in more than one year for harvesting purposes.422  
More interesting, however, is the fact that in this tight-knit family cluster much of 
the collaboration took place within the prebendary group. There are at least three 
members of the wider Ea-ilūtu-bani clan who engaged in the cultivation of land. In 
the first case, the employer was Mušēzib-Bēl//Ea-ilūtu-bani;423 the two remaining 
                                                
416 This is because the majority of these tenants do not resurface elsewhere in the documentation. A 
unique archive of such a ‘country dweller’, namely the small archive of fInṣabtu//Naggāru, is 
published in Waerzeggers 1999/2000.  
417 Perhaps, one could postulate that for those well-to-do country dwellers the most honourable way of 
making a living and maintaining their patrimony was to take on agricultural management for third 
parties, presumably in addition to their own land. This idea needs further study. 
418  Information from other priestly archives comes in much smaller amounts. Especially, the 
information on land management in the Rē’i-alpi archive is exceptionally sparse. 
419 For this archive see Ch. 0.7.1. 
420 TuM 2/3 135 (Ner 03). 
421 TuM 2/3 136 (Nbn 04) 
422 Nabû-šumu-iškun//Iddinā: TCL 12/13 56 (Nbk 30+) and A 180 (Nbk 40); Itti-Šamaš-balāṭu//Ibnāya: 
TuM 2/3 155 (Nbk 40) and TuM 2/3 154 (Nbk 41); Nabû-ahhē-ušallim//Siātu: TuM 2/3 159 (Cyr [x]) 
and L 1668 (Cyr 07); Nabû-ēṭir//Šangû-Ninurta: L 1647 (Nbn 13) and A 178 (Nbn [x]); Arad-
Nanā//Širikti-Nabû: TuM 2/3 162 (Cam 03) and TuM 2/3 163 (Cam 06). 
423 BM 94692 (Cyr 06). 
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tenants were hired by the Ilī-bāni family.424 Hence, all three tenants were working 
either for a member of their own clan, or for a family to which they were associated 
by marriage and professional affiliation. The same is true for the temple-enterer 
families of the Ilī-bāni and the Aqar-Nabû. Of the five Ilī-bānis who were employed 
as gardeners, four worked on land owned by the same clan.425 Three tenants from the 
Aqar-Nabû family were hired by the Ilī-bānis and the Nanāhus.426 While at least in 
one case collaboration proceeded from the fact that the tenant owned neighbouring 
land – in the light of inheritance and close intermarriage this might have been the 
primary motivation behind other collaborations as well – one cannot escape the 
impression that in the group of temple-enterers, patterns of tenancy were also 
motivated by clan membership, intermarriage and professional affiliation. In fact, a 
similar attitude of solidarity towards the own professional group is found in their 
credit operations (see Ch. 3.1). 
The Ilia (A) archive is our largest source on agricultural management by the 
brewers of Ezida. Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia held a number of small plots in various 
locales, some of which together with his younger brothers. Although individuals 
employed by Marduk-šumu-ibni came from a limited number of families, he was able 
to secure their services on a longer basis than his senior temple colleagues. Besides 
members of his own clan, most of the tenants were recruited from the Esagil-mansum, 
Iddin-Papsukkal, Ilšu-abūšu, Naggāru, Ša-haṭṭu-ēreš and Ṣilli-ahi families.427 If we 
compare these families with the marriage network (Fig. 6, above), it appears that most 
of them qualify as direct or indirect wife-givers of the Ilias. Not only is this in line 
with the pattern of tenancy observed among the temple-enterers, this correlation gives 
further weight to the importance of marriage in this community. Priestly marriage in 
Borsippa did not only entail the transfer of a woman and her property, it also implied 
that the wife-giver family provided certain services to its wife-taker. Note in this 
                                                
424 TuM 2/3 77 (Nbk 38) and NBC 8338 (Nbn 15). 
425 TCL 12/13 97 (Nbn 10), TCL 12/13 128 (Cyr 03), NBC 8361 (Cyr 04), BM 94608 (Dar 26); 
according to BM 96306 (d.l.) Ṭābia//Ilī-bāni was working for Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, together with 
another gardener of the Pahhāru clan. 
426 Ilī-bāni: TuM 2/3 158 (Nbn 09) and TCL 12/13 97 (Nbn 10); Nanāhu: TuM 2/3 165 (Dar 03) 
427  Among the most notable tenants are: Šumu-ukīn//Esagil-mansum, BM 102278 (Cam 01); 
Nidintu//Iddin-Papsukkal, BM 17686 (Dar 05); Lābāši//Naggāru, BM 94688 Cam 02); Nabû-tabni-
uṣur//Ša-haṭṭu-ēreš, LB 863 (Nbn 15); Nabû-uṣuršu//Ṣilli-ahi, BM 95194 (Cam/Cyr 01). 
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respect that both the Ilšu-abūšus and the Naggārus acted as ēpišānūtu for the Ilia clan 
and thus provided their wife-taker with cultic support as well (see Ch.1.6). 
Additional evidence comes from the baker’s archive of the Bēliya’us. We have 
seen already that half of Šaddinnu’s tenants were recruited from the lower and unfree 
strata of society. Turning to the tenants with family names, it seems that he enjoyed 
particularly strong collaborations with tenants from the Bā’iru, Pahhāru and Esagil-
mansum families.428 While the first family does not figure prominently in Šaddinnu’s 
affairs, his relationship with the Pahhārus and the Esagil-mansums was well-
established. An individual from the Pahhāru clan had married his mother after her 
husband’s death.429 The Esagil-mansums were immigrants like the Bēliya’us and also 
belonged to the ranks of the temple bakers. Moreover, they had committed themselves 
as wife-givers to Šaddinnu’s family, and acted as Šaddinnu’s ēpišānū in the cult. This 
gives additional force to the idea that intermarriage regulated patterns of tenancy. 
Incidentally, the Pahhāru family was also an indirect wife-giver of the Bēliya’u clan. 
The Atkuppu family was located on the lowest fringes of the priestly community, 
in both economic and professional terms. Accordingly, their pattern of tenancy, which 
differs from what we have observed among more senior temple colleagues, is 
congruent with their, modest position. First of all, it appears that none of their tenants 
came from priestly families. With the exception of gardeners from the Atkuppu 
family itself, collaboration took place with the Ašgandu, Maṣṣār-abulli, Rēmūt-Ea and 
Zērāya families. Secondly, as opposed to their senior colleagues, the archive holding 
branch of the Atkuppu family engaged frequently in agricultural management 
themselves. They are found in the employment of the Gallābu, Ilia and Kidin-Nanāya 
families (all senior temple families),430 although most of the Atkuppu’s labour force 
was invested within the extended family. Hence, out of eleven tenants from the 
Atkuppu family, seven worked on land owned by the Atkuppus themselves or by 
                                                
428  Most notably: Habaṣīru (aka. Ṣiṣiru)//Bā’iru, BM 29474 (Dar 20?); Bēl-uballiṭ (aka. 
Bibānu)//Pahhāru, BM 96306 (d.l.); Iddin-Nabû//Pahhāru, BM 29432 (Dar 21); Lābāši//Esagil-
mansum, BM 96277 (Dar 22); Mār-bīti-ahhē-iddin//Esagil-mansum, VS 3 91 (Dar 02). 
429 Šaddinnu’s father died early in the reign of Nabonidus and his mother had presumably married 
Nādin//Pahhāru by Nbn 07 (BM 29067). In his last will dated to Cyr 08 (BM 28861), Nādin specifies 
that his new wife should live in his main residence for the rest of her live, which might suggest that 
she had moved there already before, presumably together with her child Šaddinnu. 
430 Gallābu: BM 26627 (Dar 26); Ilia (D): BM 26736 (Dar 24); Kidin-Nannāya: BM 25713 (Dar 14). 
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members of the Adad-nāṣir family, to which it was linked through marriage.431  
                                                
431 BM 87327 (Cyr 05), BM 87348 (Cam 01), BM 27781 (Cam 094), BM 17706 (Dar 04), BM 17694 
(Dar 05), BM 94787 (Dar 11), BM 28897 (Dar 18).  
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Conclusion  
In the first part of this chapter I have traced the creation of hanšû land in Borsippa and 
the surrounding region back to the reign of Erība-Marduk, the Chaldean king who 
ruled in the first quarter of the eighth century BCE. The motivations behind these 
royal land allotment schemes were multiple. Economically they enabled the state to 
(re)organise the taxable population in a more systematic way, to reinvigorate the 
agricultural output and the mercantile potential of the urban centres, and to turn the 
hydraulic infrastructure into a more lucrative source of revenue. On an ideological 
level, it allowed the kings to walk in the footsteps of Marduk who, as king of the 
gods, had established boundaries and granted land to his divine subjects. Yet, there 
can be little doubt that in the extreme political volatility of the early first millennium 
BCE, the need to conciliate the local population was great for any king. 
My enquiry has made it clear that in Borsippa the ownership of this type of land 
was not a specifically priestly prerogative. In addition to hanšûs that were named after 
an individual, temple or geographic location, a far larger number was named after 
local families. Only 40% of these hanšû names refer to sacerdotal families and 
families associated to them by marriage. Of the remaining hanšû names, 28% refer to 
families who did not belong to this circle. Based on a number of arguments, I 
proposed to label the latter collectively as having a ‘secular’, and perhaps more 
specifically a military, background. 
These results are important for several reasons. First and foremost, they show 
beyond doubt that the local upper stratum was not restricted to priestly families but 
included families with different social backgrounds (e.g., royal, military, or 
commercial). It has to be seen whether future investigation can improve and refine the 
characterisation of individual families within this group. Second, as the hanšû grants 
benefitted priestly as well as non-priestly families, the local countryside became an 
arena in which the larger Borsippean elite stratum had a stake. Yet, even here 
Borsippa’s priestly families kept interaction with non-priestly outsiders to a 
minimum. These findings thus provoke a more weighty impression of the priestly 
stratum as a social group. Having demonstrated that the Borsippean elite community 
consisted of a far larger group of families than only the prebendaries, it is striking 
how little these ‘others’ are attested in the documentation. Certainly, large parts of the 
priestly archives deal with temple affairs in which non-priestly families are not likely 
to have been involved. But an equally large part of their archives deals with land 
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management, monetary transactions, family affairs and other non-religious subject 
matters. The absence of ‘others’ in these transactions adds further weight to my 
working hypothesis that the priestly stratum in Borsippa (and presumably Babylonia 
at large) formed a close-knit community that was effectively shielded off from 
external influence and can thus be perceived as a distinct segment of the Babylonian 
population. 
The final inquiry of part 1 dealt with the bond between the local families and their 
ancestral hanšû land in the long sixth century. At first sight this bond seemed to have 
been marked by discontinuity. Much of our evidence on hanšû land came into 
existence when the property was sold. Yet, this rarely meant complete alienation of 
the ancestral land. First of all, families owned multiple hanšû estates. In addition to 
the hanšû named after the clan as a whole, which can perhaps be identified with the 
original eighth century endowments, there also existed estates linked to individual 
family members. Secondly, sales usually involved shares in a hanšû unit; the sale of a 
hanšû in its entirety is attested only once so far. However, even if they had somehow 
lost control of (parts of) their land, families kept an active interest in it. Descendants 
can be found as tenants, scribes or witnesses in matters concerning their land, while 
others endeavoured to buy back their land and re-accumulate the patrimony, 
sometimes centuries after it had been sold.  
Finally, while hanšû land could be bought and sold just like any other private 
property, the special attachment to this ‘eponymous’ land transpires from the 
composition of dowries. Dowries played an important role in the priestly marriage in 
Babylonia, and land is an often-reoccurring component of them. While there are 
relatively many instances in which priestly families from Borsippa transferred hanšû 
land through marriage settlement, in only one case did this involve the family’s own 
hanšû land.  
All this makes it clear that the sixth century descendants of the original 
beneficiaries still greatly valued the land that their forebears had obtained centuries 
before. This ancestral land was clearly meant to stay in the patrimony, even more than 
any other type of landholding. We can assume that being in possession of one’s 
original hanšû signalled successful cross-generational continuity and gave its owners 
a place in the established local history. 
In the second part of this chapter I explored possible social restrictions on the 
circulation of hanšû land. I started by comparing the transaction patterns of hanšû 
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with the marriage network reconstructed in the previous chapter. It turned out that 
there is only very limited overlap between the constellation of wife-givers and wife-
takers and that of sellers and buyers of hanšû land. On the contrary, priestly families 
of Borsippa tended to acquire this property from, and sell this land to, families that 
were not part or their direct or indirect marriage network (94%). The same tendency 
was found for other types of real estate. Almost 80% of the transactions were carried 
out between families that could not be linked by marriage according to the current 
state of documentation. Besides the fact that the acquisition of someone’s property 
could be seen as an unfriendly act and an infringement on the patrimony, I proposed 
that this could perhaps best be explained by the dynamics of marriage. After all, 
intermarriage meant that two clans engaged in a mutual alliance, assigning each of 
them a specific set of rights and obligations. Marriage reconfirmed or indeed triggered 
a relative hierarchy, ranking the family of the wife-taker over the wife-giver. I 
suggested that rather than to upset the (fragile) status quo reached through marriage, 
the families preferred to look for suitable buyers or sellers among the families to 
which they were not yet related. I tentatively formulated the general rule that in the 
priestly community of Borsippa marriage ties excluded property sales.  
The following issue I addressed was the possibility that the patterns of hanšû land 
(and other real-estate) transaction were regulated by a particular solidarity towards the 
professional group. I have shown earlier that at the time of its inception hanšû land 
was given to the wider elite stratum of Borsippa and that it, as a consequence, did not 
circulate in the group of sacerdotal families alone. As the professional affiliation of 
many of the non-priestly families is not clarified in the corpus it posed a serious 
limitation to this analysis. Yet some patterns were still discernable. First of all, the 
available evidence suggests that there was no clear preference to sell land to and buy 
land from families that traditionally belonged to the same prebendary group. Rather, 
there was a tendency to circulate hanšû land mainly among the wider priestly stratum. 
Moreover, it appeared that there was a steady influx of newly acquired land from 
outsiders to whom only relatively little land was sold in return. This trend was not 
limited to hanšû property: 50% of all sales were made between priestly families. In 
40% of the transactions one finds priestly families buying up property from non-
priestly families. Finally, of all the sales made by sacerdotal families probably less 
than 20% were made to ‘outsiders’. It seems that the priestly stratum of Borsippa 
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worked as a centripetal force, steadily acquiring new property and releasing only very 
little from its control.  
While this might point to an attitude of solidarity among priests, a note of caution 
is at place here. The numbers drawn from the statistic analysis are likely to be a result 
of the biased nature of our documentation, consisting predominantly of temple-based 
family archives. Especially the number of sales made by priestly families to non-
priestly families remains difficult to gauge since most of the property that was sold in 
these transactions has become untraceable for us. It should thus be clear that more 
evidence is needed in order to validate my hypothesis concerning solidarity of sales 
within the prebendary circle of Borsippa. 
In the final part of this chapter I investigated the pattern of tenancy and agricultural 
collaboration. My point of departure was the notion that priests did not cultivate their 
land themselves. Since most of their energy was devoted towards their cultic duties in 
town, priests outsource cultivation either to tenants of unfree status, to free tenants 
without family names or to free tenants with family names.  
Tenants of unfree status, including temple serfs (širkus) and privately owned 
slaves, are the smallest group and represent only 8% of the labour force employed by 
priests from Borsippa. A small note of caution should be sounded, however. It is not 
unlikely that slaves were used on a more regular basis and the fact that they appear 
only infrequently in the documentation should be seen in the light of their status. The 
same might apply to the next group of tenants. 
While individuals lacking family names must have constituted the vast majority of 
the Babylonian population, they make up for only 17% of the tenants in Borsippa. 
Only Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u recruited his tenants from amongst this group on a more 
regular basis, almost half of the time. Whether this should be assigned to Šaddinnu’s 
keen entrepreneurship or to the fact that, due to his immigrant background, he was 
unable to rely on social conventions in matters of tenancy to the same degree as 
established priestly clans remains uncertain. 
With 75% tenants with family names represent the dominant group in this domain. 
While I designate them as tenants, it is likely that these upper-stratum individuals 
only assumed managerial responsibilities of the land, while outsourcing the actual 
labour to a (subordinate) third party. The vast majority belonged to temple-based 
families. By analysing the identity of these tenants in conjunction with the identity of 
the landowners I was able to reveal some underlying principles of tenancy and to 
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assign agricultural collaboration a sound place in the social organisation of this 
priestly community.  
Tenancy among the priestly families of Borsippa was for a large part based on the 
intricate web of social rules or conventions that was being spun together since long 
before the start of our documentation. Even though, in the light of sale, inheritance 
and intermarriage, neighbourship might have been an important motivation for 
collaboration on the countryside as well, there is only very little direct evidence for 
this. I showed that the particular arrangements of tenancy and agricultural 
collaboration could perhaps better be understood as deriving from professional 
solidarity (e.g. temple-enterers) and intermarriage (e.g. brewers). In fact the pattern of 
tenancy neatly follows the organisation of this priestly community, which has been 
outlined first and foremost by the hypergamous marriage system. Moreover, the fact 
that priests relied primarily on individuals from fellow priestly families in agricultural 
matters, lends further weight to my working hypothesis, that the priestly circle in 
Borsippa formed a close-knit community that effectively shielded off external 










In this chapter I will investigate the practices of silver lending in the priestly 
community of Borsippa. In the previous chapters of this study I have drawn on a wide 
range of documents kept by the sacerdotal families, including marriage and dowry 
contracts, sales of property, and documents related to the management of urban and 
rural property. However, a large part of the corpus is made up of debt notes of silver 
and related receipts.  
Existing studies of lending practices focus mainly on the technicalities of the 
Babylonian debt note (u’iltu).432 Composed in an abstract and versatile phraseology, 
this type of document enabled the Babylonian scribe to record a wide range of 
transactions.433 In her recent article on the Neo-Babylonian credit system, C. Wunsch 
identified no less than fourteen different transactions that could be rendered through 
the u’iltu:434 from the investment of money for business ventures and the deferred 
payment of acquired property to rents of fields and houses, and genuine loans of 
money or in kind.435 As to silver loans, one can distinguish three general types. The 
                                                
432 Despite its age the most important study on the legal issues of loans in first millennium Babylonia is 
still Petschow 1956. More recent studies include, Oelsner 2001, Jursa 2002, Wunsch 2002, Oelsner, 
Wells & Wunsch 2003: 949-953, Jursa 2004d: 451-454, Jursa 2005: 41-42. More general surveys of 
moneylending and the role of silver in Neo- and late-Babylonian society, include Bongenaar 1999, 
Powell 1999, Varygas 2000, van Driel 2002, Jursa 2009, and Jursa et al. 2010: 240-245. 
433 The operative clause in these debt notes reads: (object) ša A ina muhhi B, ‘(object) is owed by B to 
A’. Receipts read simply: (object) A ina qāt B eṭir (mahir), ‘A has been paid (has received) (object) 
from B’. Cf. Oelsner 2001: 290-292, Wunsch 2002: 229-234 and Jursa 2005: 41-42. 
434 Derived from the verb e’ēlu (CAD E, p. 40 meaning 2: ‘to bind’) it has been rendered as ‘binding 
obligation’. 
435 Wunsch 2002: 224-229. 
CHAPTER 3  
 118
interest-free loan usually involved modest sums of silver to be repaid on a set date; 
this can be considered a ‘friendly’ loan. The interest-bearing loan usually charged a 
rate of 20% per annum, which, although high to modern standards, was the norm 
during the Neo-Babylonian period.436 Finally, loans secured by a pledge ensured that 
the creditor could retrieve his capital even in the event of non-payment. Slaves, 
houses, fields and prebends are the most frequently found pledges. Creditors could 
also be allowed antichretic usage of the property in lieu of interest. In archival studies 
these different loans are usually dealt with in synoptic terms.437 Besides an attempt to 
assign individual debt notes to existing dossiers, these texts are commonly reduced to 
tabulated summaries.  
What is still largely outstanding is an investigation of the individuals and families 
who interacted with each other in this domain and under what conditions. A 
pioneering study in this respect was M. Jursa’s 1999 monograph on the archive of 
Bēl-rēmanni, a priest who worked in the Ebabbar temple of Sippar in the early Persian 
period. Jursa used debt notes and receipts to examine the social field of this man’s 
lending activities. It turned out that the majority of his loans were contracted with 
individuals who were not enrolled in the temple organisation and who thus stood 
outside of his intimate social network. In the following pages I will apply this 
methodology not to one man but to a cross-section of the Borsippean priesthood. My 
focus will be on silver loans; advancements in kind (normally dates or barley) are left 
to future research, as such transactions arose first of all from agricultural and 
prebendary activities.438 
Crucial to the following analysis is the division of families into priestly and non-
priestly categories. Did a certain debtor/creditor belong to a prebendary family of 
Borsippa or was he or she a descendant of a non-priestly ‘outsider’? While Borsippa’s 
priests kept their marriage system closed to outsiders, interaction with non-priestly 
families was more commonplace in the domain of land management and property 
sales, as we have seen. Determining the social pattern of silver lending will tell us in 
                                                
436 Jursa et al. 2010: 490-500. Interest is expressed in the sources by saying that per mina (= 60 
shekels) of silver, one shekel accrues per month, i.e. twelve shekels per mina per year. Higher and 
lower interest rates are attested.  
437 E.g. Joannès 1989: 103-104, 114-118, Kessler 1991: 118-120, Wunsch 1993: 56-57, Waerzeggers 
2000/2001: 115-125, Baker 2004: 77-82, Frame 2013: 68-70.  
438 This also stands to some degree for silver loans, see Jursa et al. 2010: 522-524. 
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which circumstances and to what degree priestly families of Borsippa adhered to the 
boundaries of their prebendary in-group or whether they interacted with a greater 
section of society in the domain of moneylending.  
Before I will start my investigation, some words of caution are in place. In view of the 
versatile nature of the debt note, it is notoriously difficult to determine whether or not 
a debt note represents a genuine silver loan.439 I will not provide a ready solution for 
this problem in the present chapter but in order to keep the data-set as clean as 
possible I left out all the credits that were part of existing contracts and agreements 
like tenancy, dowry transfer, harrānu-enterprises or refer to a previous transaction 
such as the acquisition of property or any other type of object.  
 
3.1. Temple-enterers 
Let us start with the credit operations of the Ea-ilūtu-banis, a family of temple-enterer 
status.440 The family archive contains a total of twenty-two silver loans. They date 
from the second generation, in the 640s, until the sixth and final generation in the 
early fifth century BCE. In this timespan, members of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family are 
attested fourteen times as debtors and eight times as creditors of an amount of 
silver.441 I will start with the former operations. 
The creditors of the Ea-ilūtu-banis belonged to priestly as well as non-priestly 
families, but whereas only four of them had no apparent connections to the temple 
institution,442 ten of them did.443 More specifically, it appears that the Ea-ilūtu-banis 
                                                
439 E.g. Joannès 1989: 1-3-104, 114-118, Kessler 1991: 7, Wunsch 1993: 7, Joannès 1995: 1476-1477, 
Jursa 1999: 111-125, Waerzeggers 2000/2001: 115-125, Wunsch 2002, Jursa 2002, Baker 2004: 77-
82, Frame 2013: 68-70. 
440 For this family see Ch .0.7.1. 
441 Here follows the lists of silver loans in chronological order. As debtor: A 127 (Nbk 00), F 6 (Nbk 
09), L 1661 (Nbn 03), NBC 8407 (Nbn 11), TuM 2/3 116 (Nbn 11), A 108 (Nbn 16), TuM 2/3 55 
(Cyr 6), BM 94501 (Cam x), TCL 12 202 (Dar 02), TuM 2/3 61 (Dar 04), TuM 2/3 120 (Dar 08), A 
130 (d.l.), A 165 (d.l.), TuM 2/3 62 (Dar 28). 
As creditor: BM 95091 (Kan 07), TCL 12 41 (Nbk 27), YBC 9631 (Nbk 29), BM 94839 (Ner 00), 
TuM 2/3 115 (Nbn 6), NBC 8342 (Cyr 02), TuM 2/3 54 (Cyr 04), L 1657 (Nbk IV 01). 
442 Abunāya (or Adnāya), Patāya (2x) and Sîn-šadûnu families, the latter two being represented by 
female members; F 6 (Nbk 09), L 1661 (Nbn 03), A 108 (Nbn 16), TuM 2/3 55 (Cyr 06). 
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preferred to appeal to fellow temple-enterer clans and kin when in need of cash: three 
loans came from the Ahiya’ūtu, Arkāt-ilāni-damqā and Nūr-Papsukkal families, and 
five from within the Ea-ilūtu-bani clan itself.444 In short, members of this family only 
rarely turned to ‘outsiders’ for silver loans but rather appealed to peers. Moreover, 
most of these loans were either small and interest-free or secured by a pledge.  
A similar arrangement is found in the eight silver loans that the Ea-ilūtu-banis 
extended to others.445 The majority of their debtors came from families belonging to 
the ranks of temple-enterers or from kin (e.g. Ēdu-ēṭir, Ilī-bāni).446  Only once did the 
debtor come from a non-priestly family (i.e. Iddinā). The evidence of the known 
credit operations from the Ea-ilūtu-bani archive is summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 1: silver loans of Ea-ilūtu-bani archive (kin 8x) 
 




































The two most striking features one can observe in this graph are, first, the fact that 
the Ea-ilūtu-bani family mainly dealt in (smaller sized) loans without interest or 
                                                                                                                                      
443 A 127 (Nbk 00), NBC 8407 (Nbn 11), BM 94839 (Ner 00), TuM 2/3 116 (Nbn 11), TCL 12 202 
(Dar 02), TuM 2/3 61 (Dar 04), TuM 2/3 120 (Dar 08), A 130 (d.l.), A 165 (d.l.), BM 94501 (Cam [-
]), TuM 2/3 62 (Dar 28).  
444 The two remaining loans were extended by members of the Ilia and the Ašlāku respectively. 
445 BM 95091 (Kan 07), YBC 9631 (Nbk 29), BM 94839 (Ner 00), TCL 12 41 (Nbk 27), TuM 2/3 115 
(Nbn 06), NBC 8342 (Cyr 02), TuM 2/3 54 (Cyr 04), L 1657 (Nbk IV 01). 
446 One loans was taken out by a individual of the Gallābu  family (prebendary barbers). 
447 The layout of the following tables is borrowed from Jursa 1999: 125. For sake of convenience loans 
which the archive-holders borrowed as debtors and extended as creditors, are merged. The purpose is 
to give a general overview of the type of families (priestly/non-priestly) involved in the lending 
partners of Borsippean priest and under what conditions silver was being loaned. For example: three 
interest-bearing loans were contracted between the Ea-ilūtu-banis and priestly families, only one with 
non-priestly outsiders.  
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security, and, second, the fact that temple-based families prevailed in this sphere of 
their business. Seventeen out of the total twenty-two silver loans (77%) were 
contracted between the Ea-ilūtu-banis and individuals from local priestly families. 
And taking a closer look at the professional identity, it appears that in fourteen cases 
the family can be classified as temple-enterer, i.e. as belonging to the same 
professional group as the archive-holders.448 
The evidence we have for the credit operations of other temple-enterer families 
from Borsippa suggests that the predisposition to engage with kin and temple families 
of equal rank was not confined to the Ea-ilūtu-banis, but that it constitutes a practice 
shared more widely in this group. The first family to be discussed is the Ilī-bāni 
family, which was associated to the Ea-ilūtu-bani clan by marriage.449 Of the twelve 
silver loans recovered from their archive, at least seven were contracted with kin or 
members of temple-enterer families (e.g. Nūr-Papsukkal, Arkāt-ilāni-damqā, and Ea-
ilūtu-bani). 450  Moreover, the fact that some of these loans concerned substantial 
amounts of silver at a reduced interest rate is suggestive of a sense of solidarity within 
this professional group.451 
The next family is that of Nanāhu.452 Six loans involving members of the Nanāhu 
family have been recovered, in all of which they appear as debtors.453 Examining the 
background of the creditors reveals the same pattern as before: twice a loan was 
received from the Ahiya’ūtu family (temple-enterer and brewer family, on both 
                                                
448 Many of which however came from the Ea-ilūtu-bani clan itself.  
449 For this family see Ch. 0.7.1. 
450 A 152 (Nbk 04), YOS 17 327 (Nbk 11), A 84 (Nbk 18), YBC 9154 (Nbk 26), A 89 (Nbk 28), A 91 
(Nbk 31), L 4731 (Nbk 41), BM 94818 (Nbn 07), BM 94885 (Nbn 08), TuM 2/3 52 (Nbn 13), TuM 
2/3 57 (Cyr 07), TuM 2/3 60 (Cam 06), TuM 2 122 (Dar 32). Of the remaining five loans, three are 
contracted with women (twice of the Bā’iru family, once with a woman lacking a family name), one 
with an individual of the Patāya clan (same creditor is found in Ea-ilūtu-bani archive) and twice with 
two members of the Balāṭu clan. Note that the latter two loans were due to a father and his son. In L 
4731 (Nbk 41), a receipt dated some fifteen years after YBC 9154 (Nbk 26), only the son is 
mentioned as debtor. Both documents probably concern the same loan and might well be related to 
the running of a business venture.  
451 E.g. A 152 (four minas, 10% interest), YOS 17 327 (two minas, 10% interest), A 89 ([x] shekels, 
12,5% interest). 
452 For this family see Ch. 0.7.1. 
453 L 1641 (Cam 02), A 119 (Dar 15), A 120 (Dar 17), NBC 8405 (Dar 18), A 123 (Dar 23), BM 94549 
(Dar [-]). 
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occasion from a woman), and four times from within the Nanāhu family.454 
The last piece of evidence that should be evaluated here concerns the Iddin-
Papsukkal (B) family.455 This small archive of a temple-enterer of Mār-bīti and Ištar 
contains five debt notes.456 In at least four of the loans contracted by the archive 
holder, the silver was due to a fellow temple-enterer or kinsman.457 A note of caution 
should however be sounded. As has been observed before by M. Jursa (2005: 85), the 
loans found in this small text group are likely to have their background in the 
prebendary sphere, based on the fact that for three loans prebendary income was 
pledged as security or interest. 
To sum up, there are strong indications that the temple-enterers of Borsippa 
exhibited an inward-looking mentality in terms of silver lending: they preferred to ask 
silver from, and lend silver to, the extended kin-group and individuals from within the 
same prebendary group. It is likely that this pattern stems from a sense of solidarity 




Our main source on prebendary brewers is the archive of Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia 
(A).458 This man only rarely engaged in money lending, his archive containing only 
thirteen silver loans. Six of these mention Marduk-šumu-ibni as debtor. 459  The 
amounts range from sixteen to sixty-six shekels, mostly interest bearing and at least 
once secured by a pledge. Taking the identity of the creditors into account, an 
interesting pattern emerges. Marduk-šumu-ibni contracted all of these loans from 
families who were either married to his own clan (i.e. Gallābu, Iddin-Papsukkal, Ilšu-
                                                
454 The loans are generally high, between twenty-seven shekels and two minas of silver, and usually 
extended under interest and security.  
455 For this archive, see Jursa 2005: 85. 
456 BM 85448 (Dar 23), BM 85443 (Dar 27), BM 85375 (Dar 31), VS 4 187 (Dar x), BM 85562 (Dar 
22). 
457 In BM 85562 the family name of the creditor is not given. 
458 For this individual see Ch. 0.7.2. 
459 The silver loans in which Marduk-šumu-ibni acts as debtor: BM 102311 (Nbn 10), BM 102342 (Cyr 
04), BM 94640 (Cam 00), BM 17651 (Cam 01), VS 4 75 (Cam 04?), VS 4 101 (Dar 04).  
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abūšu)460 or who belonged to his direct temple associates.461 
Marduk-šumu-ibni is himself attested seven times as creditor of silver.462  The 
amounts of these loans were rather small, rarely exceeding five shekels of silver.463 
His debtors belonged to a somewhat wider and less homogeneous circle. Twice he 
extended a loan to kin (i.e. descendants of the Iddin-Papsukkal and the Ilia families; 
the latter his paternal cousin) and once to a family of temple-enterers (i.e. Aqar-
Nabû). The remaining loans were contracted by individuals with no apparent temple 
background. The evidence of the credit operations of Marduk-šumu-ibni is 
summarised in the following table: 
 




































It is clear from this table that Marduk-šumu-ibni most often contracted loans from 
fellow prebendary families (69%). Moreover, eight out of these nine individuals were 
related to Marduk-šumu-ibni either by blood or marriage. The high presence of fellow 
priests and kin involved in the loans of Marduk-šumu-ibni is comparable to what we 
have seen among temple-enterers. There I suggested that it could point to an attitude 
                                                
460 E.g. at one point or another, fAmtia//Ilšu-abūšu (creditor in BM 102342) became his sister-in-law. 
Nabû-zēru-līšir//Ilšu-abūšu was the brother-in-law of the original debtor and cousin of Marduk-šumu-
ibni, whose debt he pays off in VS 4 101.  
461  Nabû-uballiṭ/Nabû-šumu-iddin/Ilšu-abūšu is a well-known temple brewer (e.g. BM 96504, BM 
96508 = AH XV no. 55). He was also present at the stipulation of the ēpišānūtu-contract between 
Marduk-šumu-ibni and his great-nephew Bēl-iddin (BM 102033 = AH XV no. 17). Nabû-zēru-
līšir//Ilšu-abūšu (mentioned above) and his brothers were associates of Marduk-šumu-ibni and the Ilia 
family in the cult (e.g. BM 24480, BM 102308 = AH XV no. 18, BM 29441 = AH XV no. 50). 
462 Loans that Marduk-šumu-ibni extended: BM 17640 (Nbn 11), BM 94922 (Nbn 14), BM 27899 
(Nbn 17), BM 17676 (Cam [-]), VS 4 83 (Cam [-]), BM 26723 (Dar 15?), BM 26708 (Dar 10+). 
463  With the exception of a one-mina loan recorded in BM 17676. 
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of group solidarity, and this might equally be the case for Marduk-šumu-ibni. Perhaps 
even more so since the latter seems to have suffered from a chronic lack of liquid 
cash, i.e. silver.464  It is therefore not surprising that Marduk-šumu-ibni turned to 
individuals who were likely to be more mindful to his needs and abilities, i.e. temple 
colleagues and members of the extended family (two of which were women). 
There are eight more silver loans involving individuals of the wider Ilia kin group. 
These include two loans of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s father Šulā,465 two loans of his great-
nephew Bēl-iddin//Ilia (B),466 one loan of Nabû-ēṭir//Ilia (C)467 and three loans of the 
Ilia (D) family.468 Except for Šulā, who contracted both of his loans from women of 
non-prebendary families, all other members dealt with fellow priests (on two 
occasions within the group of brewers), bringing the total distribution of credit 
partners of the Ilias to 12:8, in favour of temple-based families. It seems that the 
evidence of the wider Ilia clan is only roughly in line with the lending pattern 
                                                
464 As the first son from a second marriage, Marduk-šumu-ibni (together with his two younger siblings) 
saw the paternal estate being divided in favour of the offspring of his father’s first marriage, who 
received a 2/3-share. Even though not all the family possessions are mentioned in these documents 
(e.g. no mention of silver is made), there is further evidence that suggests that Marduk-šumu-ibni was 
not particularly loaded in terms of cash. In order to improve his inherited estate Marduk-šumu-ibni 
most frequently resorted to exchange. The few acquisitions found in the archive were minor and 
probably bought with the money from his wife’s dowry (LB 874). The paucity of silver is further 
suggested by the compositions of the dowries of his daughters. At one occasion, Marduk-šumu-ibni 
converted five minas of silver belonging to his daughter’s dowry into real estate (BM 26483). There 
is so far no evidence that he spent any silver on the dowries of his two other daughters. Moreover, as 
a whole, the texts of Marduk-šumu-ibni contain only very few payments made in silver (exceptions 
are: forty-five shekels for qaštu-tax in BM 27779 = AH XV no. 25; and again sixty shekels for qaštu-
tax in BM 102031). Finally, it is worth pointing out again that the amounts of silver Marduk-šumu-
ibni borrowed were higher than the credits he extended himself. Marduk-šumu-ibni’s monetary 
situation has already been investigated in an unpublished study of C. Waerzeggers on which this 
overview relies. 
465 BM 94604 (Nbk [x]+3, no family name) and BM 102286 (Nbk 27, Adad-šumu-ēreš). I do not think 
that the 80 shekels debt Šulā had to pay to the rēš-šarri šá kurummāt šarri, qualifies as a genuine 
loan (BM 25858). 
466 JCS 39 (Cam 06, Babāya) and BM 102257 (Dar 18, Nūr-Papsukkal). 
467 BM 17656 (Nbk 38, Ea-ilūtu-bani). The slave taken as antichresis belonged to the dowry of Nabû-
ēṭir’s wife. 
468 BM 94624 ([Dar?] 05, Šikkûa), BM 94714 ((Dar 12), Suhāya; for the restoration of debtor’s filiation 
see Sandowicz 2012: 340-341) BM 87315 (Dar 20, Ilia). 
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observed for Marduk-šumu-ibni. Yet, the evidence pertaining to these other members 
is scant and less forceful from a quantitative point of view. The same stands for the 
information on silver lending for other brewers from Borsippa. There is only one loan 
from the Ahiya’ūtu,469 three from the Ilšu-abūšu (B),470 one from the Kudurrānu,471 
two from the Lā-kuppuru,472 and three from the Mannu-gērûšu archives.473 Integrating 
the heterogeneous evidence on moneylending among the brewers from Borsippa, one 
arrives at the following figures: 
Table 3: silver loans of all brewer archives (Ilia (A-D), Ahiya’ūtu, Ilšu-abūšu (B),  
Kudurrānu, Lā-kuppuru and Mannu-gērûšu)    
 



































                                                
469 Nabû-ana-mērehti//Ahiya’ūtu once gave out a loan of fifty shekels according to Amherst 246//RBC 
734 (Xer 01). The debtor came from the Kidin-Sîn family who pledged his cultic storeroom (bīt-
šutummi) against the silver. 
470 In VS 4 153 (Dar 20) Nabû-uballiṭ//Ilšu-abūšu (B) is found as a debtor of an interest-free loan of 
twenty shekels, borrowed from the Ibnāyas, a family of prebendary butchers. 470  Nabû-uballiṭ 
extended loans on two occasions: in BM 29038 (Dar 12) a sum of fifty shekels to his kinsman from 
the Ilšu-abūšu family, and in BM 28994 (Dar [-]) a loan of four minas to a member of the Ir’ani 
family. There is, so far, no evidence that the Ir’anis belonged to the prebendary ranks of Borsippa.  
471 In Nbk 34 Nabû-ahhē-iddin//Kudurrānu provided ten shekels of silver, the interest of a principal 
loan of one mina (BM 29103). The silver was due to a minor and his mother, neither of whom bore a 
family name. 
472 Nabû-ušallim (aka. Šullumā)//Lā-kuppuru is found twice involved in silver lending: VS 4 173 (Dar 
27) and A 160 ([-]). The first was contracted at Babylon and was interest bearing. The second 
concerns a short-term, interest-free loan of about twenty shekels. None of the credit partners seem to 
have belonged to the prebendary circle of Borsippa 
473 As debtor Nabû-ahu-ittannu//Mannû-gērûšu contracted two loans of around ten shekels: VS 4 179 
(Dar 23) and Amherst 245 (Xer 01).473 The first was borrowed without interest from a couple that 
lacked family names. The second was extended by fellow brewer of the Ilia clan and was interest-
bearing. As creditor Nabû-ahu-ittannu once issued an interest-bearing loan of one mina of silver to a 
descendant of the non-priestly Širikti-Marduk clan. 
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Carefully summarising this information, it seems that the remaining evidence of 
the Ilia and other brewer clans is only partly in line with the lending pattern observed 
so far. Moneylending with non-priestly members of the community more often than 
not assumed the form of an interest-bearing or collateralised debt obligation, whereas 
loans within the prebendary group were often extended under more lenient conditions, 
which betrays an attitude of mutual support towards the sacerdotal in-group. If so, it 
should not come as a surprise that brewers preferably called on (extended) kin and 
fellow brewers when in need of cash, though again, the idea that these loans could 
have a background in the cultic logistics should not be dismissed altogether. There are 
in total twelve loans extended between kin and fellow temple brewers. Yet on the 
whole, compared to the temple-enterers, the reliance on these people is less 
numerically significant among brewers. Of the total of thirty-one loans, fourteen were 
contracted with outsiders, and only slightly more than half (i.e. 55%) between 
prebendary families.  
 
3.3. Bakers 
The largest and most important source pertaining to the bakers of Ezida is the archive 
of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u.474 Because the archives of other baker families, such as the 
Kidin-Sîn, Nabû-mukīn-apli, Šēpê-Ilia and the Esagil-mansum, still need to be 
recovered, the lending patterns of this group can only be reconstructed partially. 
Moreover, while the evidence on Šaddinnu’s credit operations is relatively generous, 
it seems that he might have he behaved differently in this domain than his fellow 
bakers did. 
The archive contains a total of twenty-six loans of silver.475 One finds Šaddinnu 
extending credit twenty-two times, whereas he took out loans on only four occasions. 
According to the archival practices of the time, paid debt notes were returned to the 
debtor as proof of his or her discharge of obligation.476  There might be various 
explanations for the relatively high number of loans in which Šaddinnu acted as 
creditor,477 but in his case it can probably be taken as an approximate reflection of 
                                                
474 For this individual see Ch. 0.7.3. 
475 See Jursa et al. 2010: 243 for an overview of these loans. 
476 Jursa et al. 2010: 241. 
477 E.g. these debt notes might have been written off as ‘bad loans’, i.e. losses, or else, Šaddinnu could 
simply have kept copies for administrative purposes.  
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actual practice. His financial position was such that he could afford to lend money 
more often than he needed it for himself 478  and presumably he engaged in 
moneylending as a business pursuit. 
Let us have a closer look at the four loans that Šaddinnu contracted as debtor. The 
first two were borrowed from non-prebendary families, Imbu-īnia and Rē’û, and 
amounted to twenty-two and thirty-three shekels of silver respectively.479 Both were 
short-term loans without interest or security. The two other loans were obtained from 
Bēl-iddin//Ibnāya and his brother Bēl-ušallim.480 These brothers might have engaged 
in the moneylending business on a more professional basis as well, acting as creditors 
in other archives too. The first loan amounted to one mina of silver and was interest-
bearing. The second loan, slightly below five minas of silver, required repayment 
within the month. We do not know what the consequences were for Šaddinnu in case 
of default. It is however interesting to note that some time earlier, Bēl-iddin//Ibnāya 
bought a field from Šaddinnu. Under what circumstances this field was sold is not 
clear, but that this Bēl-iddin was a strict moneylender can be deduced from the fact 
that he extended loans in return for pledges that were automatically forfeitable on due 
date (i.e. Verfallspfand).481 
Let us now turn to the twenty-two loans that were extended by Šaddinnu.482 The 
amounts range from less than ten shekels to more than 300 shekels of silver.483 There 
are only two instances in which Šaddinnu lent money at interest. More frequent are 
the ‘friendly’ loans on short term (11), and loans that were covered by a pledge or lent 
                                                
478 Note that his four debts had to be repaid on short term, which means that Šaddinnu was able to raise 
the silver on short notice. 
479 BM 29174 (Cam 03), BM 96266 (Dar 09). Note that the former might have resulted from a house 
sale, BM 29019 (Dar 06?). 
480 BM 96150 (Dar 21), BM 29116 (Dar [-]). 
481 BM 26650//BM 27857 (Dar 13), a silver loan from the Rē’i-alpi archive in which the creditor, Bēl-
iddin//Ibnāya, holds a field of the Rē’i-alpi family as a Verfallspfand.  
482 VS 4 64 (Cyr 07), BM 29190 (Cam 0), BM 96177 (Cam 06), BM 28973 (Cam [-]), BM 96334 (Dar 
09), BM 29494 (Dar 09), VS 4 130 (Dar 10), BM 29484 (Dar 12), BM 96248 (Dar 12), BM 96187 
(Dar 12), BM 29716 (Dar 14), BM 29416 (Dar 15), BM 28988 (Dar 15), BM 96271 (Dar 15), BM 
28912 (Dar 21), BM 29433 (Dar 21), BM 25644 (Dar 25), BM 96234 (Dar 26), BM 96331 (Dar 30), 
BM 28864 (Dar 34), BM 28931 (Dar 36), BM 29010 (Dar [-]).  
483 Six times the amount was sixty shekels or more, five times between twenty and sixty shekels, and 
six times less than twenty shekels of silver. 
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under antichresis (9).  
Dividing Šaddinnu’s debtors in the two familiar groups yields the following 
figures: twelve of the twenty-two loans (55%) were taken out by individuals of local 
prebendary clans.484 The remaining loans were contracted by non-prebendaries.485 
Cooperation with fellow priests was clearly limited compared to the brewers and, 
especially, the temple-enterers. Moreover, most of the loans Šaddinnu extended to 
prebendary families were secured with a pledge.486 The following table summarises 
the silver loans found in the Bēliya’u archive: 
 
Table 4: silver loans of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u (4x kin) 
 




































More revealing aspects of Šaddinnu’s attitude towards his immediate environment 
become apparent once we take a closer look at the identity of the families concerned. 
In the first place, kin and affinal relatives played only a minor role in his lending 
activities. They appear in only four (15%) of the twenty-six silver loans preserved in 
the archive. Twice, a loan was extended to a member of the Bēliya’u family: first a 
sum of sixteen shekels and second the staggering sum of 320 shekels of silver, for 
which a kettle and a field were taken as pledge respectively.487 The remaining two 
                                                
484 I.e. Kidin-Nanāya, Eppēš-ilī, Naggāru, Lā-kuppuru, Bēliya’u (2x), Ilī-bāni, Itinnu (2x), Ilšu-abūšu, 
Allānu, Esagil-mansum.   
485 i.e. Mudammiq-Adad, Sîn-tabni (2x), Ea-ibni, Idinnāya, Bābūtu, Sîn-damāqu, Ṣillāya, Sîn-šadûnu. 
486 VS 4 64 (Cyr 07), BM 96177 (Cam 06), BM 29716 (Dar 14), BM 29416 (Dar 15), BM 28912 (Dar 
21), BM 96331 (Dar 30), BM 28864 (Dar 34). The pledged properties, which, as far as I can judge, 
were of equivalent value as the borrowed sums, ranged from houses and fields to slaves, kettles and 
at least once a garment of a god (presumably derived from a domestic shrine). 
487 BM 29716 (Dar 14) and BM 28912 (Dar 21). Note that the second debtor, Nabû-ahhē-iddin/Nabû-
mukīn-apli, was Šaddinnu’s nephew, see Waerzeggers 2010: 732.  Nabû-ahhē-iddin also occupied 
the position of gugallu of Borsippa around Dar 18 (BM 21965). 
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loans were taken out by clans who were connected to the Bēliya’us through marriage: 
Kidin-Marduk (alias Kidinnu)//Ṣillāya, a well-known scribe in the archive, borrowed 
the sum of thirty-six shekels,488 and Mār-bīti-ahhē-iddin//Esagil-mansum received a 
loan of twenty shekels. 489  The limited appearance of relatives in Šaddinnu’s 
moneylending contrasts strongly with the practices observed among temple-enterers 
and brewers, where the majority of the loans were contracted with kin and temple 
families, especially from the same prebendary profession. 
This brings us to the second peculiarity of Šaddinnu’s moneylending practices: the 
absence of fellow bakers. According to the available documentation, Šaddinnu 
contracted only one loan with an individual of a baker family. It concerns the loan 
taken out by Mār-bīti-iddin//Esagil-mansum, mentioned above. It is remarkable that 
neither the Nabû-mukīn-aplis, nor members of the prominent Kidin-Sîn and Šēpê-ilia 
families, figure in these interactions, especially given the significant role played by 
fellow priests among the more senior prebendary groups. Could there be a specific 
reason behind the absence of interaction? 
It seems that the bakers of Ezida were divided in two opposing camps: the Kidin-
Sîn and Šēpê-ilia families represented an older group, while the Bēliya’u and Esagil-
mansum families represented a younger group.490 That these families constituted two 
distinct groups is seen, first of all, in the fact that while marriages were settled 
between Kidin-Sîn and Šēpê-ilia, and between Bēliya’u and Esagil-mansum, there is 
so far no evidence for alliances established between these two family clusters.  
Additional evidence is found in a series of property sales. In a short period during 
the early years of Darius I (probably years 3 and 4) at least five important transactions 
were negotiated between these two groups: three sales of prebends and two sales of 
real estate.491 On four occasions property was sold by the Kidin-Sîns to the Bēliya’u 
family; once the Bēliya’us sold a prebend to the Šēpê-ilia clan. That these sales did 
not always run smoothly is demonstrated by the acquisition of a plot of land by the 
Bēliya’us, which required a further (mukinnūtu) document preventing the alienating 
                                                
488 BM 96271 (Dar 15). He probably also sold a field to Šaddinnu (BM 29404//BM 28914, Dar 16), as 
well as a slave (VS 5 85, Dar 08?).  
489 BM 29010 (Dar [-]). He also owed Šaddinnu dates from the harvest estimation (VS 3 91, Dar 02). 
490 See Ch. 0.7.3. 
491 Prebend sales: BM 96286 = AH XV no. 75, BM 96163 = AH XV no. 77 and BM 96194. Sales of 
real estate: BM 25589 and BM 96218. 
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family to contest this transaction in the future. A more compelling testimony 
transpires from the fact that the acquisition of the prebend by the Šēpê-ilias was 
eventually nullified by the Bēliya’u clan, who successfully reclaimed their cultic 
rights.492 
It is hard to determine how the various parties perceived these sales, but 
Šaddinnu’s reluctance to loan silver to members of the opposing camp is further 
evidence of a lack of solidarity, trust and inner-group collaboration among the bakers 
of Ezida. If their relationship can indeed be described as antagonistic, the situation 
seems to have deteriorated over the years, culminating in Dar 33, when two high-
profile lawsuits were filed against Šaddinnu. In the first case, a member of the Kidin-
Sîn contested the sale of a housing plot, a field and a baker’s prebend to Šaddinnu – 
the matter was settled to the latter’s advantage.493 The second case, adjudicated some 
five months later by the same judge, deals with the rights to prebendary income and 
was decided in favour of the Šēpê-ilia clan.494  
A possible explanation for this ‘rift’ may be sought in the background of 
Šaddinnu’s family. The Bēliya’us were part of the larger group of families that moved 
from the capital of Babylon to the burgeoning provincial towns during the reign of 
Nebuchadnezzar II.495 This meant that Šaddinnu and his relatives were left out of 
much of the local social organisation that had been evolving since at least the eight 
century BCE.496 Consequently, it can be argued that the Bēliya’u clan was not tied to 
the same customary rights, obligations and moral restrictions, as were the indigenous 
priestly families. Presumably, Šaddinnu and his kin could act more independently 
from this close-knit priestly community, and thus also deviate more easily from the 
established social norms in pursuit of their fortunes. Not only does the near absence of 
kin and fellow bakers families in Šaddinnu’s lending practice become less surprising, 
                                                
492 That Šaddinnu seemed to have had a personal hand in this affair is clear from the fact that he 
acquired half of the prebend in the course of these events. 
493 BM 25629. Note that a member of the Purkullu family joined the claimants. 
494 BM 25633. 
495 See Ch. 0.7.3. It is not unlikely that Šaddinnu’s forebear only settled in Borsippa as late as Nbk 33 
(BM 28904). For similar immigrant families in Sippar, see Waerzeggers 2014. 
496 I have argued earlier that local landownership (Ch. 2.1.2) as well as the marriage system (Ch. 1.5) 
went back several centuries before our documentation and brought with it various side effects in the 
social organisation of this community. 
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Šaddinnu’s family background and social position in this community could also 
explain, at least in part, his active engagement in entrepreneurial activities, such as the 
acquisition of (vacant or dilapidated) urban plots, with the aim of renting them out.497 
There is no doubt that Šaddinnu’s involvement in this sector can to a large extent be 
ascribed to his personal entrepreneurial mentality, but it might have been his lack of 
deep roots in Borsippa’s sacerdotal community that allowed him to pursue this line of 
work on an ‘un-priestly’ scale. 
Finally, Šaddinnu’s implication in the housing business might help to elucidate 
further aspects of his lending practice. If we compare the families who contracted 
loans from Šaddinnu with the families who appear in the housing dossier, there seems 
to be some overlap: e.g. Kidin-Nanāya, Imbu-īnia, Eppēš-ilī, Ea-ibni, Šigûa, Sîn-
šadûnu all appear in both dossiers. In some cases it concerns the same individuals. For 
example, Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa, one of Šaddinnu’s most trusted contacts,498 collected some 
of his rents499 but also contracted a loan from Šaddinnu.500 Libluṭ/Nabû-ušebši, an 
individual who leased rights to temple revenue to Šaddinnu, at least once took out a 
loan. In return he pawned his house to Šaddinnu, who consequently cashed in the 
house rent.501 Yet, in most cases the overlap is only in the families concerned and not 
in the individual persons. Still, it seems not too far-fetched to suggest that some of the 
loans have their background in Šaddinnu’s housing business. Some of the moderate-
sized loans that were extended on short term and without interest might actually 
represent house rents. If nothing else, his activities as multi-landlord must have 
brought him in contact with various tenants, their neighbours and families, who were 
likely to appeal to a propertied man, a patron, like Šaddinnu when in need of cash.  
 Summarising, Šaddinnu’s peculiar moneylending practices can be explained in 
their proper context. Disunity among the ranks of Ezida’s bakers divided them in two 
seemingly opposing camps. While collaboration in the cult was inevitable, their 
interaction outside the temple was marked by mutual exclusion (in marriage and 
silver lending) and discord (in property sales and lawsuits). Even if Šaddinnu was 
able to maintain more intimate relationships with members of the Kidin-Sîn family, I 
                                                
497 Jursa et al.  2010: 170f. 
498 See Ch. 4.2.3. 
499 BM 25690 (Dar 21). 
500 BM 25644 (Dar 25). 
501 BM 29433 (Dar 21). 
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will show in the next chapter that such ties were completely absent with the Šēpê-
ilias. I argued that some of this could be related to the fact that Šaddinnu and his 
family were not indigenous to Borsippa. There is no question that Šaddinnu took part 
in the local priestly community, indeed quite successfully, but his lack of deep roots 
meant that he was less thoroughly embedded in it, and perhaps more importantly, not 
restrained by the social norms that indigenous families tended to respect.  
 
3.4. Oxherds 
Counting well over four hundred documents, the Rē’i-alpi family archive informs us 
in great detail about the family’s main occupation as cultic oxherds.502 The majority 
of the documents concern Nabû-mukīn-zēri/Aplāya and his son Rēmūt-Nabû of the 
third and fourth generation respectively. The family was obviously rich and there is 
ample information on the acquisition of property as well as on moneylending. 
Together, Nabû-mukīn-zēri and Rēmūt-Nabû appear in no less than eighty-three silver 
loans (a further seven being contracted by Rēmūt-Nabû’s son, Bēl-ittannu), making it 
the largest dataset on lending in the Borsippa corpus.  
Let us start by evaluating the silver loans of Nabû-mukīn-zēri and his son 
individually. Of the ninety loans found in the archive, thirty-four belong to Nabû-
mukīn-zēri (nineteen as debtor, fifteen as creditor).503 He tended to borrow modest 
sums of silver (ten times under twenty shekels), while himself extending more 
substantial ones (eight times over sixty shekels of silver). Nabû-mukīn-zēri did not 
usually pay interest or provide pledges to his creditors, yet he did receive such 
benefits from his own debtors on multiple occasions. On the whole, Nabû-mukīn-
zēri’s financial situation seems to have been favourable. 
There are forty-nine loans contracted by his son, Rēmūt-Nabû (thirty-one as 
                                                
502 For an overview of this archive see Ch. 0.7.4. 
503 Loans Nabû-mukīn-zēri contracted as debtor: BM 102320 (Ner 03), BM 94824 (Nbn 02), VS 4 38 
(Nbn 04), BM 25856 (Nbn 05), BM 94841 (Nbn 08), BM 94830 (Nbn 08), BM 17664 (Nbn 09), BM 
94811 (Nbn 10), BM 94730 (Nbn 12), BM 82678 (Nbn 12), BM 82778 (Nbn 14), BM 94758 (Nbn 
16), BM 94873 (Nbn [-]), Smith Coll. 82 (Cyr 02), BM 26664 (Cyr 06), BM 26608 (Cyr 06), VS 4 
111 (Dar 06), BM 82627 (Dar 07) (this loan was later cancelled), BM 26490 (Dar 11).  
Loans Nabû-mukīn-zēri extended as creditor: BM 94698 (Nbn 14), BM 94977 (Cyr 01), VS 4 70 
(Cyr 01), BM 102028 (Cyr 02), BM 94689 (Cyr 03), BM 102013 (Cam 01), VS 4 76 (Cam 04), BM 
94718 (Cam 04), VS 4 100 (Dar 01), BM 102003 (Dar 01), BM 27858 (Dar 04), BM 26697 (Dar 06), 
BM 101994 (Dar 08), BM 94648 (Dar 09), BM 102018 (Dar [-]).  
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debtor, eighteen as creditor).504 However, Rēmūt-Nabû’s lending pattern differs from 
that of his father. He tended to borrow substantial sums of silver: he asked for 
amounts between twenty and sixty shekels on twelve occasions, but at least as often 
for more than one mina of silver. His creditors usually demanded security. The loans 
he extended were modest in comparison: only three out of eighteen loans exceeded 
thirty shekels of silver. At least half of these were interest-bearing or secured by a 
pledge. This suggests that Rēmūt-Nabû tried to make a profit on the small amounts of 
silver at his disposal. On the whole, however, his finances were unbalanced: he 
borrowed at a far greater speed than he was able to raise money. This situation clearly 
derailed in Dar 20 when Rēmūt-Nabû was charged with paying close to one talent of 
silver (BM 26576). One possible explanation for Rēmūt-Nabû’s financial difficulties 
is tax pressure.505  
Let us now turn to the individuals and the families with whom the Rē’i-alpis 
engaged in moneylending. Nabû-mukīn-zēri contracted most of his loans with fellow 
temple-based families (ca. 70%).506 Rēmūt-Nabû, by contrast, turned more often to 
                                                
504 Loans Rēmūt-Nabû contracted as debtor: BM 26680//BM 26754 (Cam 06), BM 82787//BM 82653 
(Dar 08), BM 102254 (Dar 09), BM 26654 (Dar 09), BM 82728 (Dar 09), BM 94667 (Dar 09), BM 
26642 (Dar 09), BM 25717 (Dar 10), BM 26542 (Dar 11), BM 26490 (Dar 11), M. 403 (Dar 12), BM 
26650 (Dar 13), BM 26547 (Dar 14), BM 26678 (Dar 14), BM 26584 (Dar 15), BM 26554 (Dar 17), 
BM 27793 (Dar 17), BM 82625 (Dar 18), BM 26618 (Dar 18), BM 26617 (Dar 19), BM 94685 (Dar 
19), EAH 225 (Dar 21), BM 94708 (Dar 21), BM 26534 (Dar 26), KVM 60 (Dar 28), BM 26521 
(Dar [-]),BM 82701 (Dar [-]),BM 26486 (Dar [-]),BM 25668 (Dar [-]), BM 82694 (d.l.), BM 102014 
(d.l.).  
Loans Rēmūt-Nabû extended as creditor: VS 4 107 (Dar 05), BM 17693 (Dar 06), BM 26696 (Dar 
08), BM 82727 (Dar 08), BM 26622 (Dar 10), BM 94872 (Dar 13), BM 25724 (Dar 13), BM 26581 
(Dar 13), BM 27845 (Dar 15), BM 26529 (Dar 16), BM 25844 = AH XV no. 189 (Dar 16), BM 
27873 = AH XV no. 190 (Dar 16), BM 94808 (Dar 19), BM 82730 (Dar 20), BM 29413 (Dar 21), 
EAH 226 (Dar 24), BM 94687 (Dar 26), BM 26555 (Dar 28).   
505 Tax payments are amply documented in the archive: e.g. BM 94970 (Dar 05), BM 94620 (Dar 10), 
BM 94545 (Dar 11), BM 102259 (Dar 13?), HSM 1899.2.145 (Dar 15), BM 82666//BM 102010//BM 
102262 (Dar 16), BM 82716 (Dar 18), VS 6 150 (Dar 27), BM 26557 (Dar 29). Note that Rēmūt-
Nabû contracted at least four loans with members of the Naggāru family (below); the fact that a 
certain Nabû-balassu-iqbi//Naggāru was the ‘ziqpu’ of the Rē’i-alpis, i.e. the person in charge of their 
tax-group (Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009: 244ff.), supports the idea that at least some of Rēmūt-Nabû’s 
loans had their background in taxation.  
506 Priestly: Arkāt-ilāni-damqā (2x), Atkuppu, Ea-ilūtu-bani (2x), Gallābu, Iddin-Papsukkal (2x), Ilia 
(3x), Kidin-Sîn, Kudurrānu, Lā-kuppuru, Nūr-Papsukkal, Rē’i-alpi (6x), Ṣāhit-ginê. Non-priestly: 
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non-priestly families (ca. 43%), especially when in need of larger sums of silver.507 
Another point of interest is that he appealed to a number of families more than once, 
which could indicate particular relations of trust between him and these families.508 
Turning to the loans he provided as creditor, it seems that here Rēmūt-Nabû’s 
practices resembled more those of his father: six loans went out to non-priestly 
families, whereas twelve to priestly families.509 
Finally, Bēl-ittannu, Rēmūt-Nabû’s son, engaged in seven silver loans, always as 
creditor.510  None of the loans exceed half a mina of silver. Most of his debtors 
belonged to the Rē’i-alpi family (4) or to other priestly families (2).511  He once 
extended a loan to an individual from the lowest stratum of the community, i.e. a 
širku of Nabû.  
Combining the data of the ninety silver loans from the Rē’i-alpi archive the 








                                                                                                                                      
Adad-nāṣir, Bā’iru, Damēqu, Mallāhu, Maṣṣār-abulli, Rēš-ummāni, Sippê, Šagimmu, Šamaš-ilāni 
Zērūtia. The Rēš-ummāni is so far not attested as prebendary of Ezida and the family is in this study 
usually classified as non-priestly. Note, however, that in this debt note the debtor Nabû-nādin-
ahi//Rēš-ummāni pledges his rights to twelve pieces of meat belonging to a (butcher’s?) prebend 
before the god Sîn (BM 94977). 
507 Creditors from priestly families: Arkāt-ilāni-damqā (2x), Ea-ilūtu-bani (2x), Esagil-mansum, Ibnāya 
(2x), Ilia (2x), Ilī-bāni, Kudurrānu, Naggāru (2x), Rē’i-alpi (2x). Creditors from non-priestly families: 
Amēl-Ea, Balāṭu, Banê-ša-ilia, Ea-imbi, Dannēa (3x), Imbu-īnia, Mallāhu, Rīšāya, Šangû-Ninurta, 
Šarrahu (2x).  
508 These relations might have originated with his father who had dealings with the same (priestly) 
families. 
509 Priestly: Ahiya’ūtu, Allānu, Gallābu, Ilšu-abūšu (2x), Naggāru (2x), Nūr-Papsukkal, Rē’i-alpi (3x). 
Non-priestly: Adad-šamê, Balāṭu, Dābibī, Rēmūt-Ea, Sîn-šar-ilāni, 
510 BM 94553 (Dar 34), BM 26541 (Dar 35), BM 94690 (Dar 35), BM 102026 (Dar 36), BM 26599 
(Xer 01), BM 94626 (Xer 01), BM 26646 (Xer 02).  
511 I.e. the Ahiya’ūtu and the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā families. 
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Table 5: silver loans of Rē’i-alpi archive (kin 28x) 
 




































With a ratio of 2:1, the Rē’i-alpis engaged most often with individuals from fellow 
priestly families. While the social patterns of moneylending becomes less centred on 
the prebendary in-group the further down we move in the temple hierarchy, the high 
over-all number of priestly families in the credit operations of the Rē’i-alpis 
resembles the practices observed among the Ea-ilūtu-banis and other temple-enterers 
more than those of the middle-high ranking brewers or bakers. 
The Rē’i-alpis share another feature with their more senior temple colleagues: a 
strong reliance on kin. Twenty-eight of their lending partners can be identified as 
relatives. Of these, fifteen individuals belonged to the Rē’i-alpi clan, the others were 
related by marriage. Taken together, close kin and extended family members 
accounted for 30% of the loans contracted by Nabû-mukīn-zēri, his son, and 
grandson. If one includes indirect marriage partners nearly half of all their loans were 
contracted with kinsmen. 
Solidarity within the Rē’i-alpi clan transpires from the many and, at times, 
favourable loans extended to each other. Many loans were non interest-bearing (e.g.
BM 94626), extended under a reduced interest rate (e.g. BM 17664), or interest-free 
until default (e.g. BM 94689). Moreover, after the crisis of Dar 20, Rēmūt-Nabû 
turned mostly to his own kin for financial support.512 Kith and kin clearly functioned 
as an ultimate safety net. 
 
3.5. Reed-workers 
The final case study of this chapter concerns the lending practices of the lowest-
ranking group of prebendaries available in the corpus – the prebendary reed-
                                                
512 E.g. BM 94708 (Dar 21), BM 26534 (Dar 26), KVM 60 (Dar 28). 
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workers.513 Most of the evidence from the Atkuppu archive pertains to Marduk-šumu-
ibni’s sons Nabû-šumu-uṣur, Nabû-iddin, Murānu and Iqīšaya.  
Together, the four brothers contracted twenty-five silver loans, primarily as 
debtors.514  Even though they preferred to borrow modest sums of silver,515 all but 
two loans – received from their two closest moneylenders, see below – were interest-
bearing or covered by a pledge. This picture corroborates the idea that their financial 
situation was not particularly strong. 
While most of their creditors are known from the archive or are attested elsewhere 
in Borsippa, two families were particularly closely associated to the Atkuppus: the 
Rēš-ummāni family who provided four loans, and the Ahiya’ūtu family who provided 
three. On two occasions the brothers turned to their in-laws from the Nappāhu family 
for financial support,516 and once even to each other.517 The remaining loans were 
received from individuals who were not closely associated to the Atkuppus: Agru, 
Banê-ša-ilia, Ea-bāni, Ea-ilūtu-bani, Gallābu, Ibnāya (2x), Sîn-imittu, The ratio 
between priestly and non-priestly families seems to have been more or less equal. The 
same applies to the loans in which the Atkuppu brothers acted as creditors.518 Sums 
are usually modest,519 and prebendaries and non-prebendaries are more or less equally 
represented among their debtors. 
Four loans contracted by earlier generations of Atkuppus should be mentioned 
briefly here. Two interest-bearing credits of circa ten shekels of silver were lent by 
                                                
513 For this family see Ch. 0.7.5. 
514 VS 4 97 (Dar 03), BM 26655 (Dar 06), BM 29678 (Dar 11), BM 102309 (Dar 14), VS 4 140 (Dar 
14), BM 26665 (Dar 18), VS 4 150 (Dar 18), VS 4 149 (Dar 18), BM 102256 (Dar 19), BM 94733 
(Dar 19), VS 4 156 (Dar 20), BM 87282 (Dar 24), BM 26649 (Dar 25), BM 26724 (Dar 26), BM 
102314 (Dar 27), BM 87297 (Dar [-]), BM 102252 (Dar [-]). Note that BM 94722 (Dar 27) records 
the loan between two of the brothers. 
515 Only two loans exceeded one mina of silver (seventy and seventy-eight shekels), fourteen loans 
ranged between three and twenty shekels of silver. 
516 Nabû-šumu-uṣur was married to a daughter of the Nappāhu family. 
517 BM 94722 (Dar 27) 
518 BM 17680 (Dar 05), BM 17698 (Dar 05), BM 26605 (Dar 06?), BM 26631 (Dar 10), BM 26693 
(Dar 12), BM 26704 (Dar 15), VS 4 174 (Dar 28). Note that BM 26631 (Dar 10) involves onions and 
two debtors which could indicated that this was part of the management of a harrānu ventureship; 
BM 26693 (Dar 12) involves the payments of tax to the rab-hanšê for a third party. 
519 Only twice exceeding twenty shekels of silver 
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Nabû-mušētiq-uddê, great-grandfather of the Atkuppu brothers, to individuals of the 
Ša-haṭṭu-ēreš and the Mallāhu families. Their grandfather, Nabû-ēṭir, once extended a 
minor loan of one shekel to an individual of the Mudammiq-Marduk clan and his 
wife, for which they pawned their house. And finally, their father Marduk-šumu-ibni 
is attested once as debtor of two shekels in return for which the creditor of the 
Pahhāru family received his field as pledge. 
The evidence can be summarised as follows: 
 
Table 6: silver loans of Atkuppu archive (3x kin) 
 





































The pattern of silver lending observed in this archive confirms the correlation 
between temple rank and reliance on temple-based families that I have observed 
earlier in this chapter. The Atkuppus relied relatively less on temple relations in terms 
of moneylending than did the temple-enterers, brewers, bakers and oxherds. 
Moreover, they also relied less strongly on kin.520 Also in other aspects of their 
interaction (most notably in marriage and tenancy) it has been shown that the 




                                                
520 Of the twenty-nine silver loans, only three (10%) were contracted with relatives. The two loans for 
which both amount and terms are preserved, suggest that there was no particular trust or solidarity 
between the parties. The ten shekels borrowed from the in-laws of the Nappāhu family were extended 
in return for the usufruct of their house; Nabû-šumu-uṣur once lent his younger brother, Murānu, five 
shekels of silver – this amount, however, bore an above-average interest rate of 25% per annum. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I investigated the pattern of silver lending in the sacerdotal community 
of Borsippa. My primary aim was to examine the extent of the priests’ social field in 
this area of interaction: did they abide strictly to the boundaries of the prebendary in-
group, or did they turn to a larger segment of the community when in need of cash? 
Secondly, is it possible to reconstruct a typical lending practice shared by all priests? 
These questions have proven difficult to answer. Not only are there many pitfalls in 
using the highly versatile genre of the Babylonian debt note as primary source, this 
investigation has made it clear that a range of social factors influenced the way in 
which Borsippa’s priests lent and borrowed, leading to divergent credit profiles. 
Hence, Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi’s favourable monetary circumstances, for 
example, allowed him to extend large sums on many occasions and borrow only 
modestly himself, while Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia’s chronic lack of silver made him 
contract loans primarily with his closest relatives and temple colleagues, while 
keeping his overall involvement in moneylending limited at the same time. Solidarity 
and co-operation did not only enable the Rē’i-alpi family to successfully manage its 
prebendary patrimony, but also motivated Rēmūt-Nabû to appeal to his innate 
network of kin and in-laws for financial support after his crisis in Dar 20, this network 
functioning both as a community of interest and ultimate safety net. Finally, I argued 
that the Bēliya’u family’s immigrant background, if not also a reason for other 
indigenous bakers to dissociate themselves from this family, may have led Šaddinnu 
to pursue a more active career as entrepreneur and moneylender besides his 
obligations as priest of Nabû.  
While other examples could be provided to illustrate the influence of personal 
circumstances and family background in this area of interaction, another factor that 
seems to have patterned the practices of moneylending in significant ways, albeit on a 
more general level, is professional affiliation. In fact, the available evidence reveals a 
faint correlation between temple rank and lending pattern. Priests on the higher 
echelons of the temple hierarchy adhered to a more inward-looking lending practice, 
geared towards fellow prebendary families and kin (i.e. Ea-ilūtu-bani and others), 
while families located on the lowest fringes of the temple institutions engaged with a 
much more diverse set of families and relied less on fellow prebendary clans 
(Atkuppu). This development could be traced from the temple-enterers, to the 
brewers, the bakers and the reed-workers. Only the Oxherd family, with its strong 
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sense of solidarity and close collaboration with fellow priests, deviates from this 
trend.  
Still, this observation has been important for a couple of reasons. Not only does it 
indicate that with the reed-workers we are indeed reaching the outer fringes of the 
temple community, but at the same time it provides additional support for my 
working hypothesis that the temple fabric loses its influence on its participants the 
further one descends in the temple hierarchy. 
Moreover, the fact that priests adopted a lending practice that was, overall, geared 
towards the prebendary in-group, becomes clear once all the loans incorporated in this 
study are added together. Dividing the lending partners into priests and non-priestly 
‘outsiders’, the grand total is 138:80, in favour of the former. This means that out of 
the 218 silver loans found in the archives of Borsippa’s priests, 63% were contracted 
with individuals from temple-based families.  
The preponderance of priestly families should perhaps not surprise us. Many 
lending partners will have met in the temple on a daily basis. Besides, loans 
contracted within the prebendary in-group often took the form of modest interest-free 
loans; one cannot fully dismiss the possibility that they were extended to cover 
prebend-related expenses and were therefore part of the cultic organisation, although 
the absence of temple colleagues in the credit operations of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u 
speaks against this. Moreover, in contrast to what has been observed in the 
organisation of tenancy, most of the debtors and creditors of silver loans resurface 
outside of these encounters. Among the twenty-six lending partners of Šaddinnu, for 
example, four remain unattested; one is found elsewhere in the corpus while the rest is 
known from his archive in other capacities. Of the forty-two credit partners of Rēmūt-
Nabû who are identified by a three-partite filiation, no less than thirty reoccur in the 
Rē’i-alpi archive. The same stands for Marduk-šumu-ibni; only three of his thirteen 
partners remain otherwise unknown, the rest is either attested in the Ilia (A) archive or 
elsewhere in the corpus. All this suggest that moneylending took place in a restricted 
geographic space and that the priests from Borsippa found their lending partners in 
their immediate environment. 
Perhaps more remarkable, then, is the relatively high involvement of non-
prebendary families (37%). There could be many reasons why priests engaged with 
‘outsiders’, one simple explanation is that priestly and non-priestly families inhabited 
the same neighbourhoods, presumably those closes to the temple area (see Ch. 6, for 
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more on residential patterns). Nonetheless, the high participation of these members of 
the community in moneylending contrasts strongly with their near exclusion in the 
hypergamous marriage system. Whereas marriage was something that was planned 
well in advanced, the motives underlying individual credits are far more convoluted. 
Many of the loans must have been contracted in moments of crisis or on an ad hoc 
basis.  
It should be clear that more work is needed to fully unravel the social dimensions 
of silver lending in ancient Babylonia. It remains extremely difficult to qualify loans, 
let alone establish their correct background. While I have been careful to only use 
credits that make no reference to existing contracts, agreements, sales etc., perhaps a 
finer methodology is advisable for future research. Perhaps a more fruitful approach 
would be to focus primarily on advancements involving lower sums, as they are more 
likely to represent genuine loans than credits of several minas of silver. Finally, it 










The previous chapters of this study were devoted to social interactions in which the 
priests from Borsippa and their families engaged on a more or less regular basis. Far 
from happening at random, we have seen that marriage alliances, professional 
affiliation, kinship ties, and family background, among possible other factors, played 
an important role in configuring these interactions, even if it would go too far to 
suggest that Borsippa’s priestly actors were deprived entirely of choice.      
This chapter studies the priests’ personal networks, more precisely, their circles of 
trust and intimacy. Which individuals belonged to their immediate entourage, whom 
did they trust and bring along to important transactions, or whom did they choose as 
business partners? It seems reasonable to suggest that in these intimate and 
confidential matters priests enjoyed much more freedom from social convention and 
custom than in any of the interactions studied so far. Exploring these relationships of 
trust and intimacy, perhaps even friendship, will provide a unique insight into their 
most immediate social environment.  
 Apart from a handful of short proverbs, no diaries, letters, poems or other textual 
sources bearing a personal account on friendship were composed during 3,000 years 
of Mesopotamian history. 521  Neither is there a Babylonian equivalent of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s most famous work on ethics, which provides us with 
a philosophical exegesis on the different forms of friendship (φιλία; philia), according 
                                                
521 See e.g. Alster 1997: SP 2.33, SP 2.62, SP 3.16, SP 3.17, SP 3.64, SP 3.159, SP 4.9, SP 9 Sec. E 5 
and UET 6/2 276 among others, for Sumerian sayings concerning friends (ku.li) or friendship 
(nam.ku.li). 
CHAPTER 4  
 142
to a prominent Athenian intellectual in the forth century BCE.522 Even if friendship 
represents a major leitmotif in the celebrated epic of Gilgamesh,523 no expressions of 
amity have entered the business archives of the Borsippean priesthood.524 One might 
therefore rightfully ask whether it is at all possible to capture ties of intimacy, let 
alone friendship, in the administrative texts, which are the products of conservative 
legal practice and scribal conventions. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that the 
written record represents only a small proportion of the transactions that took place in 
actual daily life, and that meeting one’s friends surely did not require a written 
testimony.  
 Hence, how can ties of ‘friendship’ in this ancient priestly community be 
reconstructed? Following notions found in the socio-anthropological literature, 
friendship could be paraphrased in the most basic terms as ‘a more or less informal 
social relationship, based on choice, trust and voluntariness’.525 Research into these 
ties, how they materialise and structure society, has a long tradition in the social 
sciences. Among the pioneering studies that focus on intimacy and friendship in the 
urban setting one should mention Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954, Laumann 1966, 
Verbrugge 1977, Fischer et al. 1977, and Fischer 1982. These studies remind us of the 
fact that friendship comes in many forms and intensities and may vary from person to 
person, context to context, and place to place. Yet, they also reveal that besides 
psychological characteristics commonly associated with friendship, one can find 
structural features that form the basis for, or alternatively, result from intimate 
relationships such as friendship. Thus, leaving aside psycho-emotional aspects, which 
transcend the scope of our legal documentation, I will approach the issue of friendship 
in Borsippa through the structural features evident in the corpus.  
                                                
522 E.g. Irwin & Fine 1996, Cooper 1980. 
523 Sallaberger 2008: 69-72, George 2003: 140-142.  
524 The term found in the Borsippa corpus that comes closest to expressing an attitude of intimacy or 
friendship is ahu, brother. Besides referring to someone’s sibling, i.e. a son of the same father, the 
term was at times also applied, fictively, to individuals of different parents. Yet, as has been shown 
by C. Waerzeggers (2010: 85-90), in Borsippa the latter use was reserved for individuals belonging to 
the same paternal family, the so-called bīt-abi (see below), and is thus far only found in the context of 
prebend transfers.     
525 This definition is adopted from Beer 2001, an overview article on the anthropology of friendship. 
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The principal concept in this respect is that of the ‘strength’ of ties, introduced 
most clearly by the sociologist M. Granovetter. In his seminal 1973 article on the 
strength of weak ties, Granovetter proposed that ‘the strength of a tie is a (probably 
linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie’.526  Even if 
he left a more precise definition for future research, many subsequent scholars (most 
notably among network analysts) have since integrated the concept of tie strength in 
their analysis and expanded the list of its dimensions, with among other, structural, 
emotional and social factors.527  
One of the most basic and commonly applied indicators for tie strength is the 
frequency of interaction: do actors have contact daily, weekly, monthly, or do they 
meet only once in a blue moon? Even if contiguity cannot be taken as an absolute 
yardstick for friendship or intimacy, repeated contact between individuals does 
facilitate the process to convert from strangers into acquaintances, and from 
acquaintances into friends.528 Moreover, it is a fact that we tend to spend relatively 
more time with our closest friends. Hence, by examining the people who figure most 
frequently in the archives of Borsippa’s priests it will be possible to get an elementary 
idea of who belonged to their intimate circles. The following investigation will start 
off with a purely quantitative approach, which will inform us on a general level about 
possible structural differences and similarities between the personal networks of 
priests.  
Yet, results gained from an analysis based solely on frequency can be misleading. 
The inclusion of, for instance, stubborn debtors or tax collectors will contaminate the 
results, 529  while the strength of ties between close kin are bound to be 
overestimated.530 Even if there is no doubt that priests will have enjoyed intimate (and 
perhaps even their strongest) relationships with immediate kinsmen, the ‘strength’ of 
                                                
526 Granovetter 1973: 1361. 
527 For some of the older studies that have invoked the concept, see Granovetter 1982. Cf. Gilbert & 
Karahalios  2009 for a brief overview of different factors of ‘strength’, with special relevance to its 
application in modern social media. 
528 E.g. Verbrugge 1977: 577-578, Fischer et al. 1977, passim (especially Ch. 3), Scott 1991: 44-46, 
and Wasserman & Faust 1994: 44-45. 
529 A similar observation has been made by C. Waerzeggers 2014: 12.  
530 See Marsden & Campbell 1984 for the problems of using frequency as a measure of tie strength.  
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such ties are based more on specifics of family demography and division of property 
than anything else. Moreover, kin relations are, so to speak, given to – rather than 
chosen by – a person. Following the notion of friendship as a relationship based on 
choice, close relatives should be set apart from the discussion.531 This requires a more 
qualitative appraisal. In the second part of this chapter I will therefore zoom in on the 
individuals who occur most frequently in the archives and examine which of them 
were involved in relations of trust and intimacy by introducing additional factors of 
tie strength. These include: 
Duration. The notion of duration refers to the possible time spent on a relationship. 
Even if the duration of a relationship cannot automatically be taken as benchmark for 
its strength, prolonged contact does increase the probability of forming an intimate 
relationship. 532  Moreover, it has been noted that over a prolonged period of 
interaction individuals will develop more efficient ways of communication, thus 
raising the intrinsic value of their relationship, provided it is a positive one.533 Hence, 
in the following investigation a relationship sustained over a long period of time can 
be considered stronger and more robust than a short-lived one with a similar degree of 
frequency.534  
Multiplexity. This refers to the idea that interpersonal ties are stronger if they 
involve different forms (and different contexts, see Ch. 4.2). 535  In essence, 
multiplexity is a measurement of the diversity of shared activity. This means that an 
individual who, for example, only acts as somebody’s witness does not enjoy an 
                                                
531  This does not apply to more distant (consanguine and affinal) relatives who cannot be linked 
immediately to the protagonists and certainly came from outside the latter’s household.  
532 E.g., Fischer et al. 1977: Ch. 3, Fischer 1982, and Marsden & Campbell 1984. 
533 E.g. Hruschka 2010: 156-159. 
534 One has to realise that an intimate relationship like friendship is not static but in a continuous 
process of change (e.g. Lazaresfeld & Merton 1954, Hruschka 2010). At the particular moment when 
we capture intimate relations in the sources, some might still be in the early stages of formation, 
while others might be already well established or even on the way towards dissolution. While it need 
not be the case, whenever the evidence for such a relation breaks off, it could point to the dissolution 
of the bond. 
535 For the concept of multiplexity (earlier also known as multistrandedness) see, Fischer et al. 1977, 
passim (especially Ch. 3), Verbrugge 1979, Fischer 1982: 139-144, Scott 1991: 65-67, Prell 2012: 
138-140, Hruschka 2010: 157. See now also Waerzeggers 2014, who did a similar investigation of 
interaction frequency and multiplexity for the Sipparean priests-entrepreneur Marduk-rēmanni. 
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equally strong relationship as someone who acts as creditor, guarantor, scribe and 
witness. Rather than requiring a new contact for every new transaction, a multiplex 
relationship between two individuals makes it possible to fulfil a much broader range 
of needs and can thus be seen as indicative of interpersonal intensity. As opposed to 
other kinds of relationships, ties of friendship are usually more multiplex, a quality 
that is often built up over time.  
Intensity. While this dimension of tie strength usually refers to emotional aspects, 
it is more important for us to take notice of the exact nature and context of interaction. 
There is a difference between people living in the same neighbourhood who enjoy a 
‘nodding’ relationship in passing, and people who acted as each other’s groomsman; 
while the former might see each other much more often, the relationship that existed 
between the latter is far more ritualised and emotionally charged, and hence more 
intensive. In the second part of this investigation I will pay special attention to 
important, personal events of Borsippa’s priests like marriage, adoption and property 
sales, and other momentous transactions including substantial loans and business 
enterprises.  
In the end, a strong tie should be understood as the result not of a high degree in 
any single one of these dimensions, but rather as the cumulative result of all these 
criteria together. While the application of tie strength will deeply refine our appraisal 
of the circles of trust and intimacy, it will equally enable us to reconstruct parts of the 
network that were not captured adequately by straightforward quantitative analysis. 
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4.1. Formal quantification of personal networks 
I will start this chapter with a quantitative appreciation of the sources from Borsippa. 
The purpose of this investigation is to see whether a purely quantitative analysis of 
the priestly archives can tell us more about the personal networks of trust and 
intimacy as well as the general (interactional) attitude of the protagonists. The 
underlying idea is that lifestyle correlates with specific social networks or, conversely, 
that specific network properties reflect particular modes of behaviour. Hence, the 
more conservative and inward-looking attitude of a priest translates into an ego-
network with less individuals but a higher number of frequent contacts, compared to 
the network of an out-going and entrepreneurial merchant, which consists of a larger 
(and more diverse) set of contacts yet holds a smaller number of frequent contacts.536 
Moreover, the network of the merchant will on the whole be less dense than that of 
the priest, secluded in his thigh-knit temple community where everybody knows 
everybody.537 
The focus will be on the main protagonists of the Ea-ilūtu-bani (including Ilī-bāni 
and Nanāhu), Ilia (A), Bēliya’u, Rē’i-alpi and Atkuppu family archives. It has been 
noted that the structures of these archives differ greatly. Whereas the documents of 
the Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Atkuppu archives are distributed more evenly over the long-
sixth century and often report on the activities of contemporary siblings and in-laws, 
thus providing a broader but less dense account, the Bēliya’u, the Ilia (A) and the 
Rē’i-alpi archives on the other hand have been classified as single-generation archives 
since the great majority of their texts were produced by one, or in the case of the Rē’i-
alpis, two consecutive individuals. We will see that the latter archives are most 
suitable for this ego-centred examination. The Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Atkuppu archive, 
on the other hand, lack a similar density of information, making quantification less 
meaningful. In order to incorporate them into the following analysis some arbitrary 
measures are in order. The Ea-ilūtu-bani archive cluster, for example, will be taken as 
one single unit; for the Atkuppu archive the focus will be on the fourth generation, 
represented by the four sons of Marduk-šumu-ibni, who carried out much of their 
business collectively. 
                                                
536 A convincing example from Sippar has been presented by Waerzeggers 2014: 10-14. 
537 In the SNA, ‘density’ measures how many ties (between the actors) of all the ones possible are 
actually present in the network. In the words of C. Waerzeggers 2014b: 212 ‘a dense network is 
indicative of a cohesive world where everybody knows everybody’. 
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Let us start with fleeting contacts. The vast majority of the individuals mentioned 
in the archive are attested only one time. There is little doubt that the archive holders 
actually met some of these contacts more than once (especially those with whom they 
entered into a formal contract),538 yet the figures are consistent between the archives 
and seem to present a fair reflection of reality. Of the 810 individuals mentioned in 
the network of Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A), 658 (or 81%) are attested only once.539 A 
very similar figure is found in the network of Rēmūt-Nabû//Rē’i-alpi in which 497 (or 
79%) of his 627 contacts appear not more than once. Also Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, who 
otherwise displayed a more entrepreneurial attitude compared to his fellow priests, 
had the same percentage of fleeting contacts (1013 out of 1248 individuals, or 81%). 
The only ego-network that deviates from this pattern is that of Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-
alpi; only 70% of his contacts occur once. In other words, almost as much as one-third 
of all individuals mentioned in his texts reappear, which might indicate that Nabû-
mukīn-zēri conducted his business in a somewhat more restricted and perhaps more 
intimate circle. Even if the full implications of this result remain unclear in the present 
state of research, the Rē’i-alpis did exhibit a noticeable attitude of solidarity towards 
their own clan and a number of related families in other settings, which might serve as 
a partial explanation.  
At the other edge of the spectrum we find the archives of the Atkuppu archive. 
Slightly over 90% of the 355 individuals attested in the documents of the fourth 
generation occur only once. However, as the sample taken from this archive is the 
smallest of our corpus (consisting of only 83 documents) and as it moreover concerns 
the affairs of four brothers it is likely that this high percentage is a result of the 
scarcity of information rather than reality. Somewhat less pronounced but still higher 
than the figures from the single-generation archives, is the number of fleeting contacts 
found among the Ea-ilūtu-banis and their connected families. Of the total 1320 
individuals, 1138 (or 86%) appear only once. Again, this should probably not be 
taken as a good reflection of reality since this figure is derived from a multi-
generational archive lacking adequate ego-networks. Still, it might reveal a more 
                                                
538  Remember that the textual evidence at our disposal is far from complete. Moreover, the widespread 
use if nicknames in Borsippa makes it inevitable that some individuals have escaped correct 
identification. 
539 Not included in this and the following numbers are those individuals whose name are damaged and 
cannot be identified with any certainty.  
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structurally inherent feature of the family. Taking only the texts of Mušēzib-Bēl/Zēr-
Bābili/Ea-ilūtu-bani, who with sixty-five attestations is the best-documented 
protagonist in this archive cluster, we arrive at the same 86%.540 Very similar figures 
are found for some of his relatives.541    
Let us now move on to the most frequently attested contacts. I used ≥5 attestations 
as cut-off point for intimate contacts.542 As could be expected, in contrast to the high 
number of one-timers, we find only a very small number of intimates in the archives 
under investigation. The highest figures are found in the networks of Marduk-šumu-
ibni//Ilia (4%, or 29 out of 810) and Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi (3,5%, or 24 out of 
688). While this seems high at first, in the case of Marduk-šumu-ibni many of these 
contacts represent close relatives. Leaving these out of the analysis reduces his 
intimate network to merely 2,2% or eighteen individuals. This group is slightly more 
diverse for Nabû-mukīn-zēri, including only three close relatives (but still a relatively 
large number of clan members, see below). In contrast, with 2% (13 out of 627) this 
number is somewhat smaller for the latter’s son, Rēmūt-Nabû – this becomes even 
smaller (1,4%) if we leave out his close relatives. A slightly higher figure is found in 
the network of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, where 2,5% (or 30 out of 1248) qualifies as 
intimate contacts. He does not seem to have relied much on close kin. 
Turning to the final two archives one finds, again, the smallest figures. In the 
documents of the Atkuppus’ fourth generation only four individuals are attested five 
times or more (1,2%). And, even if the number seems higher in the collective network 
of the Ea-ilūtu-bani cluster (2,5%), it turns out that many of these close contacts can 
be identified as one of the many archive holders; once we leave them out, barely 1% 
qualifies as a close contact.  
                                                
540 232 of his 270 contacts occur only once. 
541 Mušēzib-Bēl’s father, Zēru-Bābili/Nabû-šumu-ukīn/Ea-ilūtu-bani, is attested forty-six times; of the 
total of 174 contacts found in his documents, 154 (88,5%) occur one time only. 87% for Nādin (aka. 
Dadia)//Ilī-bāni; 84% for Ahušunu//Nanāhu; 86% for Zēru-Bābili/Šumā/Ea-ilūtu-bani. However, 
these latter three men are poorly attested. 
542 The cut-off point of five or more attestations, which is also used by Waerzeggers 2014: 10-14 in a 
similar analysis, seems to offer a suitable middle ground. Lowering the cut-off point to four 
attestations drastically inflates the number of individuals involved, making our dataset a questionable 
tool for studying circles of trust and intimacy, let alone networks of friendship. Raising this point 
above five attestations, on the other hand, would have nearly excluded the Atkuppu archive, which 
mentions only three individuals more than five times. 
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As I said earlier, the figures from the latter two archives should not be taken at face 
value, as they are possibly a result of a lack of information. The figures established 
for the other archives seem, however, more reliable, and these ego-networks can be 
compared more adequately with one another on a quantitative level. The relatively 
higher presence of intimate contacts in the network of Marduk-šumu-ibni could point 
to a particular reliance on family. Equally interesting is the contrast between the 
networks of Nabû-mukīn-zēri and his son, Rēmūt-Nabû. With a relatively low 
frequency of fleeting contacts (70%) and a relatively high number of close contacts 
(3,5%), the former seems to have maintained a closer grip on his social environment 
compared to his son (75% fleeting and 2% close contacts). Whereas Nabû-mukīn-
zēri’s business activities are marked by prosperity and property acquisition, Rēmūt-
Nabû faced times of austerity and crisis. One wonders whether their respective 
networks can account for these events; that is to say, whether their different levels of 
connectivity could be linked to their prosperity and hardship respectively. 
Before we investigate the identity and contexts of the closest contacts of the 
Borsippean priesthood in a more qualitative manner, let us briefly turn to a recent 
study on an influential man from Sippar and his social environment by C. 
Waerzeggers (2014: 10-14). In this archival study of the entrepreneur-priest Marduk-
rēmanni//Ṣāhit-ginê, she begins her investigation by submitting this man’s archive to 
a similar quantification. Marduk-rēmanni, whose recent ancestors had migrated from 
the capital of Babylon, was both active in the temple and on the harbour of Sippar, 
and he had contacts all over Babylonia. Waerzeggers showed that this man’s ego-
network reflects his broadly connected and dynamic lifestyle by comparing it with the 
contemporary network of Bēl-rēmanni, a more conventional priest of Šamaš. The 
network of Marduk-rēmanni was relatively less dense (84% fleeting and only 2% 
close contacts) than the one of his co-resident, Bēl-rēmanni (74%, against 4%). How 
exactly these figures relate to the networks from Borsippa remains unclear, as the 
latter seem to oscillate between the two. While affinity between the networks of Bēl-
rēmanni and Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi seems right on an intuitive level, the fact that 
we have similar figures for Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia and the entrepreneur Marduk-
rēmanni is surprising to say the least. 
 
 




         Table 7: contacts in Borsippa archives vs. Sippar archives 
 
Not much can thus be said based on this rudimentary quantification. While the Ea-
ilūtu-bani and the Atkuppu archives do not provide us with ideal data sets, the 
remaining archives generate nearly identical results. Besides a few general 
observations, the numbers do not seems to reveal any clear differences in terms of 
social behaviour of individual priests, nor do they help us to pinpoint their position in 
this community more precisely. Having said that, all ego-networks belong to priests, 
and even if different attitudes or mentalities have been observed in previous chapters, 
they essentially shared very similar social positions and lifestyles. Hence, 
homogeneity must be expected rather than heterogeneity. It is clear that much more 
work is needed on Babylonian ego-networks before we can fully grasp the meaning of 
these figures. Ideally, one should be able to compare these priestly ego-networks with 
the non-priestly networks from Borsippa with similar parameters (i.e. archive size, 
chronology etc.).544 Moreover, I believe that it is necessary in the future to examine 
how factors like time-span of the archive, size of the archive, text genre and perhaps 
even community size influence the nature of these ancient networks. 
                                                
543 Note that the figures given for Bēliya’u, Marduk-rēmanni and Bēl-rēmanni do not include close kin. 
544 The only non-priestly archive from Borsippa that might be used to carry out a comparative study is 
the Gallābu archive. The texts from Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Gallābu contain 89% fleeting contacts against 
1,6% ≥5 contacts. The fact that these figures resemble the results gained from the Atkuppu and Ea-
ilūtu-bani archives supports the idea that they are linked to the limited size of the archives. 
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4.2. Qualitative analysis of tie strength and friendship 
The formal quantitative analysis of the previous part helps us to delineate, at least in 
preliminary form, the priests’ networks of trust and intimacy as they supply us with 
the names of their most regular contacts. Following the order of the subsequent 
discussion, these networks consisted of thirty-one individuals in the Ea-ilūtu-bani 
archive cluster, twenty-nine for Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A), thirty for 
Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, twenty-four and thirteen for Nabû-mukīn-zēri and his son Rēmūt-
Nabû//Rē’i-alpi respectively, and four for the Atkuppu brothers. These figures, 
however, include close members of the family and individuals whose relationship 
with the protagonist cannot be qualified as one based primarily on voluntariness or 
involving intimacy. Even if frequency of interaction is an important dimension of the 
strength of ties, it is clear that these numbers give at best a very crude representation 
of the actual networks of friendship. Hence, in the following I will present a more 
qualitative appreciation of the circles of trust and intimacy by introducing the 
additional factors of tie strength: duration, intensity, and multiplexity. While the first 
two dimensions do not need further explanation, some words need to be said about 
multiplexity in our sources. As we will see in the following, individuals attested most 
frequently in the personal networks of our priests can only rarely be described as 
being highly multiplex in terms of roles, as they usually appear in only one or two 
functions on a regular basis. While the traditional sense of multiplexity will be 
applied in our investigation, I would like to introduce a further notion that might be 
more useful in our case, namely that of multiplexity of context. In the following 
survey I have divided the activities of our priests according to socio-economic 
contexts: temple-related activities including prebendary management, agricultural 
management, family affairs, property sales and acquisition, money-lending, housing 
management, harrānu business enterprises, and taxation. While some of these overlap 
–for example, was the transfer of a prebend within the Rē’i-alpi clan a matter of cultic 
management, a property acquisition, a family affair, or indeed all three of them? – 
these social settings were to a certain extent structurally (and sometimes also 
culturally) circumscribed areas of activities, which may be associated with specific 
physical settings, as with agricultural or temple affairs, and with specific sets of 
people, such as colleagues, kin, tax collectors, tenants, etc. Hence, the relationship 
between an individual who accompanied someone to a wide range of contexts can be 
qualified as more robust and involving a higher degree of trust and intimacy, than a 
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relationship that is found in a range of contexts only. Even if these contexts were not 
isolated social worlds, I believe that this additional notion of ‘multiplexity of context’ 
can offer us an informative dimension of tie strength in Borsippa.   
         The following investigation adopts a descriptive approach, evaluating the 
individuals most frequently attested in the networks in terms of the various 
dimensions of tie strength. However, in light of the size of some of these personal 
networks reconstructed through quantification (some of which consisting of around 
thirty individuals), it would be impractical and rather needless to discuss all of them 
in full length. Instead, for each network I will focus on a couple of individuals who 
seem to have enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the archive holder. These 
accounts should give us a good idea about the types of trust and intimacy that 
transpire from our sources, offering us the most likely cases of friendship among 
individuals of this priestly community. All the information about the multiplexity of 
roles, contexts and duration of interaction will be summarised in tabulated form at the 
end of each section.545. Rather than an attempt to rank individuals in absolute terms, 
these tables will serve as a convenient overview of the relations of trust and intimacy, 
and place them only on a very relative scale. Finally, while these tables are made for 
the larger single-generation archives of the Ilia (A), Bēliya’u and Rē’i-alpi, they are 
lacking for the Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Atkuppu archives. The information in these 
archives is simply not adequate enough to warrant such an overview, either because 
the number of frequent contacts is too small or because the protagonists are found in 
only a handful of different contexts. 
 
4.2.1. Ea-ilūtu-bani 
While the make-up of the Ea-ilūtu-bani archive cluster was not ideally suited for the 
quantifying analysis, it is still useful to take a closer look at the identity, attestations 
and roles of the close contacts of these temple-enterer families. In the following I will 
look at the various archive holders and their intimates individually.  
                                                
545 I will include some additional individuals in these tables, which have not been discussed in this 
study. Their inclusion will help to give a more complete picture of the personal networks but may 
also serve as examples of individuals that are well attested yet enjoyed an overall weaker connection 
to the protagonists in terms of tie strength. 
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Let us start with Nabû-šumu-iškun/Puhhuru from the third generation of the Ea-
ilūtu-bani family, who lived roughly between the 610s and 560s BCE.546 There is 
relatively little information on this protagonist and only one of his contacts deserves a 
closer look. Although Nabû-šumu-iddin//Ahiya’ūtu is attested only four times, and 
always as a scribe, the variety of events that he recorded seems to mark him out as an 
intimate contact. Besides an ordinary debt note for vats, 547  he composed the 
inheritance division between Nabû-šumu-iškun and his two brothers,548 a sale contract 
of hanšû land,549 and a record pertaining to the marriage arrangements of Nabû-šumu-
iškun’s son.550 In view of the fact that scribes of such documents usually represent 
intimate relations in other archives, Nabû-šumu-iddin//Ahiya’ūtu can be considered a 
close contact, even if the number of attestations falls under the threshold applied 
elsewhere in this study. 
Nabû-šumu-iškun’s son, Zēru-Bābili//Ea-ilūtu-bani, appears to have had only one 
contact who appears more than five times in the available sources. 551  Nabû-
lē’i/Marduk(a)/Ur-Nanna is attested eight times as a witness between 565-558 
BCE.552 The majority of these transactions took place in an agricultural context, once 
even in a village outside of Borsippa.553 He also witnessed a work contract for the 
manufacture of bricks (i.e. taxation),554 a loan of silver,555 and a house rent contract 
for Zēru-Bābili.556 That he enjoyed an intimate relationship with Zēru-Bābili might be 
further deduced from the fact that he usually appears as first witness in his records. 
                                                
546 For more information on this individual, see Joannès 1989: 31-35. 
547 BM 94819 (Nbk 08). 
548 TuM 2/3 5 (Npl 16). 
549 A 98 (Nbk 08); Nabû-šumu-iškun bought the land from the same clan. 
550 TuM 2/3 48 (Nbk 25). It concerns silver from the dowry of his daughter-in-law that was still due to 
him. 
551 For more information on this individual who can be followed in the documentation between roughly 
580-540 BCE, see Joannès 1989: 35-36. 
552 A 88 (Nbk 40) and NBC 8378 (Ner 02). 
553 TuM 2/3 156 (Ner 02) is an imittu text written in Bāb-kirāti. Others texts include A 88 (Nbk 40), L 
4735 (Nbk 41) and TuM 2/3 80 (Nbk 42). 
554 L 1632 (Nbk 40). 
555 L 1625 (Nbk [x]) 
556 NBC 8378 (Ner 02). 
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Iqīša-Marduk/Šumu-ukīn/Ea-ilūtu-bani was a distant relative and frequent 
contact of Mušēzib-Bēl, son of Zēru-Bābili//Ea-ilūtu-bani. 557  Besides acting as a 
witness for Mušēzib-Bēl on four occasions (twice as first witness), 558  he also 
exchanged land with him.559 Moreover, one year after the exchange he took out a loan 
of silver from Mušēzib-Bēl.560 
The last protagonist of the Ea-ilūtu-bani clan to be discussed here is Zēru-
Bābili/Šumā, who is frequently identified as a temple-enterer of Nabû.561 In the ca. 
twenty-five documents that have entered the archive, most of which dealing with the 
management of his agricultural property, there is one individual who stands out: 
Šulā/Arad-Nabû/Ea-ilūtu-bani. Attested some ten times between ca. 584-562 BCE, 
he is Zēru-Babili’s best-attested witness (usually as first witness).562 In this capacity 
he accompanied him to eight imittu harvest estimates, 563  a sales contract for a 
donkey,564 and a debt note for silver resulting from a work obligation.565 Moreover, 
according to TCL 12 52 (Nbk 35) Šulā’s slave was to deliver the harvest from a field 
belonging to Zēru-Bābili, presumably by virtue of his activities as tenant. This last 
piece of evidence indicates that Šulā and Zēru-Bābili enjoyed a more complex 
relationship. Finally, although Šulā’s exact patrilineal connection to the family is not 
elucidated in the present state of the documentation, it is interesting that he shows up 
in connection with other protagonists of the archive: once in connection with Nabû-
                                                
557  See Joannès 1989: 39-45, for more information on this protagonist who is found in the texts 
between ca. 560-510 BCE. 
558 TuM 2/3 6 (Nbk IV 00), TuM 2/3 166 (Dar 07), NBC 8376 (Dar 07), and A 165 ([-]). 
559 NBC 8366 (Cam 07) is a debt note of silver referring to the earlier exchange of land with Mušēzib-
Bēl. 
560 L 1657 (Nbk VI 01). 
561 For more on this individual, whose texts date between ca. 587-550 BCE, see Joannès 1989: 36ff. As 
Joannès shows (following an earlier observation by San Nicolò 1947: 155) he should not be equated 
with Zēru-Bābili/Nabû-šumu-iškun, in spite of the onomastic similarities. 
562 His earliest and latest attestations are, respectively: YBC 9194 (Nbk 21+) and TuM 2/3 112 (Nbk 
42). 
563 E.g. YBC 9194 (Nbk 21+), TuM 2/3 152 (Nbk 28), YBC 9158 (Nbk 32), TuM 2/3 155 (Nbk 40). 
564 A 90 (Nbk 30). 
565 TuM 2/3 112 (Nbk 42). 
CIRCLES  OF  TRUST  &  INT IMACY 
 
 155
šumu-iškūn/Puhhuru,566 and three times with Luṣi-ana-nūr-Marduk/Aplā/Ilī-bāni.567 
Moreover, Šulā’s son, Nabû-nādin-ahi, is frequently attested as scribe (see below).  
Shifting our focus to the Ilī-bāni family branch and its first protagonist, Lūṣi-ana-
nūr-Marduk/Nabû-mukīn-zēri,568 it turns out that his closest contact, Marduk-šākin-
šumi/Bēl-šunu/Rē’anu, is also found in documents of Zēru-Bābili/Šumā (see above). 
In the relatively short period of twelve years, 569  Marduk-šākin-šumi wrote ten 
documents of the archive – six for Lūṣi-ana-nūr-Marduk 570  and four for Zēru-
Bābili/Šumā571  – all related to the management of agricultural holdings or silver 
debts. Admittedly, this contact seems not to have been particularly influential (neither 
in terms of roles nor in terms of contexts in which he appears), and apart from the fact 
that he was connected to various protagonists of the archive, not much can be said 
about him. 
We learn a great deal more about the close associates of Nādin (aka. Dadia), son of 
Lūṣi-ana-nūr-Marduk//Ilī-bāni, 572  most notably about the three scribes Nabû-
kāṣir/Itti-Marduk-balāṭu/Ea-ilūtu-bani, Nabû-nādin-ahi/Šulā/Ea-ilūtu-bani and 
Nabû-mukīn-apli/Nabû-nādin-ahi/Gahal. While the majority of the texts written by 
Nabû-kāṣir (12),573 Nabû-nādin-ahi (6)574 and Nabû-mukīn-apli (4)575 represent run-
of-the-mill documents such as debt notes, receipts and harvest estimates (which, 
however, required them to be on location in the countryside), they were all involved 
in more significant family events. Nabû-kāṣir, for example, wrote the marriage 
                                                
566 TuM 2/3 75 (Nbk 15). 
567 NBC 9189 (Nbk 19), A 93 (Nbk 30), and TuM 2/3 127 (Nbk 35). Note that according to this last 
documents he sold sheep to Lūṣi-ana-nūr-Marduk. 
568 For more information on this individual, see Joannès 1989: 49-50. 
569 Between TCL 12 56 (Nbk 30) and TuM 2/3 81 (Nbk 42). 
570 TuM 2/3 128 (Nbk 37), TuM 2/3 77 (Nbk 38), TCL 12 55 (Nbk 38), L 4725 (Nbk 40), L 4731 (Nbk 
41), TuM 2/3 81 (Nbk 42). 
571 TCL 12 56 (Nbk 30), A 180 (Nbk 40), TuM 2/3 155 (Nbk 40), TuM 2/3 101 (Nbk 40). 
572 See Joannès 1989: 50-56 for more information on this individual, who was active in the reign of 
Nabonidus (ca. 555-539 BCE). 
573 E.g. Tum 2/3 84 (Nbn 02), MLC 381 (Nbn 04), A 101 (Nbn 05), BM 96263 (Nbn 08) written in bīt-
Apkallu, L 1637 (Nbn 09) written in Nuhšānitu, and A 178 (Nbn [x]). 
574 E.g. TuM 2/3 158 (Nbn 09), NBC 8357 (Nbn 15), and NBC 8367 (Cam 01) written in Sūr-Amēlūtu. 
575 E.g. A 174 (Nbn 02), BRM 1 58 (Nbn 05), BM 94885 (Nbn 08), and BM 96263  (Nbn 08) written 
in bīt-Apkallu. 
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agreement between Nādin and his wife fKabtā//Ilī-bāni in Nbn 06, where Nabû-
mukīn-apli was present as a witness.576 Nabû-nādin-ahi wrote the sales contract of a 
date grove, sold by Nādin and his brother to a distant relative, 577  as well as a 
proceeding of Nādin’s business venture.578 
The last of Nādin’s contacts who should be mentioned here is Nabû-ēṭir-
napšāti/Šumā/Ea-ilūtu-bani, possibly the brother of the temple-enterer Zēru-
Bābili/Šumā (see above). In only a very short period of five years he is mentioned 
eight times as first witness in Nādin’s business transactions. Like the three scribes, he 
is mainly found in documents related to agricultural management, 579  with one 
important exception: he was present at the drafting of the same marriage contract as 
Nabû-kāṣir and Nabû-mukīn-apli. His presence in what might have been Nādin’s 
most personal record marks him out as an intimate contact. 
 The final protagonist who deserves a closer examination is Ahušunu/Nabû-
mušētiq-uddi (aka. Bazuzu)/Nanāhu.580  The first individual who stands out as an 
influential associate is Nabû-ahhē-iddin/Nabû-zēru-ibni (aka Kalbā) /Nanāhu. His 
involvement, which spanned over fifteen years, is remarkable and can only stem from 
a particularly robust relationship. Firstly, he lent Ahušunu the sum of one mina of 
silver in Dar 13.581 Secondly, in Dar 17 he stood surety for a debt of two minas of 
silver drawn against Ahušunu.582 Thirdly, between Dar 17 and Dar 29 he repeatedly 
paid (ina qātān) taxes on behalf of (ana muhhi) Ahušunu.583 And finally, Nabû-ahhē-
                                                
576 Tum 2/3 1. 
577 NBC 8395 (Nbn 15). 
578 TuM 2/3 86 (Nbn 08) documents the receipt of eleven kur of dates paid by Nādin//Ilī-bāni to Iddin-
Nabû//Ēdu-ēṭir and Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Amēl-Ea. It then mentions another debt, said to be the debt 
note of the business venture (u’iltu ša harrānu) of two other individuals, who have to hand it over to 
Nādin.  
579 This required him to accompany Nādin on at least three trips outside of the city walls: TCL 12 85 
(Nbn 05) written in Sūr-Amēlūtu; BM 96263 (Nbn 08) written in bīt-Apkallu; L 1637 (Nbn 09) 
written in Nuhšānitu. 
580 See, Joannès 1989: 59-64, for this individual who can be traced in the documentation between ca. 
522-492 BCE. 
581 A 123. 
582 A 120. 
583 TuM 2/3 169 (Dar 17), A 173 (Dar 18), L 4720 (Dar 25), L 1651 (Dar 27).  
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iddin was present at both of Ahušunu’s marriage contracts as witness. 584  Few 
individuals in the Borsippa corpus are known to have maintained such a marked 
relationship, but, as the genealogy of the Nanāhus is still badly known, this bond 
might have existed by virtue of being close relatives. 
In closing this section, there is one individual who remains to be mentioned. Even 
though he seems not to have been linked to one protagonist in particular, Nidinti-
Bēl/Bēl-ahhē-iddin/Bēl-eṭēru is a good example of an individual who, while being 
mentioned relatively rarely, seems to have enjoyed a close relationship with the 
various branches of this family cluster. While he is first attested in Dar 18 as the 
scribe of an unremarkable debt note for Bēl-uballiṭ//Ilī-bāni,585 some months later 
Nidinti-Bēl also recorded the inception of a harrānu business venture for him.586 In 
the following years he seems to have remained in close touch with the family: the 
next time we meet him in Dar 26 he was married to fAmat-Sutīti, daughter of 
Nādin//Ilī-bāni and cousin of Bēl-uballiṭ, who was formerly married to Mušēzib-
Bēl//Ea-ilūtu-bani.587 Two years later we find him as first witness at the marriage 
agreements of his stepdaughter, Lurindu//Ea-ilūtu-bani and Ahušunu//Nanāhu 
mentioned above.588 The latter was, finally, also present as a witness at Nidinti-Bēl’s 
second marriage in Dar 35.589 
The majority of the contacts discussed above either belonged to the same clan (e.g. 
Ea-ilūtu-bani, Nanāhu) or to fellow temple-enterer families (e.g. Ahiya’ūtu). Relatives 
and members from the own professional group clearly assumed an important role in 
the relations of trust and intimacy among these families, a trend that also emerge 
strongly from other types of interaction. Even so, individuals from families that 
cannot be linked to the priestly circle of Borsippa can be found in the personal 
networks, too (i.e. Gahal, Rē’anu, Ur-Nanna). Even if this point to the fact that ties of 
friendship in Borsippa were not fully restricted by concerns of professional affiliation, 
one thing is clear: individuals lacking family names are entirely absent. This holds for 
the following priests as well. 
                                                
584 NBC 8410 (Dar 18), TuM 2/3 2 and part-duplicate BM 94577 (Dar 28), 
585 TuM 2/3 96. For more information on Bēl-uballiṭ, see Joannès 1989: 56-58. 
586 BM 94492. 
587 BM 94608. 
588 TuM 2/3 2 (Dar 18) and part-duplicate BM 94577. 
589 L 1634. 
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4.2.2. Ilia (A) 
Of the circa 810 individuals mentioned with Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A), nearly 4% 
met him five times or more. Compared to other priests under investigation, Marduk-
šumu-ibni has the largest number of close contacts. If we take a closer look at the 
identity of these ≥5-contacts it turns out that the great majority bore temple-based 
family names (ca. 81%). Equally important is the observation made earlier that more 
than half of these individuals (15) were allied to the Ilias by marriage or blood and no 
less than eleven belonged to Marduk-šumu-ibni’s immediate kin, i.e. brothers, 
cousins, nephews, father, wife and son. Since this last set of ties are so to speak 
‘given’ and not based on choice or voluntariness, I have left Marduk-šumu-ibni’s 
close relatives out of the following survey. 
The first individual who should be mentioned is Nabû-uṣuršu/Nabû-ahhē-
iddin/Šēpê-ilia. He is attested twenty-seven times in the period between 516-493 
BCE.590 Notwithstanding his frequent occurrence, there are only two instances in 
which he assumed an active role. According to BM 109875 (Dar 10) and BM 94666 
(Dar [x]) he is one of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s partners in the production of beer for the 
cult of Nabû and perhaps for retail.591 In general his involvement in the affairs of 
Marduk-šumu-ibni was of a much more passive nature. He witnessed no less than 
twenty-five transactions (often as first witness), usually relating to agricultural592 or 
prebendary management,593 but he also witnessed at least one silver transaction,594 a 
house rental,595 and a family event.596 Since this last transaction records the marriage 
negotiations of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s daughter, fAmat-Nanā, his presence can be taken 
                                                
590 See BM 102336 (Dar 06) and BM 26500 (Dar 28) for his earliest and latest secured attestations, 
respectively. 
591 It should be noted that in the domain of beer production the line between business partnerships (beer 
for the public market) and ēpišānūtu contracts (beer for cultic use) is not very clear and might well 
have gone hand in hand.  
592 E.g. BM 95187 = AH XV no. 32 (Dar 15), BM 26751 (Dar 15), BM 95198 (Dar 17), BM 101999 
(Dar 18), VS 5 86 (Dar 19), VS 3 121 (Dar 16 or 19).  
593 BM 94632 = AH XV no. 36 (ca. Dar 18), BM 17695 = AH XV no. 38 (Dar 22), BM 26758 = AH 
XV no. 39 (ca. Dar 23), BM 26726 = AH XV no. 40 (Dar 25). 
594 BM 26708 (Dar 10+). 
595 BM 94731 ([ - ]).  
596 BM 26483 (Dar 14). 
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as a sign of intimacy between Nabû-uṣuršu and Marduk-šumu-ibni.597 Finally, there 
are three more documents that should be mentioned here as they provide an extra 
dimension to the relationship between Nabû-uṣuršu and Marduk-šumu-ibni. Towards 
the end of his career Marduk-šumu-ibni functioned as notary scribe in Borsippa and 
the archive holds at least eight property deeds written (some also sealed) by him.598 
As far as we can see, these documents were composed for individuals with no obvious 
ties to the notary (presumably for the sake of neutrality), but it seems that the latter 
could bring his own confidants to the transaction. As it turns out, Nabû-uṣuršu 
accompanied Marduk-šumu-ibni in this capacity on at least three occasions. 599 
Holding no stakes in these transactions, their co-occurrence can only be understood as 
the result of personal volition and trust. 
Another partner of Marduk-šumu-ibni, who seems to have enjoyed a more 
substantial relationship with the Ilias, is Rēmūt-Nabû/Nabû-bāni-zēri/Bēliya’u. 
While he owed Marduk-šumu-ibni a small number of vats on two occasions600 – 
presumably used for the production of beer for retail – he recorded (11) and witnessed 
(4) a range of transactions well beyond this sphere between 546-522 BCE.601 Most 
notably he seems to have accompanied Marduk-šumu-ibni regularly on trips to the 
countryside for the purpose of harvest estimates and the management of rural 
property.602 Finally, he also wrote an important property deed recording the transfer 
                                                
597 Nabû-uṣuršu witnessed at least one transaction of the Ilia (A) archive at which Marduk-šumu-ibni 
was not personally present. BM 26629 (Dar [x]) is a cultivation contract of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s 
daughter and was possibly written after the former’s death. 
598 For an article on the function and the sealing practice of the Neo-Babylonian notary scribes, see 
Baker & Wunsch 2001. Tablets that have entered the Ilia (A) archive by virtue of his activity as 
notary include among others, BM 26511 = AH XV no. 35 (Dar 16), BM 27746 (Dar 27), BM 26503 
(Dar 27) BE 8 115 (Dar 27), BM 26500 (Dar 28). 
599 BM 87289 (Dar 19), BE 8 115 (Dar 27), and BM 26500 (Dar 28). The only exception being Itti-
Nabû-balāṭu/Nabû-tabni-uṣur/Kidin-Sîn, who is attested 6 times in connection with Marduk-
šumu-ibni between 514 – 494 BCE, including BM 26500 and BM 109363, a related to Marduk-
šumu-ibni’s notary activities written by Itti-Nabû-balāṭu. 
600 Ten vats of good beer in BM 27875 (Cam 01) and another ten in VS 6 111 (Cam 03). 
601 BM 102311 (Nbn 10) and BM 26673 (Bar 01). 
602 A 82 (Nbn 10+) and BM 94842 (Nbn 11) written in Bīt-ša-Nabû-damqā; BM 102267 (Cam [x]) and 
BM 82806 ([-]) written in Birit-aṣunê; BM 21159 (Cam 00) and BM 26673 (Bar 01) written in Tīl-
būri. 
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of prebends between Marduk-šumu-ibni and his close relatives, and is found as 
witness in another.603 
A final colleague of Marduk-šumu-ibni who deserves a closer look is Nabû-ēṭir-
napšāti/Tabnēa/Kudurrānu. In addition to his single attestation as Marduk-šumu-
ibni’s cultic colleague and employer,604 Nabû-ēṭir-napšāti acted frequently as scribe 
(8) in the archive between 545-507 BCE.605 Of particular interest is his involvement 
in the redistribution of property after Šulā’s death.606 That Nabû-ēṭir-napšāti enjoyed a 
durable and intimate relationship with Marduk-šumu-ibni is revealed most clearly by 
the fact that he also recorded the marriage negotiations of his daughter in Dar 14.607  
The next individual to be examined is Nabû-bēlšunu/Mušēzib/Itinnu. He is 
attested twenty-four times in connection with Marduk-šumu-ibni in the period 
between 547-521 BCE,608 either as scribe (13) or witness (11). In these capacities he 
was present at various transactions relating to agricultural management, 609  beer 
production,610 prebendary administration,611 taxation,612 and a range of miscellaneous 
transactions.613 More important was his repeated presence at family affairs after the 
death of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s father during the reign of king Nabonidus.614 He was 
present at, and wrote, at least three documents dealing with the re-division of the 
                                                
603 VS 5 37 (Cyr 02) and BM 26569 = AH XV no. 14 (Cyr 03). 
604 BM 94699 = AH XV no. 43 ([-]). Unlike the previous two individuals who were employed by 
Marduk-šumu-ibni, perhaps we should see Nabû-ēṭir-napšāti as the superior party since he recruited 
Marduk-šumu-ibni to perform his cultic obligations. 
605 His earliest and latest attestation in connection with Marduk-šumu-ibni are BM 17640 (Nbn 11) and 
BM 95187 = AH XV no. 32 (Dar 15), respectively. Note, however, that he is already mentioned 
earlier together with Šulā//Ilia BM 27879 (Nbn 05). 
606 BM 26731 (Nbn 12), BM 17657 (Nbn 13), BM 26532 ([Nbn 13]), BM 26569 = AH XV no. 14  
(Cyr 03). 
607 BM 26483. 
608 Earliest and latest attestations: BM 27890 (Nbn 08) and VS 6 119 (Dar 01). 
609 BM 102289 (Nbn 12), BM 94882 (Cyr 07), and BM 94729 ([-]). 
610 BM 94744 (Cyr [x]). 
611 BM 102313 = AH XV no. 15 (Cyr 06). 
612 BM 17654 (Nbn [x]), BM 17717 (Cam 06), VS 6 119 (Dar 01). 
613 E.g. BM 87332 (Nbn 10) is a debt note for dates; BM 95007 (Nbn 11) is a receipt of pegs and dates; 
BM 26099 (Cyr 02) is a receipt of wages for the manufacture of a bronze kettle. 
614 See Waerzeggers 2010: 378-381 for a brief overview of the family history. 
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patrimony between the four sons,615 the management of outstanding debts,616 and the 
transfer of property between relatives.617 We can conclude that even if his role in the 
archive of the Ilias was not very multiplex, the fact that he made an appearance at 
most of the family arrangements, that took place in periods crucial for the 
development of the family, either as witness or as scribe, qualifies him as an intimate 
contact of Marduk-šumu-ibni and his family.  
An individual who enjoyed a similar connection to the family is Nabû-mukīn-
zēri/Taqīš-Gula/Siātu. Although with only ten attestations the frequency of 
encounter is relatively limited, the intimacy of his connection transpires, again, from 
the events he attended. Like Nabû-bēlšunu//Itinnu, he witnessed no less than five of 
the re-divisions of property between the Ilia brothers.618 On top of that Nabû-mukīn-
zēri was also present at Šulā’s last will and testament in Nbn 02.619 Nabû-mukīn-zēri 
together with Nabû-bēlšunu, seem to have been the only individuals who enjoyed 
such an intimate relationship with the entire nuclear family. He is attested one final 
time in a receipt of silver of Marduk-šumu-ibni dated to Dar 02, more than thirty 
years after his first appearance in the archive.620  
Even though frequency of attestation has been a good indication of intimacy so far, 
there is at least one example to warn us that this is not always the case. Between 529-
505 BCE, Nabû-uṣuršu/Bēl-ahhē-iddin/Ṣilli-ahi is attested no less than fourteen 
                                                
615 BM 17657 (Nbn 13) and BM 26532 ([Nbn 13?]) are redivisions of a date grove between the four 
brothers; BM 94587 (Nbn 13) is a redivision of property (field and houses) in Tīl-būri between the 
three younger brothers. 
616 BM 27890 (Nbn 08) is a debt note for silver between Marduk-šumu-ibni and his older brother; in 
BM 26731 (Nbn 12) he pays a sum of silver to his sister-in-law (presumably from her dowry), which 
his father still owed her; BM 27899 (Nbn 17), is a debt note for silver between Marduk-šumu-ibni 
and his cousin, perhaps related to the property exchanged in BM 25664, which was also written by 
Nabû-bēlšunu. 
617 BM 25664 (Nbn 16) is an exchange of two date groves between Marduk-šumu-ibni and his cousin, 
written by Nabû-bēlšunu; VS 5 37 (Cyr 02) is a donation of a door-keeper’s prebend to Marduk-
šumu-ibni (and his nephew) by his cousin; BM 82695 = AH XV no. 19 (Cam [x]) is a transfer of a 
prebend to Marduk-šumu-ibni, written by Nabû-bēlšunu.  
618 BM 26731 (Nbn 12), BM 17657 (Nbn 13), BM 26532 ([Nbn 13?]) BM 94587 (Nbn 13), BM 94617 
([-]). 
619 BM 26498. 
620 BM 102020. 
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times, making him one of the most frequently attested contacts in the archive.621 
However, he is only attested in two spheres of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s business affairs: 
agriculture and housing. Nabû-uṣuršu was a tenant of Marduk-šumu-ibni during the 
reigns of Cambyses and Darius I, working his estates in the area of Tīl-būri.622 
Moreover, probably living in close vicinity to this village, he witnessed various 
documents related to the administration of property held by Marduk-šumu-ibni and 
his family in the countryside. Instead of identifying this relationship as an intimate 
one, between equals, it is can better be understood in terms of ‘employer and 
employee’ or ‘patron and client’.623  
In conclusion, even if Marduk-šumu-ibni’s reliance on fellow temple brewers is 
limited – besides members of the Ilia clan there are only two individuals from the 
Allānu and Kudurrānu families, respectively – he found many of his closest contacts 
among local prebendary families (e.g. Bēliya’u, Šēpê-ilia). Still compared to the 
temple-enterers discussed above, there are relatively many individuals from non-
priestly families in Marduk-šumu-ibni’s personal network (e.g. Itinnu, Siātu, 
Mušēzib), some of which seem to have been on intimate terms with his entire family. 
Again, entirely absent are individuals who lack family names or established 
pedigrees.  
                                                
621 His earliest attestation is BM 25832 (Cam 00); his latest is BM 27992 (Dar 16). 
622 BM 95194 (Cam/Cyr 01), Amherst x (Cam 02), BM 94659 (Cam [x]), Berens 108 (Dar [x]). 
623 This does however not rule out the existence of friendship according to the cross-cultural record. 
Anthropologists usually refer to these friendships between individuals of different (social) status as 

























































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of the 1248 individuals mentioned in the archive of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, thirty 
individuals (2,5%) qualify as ≥5-contacts. Roughly two thirds of these individuals 
bore local priestly family names, and at least half (15) were prebendary bakers, i.e., 
Šaddinnu’s immediate temple colleagues. This does, however, not apply to the most 
frequently attested contact, Bēl-ēṭir/Guzānu (aka. Nādin)/Šigûa. He appears over 
forty times in the period between ca. 506-496 BCE.627 His primary role in the archive 
of Šaddinnu was that of scribe (31).628 He wrote a great variety of texts and his 
services were clearly not restricted to one specific sphere of Šaddinnu’s affairs. He 
composed documents related to agricultural administration (e.g. imittu, cultivation 
contract629), which occasionally required him to be on location outside of the city 
walls,630 and he also wrote temple-related texts, usually recording the disbursement of 
prebendary income to Šaddinnu’s cultic collaborators. 631  Bēl-ēṭir also authored 
documents of greater personal significance to the archive holder: property deeds,632 
protocol texts, 633  and the two documents settling the arrangement with Bēl-
iddin//Kāṣir, 634  whose old-age maintenance Šaddinnu had assumed in return for 
property rights.635 Last but not least, Bēl-ēṭir was also involved in harrānu business 
ventures. He wrote documents related to silver loaning, and work contracts for the 
                                                
627 His earliest attestation is BM 29416 (Dar 15?), his latest in BM 96234 (Dar 26). 
628 E.g. BM 28981 (Dar 17), BM 96167 (Dar 18), BM 29447 (Dar 19), BM 29057 (Dar 20), BM 
25653//25630 (Dar 20), BM 96190 (Dar 20), VS 3 128 (Dar 21), BM 96373 (Dar 22), BM 29092 
(Dar 23), BM 25644 (Dar 25), BM 96234 (Dar 26), BM 96193 (Dar [-]), BM 96346 (Dar [-]). 
629 For a cultivation contract see, BM 96190 (Dar 20); for imittu-texts see, e.g. BM 28983 (Dar 17), 
BM 29089 (Dar 21), BM 96299 (Dar 22). 
630 VS 3 128 (Dar 21) is composed in Ṭābānu and BM 96299 (Dar 22) in tamirtu Sippuli(?). For these 
toponyms, see Zadok 2006: 402 and 444. 
631 For so-called idū ša maššarti documents, see e.g. BM 29514 (Dar 19), BM 29057 (Dar 20), BM 
29092 (Dar 23). In this context should also be mentioned the various texts from the so-called Apamû-
dossier (Waerzeggers 2010: 127-128): BM 29447 (Dar 19) and BM 96167 (Dar 18?) published in 
Zadok 2003a. They record the leasing of rights to cultic leftovers by Šaddinnu. 
632 Agricultural plots: BM 29666 (Dar [x]), BM 96193 (Dar [x]). Slave: BM 21978 (Dar 24).  
633 Both texts agree on the bailment of individuals that have to be brought before Šaddinnu on set date: 
BM 28981, Dar 17) BM 96205, Dar 25) 
634  Bēl-iddin might have been a retired baker. Note that he is only mentioned once before these 
transactions, as witness in a document dealing with prebendary income BM 29512 (Dar 10). 
635 BM 25653//25630 (Dar 20) and BM 21979 (Dar 20). 
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production of beer, as well as the formal conclusion of a joint venture. However, his 
involvement in Šaddinu’s business affairs was deeper than simply that of scribe. 
There is at least one instance when he was required to deliver 100 vats of beer, 
suggesting that he was responsible for running parts of this enterprise himself.636 
More evidence of his personal investment can be found in BM 25714 (Dar 20), which 
informs us that Bēl-ēṭir (and Nabû-uṣuršu//Bā’iru) owed Šaddinnu’s son, Nabû-
uballiṭ, the relatively high sum of 140 shekels of silver.637 Even if the text does not 
specify the background of this debt, the amount of silver and the identity of the co-
debtor suggest that we are dealing with the organisation of a business venture.638 The 
house rented by Bēl-ēṭir from Šaddinnu in BM 29036 (Dar 25) may also feature in 
this context. There is at least one occasion on which he collected house rent 
presumably on behalf of Šaddinnu.639  
To conclude, even if Bēl-ēṭir/Guzānu/Šigûa is only attested for a relatively short 
period of ten years, he can be identified as one of the most influential contacts of 
Šaddinnu during the second half of Darius I’s reign. This is not only suggested by the 
high contiguity with Šaddinnu, but also by the active role he assumed on various 
occasions. As a scribe he wrote texts pertaining to a disparate range of social settings, 
from run-of-the-mill receipts of silver and dates to important property-deeds and long-
term arrangements. Besides his scribal activities, he is attested as witness (usually as 
                                                
636 BM 28893 (Dar 21). 
637 There is one further text that mentions Nabû-uballiṭ//Bēliya’u and Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa and seems to be 
dealing with silver for harrānu purposes but unfortunately BM 28962 (Dar 24) is highly damaged. 
638 For the co-debtor Nabû-uṣuršu/Rēmūt/Bā’iru, see Zadok 2008: 76+3. Apart from BM 25714, he is 
mentioned at least six more times in the Borsippa corpus: BM 27813 (Dar 13), BM 25732 (Dar 21), 
BM 27870 (Dar 22), BM 25647 (Dar 22), BM 25686 (Dar 23), BM 25655//BM 25648 (Dar 23). 
Even if Šaddinnu or his son are not mentioned in these texts they must have entered the Bēliya’u 
archive through his connection with Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa and their joint harrānu enterprise with the family. 
In BM 25732 (Dar 21), for example, we find Nabû-uṣuršu concluding a joint venture with a certain 
Sîn-ibni/Kalbā. While no mention is made of the Bēliya’us the contract was drawn up by Bēl-ēṭir. It 
seems that Nabû-uṣuršu was also active in Babylon. Interestingly, two of the three texts written at the 
capital inform us that he coordinated building contracts for private houses. It is probably not a 
coincidence that both he and Šaddinnu were active in the housing sector and one might expect a link 
between their enterprises. 
639 BM 25690 (Dar 21).  
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first witness640), but more importantly he also acted as Šaddinnu’s business partner in 
the production of beer and perhaps the renting of housing plots. Moreover, his 
association to Šaddinnu bridged generations as he is found running a business with 
Nabû-uballiṭ, the former’s son. Nor was Bēl-ēṭir a stranger to Šaddinnu before his first 
appearance in the documentation. Their relationship can be traced back to at least 519 
BCE (Dar 03), when Guzānu//Šigûa, the father of Bēl-ēṭir, acted as a witness to 
Šaddinnu’s acquisition of a housing plot.641 Far more momentous in this respect is the 
fact that only six months later Guzānu bought a house adjoining Šaddinnu’s 
property,642 making him and presumably his son the new next-door neighbours.643 
The relationship between Šaddinnu and Bēl-ēṭir can thus be characterised as frequent, 
diverse, long lasting, and based on trust and intimacy – many of the aspects one might 
associate with friendship. 
Another important individual in Šaddinnu’s circle is Nabû-bullissu (aka. Nabû-
balassu-iqbi)/Mār-bīti-iqbi/Kidin-Sîn. Attested some thirty times between 519-491 
BCE,644 he is by far the most frequently attested witness in the archive. While mainly 
found in documents written in the prebendary sphere 645  and in texts recording 
agricultural exploitation, 646  he accompanied Šaddinnu to a much wider range of 
settings. We find him in documents related to the running of harrānu ventures647 and 
silver loaning, 648  but also in the contexts of house letting 649  and property 
                                                
640 Texts in which he acts as witness to Šaddinnu’s business affairs, e.g. BM 29024 (Dar 18), BM 
29408 (Dar [19]), BM 28966 (Dar 20), BM 28899 (Dar 20). 
641 BM 25589 (Dar 03). 
642 VS 4 98 (Dar 03). Even though, Šaddinnu’s full filiation is not provided he can beyond doubt be 
identified as Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u.  
643 Guzānu is further attested as witness (4 out of 6 times as first witness), e.g. house lease contract: VS 
5 67 (Dar 05); receipt of rations for Carians: BM 29488 (Dar 06); cultivation contract: BM 29004 
(Dar 10?); receipt of a ‘gift’ in silver from Šaddinnu’s wife to the temple authorities: BM 28913 (Dar 
25?). He once extended Šaddinnu a loan in dates: BM 29452//YBC 11289 (Dar 12).   
644 See, BM 96374 (Dar 03) and VS 3 151 (Dar 31) for the earliest and latest attestation respectively. 
645 E.g. BM 96320 (Dar 15), BM 29034 (Dar 16), BM 21962 (Dar 26), BM 29460 = AH XV no. 97 
(Dar 27). 
646 E.g. BM 96374 (Dar 03), VS 3 111 (Dar 11), BM 96190 (Dar 20), VS 3 151 (Dar 31). 
647 E.g. BM 95861 (Dar 16), BM 28927 (Dar 20).  
648 E.g. BM 29716 (Dar 14+), BM 22105 (Dar 16), BM 96150 (Dar 21). 
649 VS 4 137 (Dar 13). 
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acquisition.650  Twice he was present at the settling of (legal) disputes;651  on one 
occasion this required him to go up to the capital of Babylon. While he is represented 
in almost as many different contexts as Bēl-ēṭir, his activities and roles were more 
restricted and passive. In fact, there is only one instance in which he acted in a 
capacity other than that of witness, namely when Šaddinnu hired him to do some kind 
of work.652 Although it is difficult to evaluate this relationship, based on frequency 
and multiplexity of context and role, it seems that Nabû-bullissu’s association with 
Šaddinnu was of a less intimate kind compared to that of Bēl-ēṭir, even if it can be 
traced over a much longer period of time. 
There are many more individuals who occur relatively often in the archive of 
Šaddinnu and who might for reasons of frequency be classified as important, intimate 
contacts. However, compared to the previous two, their involvement is usually 
restricted to a single, specific setting. This includes people like Nabû-ahu-
ittannu/Hašdāya/Ṣillāya: a distant relative of Šaddinnu’s wife, fNanāya-
damqat//Ṣillāya, he acted eighteen times as a witness for Šaddinnu between 506-497 
BCE.653 With a few exceptions,654 his presence was restricted to proceedings in the 
prebendary and agricultural spheres.655 His repeated attestation as first witness could 
indicate a more intimate connection to Šaddinnu. The fact that he is often found in 
texts with Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa – most notably in BM 28962 (Dar 24), concerning a 
harrānu venture of Bēl-ēṭir and Šaddinnu’s son – may also be of interest. Another 
kinsman of Šaddinnu’s wife is Kidin-Marduk (aka. Kidinnu)/Nabû-uballiṭ (aka. 
                                                
650 VS 5 79 (Dar 15?). 
651 BM 96218 (Dar 04?), and BM 25626 (Dar 25). The last document, written in Babylon, records a 
contestation of a plot of land more than ten years after the deed. 
652 Unfortunately the operative clause in BM 96388 (Dar 11) is illegible, making the identification of 
the requirement of this job difficult. However, the archive holds one text of Nabû-bullissu in which 
he advanced an amount of barley that was to be repaid in loaves of bread (BM 96328). Even if 
Šaddinnu was not presence at that transaction, I am tempted to link BM 96388 to the same line of 
work, presumably located in the (prebendary?) bread-making sector.   
653 Earliest attestation: BM 29034 (Dar 16); latest attestation: BM 28962 (Dar 24). 
654 A harrānu-related text: BM 95861 (Dar 16); a land sale: BM 29666 ([-]); a documents related to the 
Bēl-iddin//Kāṣir arrangement: BM 25653//BM 25630 (Dar 20). 
655 Prebendary: BM 29034 (Dar 16), BM 96253 (Dar 17), BM 29514 (Dar 19), BM 96288 = AH XV 
no. 91 (Dar 19), BM 29057 (Dar 20), BM 28936 (Dar 20). Land exploitation: BM 96322 (Dar 18), 
BM 29473 (Dar 19), BM 96190 (Dar 20), BM 96211 (Dar [x]).  
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Bibānu)/Ṣillāya. He is attested some eighteen times, usually as scribe in transactions 
related to prebendary matters,656 but he also wrote at least one debt note for silver,657 a 
receipt for house rent,658 and a payment of wages.659 However, by Dar 15 Kidin-
Marduk seems to have accumulated considerable debts and we find Šaddinnu 
compensating his creditor and taking possession of the pledged property.660 Whether 
this came to the relief of Kidin-Marduk is not clear, however, it turned out to be a 
complicated affair,661 and his relatives later contested the acquisition.662  
Several temple colleagues appear frequently in the archive. For instance Nabû-
gāmil/Nabû-šumu-ukīn/Bēliya’u and his son (Ina-)Qībi-Bēl, distant relatives of 
Šaddinnu, who are both mentioned some fifteen times, as cultic collaborators. At first 
Nabû-gāmil can be found alone (Dar 09-13),663 after which he is supported by his son 
(Dar 17-20),664  who eventually took over his father’s responsibilities in full (Dar 
29).665 Both are very occasionally found in texts outside of the prebendary sphere.666 
Another example is Lâbâši/Rēmūt/Kidin-Sîn: he performed (parts of) Šaddinnu’s 
cultic service between 516-489 BCE.667 Lâbâši’s brother, Marduk-šumu-ibni//Kidin-
Sîn (or perhaps Lâbâši under his full name?) set up a joint venture with Šaddinnu 
according to BM 96246 (Cyr 06).668   
Finally, we briefly need to consider the association of Šaddinnu with members of 
other baker clans, in particular the Kidin-Sîns and the Šēpê-ilias. In the previous 
chapter I advocated that the relationship between these two families on the one hand 
                                                
656 E.g. BM 29532  (Dar 09), BM 29749 (Dar 09), BM 29512 (Dar 10), BM 29034 (Dar 16), BM 
96350 ([-]). 
657 BM 29494 (Dar 09). 
658 VS 5 80 (Dar 15). 
659 BM 28996 (Dar 15). 
660 BM 29420. 
661 Apparently some of the legal documents had gone missing, BM 29404//28914 (Dar 16). 
662 BM 25626 (Dar 25). 
663 BM 29749 (Dar 09), BM 29051 (Dar 12), VS 5 124 (Dar 13).  
664 BM 96253 (Dar 17), BM 29024 (Dar 18), BM 29057 (Dar 20). 
665 BM 82642 = AH XV no. 98 (Dar 29). Note that in this last text Šaddinnu is not mentioned. 
666 BM 96374 (Dar 03), BM 96312 (Dar 07) BM 22105 (Dar 16), BM 28966 (Dar 20). 
667 For the earliest and latest attestation as Šaddinnu’s cultic collaborator, see BM 96413 (Dar 06) and 
BM 28916 (Dar 33). 
668 For this text, see Zadok 2003b. 
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and the Bēliya’us and the Esagil-mansums on the other hand could best be 
characterised in terms of discord and mutual exclusion. However, Šaddinnu was in 
repeated contact with a number of members of the Kidin-Sîn family. While most of 
these contacts were restricted to only one or a very few social settings, as was the case 
with Lâbâši//Kidin-Sîn,669 his relationship with Nabû-bullissu//Kidin-Sîn was clearly 
more robust. Even if this seems to contradict the portrayal of the local bakers as being 
in a state of conflict and disunity, it should be pointed out that members of the Šēpê-
ilia clan are conspicuously absent from Šaddinnu’s circle of trust and intimacy. 
Moreover, those members of the Kidin-Sîn family attested ≥5 in Šaddinnu’s network 
were absent from his more momentous and personally relevant transactions. Hence, 
no member of either the Kidin-Sîn or the Šēpê-ilia families was present at the 
donation and old-age arrangements of Bēl-iddin//Kāṣir.670 And the same is true for the 
marriage agreement of Šaddinnu’s son, Bēl-uballiṭ, and fAmat-Nanāya, daughter of 
Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A).671 While a member of both the Šēpê-ilia and the Kidin-
Sîn families can be found as witness in this transaction, the former was a well-known 
contact of Marduk-šumu-ibni,672 and the second is so far not attested in any other 
document known to us, and could have been a particular contact of both or none of 
the parties.673 
                                                
669 Others include Nabû-tāriṣ/Marduk-ušallim/Kidin-Sîn (6x), Gimil-Nabû/Šāpik-zēri/Kidin-Sîn (6x), 
and Nabû-balassu-iqbi/Nabû-ahhē-iddin/Kidin-Sîn (5x). 
670 BM 25653//25630 (Dar 20) and BM 21979 (Dar 20). Instead we find other intimate contacts such as 
Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa (40x), Nabû-ahu-ittannu//Ṣillāya (16x), and Nabû-ittannu//Nappāhu (11x), see the 
table below. 
671 BM 26483 (Dar 14). 
672 Nabû-uṣuršu/Nabû-ahhē-iddin/Šēpê-ilia (see above). 
673 Nabû-uṣuršu/Bēl-kēšir/Kidin-Sîn. He be attested in a cultivation contract from the Bēliya’u archive, 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   






























































































































































































































































































































Of the circa 1315 individuals mentioned in the texts of Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi 
and his son Rēmūt-Nabû, thirty-seven are attested five times or more – ca. 3,5% of 
the father’s contacts and ca. 2% of the son’s contacts.675 The vast majority of these 
men (32) belonged to temple-based families, while almost half (18) were members of 
the Rē’i-alpi clan itself or of families affiliated by marriage. As one can see from the 
table below, many acted in a variety of roles and contexts. While this suggests that the 
family maintained overall stronger relationships in terms of tie strength compared to 
other archive holders, the answer should be sought elsewhere. First, the multiplexity 
of roles usually applies to people from the Rē’i-alpi clan who in addition to their 
activity as witnesses or scribes acted as donors (or sellers) of prebends and cultic 
partners. Since the ownership of the clan’s prebendary patrimony was constantly 
changing hands in order to satisfy both demographic and cultic needs, and because the 
family held a near monopoly on the oxherd prebend, the only individuals who could 
donate a prebend or act as cultic collaborator were obviously kinsmen. Secondly, the 
relatively high multiplexity of contexts is due, in part, to the fact that in the Rē’i-alpi 
archive transactions can often be interpreted as pertaining to a number of contexts 
simultaneously, e.g. the sale of a prebend is a property sale belonging to a prebendary 
context, but in the case of the Rē’i-alpis it also represents a family matter. 
Let us start with the most frequently attested contact in the archive, Nabû-mukīn-
zēri/Zēru-Bābili/Nappāhu. He is found twenty-nine times in the period between 
534-510 BCE.676 His primary role in the archive is that of witness (18, often as first 
witness), followed by that of scribe (9). He is found in all domains of Nabû-mukīn-
zēri’s (and to a lesser extent, Rēmūt-Nabû’s) business affairs: prebendary, 677 
agriculture,678 property acquisition,679 moneylending680 and taxation.681  Particularly 
                                                
675 As one can see in the table below, some of these contacts were shared by both protagonists. 
676 For the earliest and latest attestation respectively, see BM 17670 (Cyr 05) and BM 102259 (Dar 12) 
677 E.g. BE 8 106 = AH XV no. 180 (Dar 05), BM 26552 = AH XV no. 188, (Dar [x]+2) 
678 E.g. various debts of barley and dates such as, BM 26701 (Dar 02), BM 17663 (Dar 03), BM 25834 
(Dar 03+). Note however that none of these documents clearly specify that the goods come from the 
harvest. Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Nappāhu is furthermore present at various acquisitions of landed estates. 
679 E.g. BM 102276 = AH XV no. 166 (Cam 06), BM 82628 (Cam 06), BM 94546 (Dar 00), BM 
94676 = AH XV no. 171 (Dar 01), BM 82619 (Dar 04), BM 94662 (Dar 04). 
680 E.g. BM 82644 (Dar 03), VS 4 100 (Dar 04), BM 102274 (Dar 04), BM 94711 (Dar [x]). 
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noteworthy is his involvement in a highly sensitive family affair. In Dar 05, Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi arranged the transfer of a significant share of property to his 
daughter, grandchildren and cousin. Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Nappāhu appears in four 
documents recording this transfer, twice as a witness and twice as the scribe.682 Even 
though this endowment meant that Rēmūt-Nabû was disinherited by his father,683 it 
did not cause a major dent in the relationship of Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Nappāhu with 
Nabû-mukīn-zēri or, more importantly, with the latter’s son. When Rēmūt-Nabû 
undid his father’s action in Dar 06 and 07, reclaiming full possession over his 
property, Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Nappāhu was called upon to act as a witness again.684 
Afterwards Nabû-mukīn-zēri can still be found in Rēmūt-Nabû’s documents, showing 
that his presence in the transactions of Dar 06 and 07 was not based on legal 
requirement alone.685 Moreover, the fact that Nabû-mukīn-zēri’s brother and sons also 
appear in documents of Rēmūt-Nabû further underlines the close relationship between 
these two households.686  The strength of Nabû-mukīn-zēri’s relationship with the 
Rē’i-alpis is reflected by its duration, cross-generational durability and the variegated 
contexts in which he appears, rather than by the multiplexity of roles he assumed in 
their affairs (either witness or scribe). However, there are two important exceptions. 
Both Rēmūt-Nabû and his father relied on him to buy property in their names: in Cam 
06 (BM 82628) he bought a slave for (ana našê ṣibûtu) Rēmūt-Nabû, and in Dar 04 
(BM 94662) he acquired a plot of land for (ina našparti) Nabû-mukīn-zēri. Even if a 
comprehensive study on such sales is outstanding and the exact rationale behind the 
                                                                                                                                      
681 E.g. BM 17670 (Cyr 05), BM 26657 = AH XV no. 167 (Cam 06), BM 82700 (Dar 07), BM 82634 
Dar 07), BM 102259 (Dar 12). Note that the first three belong to the dossier dealing the production of 
bricks by prebendary oxherd’s for the temple, which can be seen as belonging to the temple sphere as 
well. For more detail on the obligation of prebendary groups to manufacture bricks for Nabû, see 
Waerzeggers 2010: 337-345. 
682 Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Nappāhu present as witness in EAH 213 (Dar 05) and BM 28872 = AH XV no. 
179 (Dar 05); he is the scribe of BM 26514 (Dar 05) and BM 101980+ (Dar 05). 
683 For a detailed account of this ‘crisis between father and son’, see Waerzeggers 2010: 561-562. 
684 BM 26492//BE 8 108 (Dar 06) and BM 26494//BM 26496//BM 26485//BM 26512//BM 109861 = 
AH XV no. 183 (Dar 07). 
685 For example in BM 27795//BM 94645 (Dar 07), BM 102259 (Dar 12) 
686  Itti-Šamaš-balāṭu/Zēru-Bābili/Nappāhu is first witness in BM 82622 (Dar 15?). Two of Nabû-
mukīn-zēri’s sons, Nabû-uṣuršu and Arad-Bēl, are first and second witness in BM 26554 (Dar 17). 
CIRCLES  OF  TRUST  &  INT IMACY 
 
 175
use of a proxy still eludes us, these acts imply a degree of trust between the proxy and 
the actual purchaser.687  
The next individual to be considered is Rēmūt-Nabû/Nabû-šumu-uṣur/Šarrahu, 
who is attested over twenty times in the period between 539-504 BCE.688 Married to 
Nabû-mukīn-zēri’s daughter, fIbnā,689 he is by far the most active in-law found in the 
archive.690 Having written at least twelve documents pertaining to a variety of social 
contexts, his first and foremost role in the archive of the Rē’i-alpis was that of 
scribe.691 In addition to his scribal activity he is also attested as witness six times. The 
most meaningful occasion was undoubtedly the marriage of Rēmūt-Nabû//Rē’i-alpi 
and fAhatu//Arad-Ea, where Nabû-šumu-uṣur//Šarrahu, Rēmūt-Nabû’s father, was 
present too.692 Rēmūt-Nabû is also found in a more active role. Twice he collected 
debts on behalf of Nabû-mukīn-zēri,693 and once he extended a loan of forty-five 
                                                
687 Most of the proxy sales from Borsippa are found in the Rē’i-alpi archive and include: BM 25627 
(Nbn 00) with Nabû-ahhē-iddin//Arkāt-ilāni-damqā as proxy; BM 26499 (Nbn 01), via Nabû-ahhē-
šullim//Nūr-Papsukkal; BM 94562 (Nbn 04) and BM 25712 (Nbn 04), with fṬabātu/Nabû-šumu-
ukīn/fMaqartu as proxy or initial buyer (note that she is the cousin of Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi, 
who eventually bought this property); BM 94653 = AH XV no. 160 (Cam 01), with Nabû-ahhē-
bulliṭ//Rē’i-alpi as proxy (he is a known scribe and witness in the archive); BM 94676 = AH XV no. 
171 (Dar 01), with the same proxy; and BM 26623 + BM 82619 (Dar 04), via Bēl-uballiṭ//Atkuppu. 
Other proxy sales from Borsippa include, from the Ibnāya archive: BM 29478 (Nbn 02), in which 
Nabû-mukīn-apli//Šikkûa, later known as the šatammu of Ezida, acted as proxy. Ilia (A): BM 94567 
= AH XV no. 33 (Dar 15), with Nabû-zēru-ušebši//Ardūtu as proxy. Unassigned: Amherst 242 (Dar 
30?), with Nidinti-Bēl//Ēdu-ēṭir as proxy (he is known from the Rē’i-alpi and the Ilia (A) archives). 
688 BM 26652 = AH XV no. 154 (Nbn 16) and KU 14 (Dar 18) are his earliest and latest attestations 
respectively. 
689 He is first attested as her husband in Dar 05 (BM 101980//BM 82607), but the marriage clearly 
predates this date as they already had two children at this time. 
690 In contrast, none of the in-laws of Rēmūt-Nabû’s two marriages are mentioned in the archive.  
691 While most of his texts were written for Nabû-mukīn-zēri (e.g. BM 26652 = AH XV no. 154 (Nbn 
16), BM 94663 (Cyr 04), BM 94653 = AH XV no. 160 (Cam 01), BM 82767 (Cam 02), BM 94682 
(Dar 08)), he wrote at least three for Rēmūt-Nabû (i.e. BM 27795//BM 94645 (Dar 07), BM 26639 
(Dar 08?), and BM 26572 = AH XV no. 187 (Dar 10). It should also be noted that many texts were 
important property deeds.  
692 BM 82609 (Dar 01) = Roth 1989: no. 22. Note that Nabû-šumu-uṣur//Šarrahu was also present at 
the dowry negotiations of Rēmūt-Nabû’s first marriage to f[x]-Sutīti//Ardūtu in Cam 04 (BM 29375). 
693 BM 94814 (Cam 05) and BM 82779 (Dar 05). Even though Nabû-mukīn-zēri was present on neither 
of these transactions, the idea that Rēmūt-Nabû was actually acting on his behalf transpires from the 
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shekels of silver to Rēmūt-Nabû//Rē’i-alpi.694 Before we move on, it should be noted 
that the family crisis of Dar 05 and the (later cancelled) endowments to Rēmūt-
Nabû//Šarrahu’s children does not seem to have had a great impact on the relationship 
between the two brother-in-laws. 
A final individual from a somewhat different background who deserves closer 
evaluation is Nabû-erība/Nabû-mukīn-zēri/Rē’i-alpi. Although he bears the same 
patronymic as Rēmūt-Nabû, C. Waerzeggers has argued that they were not brothers, 
but in fact belonged to two different branches of the Rē’i-alpi clan (2010: 564). Nabû-
erība is attested twenty-two times in the period between 527-490 BCE.695 His primary 
role in the archive is that of cultic colleague of Rēmūt-Nabû. While he sold various 
days of the oxherd prebend to Rēmūt-Nabû early in the reign of Darius I, around 504 
BCE he is found taking over the ritual obligations of a large share of the temple 
service again.696 He remained in Rēmūt-Nabû’s service until after the latter’s death, 
when we find him in the service of his sons.697 Besides his role in the cult, he wrote at 
least eight documents for Nabû-mukīn-zēri and Rēmūt-Nabû and witnessed a further 
five transactions, ranging from important property deeds to minor debt obligations 
and harvest estimates.698 Even though the nexus of Nabû-erība’s and Rēmūt-Nabû’s 
relationship is located in the cultic sphere, it was certainly not confined to prebendary 
matters alone. 
                                                                                                                                      
fact that in both cases the commodities were to be delivered in the ‘measurement of Nabû-mukīn-
zēri’ (mašīhu ša NMZ). 
694 BM 26678 (Dar 14). The background of this debt is not specified but it took place at a time when 
Rēmūt-Nabû seems to have been short of cash, see Ch. 3. 
695 BM 26480 = AH XV no. 163 (Cam 05) and EAH 229 (Dar 32). 
696 BM 26737 = AH XV no. 176 (Dar 02), BM 94579 = AH XV no. 182 (Dar 06); BM 26509//BM 
94563//BM 94571 = AH XV no. 191 (ca. Dar 18). 
697 BE 8 117 = AH XV no. 197 (Dar 32). 
698 Property deeds written by Nabû-erība include: BM 94680 (Cam 05), BM 82686 = AH XV no. 162 
([Cam] 05), BM 94712 = AH XV no. 172 (Dar 01). Harvest estimate: BM 94675 (Dar 18). He is 
found as witness in: BM 26671 (Dar 00), EAH 212 (Dar 02), BM 86290 (Dar 05), BM 17693 (Dar 
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As we have said previously the Atkuppu archive is not particularly suited for the present 
investigation. The available information for this family is limited in size, coherence and 
depth. In order to counter some of these drawbacks I have taken only the texts from the fourth 
and penultimate generation. Covering the period between ca. 534-494 BCE, it is represented 
by Nabû-šumu-uṣur/Marduk-šumu-ibni, and his three younger brothers Nabû-iddin, Murānu 
and Iqīšaya. However, with just over eighty texts for a period of roughly forty years, there is 
still much left to be desired in terms of information density, especially since it lacks important 
family documents or property deeds. In spite of that, close contacts can still be found in the 
records of the Atkuppu brothers.  
Let us start with the most frequently attested individual, Gimil-Nabû/Mušēzib-Bēl/Šēpê-
ilia. Mentioned seven times between 517-494 BCE, his primary role in the archive is that of 
scribe. 702  His most noteworthy contribution in this capacity was the recording of the 
dissolution of the harrānu enterprise between two of the Atkuppu brothers, Nabû-iddin and 
Murānu. Besides a promissory note for barley from the temple income (maššartu),703 he 
mostly wrote debt notes for silver, some of which could have a background in harrānu 
ventures.704 
The next individual who needs examination is Iddin-Nabû/Nabû-šumu-ukīn/Rēš-
ummāni. Attested between 517-496 BCE,705 he assumed more diverse and active roles than 
Gimil-Nabû. Found for the first time as scribe of a debt note for silver in Dar 05 (at which 
Gimil-Nabû was present as witness), 706  he repeatedly acted as creditor of the Atkuppu 
brothers – one loan amounting to one mina of silver and secured with a pledge.707 In Dar 26, 
Iddin-Nabû took it upon himself to settle two accounts with the gugallu of Borsippa on behalf 
of the Atkuppu brothers.708 Even though these last two transactions might infer a degree of 
trust, it is hard to decide whether Iddin-Nabû acted as an agent or a patron here. In the light of 
the various (secured) loans he extended to the Atkuppus, I prefer the latter option. Moreover, 
                                                
702 Earliest and latest attestation, respectively: BM 17680 (Dar 05) and VS 4 174 (Dar 28). 
703 VS 3 84 (Dar 07). 
704 BM 29678 (Dar 11), BM 26666 (Dar 19?), VS 4 156 (Dar 20), VS 4 174 (Dar 28). 
705 Earliest and latest attestation, respectively: BM 17680 (Dar 05) and BM 17707 (Dar 26). 
706 BM 17680. 
707 I.e. VS 4 156 (Dar 20). The other two debt obligations are: VS 4 140 (Dar 14?) and BM 94733 (Dar 19). 
708 Both written on the same day in Dar 26, BM 17707 deals with the payment for two hirelings and BM 26702 
with the tax obligation for ‘work on the royal docks’ (dullu ša kāri ša šarri). 
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the brothers’ joint venture was deployed in the agricultural sector (onions being part of their 
business assets), and the fact that at least one of Iddin-Nabû’s loans was to be repaid from the 
surplus of their harvest suggests that he was in a formal business relationship with the 
brothers, presumably as the stronger, investing partner.709 
 Another individual who shows up in the inner circle of the Atkuppus is Nabû-
uballiṭ/Nabû-ēṭir-napšāti/Gallābu. Mentioned five times between 517-496 BCE,710 Nabû-
uballiṭ’s primary role was that of witness. He first appears in Dar 05 in a debt note where 
Gimil-Nabû and Iddin-Nabû were present as well.711 After taking out a loan of the Atkuppus 
in Dar 05,712 and witnessing a similar transaction a year later,713 it takes twenty years before 
Nabû-uballiṭ reappears in the archive. In Dar 26, he witnessed the two transactions with the 
gugallu of Borsippa mentioned above. This shows that he was not only connected to the 
Atkuppus but also to their business partners or patrons. Another individual who should be 
mentioned in this respect is Nabû-bēl-zēri/Mušēzib-Marduk/Aškāpu. Even though he is 
mentioned only three times between Dar 05 and Dar 06 (twice as debtor, once as scribe), he 
always appears in connection with the Atkuppus’ intimate contacts: his debt in BM 17680 
(Dar 05) was recorded by Iddin-Nabû, and witnessed by Gimil-Nabû and Nabû-uballiṭ; BM 
26605 (Dar 06), another promissory note drawn up against him was also witnessed by Nabû-
uballiṭ; and finally, he recorded a debt due from Nabû-uballiṭ. Although not much can be said 
about Nabû-bēl-zēri, his case does add evidence to the fact that the Atkuppu brothers and their 
close contacts formed a close clique. Even if the full extend of their relationship remains 
uncertain, it seems to have revolved around the running of business enterprises in the local 
countryside.714 
                                                
709  Note also that Iddin-Nabû’s brother, Mušēzib-Marduk, also acted as a creditor of the brothers. BM 26724 
(Dar 26) records a loan of silver for which part of the patrimony was taken as pledge. 
710 Earliest and latest attestation, respectively: BM 17680 (Dar 05) and BM 17707 (Dar 26). 
711 BM 17680. 
712 BM 17698 (Dar 05). 
713 BM 26605 (Dar 06?). 
714 There are at least two more individuals who may be relevant in this respect. 1) Šamaš-iddin/Silim-Bēl/Sîn-
imittī is mentioned four times (3x as creditor, 1x as witness): VS 4 149 (Dar 18), BM 94733 (Dar 19), BM 
26710 (Dar 19), and BM 26666 (Dar 19?). 2) Nabû-uballiṭ/Nabû-šumu-iddin/Ea-ibni is only mentioned twice, 
but each time in significant contexts: in Dar 06 as first witness in the dissolution contract of the Atkuppu 
brothers’ harrānu (BM 17683); in Dar 10 as payer of taxes on behalf of Iddin-Nabû/Atkuppu (BM 102330). 




In this chapter I tried to reconstruct the networks of intimate social relationships in the 
priestly community of Borsippa. Besides psycho-emotional aspects most commonly 
associated with intimacy and friendship, it has been shown in the social sciences that 
intimate relationships can be identified and reconstructed based on structural features. 
This idea is captured most clearly by the concept of tie strength, which postulates that 
the intensity or robustness of a relationship can be determined using objective 
(interactional) criteria. The most basic and widely used yardstick in this respect is the 
amount of time two individuals spend together, i.e. frequency of contact; other 
criteria, also incorporated in the present study, include duration of contact, 
multiplexity of roles (and context), and intensity of encounters. Since intimate 
relationships such as friendship tend to be among the strongest ties in our lives they 
usually involve relatively high degrees of tie strength. 
The first part of this chapter was devoted to a formal quantitative analysis of the 
data, based exclusively on the frequency of attestations. The underlying idea is that an 
individual’s lifestyle and specific modes of behaviour vis-à-vis the social environment 
are reflected in his or her ego network, and vice versa. Hence, the aim of this initial 
investigation was to find out more about the structure of the personal networks in 
Borsippa and the interactional attitudes of local priests.  
I started by assessing the contacts that occur only once. As expected, this was the 
case for the vast majority of individuals mentioned in our corpus. Percentages range 
from 70% in the archives that contain adequate, that is, data-rich ego networks such 
as Ilia (A), Bēliya’u and Rē’i-alpi, to 90% in the more sparsely documented archives 
of the Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Atkuppu families. On the other side of the spectrum, only 
a very small number of individuals occur ≥5 times. Ranging between 4% and 2% in 
the single-generation archives to around 1% in the archives of the Atkuppus and the 
Ea-ilūtu-banis after close relatives and protagonists have been left out of the 
quantification. 
The fact that the figures found in the latter two archives were consistently larger 
and smaller, respectively, seems to be related primarily to the paucity of information 
and should not be taken as reflecting reality. The results gained from the single-
generation archives with a much higher density of information and adequate ego 
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networks, are probably more representative. Unfortunately the figures in these 
archives turned out to be too similar to make a meaningful comparison between them. 
The question that imposed itself was whether diverging networks and distinct 
attitudes were to be expected in our analysis? All ego networks belong to priests, and 
even if different comportments and business strategies have been observed in 
previous chapters, this quantitative procedure was probably not sensitive enough to 
pick up on these details.  
Finally, while a comparison between the figures found in our archives and the one 
found in Sippar by C. Waerzeggers, is not particularly helpful for gaining more 
information about typical priestly behaviour or networks, it does warn us of one thing: 
evidence from one city cannot automatically be held as representative for other cities, 
even if the individuals involved are from a similar socio-economic background and 
own comparable archives. It should be clear that much more work is needed on 
Babylonian ego networks before we can fully grasp the meaning of the figures found 
in the priestly archives of Borsippa. It will be particularly helpful in the future to 
investigate exactly how and which factors influence the nature of these ancient 
networks.  
In the second part I presented a more qualitative appreciation of the data. Zooming 
in on the group of individuals attested ≥5 times, I assessed their relationship with the 
protagonists by introducing additional dimensions of tie strength: intensity, 
multiplexity and duration. What did this analysis tell us about the circles of trust and 
intimacy and the formation of friendship in the priestly community of Borsippa? Let 
us start with a general but important observation, which concerns the social 
background of the people involved. The great majority of the intimate relationships 
found in the archives of priests materialised with individuals from fellow priestly 
families. While this reconfirms my notion of the priesthood as maintaining a generally 
inward-looking attitude, it assumed even more rigid dimensions in the domain of 
friendship. The evidence suggests that in this priestly community relations of trust and 
intimacy occurred exclusively within the high social stratum marked by the use of 
family names. Moreover, the only possible exception I could find in the entire corpus 
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seems to prove this rule. Between ca. 544-540 BCE,715 a certain Ana-bītīšu/Nūh-ilī is 
found four times as witness in the archive of Nabû-zēru-ukīn//Gallābu: twice in a debt 
note of silver, once in a debt note of silver and vats, and once in a receipt of silver 
resulting from a property sale. It is very likely that the same Ana-bītīšu also received 
disbursements of flour in BM 85966 (not dated).716 Admittedly, neither in terms of 
frequency, duration, or multiplexity does Ana-bītīšu seem to have been a particularly 
intimate contact of the protagonist. Yet, it is telling that the only instance in which a 
‘commoner’ might have enjoyed such a relationship, is found in a non-priestly 
archive. Even though Nabû-zēru-ukīn//Gallābu descended from a family that 
traditionally performed the duties of the prebendary barber (gallābūtu), the archive 
does not place the protagonist in a prebendary context and references to the temple 
institution are entirely missing.717  Even if individuals from lower strata are found in 
the archives of priests, no more than two such individuals are mentioned more than 
five times (≥5), and neither of them represent intimate relationships.718  
Even if factors like spatial proximity and legal convention might have contributed 
to the formation of this strict (segregational) pattern, I do not think it could have taken 
this clear-cut shape without the existence of a strong collective preference and 
conscious choice on behalf of the priests. Of course to some extent such configuration 
was to be expected. Socio-anthropologists have long since noticed that friendships 
tend to be maintained among status or social equals.719 Moreover, people can select 
friends only from among other people available to them, and that pool is shrunken 
tremendously by the social contexts in which people participate. Still, the degree to 
which this trend manifests itself in the community under investigation is striking to 
say the least. It strongly suggests that the priests from Borsippa perceived of 
                                                
715  See BM 85643 (Nbn 12) and BM 85610 (Nbn 16), for the earliest and latest attestation, 
respectively. Note however that the date of Smith Coll. no. 97 is damaged (Nbn 30-II-[x]) and BM 
85966 is not dated at all. 
716 See for a summary of this text, Zadok 2009: 28. 
717 Jursa 2005: 82-83. 
718 The first exception being fTutubu-esu, a Caro-Egyptian mother who, together with her son, received 
rations from Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A), see Waerzeggers 2006. The second is Libluṭ/Nabû-ušebši, a 
person in charge of the ration of the king (later the rations of Queen Apamû), who leased this income 
to Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u on several occasions, see Waerzeggers 2010: 127-129. 
719 E.g. Lazarsfeld & Merton 1964, Verbrugge 1977, McPherson et al. 2001, and Hruschka 2010: 65-
66. 
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themselves as a discrete and socially exclusive unit, and actively sought to maintain 
this. This observation is of great significance for the ultimate reconstruction of this 
community and we will come back to this more extensively in the following chapters. 
Let us now turn to the relations of trust and intimacy proper and take a closer look 
at their general features. What was the role of intimate contacts in the archives? In 
this study a person’s status of intimacy depended on four dimensions of tie strength: 
frequency, duration, intensity and multiplexity. While the first three could be applied 
fairly straightforwardly, the notion of multiplexity with its traditional emphasise on 
diversity of roles, befitted our study much less. Individuals who scored high on the 
first three dimensions of tie strength did usually not fulfil a high diversity of roles or 
functions in the available documentation; they are predominantly found as scribe and 
witness. On a more general level it seems that, apart from temple colleagues and 
tenants, individuals who entered in formal contract with priests do not frequently 
reappear in the archive. Parties tended to engage in business once or a limited number 
of times only. Rather than concentrating on the multiplicity of roles, I therefore 
focused my attention more on the range of social settings in which individuals 
appeared, i.e. the multiplexity of context. This allowed me to better assess the 
relationship of intimate contacts even if the range of functions they assumed was 
limited. But there are some notable exceptions. Take for instance Nabû-ahhē-
iddin//Nanāhu, the best-known contact of Ahušunu//Nanāhu: besides being present at 
both of Ahušunu’s weddings, he also lent him money, stood surety for a heavily 
secured debt, and repeatedly paid taxes on his behalf. Another example can be found 
in the Bēliya’u archive: Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa is attested over forty times in the documents of 
Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u. While he is most frequently attested as scribe and witness, he 
also acted as business partner and as agent, and presumably grew up as Šaddinnu’s 
next-door neighbour. Notwithstanding these and other examples, intimate contacts in 
this community are found predominantly in passive roles of scribe and witness and 
only seldom assumed a more active role, let alone engaged as contracting parties. The 
adage not to do business with one’s friends seems very much in evidence here – or 
did friends simply not need to record their dealings in formal contracts? 
This investigation also sheds more light on the presence of witnesses and scribes in 
the Neo-Babylonian documentation. Far from being selected at random, their 
presence can best be understood as a result of their association to one of the contract 
parties. While it has already been observed that individuals appear repeatedly as 
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witnesses in Neo-Babylonian private archives,720 this investigation made it clear that 
Babylonians, or more specifically Babylonian priests, relied on a small number of 
individuals to witness and record their transactions and accompany them on their day-
to-day business in town and in the countryside. Among this retinue one finds the 
priests’ most intimate contacts.  
It is well known that being a witness (or a scribe for that matter) was not simply a 
passive function but carried responsibilities. While specific individuals could be 
present at a transaction for a number of reasons (e.g. consent), the presence of 
witnesses served in the first place to authenticate the transaction and the 
accompanying legal contract.721 More important was the fact that they could be called 
upon to testify in case of litigation.722 It goes without saying that it was of prime 
importance that one was able to call on someone who could be summoned on short 
notice and trusted to provide unconditional support to one’s claim, indeed whether it 
was false or as per agreement. By bringing their most trusted and intimate contacts 
along to transactions priests made sure they could always rely on the right support in 
case necessary. 
Finally, while it should be clear that the presence of witnesses in legal contracts 
was often based on their connection to one of the parties, clear guidelines for their 
selection have eluded us so far, that is, if any existed to start with. However, a 
glimpse of what might have been the customary, perhaps even ideal, set-up can be 
gleaned from BM 26483 (Dar 14), mentioned earlier. This marriage agreement 
between the daughter of Marduk-šumu-ibni//Ilia (A) and the son of 
Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u is one of the few documents from Borsippa that involves 
protagonists of two known archives, offering us the unique opportunity to examine 
the list of witnesses from both sides. As expected, intimate contacts of both parties 
were present. Apart from the brother of the bride, two of Marduk-šumu-ibni’s best-
known contacts attended the transaction, Nabû-uṣuršu//Šēpê-ilia as witness and Nabû-
ēṭir-napšāti//Kudurrānu as scribe. While the entourage of the Ilias was slightly bigger, 
presumably because the agreement was concluded at their place, the Bēliya’us did not 
come without backup. On the side of the groom we find Nabû-ittannu//Nappāhu, a 
                                                
720 E.g. Von Dassow 1999b: 6-7. 
721 Von Dassow 1999b. 
722 See Lambert 1996: 100-101 for an interesting passage on the charge (or rather the burden) to 
function as witness in a Babylonian court. 
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known witness from the archive of Šaddinnu. Apart from these trusted and familiar 
individuals there are three further witnesses who do not seem to have maintained a 
particularly strong relation with either of the parties. While this could simply be due 
to the accident of documentary recovery, they might have been invited to join the 
arrangements as neutral parties. This transpires also from Marduk-šumu-ibni’s 
activities as notary scribe. There is so far no evidence that he was acquainted with any 
of the parties mentioned in the transactions that he recorded in this official capacity. 
This suggests that the involvement of a neutral party at important transactions, 
especially those involving the transfer of property, was desirable if not requisite.  
In conclusion, the circles of trust and intimacy I reconstructed in this chapter 
emerged from the highly formalised contexts of the legal documents. As a result, the 
information gained from this analysis was obviously biased and fairly static in nature. 
We all know from our own experiences that in reality these relationships are more 
multifaceted, more complex, and come in a multitude of gradations and variations. 
Making more generalised statements about intimacy and friendship as it existed in 
this ancient community of priests would therefore be misleading. This brings us back 
to our initial question: is it, in this case, valid to talk about friendship? While I have 
used terms such as circles of trust, intimacy and friendship interchangeably 
throughout this chapter, the use of the last term is certainly open to discussion. Still, I 
believe that I was able to show that the relationships examined in this chapter were 
strong in terms of tie strength. Many of the people concerned knew each other and 
their families for many years, sometimes decades, kept close and repeated contact and 
presumably lived in close proximity. They witnessed and recorded each other’s 
investments, weddings and other family affairs, travelled together into the countryside 
and surrounding cities for business, and at times assumed significant responsibility by 
standing surety, setting up joint ventures, discharging cultic duties or buying property 
on each other’s behalf. While certainly not all of these relationships represented 
friendships, it stands to reason that such intimate bonds were formed, maintained and 
terminated among this very set of relations.  
The investigation offered here was obviously exploratory in nature and it should be 
clear that much more work still needs to be done on this topic. It should be possible 
and perhaps desirable to devise a simple algorithm allowing us to rank relations more 
absolutely in terms of tie strength. Moreover, from a network analytic perspective it 
would be interesting to substantiate these claims by looking closer into the influence 
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and the positions these individuals occupy in the overall networks. Finally, it would 
also be worthwhile for future research to investigate whether more dimensions of tie 
strength could be extracted from our sources, such as reciprocity or other notions 





















In PART ONE of this book I have looked into the social interactions that structured 
the priestly community of Borsippa. This included the hypergamous marriage system 
(Ch. 1), the distribution and management of landholdings (Ch. 2), silver lending (Ch. 
3) and the formation of friendship (Ch. 4). At least three important notions emerged: 
first, marriage functioned as a primary building block for this community, regulating 
interaction both inside and outside of the temple; second, the purity-based hierarchy 
of the priesthood is mirrored in the social world of the priests, suggesting that social 
interaction was informed by the temple fabric; third, priests interacted predominantly 
with individuals from fellow priestly families. 
The interactional pattern of the priesthood of Ezida could be summarised as 
follows: the vast majority of their interaction took place within the circle of temple-
based families. This showed especially in the more consequential and significant 
types of interaction such as marriage and friendship. Yet, a not insignificant minority 
took place with individuals from non-priestly elite families. While their involvement 
in the marriage system and the formation of friendship was limited, they appeared 
more often in the less symbolic or intimate transactions, especially related to the 
management of property or silver lending. Beyond the circle of the traditional urban 
elite families interaction was negligible. ‘Outsiders’, distinguishable by the non-usage 
of family names and making up the vast majority of Neo-Babylonian society, are 
attested strikingly little. They appear only on what might be called the fringes of the 
interactional landscape of Borsippa’s priests (the occasional creditor, seller, tenant or 
witness), and do not participate in the more significant affairs of the priests. The same 
goes for ethnic minorities. Apart from the Caro-Egyptian mercenary families who 
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were temporarily placed under care of the local priesthood,723 individuals bearing 
West-Semitic or other non-Babylonian names are virtually absent from the 
documentation. 
Figure 12 (below) is a schematic representation of this interactional pattern. It 
follows the viewpoint of the priests, which are located at the centre in black. The 
middle grey circle represents the larger elite stratum from Borsippa, the outermost 
white circle the so-called ‘outsiders’. The latter basically represents the rest of 
Babylonian society and includes a very diverse range of individuals, poor and rich, as 
well as native and foreign. The inward-pointing ‘breaches’ represent the interaction 
between these social segments, and particularly how this took shape in the social 

















In PART TWO I will take a step back and approach the phenomenon from a higher 
perspective. Instead of further delineating the organisation between the various temple 
ranks and families within the priestly community, I will attempt to situate this group 
as a distinct social segment within wider society. The question I would like to address 
in this PART TWO is how the emergence of the distinct pattern outlined above 
                                                
723 Waerzeggers 2006. 










should be understood. Can we find possible causations behind the dynamics of 
interaction?  
I will start by providing two different explanations of Fig. 12, which correspond to 
two alternative understandings of the causation behind interaction. The first scenario 
of causation will adopt a pragmatic and purely spatial rationale; for the second I will 
introduce the concept of homophily, which has been identified as a basic organising 
principle in human societies. Finally, and building further on the second scenario, I 
will show that interaction can also be approached from a more structural perspective 
by introducing the concepts of rentier and entrepreneur. These two typologies have 
been applied recently to Neo-Babylonian society in order to characterise family 
archives and larger social segments on the basis of economic features. I will argue 
that the interactional pattern of priests is in perfect congruence with the general 
economic mentality and objectives sustained by this social group as rentiers. 
Babylonian priests can thus be distinguished from other, entrepreneurial elements in 
society based on more than economic features alone, namely by a fundamentally 
different mode of interaction towards the social environment. 
 
5.1. Spatial distribution 
The existence of the particular pattern of interaction represented in Fig. 12 could be 
explained simply by taking it as a natural outcome of the geographic or spatial 
situation of our priests and the demography of their most immediate social 
environment. The argumentation would run as follows: the priestly families from 
Borsippa clustered and lived together in the old quarters in the heart of the city 
immediately surrounding the temple precinct, similar to the residential patterns 
reconstructed for other Babylonian temple towns.724  Working and living in close 
proximity to each other, it is only natural that most of their interaction took place 
within this socially and geographically restricted circle of temple families, within 
which the most basic and everyday needs could be met, e.g., finding creditors, sellers, 
witnesses, scribes, as well as marriage partners and friends.  
Yet, priests were part of a much larger circle of urban families. Living in the better 
parts of town will undoubtedly have brought them in contact with individuals from 
other established elite families that did not enjoy a professional affiliation to the 
                                                
724 See Ch. 6.2.1. 
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temple. I will show in the following Chapter 6, that on the whole these families 
maintained a very similar socio-economic and cultural repertoire, and priests will 
have had ample opportunity to come into contact with them through, for example, 
joint neighbourhood networks, membership of legal bodies and administrative units, 
attendance at public assemblies etc.  
Finally, individuals from outside this social stratum were much less present in the 
priests’ most immediate social environment. It seems reasonable to assume that it was 
less likely for these people to live in the traditional (and certainly not inexpensive) 
parts of town surrounding the temple. Moreover, one has to realise that the majority 
of the individuals I subsumed under ‘outsiders’ belonged to the lower strata of 
society725; their general inferior financial situation also meant that they were less 
likely to meet the standards of priests, whose needs, wants and transactions were 
pursued on a higher social and financial level. Yet, contact between them was 
unavoidable and besides the occasional witness or contract party this is perhaps most 
visible in the management of landed estates in the countryside where they were hired 
as gardeners and lived as tenants. Moreover, lacking a professional focus on the 
temple, non-priestly elite families – in particular entrepreneurs – are likely to have 
engaged with these ‘outsiders’ on a larger scale.  
 In the first instance such a descriptive, down-to-earth approach seems very 
felicitous, not least because it resonates easily with our own, present-day reality.726 
The downside of this interpretation, however, is that it cannot account for some 
important features of the pattern outlined above. Even if geographic space is an 
important (limiting) factor for interaction, this scenario of causation suggests that 
participation in society was determined solely by the spatial organisation of the social 
environment and its demographic configuration. It fails to explain adequately the 
more salient features of the interactional landscape in terms of the clearly defined 
hypergamous marriage circuit and the formation of friendship – especially in the latter 
domain one can expect individual actors to have had a greater degree of self-
determination and agency, which should have translated in a more representative 
reflection of society and at the very least shown a greater presence of individuals from 
                                                
725 But also included among many others royal officials, Persian nobles, foreign merchant, and nouveau 
riches in general. 
726 See McPherson et al. 2001: 429-430, for an overview of studies on community and interaction, 
which pay special attention to the role of geographic or spatial factors. 




non-priestly elite families. Rather than having emerged passively, I will suggest in 
Chapter 6 that the distinct interactional pattern materialised at least as much through a 
conscious, collective attitude towards the social environment and a deliberate attempt 
to keep the ‘us’ apart from ‘them’. 
Drawing on a particular concept from the social sciences, called homophily, a 
more balanced position between these two perspectives can be obtained. I will be able 
to include a higher degree of agency on behalf of the priests in the dynamics of their 
interaction, without excluding limiting forces of existing structures such as space. 
This concept will allow for an evaluation of causation in wholesale and theoretical 
terms, and resulting, I believe, in a more sophisticated account of Fig. 12.  
 
5.2. Homophily 
While the concept of homophily, also known as the like-me hypothesis, has a long 
history in the social sciences, going back to the first half of the twentieth century and 
the theoretical studies on interaction, the term was coined in the 1950s by Lazarfeld & 
Merton 1954 in their research on the formation of friendship. It was thanks to their 
ground-breaking work that homophily was soon picked up and further developed by 
various scholars working on patterns of human association in general (e.g., Laumann 
1966, Verbrugge 1977, Fischer 1982). The concept has now been fully integrated in 
the fields of social capital studies (e.g. Nan Lin 2001) and networks analysis (e.g. 
McPherson et al. 2001) and forms an essential principle for social scientists across the 
board. 
Homophily is the principle that ‘contact between similar people occurs at a higher 
rate than among dissimilar people’ (McPherson et al. 2001: 416), or more precisely, 
that ‘social interactions tend to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles 
and socioeconomic characteristics’ (Nan Lin 2001: 39).727 The saying ‘birds of a 
feather flock together,’ has often been used to encapsulate the empirical pattern of this 
principle. Found in the widest range of ties including marriage, friendship, 
professional affiliation, co-membership, advice, information transfer, and permeating 
through sociodemographic characteristics such as ethnicity, education, age, religion, 
                                                
727 The realisation that similarity breeds connection, association and friendship did not escape the 
classical philosophers and can already be found in Aristotele’s Nichomachean Ethics, see Irwin & 
Fine 1996: 274.  
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gender, class etc., homophily has been identified as one of the most basic and 
pervasive organising principles in society. 
The concept of homophily is quite straightforward.728 The point of departure is the 
idea of a positive reciprocal relationship between sentiment, similarity and 
interaction.729 In other words, the more people interact, the more likely it is that they 
will share similar sentiments. Also, the more similar people are – be they famous 
movie stars, second graders, or members of an interest group – the more likely they 
are to have similar experiences, interests and desires, and the more likely it is that 
they will interact. Hence the basis for interaction is shared sentiment and vice versa. It 
is further implied that the more similar people are to each other the easier it is to 
interact, as fewer barriers need to be overcome. Homophilous interaction is therefore 
seen as the normative and least effort requiring type of interaction in society. 
Moreover, patterns of homophily tend to get stronger as more types of relationship 
exist between two actors. In other words, the degree of homophily tends to be 
amplified in multiplex associations rather than in simplex ones, indicating that the 
principle has a cumulative effect. 
In order to examine the relevance of homophily in a given context, scholars now 
often make a distinction between ‘baseline homophily’ and ‘inbreeding 
homophily’.730 The former is the degree of homophily that would be expected by 
chance, that is based on the demography of the interactional pool of a given actor, 
which is limited by geographic space and other social structures. This ties in to the 
idea that the interactional pattern of the priests from Borsippa is a direct result of their 
geographic situation and the demography of their social environment. Inbreeding 
homophily is the degree of homophily measured over and above the baseline value. 
This is often induced by personal choice and is thus reminiscent of the idea that the 
interaction of priests was much more selective and done consciously within the 
boundaries of the social in-group.  
Since census records or any other documents that can help us reconstruct the 
population size or demography of ancient Borsippa are lacking, it is beyond the 
bounds of possibility to quantify the measure of baseline versus inbreeding 
                                                
728 The following discussion is based on McPherson et al. 2001, Lin 2001 (esp. Ch. 3-4), and Lin 2008: 
59-62. 
729 See especially the pioneering study of Homans 1950 on small primary groups. 
730 McPherson et al. 2001: 419. 




homophily. Even so, the interactional patterns, especially in terms of marriage and 
friendship, are indicative of a high degree of inbreeding homophily within the priestly 
community of Borsippa. In light of this basic organising principle, causation of 
interaction can now be re-evaluated and adjusted based on (socioeconomic) similarity, 
without dismissing the factors of spatial distribution and demography. This leads to a 
somewhat different reading of Fig. 12. 
As I will show in extenso in Chapter 6 below, priests nurtured a distinct collective 
social identity. The most important of its markers was undoubtedly the ownership of 
cultic rights, or more loosely a traditional affiliation to the temple.731 In accordance 
with the principle of homophily as the normative and least effort-requiring type of 
interaction, the priests from Borsippa will have engaged predominantly with 
individuals with a similar lifestyle, i.e. individuals from temple-based families. Not 
only was interaction facilitated by professional and residential proximity but in fact 
encouraged by similarity in social, cultural, and economic terms. However, with over 
80% of the marriages contracted between priestly families (this degree was even 
higher in the formation of friendship), there was a clear tendency in this inner circle to 
engage in homophilous interaction over and above the baseline that could be expected 
by mere chance. Since an almost identical set of families reoccurs in other kinds of 
interaction – always at the expense of both non-priestly elites and ‘outsiders’ – the 
hypergamous marriage circuit provides a clear outline of the ‘social boundary’ of this 
group.732 Moreover, the multiplexity of association and similarities by its members 
will only have strengthened the degree of homophily within the social group and 
raised the probability of interaction. Hence, the outline of the black inner circle in Fig. 
12 does not only represent the spatial distribution of priests in the heart of the city but 
also the boundary of the priests as a distinct social group. 
Non-priestly elite families (represented by the larger circle in grey), appear only 
rarely in significant types of interaction, e.g. less than 20% in terms of marriage, 
while they are found much more often in dealings of secondary importance. These 
                                                
731  In anticipation of what will be discussed in Ch. 6, their identity was further marked by the 
ownership of urban and landed property (Ch. 6.2), and an adherence to traditional Babylonian norms 
and values, most clearly expressed through a command of the cuneiform script (Ch. 6.3) and its 
native language (Ch. 6.4). 
732  The existence of a so-called social boundary in the priestly community of Borsippa will be 
discussed in Ch. 6. 
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families will have been present in Borsippa in similar (if not much larger) numbers 
and differed from our priests primarily in the sense that they engaged in different 
economic activities and lacked an established affiliation with the temple. Yet, these 
socioeconomic differences were apparently important enough to make interaction less 
common. And, following the patterns of marriage and friendship, they were therefore 
largely excluded from the primary social circle maintained by the local priestly 
families. It presumably depended on specific circumstances whether or not they were 
drawn into the intimate in-group of the priests. All this supports the notion of 
interaction as being patterned by homophily (and a rigid social boundary, see Ch. 6).  
Beyond this wider urban elite circle interaction became negligible as geographic 
and especially social distance increased dramatically. This refers to the large (white) 
circle of individuals belonging to other social strata of society, which made up the 
vast majority of Babylonia’s population. These individuals were not only less likely to 
have lived in the city quarters surrounding the temple complex but more importantly 
failed to associate with most of the socioeconomic characteristics of priests. They 
lacked illustrious ancestries and were excluded from the temple; while they may have 
spoken Babylonian they will have remained illiterate. Moreover, often belonging to a 
lower income class these individuals owned very little, if any real estate or any silver 
to dispense in lending. Hence, in accordance with the principle of homophily, these 
individuals appear only in the liminal regions of the social world of the priests, both 
in terms of interaction (unimportant transactions, rarely as contract party) and in 
actual geographic distance (as gardeners or tenants in the countryside). 
Even if the principle of homophily does not provide the absolute key to 
understanding the causation of interaction, it does allow us to approach the matter 
from a socio-theoretic perspective. It tells us that the more similar one was to the 
priests the more likely he or she was to interact and be drawn into their social world.  
 
5.3. Understanding rentiers and entrepreneurs  
While the principle of homophily allowed us to evaluate the interactional patterns of 
the priestly community of Borsippa in light of similarity and dissimilarity of their 
social environment, the argument could be taken one step further, and applied to 
another, debated topic in Neo-Babylonian studies. More than just the notion that 
social interactions tend to take place among individuals with similar sentiments, the 
principle of homophily has recently been modified in social capital studies (most 




notably by Nan Lin), and might in fact help us understand much broader 
socioeconomic phenomena found in the Neo-Babylonian sources.  
First, while the basic idea behind homophily is a positive relationship between 
sentiment and interaction, the social capital expert Nan Lin (2001: 39-40) has recently 
expanded the concept to entail a triangular reciprocal relationship between ‘sentiment 
– interaction – resources (/network position)’ without insisting on a particular cause-
and-effect sequence. Here resources are understood in the broadest sense of the term 
and may involve material goods such as land, houses, money, and symbolic goods 
such as education, prestige, power, family name, titles, etc. This triangular 
relationship is based on the fact that lifestyle and socioeconomic characteristics are 
assumed to ‘reflect resources embedded in individuals and their hierarchical positions 
in network locations’.733 This idea correlates well with our perception of Babylonian 
priests, who occupied very similar positions in society, had similar economic outlooks 
and property portfolios, and showed a distinct predisposition to interact with their 
social equals.  
Second, Nan Lin insists that there are two primary motives or behavioural 
consequences vis-à-vis (inter)action and resources: maintaining resources and gaining 
additional resources.734 The first motive aims at protecting existing resources, which 
is best served through recognition of one’s legitimacy in claiming these rights. Since 
it is only required that significant others share similar sentiments and acknowledge 
someone’s legitimacy, and does not demand any particular action on behalf of the 
interacting partners, it is said to involve ‘expressive action’. This mode of 
(inter)action solicits support and is meant to promote sympathy. On the other hand, 
the motive of gaining additional resources is best served by ‘instrumental action’. 
That is, more than obtaining (passive) recognition of one’s existing rights, the aim of 
interaction here is to make a profit and add new resources. Hence, it requires action 
on behalf of the interacting partner, who should make his resources available in order 
for the other to profit from them. 
These two motives vis-à-vis resources correspond roughly with the two 
socioeconomic profiles or behaviours labelled as ‘rentier’ and ‘entrepreneur’. 
Formulated in the early 20th century, most notably by Vilfredo Pareti and Max Weber, 
                                                
733 Lin 2001: 39. 
734 E.g., Lin 1982, and Lin 2001, especially Ch. 4.  
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these typologies have recently been applied to Neo-Babylonian society by M. Jursa  
(2004e: 121ff.).735 While these ideal types are based largely on economic criteria, I 
believe that they can be significantly deepened and strengthened from a social 
structural perspective by introducing the concept of homophily outlined above.   
Rentiers can be best described based on what they own (property portfolio) rather 
than what they do (business activities) for their subsistence. In Neo-Babylonian 
society, this economic behaviour is most clearly embodied by the priests.736 As we 
will see in more detail in the following chapter, the livelihood of this social stratum 
was largely based on two elements normally obtained through inheritance: prebend 
ownership and landownership. Most of their attention was centred on their cultic 
duties in the temple. Being rather immobile and occupied predominantly with their 
duties in town, priests usually outsourced cultivation of their landholdings – and to 
some extent also the preparatory duties of their prebends – to third parties, and thus 
relied on the labour of others to be able to enjoy their main income.737 Apart from 
moneylending, their involvement in other business ventures or the (monetised) 
business economy in general was limited. 738  Hence, rentier-priests relied 
predominantly on their inherited property, engaged in traditional activities, and 
pursued an altogether risk-free and conservative economic regime.739 Their aim was 
first of all to manage and maintain the patrimony and maximise its security rather 
than to make large profits and add new resources.  
Maximisation of profit and the acquisition of new resources is however 
characteristic for the entrepreneur type of behaviour. Entrepreneurs can best be 
described by what they do, that is, based on the business activities they pursue for 
their subsistence. While they came from a much more diverse background compared 
to the Neo-Babylonian rentiers, these individuals did usually not belong to the 
traditional elite stratum that owned prebends and land.740 In fact the lack of tight links 
                                                
735 See now Jursa et al. 2010: 282-294. 
736 Note however that the same applies to non-priestly families that relied mainly on the management 
of their property and did not actively engage in the business economy for their subsistence. 
737 Jursa et al. 2010: 283. 
738 Jursa et al. 2010: 287f. 
739 E.g. Jursa 2013. 
740 Yet profit could of course be invested in landed property, as was the case with the Egibis, see 
Wunsch 2000. 




to the temple is one of the primary features that circumscribes this social group.741 
Rather than being concerned with the preservation of the (landed) patrimony and 
relying on its income for their livelihood, these individuals and families were actively 
engaged in the business economy in the form of agricultural contracting, tax farming, 
trade, business companies etc.742 It is assumed that the primary motivation behind 
these activities was a desire to maximise profit. Entrepreneurs were much more 
mobile compared to rentiers and pursued a much riskier but potentially profitable 
subsistence strategy in a highly competitive business environment.  
Of course the ‘rentier’ and the ‘entrepreneur’ represent ideal types that are first and 
foremost useful from a heuristic point of view. In fact, even if one type of behaviour 
usually dominates, most Babylonian family archives show elements of both. Yet, 
important for us here are the two primary motives underlying these economic 
mentalities, namely the aim to maintain existing resources by rentiers, and the aim to 
gain additional resources by entrepreneurs. 
In theory priests were thus primarily concerned with maintaining their existing 
resources, both material (wealth or property) and symbolic (social status, power, or 
lifestyle), which was best served by the recognition and sympathy of significant 
others. It should be obvious by now that the homophilous interactional pattern of the 
priests is perfectly consistent with the motive of maintaining resources. In the words 
of Nan Lin (2001: 49) ‘[d]efending one’s resources requires the sentiment and support 
of those who are in the same social groups or those who are in a similar position (e.g., 
class) in the hierarchical structure’ – and this is exactly what priests did, interacting 
predominantly with individuals from within their social in-group. Hence the 
fundamentally conservative economic mentality of priests provides an additional 
structural explanation for the largely normative, least effort homophilous mode of 
interaction one can observe for this social segment 
Finally, if maintaining resources is achieved through homophily, the motive of 
gaining additional ones requires a different mode of interaction. We have seen that 
interacting with similar others will only give access to similar resources already 
owned. Hence, in order to gain new ones the entrepreneur is obliged to interact with 
                                                
741 Jursa et al. 2010: 288f. 
742 Jursa et al. 2010: 289. See on the typical activities of the Babylonian entrepreneur also Wunsch 
2010: 247ff. 
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dissimilar individuals, i.e. engage in so-called heterophily. This form of interaction 
requires more effort since ‘interacting partners, aware of the inequality in differential 
command over resources that can be brought to bear, need to assess each other’s 
willingness to engage in exchange’ (Lin 2001: 47). In the Neo-Babylonian context 
these partners could include powerful institutions like the temple or palace with their 
large agricultural or tax farming contracts, as well as for example merchants, tenants 
or labourers from lower strata of society. Even if much more research is needed on 
the dynamics of interaction of those Neo-Babylonian families that qualify as 
entrepreneurs, it seems that heterophily was as fundamental to their interaction and 
economic behaviour, as homophily was to rentiers. This can already be glimpsed from 
those priests who displayed a somewhat more entrepreneurial mentality compared to 
other members of their social group. I am thinking of Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, who unlike 
most of his fellow priests engaged lower-stratum tenants on a large scale.743 Another 
example is Marduk-rēmanni//Ṣāhit-ginê from Sippar. Besides owning various 
prebends, this man spent much of his time in the mercantile sector on the local quay 
where he engaged with foreign as well as lower stratum individuals on a large 
scale.744 
The distinction between homophily and heterophily is obviously not always clear-
cut, just as this is not the case for rentiers and entrepreneurs in general, yet, these 
concepts allow us to dissect Babylonian society from a particular social angle. Even if 
more research is needed in order to develop and apply these concepts to our sources, 
it should be clear that priests interacted on a fundamentally different basis with 
society than other more entrepreneurial elements. In other words, rentiers and 
entrepreneurs were not only dissimilar in terms of economic behaviour and 
subsistence strategy, but they can also be distinguished by two opposing modes of 
interaction. Moreover, this excursion tells us that phenomena like rentiers and 
entrepreneurs, more than just based on economic criteria can be explained from a 
more fundamental or structural perspective, which at the same time allows us to refine 
our understanding about the functioning of this ancient society as a whole. 
 
 
                                                
743 See above, Ch. 2.3.1. and Ch. 2.3.2. 
744 Waerzeggers 2014. 





In this chapter we took a step back from the detailed examination of interaction within 
the priestly community of Borsippa and approached the interactional pattern as a 
whole. In order to better understand the position of priests as a distinct social segment 
in Neo-Babylonian society, I started out by examining possible causations behind 
their distinct interactional pattern. Priests engaged predominantly with members of 
fellow priestly families, both in mundane transactions like silver loans as in highly 
symbolic affairs such as marriage. Individuals from non-priestly elite families are 
attested significantly less often, while ‘outsiders’, i.e. all those who did not belong to 
the established urban elite segment, are almost entirely missing. How can this be 
explained?  
A satisfying and theoretically informed interpretation of interaction was reached by 
introducing the concept of homophily. This principle, which poses that social 
interaction tends to take place among individuals with similar lifestyles and 
socioeconomic characteristics, has been identified as one of the most basic and 
pervasive organising principles in human society. Homophily represents the 
normative and least effort-requiring mode of interaction. That homophily played a 
deciding role in Borsippa’s priestly circle transpires from the fact that the significant 
types of interaction (marriage and friendship) materialised to a disproportionate 
degree within the social in-group – a feature that could not be explained with a spatial 
argumentation alone. While non-priestly elite families were occasionally welcomed 
into the hypergamous marriage system and the circles of friendship, they appear more 
often in less significant capacities and affairs. They seem to have been kept outside of 
the social boundary to a large extent. This applied a fortiori to individuals from other 
and, predominantly, lower strata of society, which were excluded from the social 
world of the priests almost in its entirety. The simple, although important, conclusion 
is that the more similar one was to priests the more likely someone was to interact and 
be drawn into their social world – how similarity and dissimilarity may have been 
assessed by priests and others in Neo-Babylonian society will be discussed in the 











In the previous chapter we looked into causations behind the interactional pattern of 
the priestly families in Borsippa. I have shown that the (economic) mentality 
sustained by this social group played an important role. As so-called rentiers, these 
families were first and foremost set on protecting their existing resources and 
preserving their traditional position in society. I argued that this motivation is best 
served through homophilous interaction, that is, interaction with individuals with 
similar lifestyles, social positions and resources. However, the analysis has remained 
theoretical and abstract, and interaction has been approached mainly from a structural 
perspective. But how was similarity or homophily assessed and maintained in this 
community? What were the material and symbolic resources these families claimed? 
What exactly constituted a Babylonian priest, and how did this specific social group 
correspond to and differ from other groups in society?  
The points of departure are what I called the more salient features of the pattern of 
interaction, i.e., the areas that show the highest degree of inbreeding homophily: 
marriage and friendship. Leaving aside the rules of hypergamy, priests most often 
married daughters of fellow priests, but alliances with non-priestly clans were 
concluded as well to a limited extent. However, intermarriage with other (non-family-
name-bearing) strata of society is thus far not attested and might for all we know have 
been considered undesirable. While it is not surprising that priests adhered to a strict 
endogamous policy in the domain of marriage – it involved nothing less than the 
transfer of women and property, besides having deep ramifications in terms of 
hierarchy and status – the fact that a very similar pattern is found in the domain of 
trust and intimacy is telling. To reiterate, friendship is understood as an informal 
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social relationship, based on choice, trust and voluntariness, and it seems only likely 
that in this personal matter priests enjoyed much more freedom from social 
convention and regulation than in any of the interactions studied above. Yet, intimate 
contacts came predominantly from temple-based families, while individuals from 
lower strata of society are entirely missing. In other words, the hypergamous marriage 
circuit as well as the circles of trust and intimacy of the priesthood of Borsippa 
comprised only individuals who boasted clan names, marking them as descendants of 
established ancestry and members of the urban elite. Hence, the fact that the priests’ 
significant and most symbolic interactions took place exclusively within this 
restricted social group strongly suggests that they perceived of, and, maintained 
themselves as a discrete social unit. 
I would like to argue that we are dealing with what is called a ‘symbolic’ or ‘social 
boundary’ in the social sciences. 745  According to Lamont and Molnár (2002), 
symbolic boundaries are, in general terms, ‘conceptual distinctions made by social 
actors to categorise objects, people, practice and even time and space,’ but can more 
practically also ‘separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and 
group membership’.746 Only after symbolic boundaries ‘are widely agreed upon can 
they take on a constraining character and pattern social interaction in important ways’ 
and become social boundaries, for example translating into patterns of social 
exclusion or racial segregation.747 These outcomes serve as mere examples pertaining 
to specific historical contexts and cannot be applied to the community under 
investigation. Yet, the interactional patterns in our corpus are clear in their own right. 
Even if individuals from the lower strata are represented in the priestly archives and 
are at times found in more important roles (e.g. as creditors, lessees, and landowners), 
they did not participate in the significant interactions of the priestly community. Not 
only the strongest ties, like marriage and friendship, materialised inside a restricted 
circle, in agricultural collaboration and silver lending too, interaction with these 
                                                
745 The idea of ‘boundaries’ has taken up a key position in scholarship across the social sciences since 
at least the mid-20th century and has become part of the standard conceptual toolkit. A good starting 
point into the various traditions, concepts and applications of ‘symbolic/social boundaries,’ are the 
review articles by Lamont 2001, and Lamont & Molnár 2002. Both articles include an extensive 
bibliography on the topic. 
746 Lamont & Molnár 2002: 168. 
747 Lamont & Molnár 2002: 168-169. 




individuals was kept to an absolute minimum. It follows that priests upheld a 
collective attitude and agenda, which allowed them to keep control over their social 
environment and preserve the configuration of their community through a deliberate 
act of auto-segregation. I believe that the clear pattern of interaction of the priests of 
Borsippa justifies designating it as the more forceful type of boundary, the social 
boundary. This social boundary set the priests apart from the rest of society and 
segmented the ‘us’ from ‘them’.  
It is widely accepted among sociologists that before an objectified collective 
identity (the ‘us’) can emerge, individuals must first share a sense of togetherness and 
be able to differentiate themselves from others by drawing on a set of common 
criteria.748 Equally important is the fact that this process of identification should be 
recognised by outsiders.749 It is in the encounter between the internal and the external 
that identification is to be found and negotiated, and that identities materialise – it is, 
in the words of Fredrik Barth, the ‘boundary that defines the group rather than the 
cultural stuff that it encloses’ (1969:15).750 In this chapter I will adopt the exact 
reversed approach to the topic. Having already detected a very clear boundary based 
on the interactional patterns of the priestly families under investigation, I will now 
proceed to look for the markers along which this social boundary was drawn. To 
rephrase the question posed above: what exactly were the symbolic and material 
resources on which priests drew to create and maintain their social in-group? In other 
words, what were the attributes and criteria, the so-called ‘cultural stuff’, that defined 
the collective social identity of the priests and their closest circles? In the following I 
will examine a range of these markers, including the affiliation to the temple, 
ownership of property, scribal education, literacy, and language. 
 
6.1. Affiliation to the temple  
 
6.1.1. Prebend ownership 
The first feature that comes to mind is the possession of priestly titles. Ownership of 
prebends and, if sanctioned, the enrolment in the priesthood had prodigious effects on 
                                                
748 E.g. Barth 1969, Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 14-21, Jenkins 2008, passim. 
749 E.g. Jenkins 2008 (especially Ch. 4), Eriksen 2002 (especially Ch. 2-3), Barth 1969. 
750 Besides having a general application on boundaries (in the social sense), in this article Barth was 
especially interested in ethnic boundaries and identities. 
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how individuals perceived of themselves and organised their professional and private 
lives,751 and can be identified as the key feature unifying the social group under 
investigation. The right to enter the employment of the gods was reserved for a select 
number of families who scrupulously transferred this privilege from father to son. 
They legitimised their position by insisting on continuity with the past and the 
preservation of hallowed traditions. Hence, the prebendary brewers from the city of 
Nippur all claimed the person of Absummu as eponymous ancestor, even if de facto 
they might not have shared consanguinity.752 Other ritual specialists versed in the 
more arcane trades went so far as to trace their roots back to the remotest, mythical 
past.753 While no direct evidence of such an ideology is found in the documents of the 
priesthood of Borsippa, one can assume that they shared a ‘deep-rooted concern for 
lineage and origins’ very similar to their colleagues from other cultic centres.754 The 
majority of the families from Borsippa managed to maintain their cultic positions 
during the entire long sixth century and some were there already long before while 
others persisted even thereafter.755 
                                                
751 Waerzeggers 2010 (especially Ch. 2). A more social-economic outlook is provided by Jursa et al. 
2010 (especially, p. 155ff.). 
752 Joannès 1992: 90 and Beaulieu 1995: 88. 
753 This idea is especially evident among ritual specialists like diviners, exorcists and cultic singers, see 
e.g. Borger 1973: 172, Lambert 1998: 142, Beaulieu 2007a. Note for example that a diviner (barû) 
had to be a descendant of Enmuduranki, the antediluvian king of Sippar, in order to be initiated in 
this trade, cf. Lambert 1998. Note that according to one tradition priests were instated by the chief 
god Marduk at the moment of creation, cf. Al-Rawi & George 1994: 135-139. 
754 Waerzeggers 2010: 78. See also note 337 for possible evidence that the tradition about Absummu 
also circulated among the brewers of Ezida. Further interest in the past (as a source of legitimation) 
can be deduced from the fact that monumental inscriptions (kudurrus) commemorating the donation 
of land and/or prebends to individuals, usually by the king, were kept on display in the temple even 
centuries after the deed, see e.g. Slanski 2000: 96f. This is for example the case for VS 1 36, a 
kudurru from the mid-eight century BCE, which describes the inauguration of a temple-enterer of 
Nabû in Ezida. It was found in the ruins of the temple by H. Rassam, Cf. Reade 1986. Interest in 
origins and history arises, moreover, from the composition of chronicles, a discipline that prospered 
in the Borsippean scribal circle, see Waerzeggers 2012. 
755 All of the family names mentioned in the mid-eight century kudurru VS 1 36 are still found in the 
temple during the long sixth century. On the other side of the chronological spectrum the Huṣābu 
family was still able to man brewers for the service of Nabû in the later Persian and Hellenistic 
periods (cf. colophons and texts written by Nabû-kuṣuršu//Huṣābu in CT 12; Hunger 1968: nos. 124-
133). 




Prebends did not (necessarily) represent the most costly asset in the property 
portfolio of priests,756 but they were certainly among their most cherished ones. Even 
if prebendary titles could be bought and sold freely, there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that priests strived to keep them firmly in the patrimony: they were hardly 
ever used as collateral on loans,757 and families usually avoided bequeathing prebends 
to female relatives.758 Prebends were put up for sale only in the uttermost end of 
needs, and even then these sales took usually took place within the paternal family 
and among immediate colleagues.759 Moreover, there are many examples of priests 
seeking to redeem previously alienated property, a context that saw the involvement 
of the so-called bīt abi, ‘house of the father’. Recent studies by, for example, C. 
Waerzeggers (2010: 81-90) and J. P. Nielsen (2011: 244-253) have shown that the bīt 
abi – a flexible social institution that united several agnatic lines of descent headed by 
the ‘big brother’ (ahu rabû), i.e. the eldest son of the eldest son of the common 
ancestor – exercised a great measure of control over the property decisions of its 
members. Most notably, it held the right to redeem alienated property, especially 
(albeit not exclusively) prebends. Besides a natural sense of solidarity 
(‘brotherhood’760), members also shared an emotional attachment to their bīt abi and 
its patrimony. 761  This institution seems to have embodied a concrete locus 762  of 
togetherness and shared identity for close relatives within the wider kin groups. It 
                                                
756 BM 26576 = AH XV no. 192 from the Rē’i-alpi archive illustrates this clearly. In this enormous sale 
of seventeen items of property, prebends rank only third highest in terms of value in silver, well after 
the housing plot and agricultural land. For the relative value of types of private property, see Jursa et 
al. 2010, Ch. 3. Note however that the prices of prebends differed greatly; the prices roughly 
correlated with the relative status of the prebendary function in the temple hierarchy, see Pirngruber 
& Waerzeggers 2011. For a general comparison between the prices for houses, agricultural plots and 
prebends, Jursa et al. 2010: 176ff. 
757 See above, Ch. 3. 
758 Roth 1990: 2, 33f. and Waerzeggers 2010: 92-94. 
759 Waerzeggers 2010: 98-99. 
760 Note that the use of (fictive) kinship term ‘brother’ is found only in prebend related cases; sales of 
houses and land were not dealt with in this framework, which, following C. Waerzeggers (2010: 87), 
shows that blood ties were especially important for the priestly identity. 
761 Van der Toorn 1996a: 20, Waerzeggers 2010: 90, and Nielsen 2011: 244ff. 
762 Note that the bīt-abi could perhaps refer to a physical building, a home base, besides the more 
symbolic concept of ones extended family unit. The reading of the relevant texts is, however, open to 
criticism, cf. Nielsen 2011: 56ff., 276-280. 
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represented a core feature of domestic and public life of the priesthood and indeed the 
urban upper stratum in general.     
 
6.1.2. Purity and initiation 
The Babylonian priesthood was submitted to stringent requirements of purity well 
beyond the basic needs for hygiene and everyday cleanness.763 A priest needed to be 
pure in all aspects of his person, which meant pure of blood, mind and body.764 That 
is why before being admitted into the priesthood, cultic authorities would conduct 
extensive inquests into a candidate’s health, past and family in order to ensure his 
ritual fitness. Correct descent was of primary importance. Both ritual and practical 
texts inform us that only a biological son of an initiated priest could enter the service 
of the gods.765 In practice, this could only be ascertained if the priest-to-be had been 
born in wedlock. Virginity of a bride upon marriage was apparently proof enough for 
uncontested paternal descent of her children,766 while birth outside of matrimony led 
to a candidate’s disqualification. Moral behaviour represented another aspect of 
purity.767  Individuals convicted of homicide or thievery, as well as those merely 
lacking proper devotion and humility were barred from entering the temple.768 In case 
of doubt, the temple authorities would summon witnesses and consult the candidate’s 
past (criminal) record to make sure his integrity was beyond reproach. Only someone 
with an impeccable record, a truly virtuous person, was qualified for cultic service.  
                                                
763 See in brief for the different concepts of purity and pollution in Babylonia, especially between cult 
and everyday life, Sallaberger 2006. 
764 The rules of admission in the Babylonian priesthood and the requirements of purity that existed in 
the Neo-Babylonian period have been discussed extensively in Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008. Cf. 
Waerzeggers 2010: 51-55. Löhnert 2007 has collected the Neo-Assyrian evidence. Borger 1973, 
Lambert 1998, and Löhnert 2010, have studied various ritual texts dealing with the initiation of 
Babylonian priests and ritual specialists. 
765 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 10-13. 
766 As argued by Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008, virgin brides received pendants (zību) from their parents 
upon marriage. This pendant, thought to consist of a couch – a mark of female purity associated with 
the goddess Ninlil – functioned both as a symbol of virginity for the bride as well as proof of 
uncontested paternal descent for her children. 
767 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 13. 
768 Waerzeggers 2010: 53. 




Once correct descent and conduct had been established, and royal permission 
granted,769 the candidate could be inducted into the priesthood. The initiation ritual is 
referred to as gullubu, literally ‘the shave’, and took place in the bathhouse the first 
time the successful candidate entered the sacred compounds of the temple. 770 
Performed by the prebendary barber (gallābu) and a team of cultic experts, the 
primary purpose of this rite of passage was to check the candidate’s physical purity 
and to shave his body and head. According to the ritual texts from Nippur edited by 
R. Borger (1973), the nešakku and pašīšu priests were required to have bodies ‘as 
pure as golden statues’ (col. I 13-14), and be free from physical imperfections such as 
bad eyesight, kidney-stones, birthmarks (?) and an asymmetrical face.771 A similar 
standard of bodily perfection was required from other ritual specialists. The diviner 
(bārû), for example, was considered unfit for service if he had squinting eyes, chipped 
teeth, a cut-off finger, or suffered from a ruptured (?) testicle or leprosy.772 Once the 
candidate had passed the physical examination in the bathhouse he could be cleansed 
and shaven, thereby ritually purified and separated from the profane.773 The candidate 
had now become an initiated priest. 
 Even if it seems likely that all active priests had to go through some sort of rite of 
initiation, the act of shaving was reserved only for those priests who had to operate in 
the sacred areas of the temple.774 This included the temple-enterers who came into 
direct contact with the divine statues as well as purveyors such as brewers, bakers, 
oxherds, fishermen etc., who manipulated the sacrificial foodstuff and participated in 
the daily ceremony on the temple courtyard.775 While the term gullubu only refers to 
                                                
769 Candidates had to be granted permission from the king or his local representative before being 
allowed to proceed with the consecration ceremony, see Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 18-19. The king 
was also actively involved in the recruitments of priests himself, at least in case of more senior cultic 
positions. Since these priests did not only enjoy proximity to the gods but also access to the persona 
of the king, careful selection was a matter of national security. 
770 See on the gullubu ceremony Scheyhing 1998, Sallaberger & Huber Vulliet 2005: 620-22, Löhnert 
2007, Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008, Löhnert 2010. 
771 Borger 1973: 172. 
772 Lambert 1998: 144. 
773 Scheyhing 1998: 73. 
774 Waerzeggers & Jursa 2008: 14-17. 
775 In the data sample used for the present study, the reed-workers are probably the only priests who did 
not belong to the consecrated (i.e. shaved) part of the temple personnel of Ezida. 
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the shaving ceremony at the threshold of office, it has been shown by C. Waerzeggers 
that these priests had to pay regular visits to the temple barber and were ‘submitted to 
tests of cultic suitability in the course of their active careers’ (Waerzeggers & Jursa 
2008: 20). The demand for shaving provided a visual aspect to the temple’s hierarchy, 
which was mirrored in the physical appearance of its personnel. It set the pure apart 
form the impure, the fit from the unfit. Besides that, it also distinguished the priests 
from the rest of the population and served as a distinctive outward sign of priestly 
status and identity in society.776 
While to need to be purges from all bodily hairs was restricted to a selected group, 
all Babylonian priests were required to wash their body with water before being 
allowed access into the temple.777 As a consequence, a priest who could no longer do 
the washing (ramāka a.meš) was immediately released from duty.778 Hence, washing 
with water was an essential requirement for and thus an inherent quality of a priest on 
duty.779 This association is also found in a couple of literary and monumental texts 
that use the term ramku (pl. ramkūtu) to designate a ‘priest’ or the ‘priesthood’ in 
general.780 A good example is found in the En-nigaldi-Nanna cylinder of Nabonidus 
(YOS 1 45) recently edited by H. -P. Schaudig (2001: 373-377). This inscription, 
composed in honour of the restoration of the Egipar in Ur and the installation of 
                                                
776 For other visible marks, which may have included specific garments and headgear, see Kessler 
1999: 250ff., Sallaberger & Huber Vulliet 2005: 623, and Zawadzki 2006: 91, 94. Of special interest 
are the so-called ṣibtu-garment and the mehēzu-girdle, which, according to the Hellenistic Uruk text 
UVB 15, 40 were worn by various priests engaged in temple ritual. Some ritual specialists (e.g. the 
lamentation priest, or kalû) even wore lubāru-garments, normally reserved for the gods. Since these 
articles of clothing are usually found in so-called dullu peṣû (‘white work’) texts, we can assume that 
the priests wore them in white too (cf. Zawadzki 2006, Bongenaar 1999: 304ff.). That the garments 
of the priests had to be in a spotless condition follows from the fact that they paid regular fees to the 
temple washerman (ašlāku), who, besides cleaning the dirty cloths of the gods was also responsible 
for washing the working cloths of his temple colleagues (cf. Waerzeggers 2010: 55). Note that priests 
can often be found on Neo-Babylonian seals. They are represented as bald, clean-shaven individuals, 
wearing a girdle and a fringed robe that passes over the right shoulder. Their right hand is usually 
raised towards the mouth in reverence, while sometimes carrying cultic devices in their left hand. See 
for the Neo-Babylonian cylinder seal and its iconography, Collon 2001: 193-195. 
777 Waerzeggers 2010: 12-13, 55. 
778 BM 26480 = AH XV: no 163. 
779 Sallaberger & Huber Vuillet 2005: 612 
780 See, CAD R: 126-127. 




Nabonidus' daughter as entu-priestess of Sîn, also records the exemption from 
taxation and corvée labour granted to the local temple personnel. The long list of 
priests who are accorded this privilege opens with the term ramkūtu, the ‘bathed-
ones’.781  
The priests’ preoccupation with purity is also borne out by the particular diet they 
followed. On the one hand, they enjoyed the privilege to consume the remainders of 
the offerings.782 Derived from the table of the gods, this food had been meticulously 
sanctified and was carefully distributed among the priesthood and the king.783 On the 
other hand, priests observed dietary restrictions in order to maintain their ritual purity. 
Although the details largely escape us, a glimpse of this custom, relating to the 
priesthood of Ezida, can be found in the text SpTU III no. 58.784 This polemic literary 
composition deals with the crimes and sacrileges committed by Nabû-šumu-iškun, a 
Chaldean king of the mid-eight century BCE. Besides appropriating temple property, 
introducing foreign gods, and flouting nearly every single ritual protocol, the king is 
said to have offered ‘leek – a thing forbidden in Ezida – into the temple of Nabû’ (col. 
ii 17-18) and made the temple-enterers eat it. The consumption of leek as well as 
other pungent foodstuff such as onion, garlic or fish, are known to have turned a 
person temporarily impure according to the Babylonian mind-set. 785  Forcing the 
                                                
781 Note that the list of priests is closed and summarized with kiništu, a term commonly translated as 
‘temple college/assembly’, which may have functioned as a synonym of ramkūtu. That both terms 
were, at the least, closely related follows from TCL 9 143 (see below). In this letter, concerned with 
the cultic activities at the Eanna temple in Uruk, the sender tells the kiništu ‘not to bring about any 
cultic interruption’ and reminds them to ‘wash themselves with water’ (ll. 6-9). Nevertheless, ramku 
as a generic word for priests is rare and found mainly in literary contexts. We have to wait for the 
Hellenistic period to find it in administrative temple documents, see CAD R: 127. Here the term is 
clearly used as a classification to divide the consecrated from the non-consecrated temple personnel. 
BRM 1 99, for example, mentions rations of the ‘sirāšû lútu5.meš,’ or ‘bathed brewers’. 
782 Waerzeggers 2010, passim (especially Ch. 8). 
783 E.g. McEwan 1983, Corò 2004. See below, for more information on the relationship between the 
king, the priesthood and the gods. 
784 See Cole 1994b, and Glassner 2004: 300-312 for an edition of this text. This text belongs the late-
Achaemenid archive of the exorcist (āšipu) Anu-ikṣur//Šangû-Ninurta from Uruk. 
785  E.g. van der Toorn 1985: 33ff. For injunctions against eating certain foodstuff in Babylonian 
hemerologies as well as medical and ritual texts, see Cole 1994b: 241. Cf. Geller 2011. 
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priests to eat tabooed substances, Nabû-šumu-iškun is thus being accused of having 
rendered the god’s immediate servants unfit for service.786  
The ideology of purity was obviously an important feature of the self-perception of 
Babylonian priests. Some of its aspects were transmitted from father to son, while 
others had to be nurtured and guarded carefully against profaning influences and 
miasma. Rules of purity not only regulated their activities inside the temple, but also 
demanded for a very specific lifestyle on the part the priests. 
 
6.1.3. Sacrifices and festivals 
Once initiated, prebendary titles gave their owners the right to perform a specific 
(ritual) task in the cult of the gods at a particular moment in the year. Priests did 
however not operate in isolation but were grouped into larger professional units.787 In 
the temple a priest thus came into contact with a large body of direct and indirect 
colleagues who were all part of the same system and ultimately served the same goal 
– the worship of the gods. As I have tried to show throughout this study, collaboration 
and association in the temple paved the ground for much of the social interaction of 
priests, most of which took place within this restricted group of temple colleagues and 
their relatives. 
One can argue that the concept of priesthood materialised on a daily basis through 
joint action inside and outside of the temple walls. The cultic calendar of Ezida has 
recently been reconstructed by C. Waerzeggers (2010: 111-152). She showed that the 
fundamental aspect of the cult of Ezida (like in any other Babylonian temple) was the 
daily worship, or, ginû. It consisted of two identical ceremonies – one in the morning 
(šēru) the other in the afternoon (kīṣ umi) – during which the priests on duty presented 
two consecutive meals to the gods, the main (rabû) and the second (tardennu) 
                                                
786 The similarities between the Babylonian priest and the Brahmin on the Indian sub-continent are 
interesting on this point. Brahmans are known to follow a very strict diet in which, especially, leek, 
garlic and onion have to be avoided according to the traditional Vedic scriptures (e.g. Olivelle 2000: 
53-55, 407-409). On the other edge of their dietary spectrum, Brahmans officiating as priests in the 
temple hold the right to enjoy the remainders of the daily food offerings, and like their Babylonian 
counterparts consume the sanctified food of the gods (e.g. Fuller 1984: 14). 
787 For the internal organisation of the priesthoods in Ezida, see Waerzeggers 2010: Ch. 4 (brewers), 
Ch. 5 (bakers), Ch. 6 (butchers), and Ch. 7 (oxherds). 




meal.788 This quotidian ritual, staged within the intimate setting of the temple and 
concealed from the uninitiated eye, was perceived of as the essential form of worship, 
the continuity of which was thought to correlate directly with the well-being of the 
land.789  
If the ‘daily care and feeding of the gods’790 was the most crucial aspect in the self-
perception of the individual priests, the group’s public image took shape during the 
cultic activities beyond the temple precinct. Just like in any other Babylonian town,791 
in Borsippa, too, there existed a number of public (monthly/annual) festivals. 792 
During many of these events the (images of the) gods left their cellae and were taken 
out on a procession through the city’s streets and the countryside, as they visited 
shrines and temples of divine relatives in Borsippa and neighbouring towns. Perhaps 
the most spectacular episode of the year took place during the so-called akītu, or, New 
Year festival held in Babylon in the beginning of the calendar year in the month of 
Nisannu.793 As shown by both the ritual texts and administrative documents from 
Borsippa, on the fifth day of this month the god Nabû came forth from his cella in 
Ezida. After a procession through the streets of Borsippa Nabû took his sacred barge 
for the capital where he was welcomed by the Babylonian king at the Red Gate Quay 
and joined the public festivities of his divine father, Marduk, for the following 
days.794 After numerous rituals, offerings, prayers and procession through the capital 
                                                
788 Waerzeggers 2010: 113-118, with exhaustive bibliographic references. 
789 It is therefore not surprising that the Babylonian rulers took great pride in emphasising their role as 
protectors and providers of the cult, cf. Waerzeggers 2011. 
790 This refers to the pioneering essay by A. L. Oppenheim 1977: 183-198, on the Babylonian temple 
worship. 
791 For cultic festivals in the cities of Babylon and Uruk, see e.g. Thureau-Dangin 1921, Çaǧirgan & 
Lambert 1991, Linssen 2004. 
792 Waerzeggers 2010: 119-141. 
793 Cf. Waerzeggers 2010: 119-121, including previous literature. Other public festivals in Borsippa 
reconstructed by Waerzeggers 2010: 129ff. include, among others, the wedding ceremony between 
Nabû and his consort in month I, a celebration at the temple of Nanāya Euršaba at the end of month I, 
the procession of Nanāya Euršaba and other gods to Babylon and Kish, and a celebration held at least 
three times a year at the shrine of Šamaš in the countryside. 
794 E.g. Pongratz-Leisten 1994, Zgoll 2006, Waerzeggers 2010: 119-121. 
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and its countryside, Nabû was to return to Borsippa on the eleventh, when he entered 
his cella following a reversed procession of the week before.795 
Although our administrative documents – concerned above all with the 
bureaucratic control of the flow of commodities necessary for proper ritual – only 
tacitly inform us on the celebratory nature of festivals and the priests’ public 
performance at such events, these aspects can to some extent be gained from the ritual 
(prescriptive) texts from first millennium Babylon and Uruk.796 Paraded through the 
processional street on divine chariots or going up and down river on sacred barges, 
the statues of the gods, fully adorned with jewellery and dressed in magnificent 
garments, were the absolute centres of attention in the eyes of the spectators.797 
Though not nearly as richly decorated as the divine statues, the large priestly retinue 
that accompanied the gods on procession and assisted them at various other stages of 
these festivals must have been not less conspicuous. Besides their proximity to the 
gods, and at the New Year festival also to the king, the onlooker must have had no 
difficulties identifying them as servants of the gods, as their immaculate priestly 
garments and their ritually shaved bodies clearly indicated. Hence, it was these public 
festivals that staged the dramatic interactions between the priesthood, the gods, the 
king, and the wider public, the intensity and sensation of which can perhaps best be 
understood in the light of similar festivals held on the Indian sub-continent today.798 
At this point a few words should be said about the relation between the king and 
the priests, who, after all, were closely tied together through their joint worship of the 
gods. 799  Rather than the ideal of the warrior-king promoted by the Assyrian 
predecessors, the most persistent theme of Neo-Babylonian kingship was that of the 
pious king as benefactor of the gods.800 The renovation of temples, the provision of 
the regular sacrifice, and the supply of new cultic objects are heavily emphasised in 
royal inscriptions.801 The epithets or short titles used most frequently by the Neo-
                                                
795 Waerzeggers 2010: 120-130. 
796 E.g. Farber 1987, Çaǧirgan & Lambert 1991, Linssen 2004. 
797 Pongratz-Leisten 1994. 
798 E.g. Younger 1980, Fuller 1984: 17-21, Fuller & Logan 1985, Good 1999, Fuller 2004, 
799 This relationship is the subject of a very stimulating article by C. Waerzeggers 2011, where most of 
the following information can be found in extenso. 
800 Waerzeggers 2011: 726-730. 
801 Waerzeggers 2011: 726-727. 




Babylonian kings express a similar generosity towards the gods and their cults: ‘the 
one who establishes the regular offerings’ (mukīn sattukkī), ‘the giver of wonderful 
gifts’ (mušarrih igisê), and the most popular, ‘the provider of Esangila and Ezida’ 
(zānin Esagila u Ezida).802  
According to the royal ideology that was current in first millennium Babylonia, the 
gods directly appointed individual kings.803 As the earthly representative of Marduk 
and the divine assembly, the king was thus invested with supreme religious authority. 
This meant that besides the allocation of resources necessary for cultic execution, the 
king had to keep a close check on the priesthood itself. Hence, it was a royal 
prerogative to endow temples with new cultic personnel as well as to remove 
incompetent priests from office or suspend their posts, even though this could not be 
done without good reason.804 Despite being formally enrolled in the service of the 
gods, the privileged position of the priests rested, strictly speaking, upon the good 
grace of the king.  
Even if the idiom of the royal ideology left little space for the mention of priests, 
their role was of crucial importance to the king. While he owned prebendary rights in 
the temple,805 the Babylonian king did not have the authority to officiate as a cultic 
agent, not even to enter the presence of the divine statues unchecked.806 As we have 
seen, it was the priests who looked after the care and feeding of the gods and 
performed the crucial daily temple ritual. Even if the king could offer a sacrifice to 
the gods, only the priest could operate it. Hence, the king had to rely on the 
interceding figure of the priest in order to interact with the gods.807 Once more, this 
                                                
802 Da Riva 2008: 94-107. 
803 Dietrich & Dietrich 1998. 
804 Waerzeggers 2011: 741-745. 
805 Kleber 2008: 287-292. 
806 Waerzeggers 2011: 733-737. 
807 The similarities with the caste system of the Indian sub-continent are striking on this point. The 
king, traditionally a member of the so-called Kshatriya class, enjoyed supremacy in absolute 
(political and military) terms, yet he was deprived of any sacerdotal function, which was the right of 
the priestly or Brahmin caste alone. While the king claimed political power (and even retained some 
magico-religious aspects) the Hindu priests held spiritual authority. This gave rise to a very similar 
triangular exchange relationship between king, priest and god observed in first millennium 
Babylonia: the Brahmins relied on the king for his protection and patronage in order to conduct 
proper ritual, while the king in turn depended on the Brahmins in order to communicate with the gods 
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triangular relationship between the king, the priesthood and the gods materialised 
most clearly during the New Year festival.  
Held in honour of Marduk’s sovereignty over the universe, the New Year festival 
staged a crucial episode during which the king’s legitimacy as the gods’ 
representative on earth was being ritually tested. Once all the gods had been 
assembled in the Esagila temple on the fifth day, the king would enter the sacred 
compound of Marduk. There, well hidden from the public gaze, he was met by the 
ahu rabû, literally, ‘big brother’ of Esagila and the first among the priests, who 
stripped the king of his royal insignia – sceptre, loop, mace, and the crown of 
kingship – which he placed in front of Marduk.808 Upon return, the high priest first 
slapped the king across the face, who was then escorted into the inner sanctuary, 
pulled by the ears and forced into submission before the statue of Marduk.809 In this 
humble position, the king would avow that he had not neglected the gods, nor 
forsaken his responsibilities toward the city of Babylon, its people and its main 
temple.810 Once the king had made his ‘negative confession,’ the high priests returned 
the royal insignia to him, after which the latter was slapped one final time, now in 
order to induce an omen: ‘if his (the king’s) tears flow, Bēl (i.e. Marduk) is well 
disposed, if his tears do not flow, Bēl is angry’.811 Manipulating the royal insignia and 
escorting the humiliated king, somewhat violently, in and out of the divine space the 
role of the high priest is absolutely indispensible in this episode. Even if the kings 
derived their legitimacy from the gods, ‘this relationship was negotiated through the 
                                                                                                                                      
and validate his kingship. Moreover, just like in Babylonia, in India too this complicated relationship 
is reflected upon in various native literary compositions. For a brief survey of the traditional notion of 
kingship in India and the relation between the king and the priestly caste, see Fuller 1984: 104-106 
and Dumont 1970: appendix C. Readers are referred to Dirks 1987 and Peabody 2003 for more 
thorough studies focusing on kingship and the role of the king in pre-colonial Indian society. For a 
collection of essays, dealing with the traditional or ideological position and authority of the Brahmin 
priests and the king, see Heesterman 1985. 
808 Note that Sallaberger & Schmidt 2012 interpret this scene differently. They argue that this ritual 
does not involve the insignia of the king but the divine insignia of Marduk, which were being 
presented in front of the king and present when the latter made his confession. 
809 Pongratz-Leisten 1994. 
810 Pongratz-Leisten 1997. 
811 Linssen 2004: 232. 




temple and the priesthoods, who played a vital role in validating the power of the 
individual kings’ (Waerzeggers 2011: 746).  
Besides this dramatic annual confrontation, the relationship between god, king and 
priest was also cultivated on a daily basis in the temples. Both king and priest were 
entitled to a portion of the divine meals and as such it was customary that every 
temple sent sacrificial leftovers to the palace.812 By sharing food the three parties 
were thus joined in an exclusive unit of commensality. This special bond was further 
underlined by the cult of the royal image.813 Although the evidence pertaining to the 
long sixth century Babylonia is in short supply, the cult of the royal image is well 
known from earlier periods as it had been performed in Mesopotamian temples since 
at least the third millennium BCE.814 Statues of the kings were erected in temple 
courtyards and inner sanctuaries. This allowed the king to be in the presence of the 
divine and enabled a continuous transmission of worship to the gods. At the same 
time, these statues also received offerings, which made them into a subject of worship 
themselves.815 The placement of royal images in the temple thus benefitted both sides: 
it allowed the kings a place in the sacred space, but also served ‘to reinforce the 
privileges of the priest through his access to the sculpted images of both god and 
king’.816 Their association to god and king was of great importance to the self-image 
of the priests and many of the literary works found in temple libraries and priestly 
archives focus exactly on this triangular relationship.817 
While public festivals allowed priests to display their privileged status under the 
most dramatic and pompous circumstances, there must have been many more (formal 
and informal) occasions during which they could broadcast their ritual status and 
collective identity to the outside world. One example concerns temple building 
projects. Besides the (Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian) kings, the priests, too, are 
known to have been responsible for the renovation and construction of various parts 
                                                
812 McEwan 1983, Beaulieu 1990, Kleber 2008: 292ff. 
813 Cole & Machinist 1998: xiii. 
814 Kleber 2008: 269-271 (Eanna, Uruk), Waerzeggers 2014c (Ebabbar, Sippar). 
815  Kleber 2008: 271-275, Waerzeggers 2014c. 
816 Waerzeggers 2011: 745. 
817 Waerzeggers 2011, passim. 
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of the temple area.818 The best-known example is found in the archives of Borsippa’s 
priests and pertains to construction work on Ezida’s riverside wall during the reigns of 
Neriglissar and Nabonidus. This dossier tells us that the priestly divisions of Ezida 
contributed to the realisation of this project, specifically by manufacturing and 
supplying bricks.819 Replicating the cultic organisation of the temple worship, various 
priestly divisions (including the temple-enterers, butchers, and oxherds) received a 
lump sum of silver from the temple treasury to produce bricks for the allotted section 
of the temple wall. 820  Although undoubtedly prestigious, according to C. 
Waerzeggers, participation in this and similar projects was not an entirely voluntary 
act on the side of the priests. The brick impost caused enormous financial setbacks for 
the families concerned, whom we find settling brick-related debts still many years 
after the inception of the building project.821 It is also dubious whether the priests 
engaged in the actual physical work themselves.822 In spite of all this, it is hard to 
imagine that the priests would have missed the opportunity to broadcast their 





                                                
818 For references to royal construction works at the Ezida temple and Borsippa, see e.g. Langdon 1912: 
Nbk nos. 11, 15 and 44 (Nebuchadnezzar); Schaudig 1995, Schaudig 2001: 395-397, and VS 6 65  
(Nabonidus); Kuhrt & Sherwin-White 1991 (Antiochus I). 
819 These texts have been examined by Waerzeggers 2010: 337-345. 
820 The clearest example pertains to the prebendary oxherds, who knew a dual organisation: the top 
level based on the trimestral rotation of the oxherd’s temple service (the bēl-agurri level), and the 
lower level based on length-units of 50 cm, the responsibility over which was assigned to individual 
priests or a group of oxherds belonging to these three rota (the bēl-ammati level). 
821 Waerzeggers 2010: 344-345. The settlements of debts forced many priests to dispose of valuable 
(prebendary) property. 
822 In fact BM 26479 = AH XV no. 139: 4 mentions ‘the workers of the house of the oxherds’ (érin.meš 
šá é lúsipa.gud.meš), which might suggests that the priests hired a work gang to do the actual work. 
823  Note that there is an interesting parallel in Nehemiah 3: 1-32, reporting on the renovation of 
Jerusalem’s damaged gates and walls. This passage gives a list of all the people who participated in 
the renovation work and assigns them very specific areas of construction. The result is that the entire 
fortification work of the city was divided in clearly identifiable units assigned to specific individuals, 
households, and/or professional groups. Priests figure prominently among this last set of contributors. 





An important platform for priests to act as a collective within the community was the 
so-called kiništu, commonly translated in the secondary literature as ‘temple 
assembly’. This was a legal body composed of the principal prebendaries of a temple 
organisation.824 While the term is hardly found in the private texts of Borsippa’s 
priests,825 it is more commonly attested in the institutional archives of the Ebabbar 
temple in Sippar and the Eanna temple in Uruk. Besides the basic cultic 
responsibilities of the members of the kiništu themselves (some texts indicate that the 
term kiništu could more generically mean ‘prebendaries’826 ), it functioned as an 
advisory board that assisted the higher temple authorities in legal matters, often 
related to (stolen) temple property, correct cultic procedure and taxation.827 But the 
kiništu also operated as an investigatory panel, which collected information about 
(historical) conflicts, inquired about persons’ backgrounds, interrogated offenders, 
dispatched messengers and produced adequate reports on behalf of the authorities. 
And finally the kiništu was also invested with the power to represent the local temple 
(community) in imperial matters. As such it was sent abroad to perform (or supervise) 
corvée work in Elam on behalf of the religious institution,828 and it stood in direct 
                                                
824 The most extensive treatment of the kiništu is still found in Bongenaar 1997: 150-153. It seems that 
the brewers, the bakers and the butchers were particularly associated with kiništu, while the temple-
enterers were traditionally set apart. Note that in Uruk we sometimes find non-prebendary temple 
personnel subsumed under kiništu. YOS 6 77 and TCL 13 182 both mention the rab-būli (‘overseer 
of the herds’), a high official in the temple’s sheep herding organisation. 
825 Besides a reference in the eighth century kudurru VS 1 36, the term is found on only three other 
occasions in the Borsippa corpus. BM 29400 = AH XV no. 78 (Dar 05?) BM 96231 = AH XV no. 83 
(Dar 09), and BM 96226 = AH XV no. 79 (d.l.) belong to the Bēliya’u archive and mention the 
kiništu in relation to the preparation of corvée work in Elam. 
826  Take for example the letter TCL 9 143, which states that the kiništu should not cause any 
interruptions in the regular service of days 2, 5, and 15 and reminds them to cleanse themselves with 
water (ramāku). 
827 See for Uruk: PTS 2097 (Nbn 01), YOS 6 77 (Nbn 04), AnOr 8 48 (Cyr 05), YOS 7 128 (Cam 02), 
TCL 13 182 (Dar 02); Sippar: CT 55 110 (Nbn 09) and BM 61344 (Nbn 14); Akkad: BM 61522 (Cyr 
04+), Smith Coll.  111 (Dar 04); Babylon/Dilbat: AO 2569 (Dar II 08). 
828 BM 29400 = AH XV no. 78 (Dar 05?) BM 96231 = AH XV no. 83 (Dar 09), and BM 96226 = AH 
XV no. 79 (d.l.) from the Bēliya’u archive deal with the preparations and compensation of an 
individual who will go to Elam with the kiništu and perform (supervise?) the corvée work on behalf 
of the prebendary bakers. 
CHAPTER 6  
 
 222
communication with the king;829 in some instances the temple assembly might even 
have represented the city at large. 830  In conclusion, the kiništu allowed for the 
multifarious priesthoods of a temple to amalgamate into a single legal body 
representing the temple institution and exercising considerable juridical control in 
addition to, or perhaps in tandem with, other more inclusive civic constituencies in the 
community.831 Much is still unknown about the exact composition and role of the 
kiništu and its development over the first millennium, and an in-depth investigation is 
still outstanding.  
 
6.1.5. Priestly families vs. the individual priest 
In the previous pages, I have shown various examples of how the ownership of 
prebends and enrolment in the priesthood was crucial in shaping the identity of priests 
and their families. Yet, a note of caution should be voiced here once again: belonging 
to a priestly family did not automatically turn an individual into an initiated servant of 
the gods. In addition to the ownership of a prebend, a candidate needed to be declared 
ritually fit, before being allowed into the priesthood. Not many will have been able to 
meet these stringent requirements, so that perhaps most individuals, indeed entire 
branches, of families will have had to make a living in other sectors of society. Good 
examples of this are the Gallābus of Borsippa and the Egibis of Babylon.832  Yet, 
there is evidence to suggest that some of the privileged (sacerdotal) status was also 
ascribed to and upheld by clan members who were not active priests themselves. The 
existence of the bīt-abi is a case in point. This flexible social institution incorporated 
                                                
829 In YOS 6 71//YOS 6 72 (Nbn 09) the king inquires with the kiništu about a ritual garment; BM 
113249 (Cam 03) tells us about a royal demand to the kiništu to inform the royal messenger about 
royal stelae and inscription set up in the Eanna by previous kings; YOS 3 6 (d.l, probably Nbn) is a 
royal request to have an audience with 10 or 15 elders and/or members of the kiništu at the royal 
court in Babylon. 
830 This is for example suggested by the Assyrian royal letter ND 2348. Here we find king Tiglath-
pileser III (744-724 BCE) urging the ‘temple-enterers, the kiništu, and the leaders of the […] (and?) 
the citizens of Babylon’ to take military action and seize the gates of the town of Hirdasu (see, 
Luukko 2012: no. 1: ll. 2-5) 
831 For other civic institutions in first millennium Babylonia like the elders (šībūtu), the assembly 
(puhru), the foremost (ašaredūtu), and the citizens (mār-banî), and their potential juridical and 
prosopographical overlap with the temple assembly, see Barjamovic 2004. 
832 Jursa 2005: 65-66, 82-83. 




several agnatic lines and united both male and female members into a social unit,833 
which, besides maintaining a cooperative property policy, shared a sense of solidarity, 
emotional attachment, and collective identity, regardless of the fact whether one was 
enrolled in the priesthood or not. Once more, a cautious parallel could be drawn with 
the Brahmin of the Indian sub-continent. Although traditionally responsible for the 
religious rituals of the temple and thus supposed to officiate as cultic agents and meet 
the liturgical needs in society,834 throughout history Brahmins are known to have 
taken on many different professions. While this could and did have an effect on the 
prestige and social standing of the individual Brahmin it never subverted his or her 
absolute status in the overall caste system, as this was determined at birth.835     
 
6.2. Ownership of property 
As we have seen in previous chapters, besides prebends, also housing plots and 
agricultural land featured prominently in the property portfolios of priestly families. 
Even though for pre-industrial societies this has remained under-theorised and 
understudied,836 it is commonly accepted that ownership of real estate has played a 
crucial and pervasive factor in elite and class formation throughout history. This 
assumption can be backed by a large number of ancient and modern examples: from 
the senatorial rank in the Roman Republic and the medieval nobility to the capitalist 
class of Marxist theory. 837  Not surprisingly the ownership of urban and landed 
property played an equally important role for the priestly families under investigation 
and should be seen as a fundamental building block of their collective identity. J. P. 
Nielsen (2011: 16-17, 276-280), following Levi-Strauss’ theoretical model of the 
‘house society’, settles on a particularly acute dependency of the family identity on 
the paternal estate (bīt abi), which consisted of, among other things, real estate, and 
                                                
833 For the role of women in the bīt-abi, see Van der Toorn 1996a: 20ff. 
834 Dumont 1970: 66-72. 
835 E.g. Béteille 2010: 112-113, Fuller 1984, passim, Dumont 1970, passim. 
836 The lack is especially striking in anthropological scholarship, where it applies in fact to elite studies 
in general. Reasons that have been advanced for this gap range from practical obstacles and the 
historical conventions of the discipline itself, to personal preferences of anthropologists who tend on 
the whole to sympathise with marginal and/or pre-modern (equalitarian) communities (Gusterson 
2001: 4417ff.). 
837 For a concise theoretical overview of various aristocratic groups (especially in pre-modern Europe), 
see Mączak 2001. 
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whose preservation was all-important. He even points to some examples in which the 
ownership of a specific type of physical property seems to have prompted individuals 
to ‘claim more permanent identities in the form of family names’ (see more on this 
below).838 
 
6.2.1. Residential property  
There is no doubt that the priestly families and their close contacts all had their main 
residences in Borsippa. This was their most important piece of property and could be 
of exceptional monetary value.839 However, much more important than the (passive) 
economic value of urban property, was the symbolic, social and emotional 
significance that it conveyed upon the inhabitants. While already millennia-old by the 
time of the Neo-Babylonian period, the ideological dichotomy between sedentism and 
pastoralism, between civilised town-dweller and barbaric nomad,840 was still very 
much alive in the psyche of the urban upper stratum as it was being transmitted 
through the literary canon of the scribal education and its devastating consequences 
witnessed even in their recent past: according to chronicle ABC 24, a scholarly 
product of the Borsippean priesthood,841 king Erība-Marduk (ca. 770s BCE) expelled 
the traditionally nomadic people of the Arameans ‘who had taken by murder and 
insurrection the fields of the inhabitants of Babylon and Borsippa’ (Grayson 1975: 
182-183; ABC 24, rev. 9-13). Not only did life within city walls protect someone 
from such marauders, attacking armies or other unearthly forces, there can in fact be 
little doubt that for the urban Babylonians the only civilised mode of life was city-life. 
It was not for nothing that the gods had chosen cities to establish their primary 
dwellings on earth. 
Babylonian cities in the first millennium BCE were still to a large extent – if not 
always in terms of Realpolitik, then at least on an ideologically level – self-governed 
by a number of (overlapping) civic institutions, which held the right to enforce a legal 
                                                
838 Nielsen 2011: 292, see pages 74-78, for his clearest example of this. 
839 For a good example readers are referred to BM 26576 = AH XV no. 192 from the Rē’i-alpi archive. 
Among the many pieces of property that are being sold, the housing plot is by far the most expensive 
one, raising no less than 26 minas of silver. Cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 169-172, with some general 
considerations on the use and value of Babylonian houses. 
840 Van de Mieroop 1997: 42-62. 
841 Waerzeggers 2012. 




order upon its local population – even if the king remained the ultimate authority.842 
The sources make it abundantly clear that living in cities inspired a sense of 
communal affiliation that differed from the notion of kinship, the primary mode of 
identification, and prevailed over (ethnic, social, professional etc.) diversity to unite 
the citizens, that is the city as a whole, on the basis of political identity and local 
belonging.843 It stands to reason that living in town, if not the actual ownership of a 
town house, must have facilitated admittance into this socio-political entity and 
enabled the resident to enjoy its communal rights and privileges.844 
Our understanding of how residence relates to Babylonian family structure in the 
first millennium is still poor, as a more generalising study that would integrate both 
the archaeological evidence and the material culture with the textual evidence is still 
outstanding.845 There was apparently both great variation in the size of dwellings and 
a multiplicity of possible household or residence scenarios.846 Yet, there is no doubt 
that the household did form the fundamental unit of organisation in Babylonian 
society. Typically an urban household would have consisted of a nuclear family of 
                                                
842 For the various civic institutions in first millennium Babylonia, see Barjamovic 2004. See for the he 
local administration in the Babylonian towns and the centralising power of the monarchy, Jursa 
2014b: 130-131. 
843 Barjamovic 2004: 49ff. The high frequency of demonyms in the Assyrian state correspondence (i.e. 
Barsipaya = Borsippean(s), Urukaya = Urukean(s)) and the kinship terminology in this respect (i.e. 
citizens would term themselves ‘son’ (māru) of a city), shows that affiliation to a city was a defining 
marker in the way this urban population identified itself and was identified by outsiders. 
844 Note, however, that this picture is somewhat complicated by the fact that people, while living in 
another town, could still uphold their traditional political/residential identity generations after 
migration. This was clearly the case in Neo-Babylonian Uruk, where one hears of two separate 
entities: the ‘Babylonians’ and ‘Urukeans’. The group of the ‘Babylonians’ consisted indeed of 
families that migrated south from the capital to Uruk, and monopolised important posts in the 
religious institution until the early reign of Xerxes (Kessler 2004). Similar dynamics can be found in 
other Babylonian town, cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 136-137, Waerzeggers 2014. 
845 This and related issues will be tackled in a forthcoming study of H. D. Baker [forthcoming (b)], on 
the urban landscape in first millennium Babylonia. For available studies on Neo-Babylonian housing 
readers are referred to other articles by this author, including Baker 2004: 47ff., Baker 2007, Baker 
2010, Baker 2014, and Baker 2015. See Baker [forthcoming (a)] for the study of first millennium 
houses and urbanism from a theoretical point of view, and Miglus 1999: 307-314, for an 
archaeological catalogue. 
846 See Baker 2014 for a concise overview of house size in the first millennium. 
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circa five individuals, 847  that is, a married couple with a number of unmarried 
children, but it could be supplemented by the presence of a widowed parent or sister, 
slaves, and tenants. H. D. Baker (2014: 14-15) has argued that instances of adult sons 
living with their fathers were not all that common in Neo-Babylonian society, as they 
would have established their own household elsewhere upon marriage. The same 
stands for brothers sharing the same house. At the death of the head of family, the 
oldest son would receive the principal or paternal home, sometimes referred to as bītu 
rabû, or big house. 
For the outside world these ‘big’ houses must have served as a clear indicator of 
wealth and status. However, for the owners and their families themselves this 
property might actually have been much more important from a symbolic point of 
view. The archaeological record tells us that in the Neo-Babylonian period it was still 
common practice to bury relatives under the floor of the house.848 While certainly not 
all inhabitants of a city could have been buried in this way, it stands to reason that this 
custom was preserved among elites like priests, who owned their own housing plots 
and held traditions in high regard. A proper burial was of paramount importance for 
the ghost of the deceased to enter the underworld. Failing to observe formal funerary 
rites, for whatever reason, could cause the ghost of king and slave alike to wander the 
face of the earth and torment the living.849 An intramural burial was a good way to 
guarantee an undisturbed final resting place. This practice was, certainly in earlier 
times, closely linked to ancestral worship. Deceased ancestors received funerary 
offerings, known as kispu. 850  This ritual, held at regular intervals under the 
responsibility of the head of the family, involved the offering of food and drinks 
(facilitated through pipes in the floor), which served to ease the lives of the dead in 
the netherworld. This domestic ritual represented the central moment of contact 
between the dead and the living, and forged a direct link between past and present. 
Even though the textual evidence for the existence of the kispu or other forms of 
                                                
847 Baker 2014. However, a glimpse at the genealogical tables in Waerzeggers 2010:731-743 shows 
that some of the priestly families from Borsippa could be substantially larger, e.g. both Marduk-
šumu-ibni//Ilia (A) and Rēmūt-Nabû//Rē’i-alpi are known to have had at least five (grown-up) 
children. 
848 Potts 1997: 230-235, Van de Mieroop 1997: 83, Baker 1995: 218f., Boehmer et al. 1995: 34ff. 
849 E.g. Schwemer 2011: 430ff, Scurlock 2006, Frahm 1999. 
850 Tsukimoto 1985, van der Toorn 1996a: 42-65, van der Toorn 1996b. 




ancestor worship during the Neo-Babylonian period comes in very short supply,851 it 
is hard to believe that priests who identified themselves through illustrious ancestral 
family names and showed a deep concern for lineage and origins otherwise, would 
have failed to pay homage to their departed forefathers. Whether there existed a 
formal ritual or not, the fact remains that with the burying of relatives within the 
residence, the emotional value of the paternal house must have increased enormously 
among the family. It changed the house from an ordinary residential area into the 
locus of a collective identity, as it anchored the family’s history into the very 
foundations of its structures. 
Besides the ancestral cult, the Babylonian house might also have accommodated an 
altar or shrine of a personal or family god. This form of domestic worship has been 
studied by van der Toorn (1996a: 66-150), drawing predominantly on second 
millennium evidence. Indeed, house chapels and rooms with altars that have been 
                                                
851 Tsukimoto 1985: 118-124, Baker 2011: 547. Two texts are of particular interest here. The first piece 
of evidence comes in the form of a curse formula found on BE 8 4 (San Nicolò 1951: no. 44), a 
fragmentary tablet from the city of Nippur dated to the second year of king Aššur-ētel-ilāni (ca. 
629/28 BCE): ‘Whoever breaks this agreement’, the curse says, ‘may Šamaš, the judge of heaven and 
earth, deprive him from a son who would libate water (nāq mê) for him and may his dead spirit 
(eṭemmu) in the […] of the netherworld be robbed of kispu’ (BE 8 4: Rev. ll. 4-6). The reference to 
the kispu in this private administrative document indicates, at the very least, that ordinary citizens 
still honoured this tradition. The second text that mentions kispu is the fAdad-guppi stele. This 
inscription recently re-edited by Schaudig 2001: 500-513, was found in the city of Harrān and 
purportedly written by fAdad-guppi, priestess of the god Sîn and mother of king Nabonidus. In this 
(fictive) autobiography, fAdad-guppi tells us that she was born during the reign of the Assyrian king 
Assurbanipal and lived for nearly a hundred years. Having thus survived all the eminent kings of the 
Neo-Babylonian dynasty and being of an extremely pious disposition, fAdad-guppi declares that it 
was left to her alone to carry out the offerings for the deceased monarchs in the following words: 
‘monthly, incessantly, in my good garments I brought them oxen, rams, bread, premium beer, wine, 
oil, honey and garden fruits of all sorts as kispu’ (Schaudig 2001: 507-508.). Needless to say, this 
inscription cannot be taken at face value as it served a very specific political purpose, i.e. to bolster 
her son’s right to rule as king of Babylon. It is doubtful whether fAdad-guppi had actually carried out 
the kispu rituals, as this did certainly not belong to the conventional duties required from a priestess. 
Yet the message is clear. Having carried out the kispu rituals for the former kings, fAdad-guppi had 
assumed the responsibilities that conventionally fell to the first-born son, thus making herself and by 
extension her son a suitable candidate, if not the rightful heir to the Babylonian throne – and, indeed, 
the Assyrian Empire (Tsukimoto 1985: 122-123). 
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identified as the loci of such worship in earlier periods,852 are entirely absent from the 
Neo-Babylonian archaeological record. 853  While this might indicate changes in 
popular religion, there are some indications that suggest that domestic veneration still 
existed in the period under investigation. One such a tiny piece of evidence comes 
from Borsippa. BM 96331 (Dar 30) is an administrative document from the Bēliya’u 
archive dealing with the return of two items that were being held as collateral 
(maškanu) for a loan. The first item was a stand for vats (šidattu, note that this item 
was also used in the cult, cf. CAD Š/II: 402-403), the second a ṣibtu-garment of the 
goddess Ninlil (túgṣibtu ša dNinlil). While it is not inconceivable that a priest could 
have manipulated temple property for their own ends, it is perhaps more likely that 
the divine garment (and perhaps the šidattu too) belonged to the cultic paraphernalia 
of a domestic shrine of the debtor’s family – however, this remains purely 
speculative. Still, whether or not specific rooms existed in the house that functioned 
as area of worship in the form of a chapel with altar, Babylonian houses will have 
hosted a variegated series of rituals that involved the nuclear and extended family, if 
not involving the veneration of a domestic god, than at least in the form of rites de 
passage like the birth of a child, the marriage of a daughter, and the death of a parent. 
A final aspect I would like to mention with respect to the ownership of urban 
property concerns neighbourhoods. Beyond the mud-brick walls that accommodated 
domestic life stretched a network of streets, passages and back alleys that linked 
neighbouring houses into larger residential units. Scholars have often classified these 
neighbourhoods as socially mixed units, hosting large as well as small houses of rich 
and poor alike.854 While this seems to have been the case for various periods of 
Mesopotamian history, H. D. Baker suggests that this was not always the case in the 
first millennium city as ‘certain classes of society resided in separate districts’ (2011: 
543-544). Drawing especially on evidence from Uruk and Babylon, she points to the 
fact that the residential areas surrounding the temples were inhabited mainly by 
(middle-ranking) temple personnel, whose houses also show a much greater degree of 
                                                
852 Postgate 1992: 99-101. 
853 Baker 2011: 547. 
854 See e.g. Stone 1987 for a study of two neighbourhoods in second millennium Nippur. For a more 
concise survey readers are referred to Stone 2007, with some comparisons to neighbourhoods dating 
to the Islamic era. 




homogeneity in terms of size. 855  This trend seems to have persisted into the 
Hellenistic period.856  
Baker’s idea might find support in the evidence from Borsippa examined in 
previous chapters. Priests’ circles of intimacy were composed exclusively of 
individuals from the urban upper stratum, the majority of whom belonged to priestly 
families. In light of the frequency at which such individuals occur in the archives 
(especially as witnesses and scribes) one might suggest that there was at least some 
overlap between the circles of intimacy and the neighbourhood network, as trust as 
well as physical proximity might have been deciding factors to someone’s presence at 
a business recording. 857  Living in town – that is, owning a house – served the 
inhabitant in more ways than providing shelter, status, political affiliation and family 
identity. Besides the prestige of living in an elegant part of town, it gave access to an 
extensive social network of neighbours, among whom confidants, business partners, 
and friends could be found. There is no doubt that these neighbourhood connections 
inspired solidarity among its residents who besides paying a communal tax (dīku ša 
bābti, ‘levy of the city warden’858) must have shared many more responsibilities and 
concerns.  
 
6.2.2. Landed property  
This type of property was a key attribute of priestly families, forming the traditional 
counterpart to their prebendary titles. 859  As opposed to houses, 860  landholdings 
                                                
855 This trend towards homogeneity of house size has also been noted by Miglus 1999: 206. 
856 Baker 2011: 554. This issue will be dealt with more extensively by Baker [forthcoming (b)]. 
857 See Ch. 4.2. and Ch. 5.1., above. The clearest case comes from the Bēliya’u archive. The most 
frequently attested contact was Bēl-ēṭir//Šigûa (more than forty times) who, besides his recurring 
involvement as scribe, witness, and business partner, also lived next to Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u. While 
there is plenty of evidence on housing in the Borsippa corpus, there are two obstacles that hinder the 
study of neighbourhood networks. Firstly, the crucial information on neighbours is usually rendered 
in an abridged form, omitting full filiation, as this was only of secondary importance to the contract 
and known to the parties anyway. Secondly, the available information usually deals with secondary 
houses that were rented out. As a consequence, we are badly informed about the main residence of 
the archive owners. 
858 See for this tax Jursa & Waerzeggers 2009: 251-252. 
859 This is borne out by some of the royal grants (kudurrus) from the early first millennium, that show 
that the beneficiary received land, in addition to the prebendary title, cf. van Driel 2002: 74-75. 
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represented the main income-producing asset. It allowed these families to live a 
(relatively) luxurious life, and bought them the necessary time and money to enter the 
less lucrative service of the gods, or to invest in cultural capital through scribal 
education, and participate in local politics and decision-making.861  
While this remains to be proven, in the light of other ancient and (pre-)modern 
agricultural societies landownership might well have been a necessary condition for 
elite membership and political participation in Babylonia.862  Land did surely invest 
the owner with status and (social) power, not in the least in terms of patron-client-
relationships. Following a social-scientific understanding, the phenomenon commonly 
known as patronage or clientelism ‘involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial, 
open-ended transactions based on the differential control by individuals or groups 
over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies’. 863  We have seen 
previously that all of Borsippa’s priests owned at least one, but more often a couple of 
agricultural plots in the countryside. This allowed them to provide selective access to 
the landed resource they controlled. Being preoccupied with running their affairs in 
                                                                                                                                      
860 I.e. people did invest in houses, but unless they owned several of them, they generally did not use 
them to generate wealth, cf. Jursa et al. 2010: 169-172. There are of course exceptions also among 
priestly families, a case at hand being Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u who ran a housing business in town, cf. 
Jursa 2005: 81-82. 
861  A recent analysis of household income in first millennium Babylonia suggests that the yearly 
income of Borsippa’s priestly families ranged from three to thirty times subsistence requirements, cf. 
Jursa et al. 2010: 296-305. 
862 E.g. Barjamovic 2004: 68-69, Jursa et al. 2010: 57-58. This could be the case for the social/legal 
group referred to as mār-banê. This term has often been translated as ‘free man’ or ‘fully fledged 
citizen’ (as opposed to unfree slaves etc.), though some contexts indicate a more specific elevated 
status favouring a rendering as ‘notable’ (Jursa 2005: 9-10, 15). In general it seems that the term mār-
banê refers to the politically active citizenry (Barjamovic 2004: 77ff.). It is noteworthy that in some 
contexts, landownership and mār-banê status are coupled: BM 102319 (Dar 05), BM 96309 (Dar 09?) 
BM 29487 (Dar 12), BM 28954 (Dar [x]), BM 29020 (Xer 02), VS 5 137 ([-]). All these texts are 
cultivation contracts stipulating that if the tenant neglects his work and does not cultivate the land 
under his responsibility, he will have to compensate the owner ‘according to the yield of the 
neighbour,’ that is, ‘in accordance with two mār-banês’ (‘akī itû šibšu akī ša 2 mār-banê … 
immidūšu,’ in date cultivation contracts, or ‘iṣṣid’ in barley cultivation contracts). Should this perhaps 
be understood as ‘like two mār-banês (read: gentlemen) they will impose (a penalty) upon him’, i.e. 
they will come to a gentlemen’s agreement? 
863 See Roniger 2001 for a concise overview of the different ideas and traditions of patron-client-
relationships in the social sciences. 




town, priests hired (at times socially and economically weaker) tenants to cultivate 
and protect their gardens.864  In other words, landownership allowed priestly (and 
other landed) families to employ individuals into their service – individuals, who in 
return for a relatively modest remuneration (i.e. material security),865 had to provide 
the landowner with their material and human resources. I have demonstrated earlier 
that these contractual relationships between landlord and tenant, or, more 
appropriately between patron and client, could be very stable and sometimes 
maintained across generations.866 To what extent this clientele could be mobilised for 
political purposes or how it contributed to the patrons’ prestige is an issue that will 
have to await future investigation. 
Landed property was economically and socially important and therefore highly 
valued by the priestly families under investigation. Individuals were clearly reluctant 
to sell their land, as the goal was to pass it on to the next generation (see Ch. 2.1.5). In 
numerous cases it can be shown that sellers only disposed of their property as a result 
of economical hardship and indebtedness. 867  That this property was not only 
important to the individual owner, but contributed to the status and identity of the 
wider family follows from the various manifestations of the bīt-abi in matters of 
landownership.868  As observed by J. Nielsen, there existed a correlation between 
ownership of specific property and the desire among the upper-stratum families to 
claim more permanent identities.869 A highly interesting case is preserved on the 
diorite stone tablet known as BBSt 28.870 This commemorative inscription, dated to 
the ninth century BCE, records the grant of land by king Nabû-apla-iddin to a temple-
enterer and namesake called Nabû-apla-iddin/Abunāya/Aqar-Nabû. This document is 
interesting for two specific reasons. Firstly, there is the reference to the bīt-abi. The 
priest Nabû-apla-iddin claims that this land belonged to his paternal estate (eqil bīt-
                                                
864 While the evidence shows that our priests usually handed the management of their property over to 
individuals from within their social (family name bearing) stratum, it is likely that they in turn hired 
tenants from lower strata to do the actual physical work (see above, Ch. 2.3). 
865 See van Driel 1988: 132-133, van Driel 1990: 241ff., Jursa 1995: 126, Jursa et al. 2010: 367, 431ff. 
866 Similar dynamics of patron and client must have existed in the domain of house letting. 
867 See for an impressive list of such cases Wunsch 1999: 397-398+14. 
868 See e.g. Wunsch 2003: no. 40, no. 42, and no. 44. 
869 Nielsen 2011: 292. 
870  King 1912: 104-106, Paulus 2014: 644-646. The following discussion can be found more 
extensively in Nielsen 2011: 75-78. 
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ab[ia…], l. 4), and appeals to the king, rather dramatically, to grant him this land so 
that his paternal house may not fall into oblivion (šarru lirīmannima bīt-abia ana ṣīti 
la uṣṣi, Rev. ll. 1-3). Secondly, there is Nabû-apla-iddin’s filiation. In the long sixth 
century BCE both Abunāya and Aqar-Nabû are known as family names, especially in 
the region of Borsippa; the question is whether this was already the case at the time of 
BBSt 28. Aqar-Nabû might already have functioned as family name; Nabû-apla-iddin 
is primarily referred to as ‘son (māru) of Abunāya’, whereas the owner of a 
neighbouring plot was identified as Nabû-šaqû-ina-māti ‘son (māru) of Aqar-Nabû’. 
It is thus possible to take Aqar-Nabû either as family name or as the name of Nabû-
apla-iddin’s actual grandfather (Nabû-šaqû-ina-māti then being his uncle), and 
Abunāya as the name of his father that happens to coincide with a (later known) 
family name. Yet, Nielsen (2011: 78) raises the interesting question, whether the case 
at hand might not actually point to a segmentation of lineages and the (subsequent) 
emergence of the family name Abunāya based on the ownership of a concrete piece of 
property. This proceeds from the fact that on the one hand, both Aqar-Nabû and 
Abunāya as family names are geographically restricted to Borsippa (and to a lesser 
extent Babylon and Sippar), 871  and on the other hand, and to my mind more 
compelling, that the property (re)claimed by Nabû-apla-iddin in BBSt 28 is referred to 
as bīt Abunāya (Rev. l. 15). The identity of this property as bīt Abunāya would have 
prompted heirs in subsequent generations to identify themselves as descendants of 
Abunāya, thus resulting in the use of the patronymic Abunāya as a family name. 
This nominal connection between family name and landed property was certainly 
not an alien concept to the Borsippeans of the long sixth century, who used it 
specifically in relation to their hanšû (‘fifties’) lands. As I showed in Ch. 2.1, this land 
came into being through royal land allotment schemes in the early first millennium 
BCE. The principal beneficiaries of these grants were urban elite families, whose 
loyalty the kings thereby wished to secure. Unlike other types of land usually 
identified on the basis of its geographic features alone, hanšû land in Borsippa was 
typically identified by the family name of the original beneficiary clan, i.e. hanšû ša 
bīt Ea-ilūtu-bani and hanšû ša bīt Gallābu – thus very much reminiscent of bīt 
Abunāya in BBSt 28.872 This nominal connection between property and family was 
                                                
871 Wunsch 2014. 
872 Note that the existence of a hanšû ša bīt Abunāya in the Babylon-Borsippa region, see Appendix 2. 




obviously very strong as the land retained its denomination even after it was lost to 
the original family. This accorded the families with a sense of permanence and 
antiquity, and, more importantly, it projected their identity on specific properties 
allowed them to lay claims to specific shares in the territory of their city, a territory 
that was carved-up between the temple, the crown and the wider elite population.  
Landed property was thus of great importance to the priestly families under 
investigation. It was the cornerstone of their subsistence strategy and it accorded them 
prestige as well as social and political power. Landownership also provided families 
with a platform to broadcast their collective identity, which was being anchored 
firmly in the landscape of their native country. The importance of this property and 
their rightful claim to it was not overlooked by the Borsippean elites, who recorded it 
in their national history. I have already mentioned the passage from ABC 24 above. 
This chronicle, written within the ‘academic’ milieu of Borsippa, recalls the loss and 
subsequent restoration of land to the citizens of Babylon and Borsippa. 873  It is 
interesting to note that the issue of landownership did make it explicitly into official 
history writing while for example prebends did not.874 
In conclusion, it should be remembered that the ownership of houses as well as 
land was not a prerogative of the priestly families alone. There is ample evidence of 
other, both higher and lower strata, individuals owning real estate. On the other hand, 
as a result of targeted royal interventions, ownership of hanšû land in Borsippa seems 
to have been reserved, at least traditionally, for the highest stratum of society. This 
domain held the concerns of the paternal houses of both priestly and non-priestly 
families, who sought to strengthen their collective identity and claim continuity with 
their shared past by forging a durable nominal bond between families and their 
property. 
 
6.3. Literacy and scribal education 
The income that priestly families drew from their landholdings and to a lesser extent 
from their prebendary duties was not only invested in real estate and other (material) 
property. Being part of the wealthier strata of Babylonian local society these rentier 
                                                
873 See above and Grayson 1975: no. 24. 
874 Perhaps the walls of Borsippa and the Ezida simply did their work in defending the city from 
outside invasion, thus allowing the cult to continue uninterruptedly since time immemorial, that is, 
without interruptions of a degree worth mentioning. 
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families accrued enough annual revenue to be able to invest in cultural capital too, 
namely in the form of a scribal education. The Neo- (and Late-)Babylonian scribal 
education has recently been studied by P. Gesche (2000), based on the large corpus of 
‘school texts’ now housed in the British Museum.875 Following differences in text 
genre and tablet shape she was able to distinguish different levels of scribal 
training.876 The necessary first step for a student was to familiarise himself with the 
scribe’s tool (stylus) and the writing medium (clay tablet),877 before he could start his 
‘first grade’ training and learn the fundaments of writing by copying extracts from 
lexical texts and other similar lists. While the student continued working on this genre 
during his ‘second grade’, the curriculum now also involved reproducing letters, 
contracts, colophons, proverbs, mathematical exercises and literary compositions. The 
last category included such texts as the Epic of Gilgameš, the Epic of Creation 
(Enūma Eliš), and the Topographical Description of Babylon (Tintir = Babylon), and 
is of special importance as it was through these compositions that the fundamental 
values of Babylonian (high) culture were being activated and transmitted most clearly 
among the literati. 878  At this stage the student had acquired a general working 
knowledge of the scribal art and its textual genres and could read and write cuneiform 
for his personal use.879 However, this was not the end of Babylonian scribal education 
and some students continued with what Gesche calls the Fachausbildungen. In this 
final stage, certainly not pursued by all, students received a more advanced and 
specialised training, instructing them in the arts of ritual specialists like that of the 
exorcists, astronomers or diviners, or preparing them for a career in civic 
administration as notary scribe or accountant.880 The student, having spent most of his 
teen years perfecting his writing, was now a professional scribe, thoroughly skilled in 
the native Babylonian cuneiform lore. 
                                                
875 For the criteria used to identify a ‘school text’, see Gesche 2000: 55-57. 
876 Gesche 2000: 44-52. 
877 For the writing stylus and the methods used to make a proper clay tablet, see most recently Taylor 
2011: 5ff. As it turns out fashioning a decent tablet was not as easy as it sounds. 
878 Gesche 2000: 149-152. For the figure of the Babylonian king and the dissemination of the royal 
ideology in the scribal curriculum, see Beaulieu 2007b: 140-148. 
879 Gesche 2000: 61-169, 211f. 
880 Gesche 2000: 213-218. 




Many school texts discussed by Gesche have been found inside temples. While this 
suggests that these religious institutions provided for the formal scribal training of 
presumably the young priests-to-be, the evidence can at least in part be interpreted 
differently. Some of these school texts bear colophons (perhaps better understood as 
votive inscriptions) stating that they were dedicated in a rite-de-passage-like act by 
the student to Nabû, the Babylonian god of writing and patron deity of scribes. The 
inscription on these specially manufactured tablets usually consisted of a prayer to the 
god, followed by wishes for the well-being of the student and his family. 881 
Accordingly, one of the largest batches of school texts known from Neo-Babylonian 
times – almost all of them originally bore colophons – was dug up in the Nabû-ša-
hare (‘Nabû of accounts’) temple in Babylon.882 
Other evidence suggests that scribal education took place privately as well, that is, 
within the family from father to son. The clearest example comes from the archive of 
the Šangû-Šamaš (A) family from Sippar, dating between the sixth and early fifth 
centuries BCE, published by M. Jursa (1999).883 The Šangû-Šamaš was a prominent 
priestly family, which besides various shares in the service of the brewers, bakers and 
butchers of Šamaš also owned a prestigious temple-enterer prebend. Together with 
the circa two hundred private administrative tablets published by Jursa, some seventy 
magico-medical texts have been found (Finkel 2000), suggesting that members of the 
family also functioned as exorcists (āšipu) and healers (asû). In both ‘parts’ of the 
archive, M. Jursa and I. Finkel independently found traces of on-going scribal 
training: this idea is based, among other things, on the high number of duplicates, 
unusual orthography, spelling mistakes, sloppy handwriting, and the unmistakable 
fact that some of the medical texts were purportedly written on dictation (ana pî 
šaṭir).884 While this presents clear evidence for scribal training at home, these private 
texts do differ somewhat from the standardised school texts studied by P. Gesche in 
both contents and format, suggesting that we might be dealing with a different kind of 
                                                
881 Gesche 2000: 153-166. For more on the contents of these dedicated school exercise and their social 
and religious context, see Veldhuis 2013 (with previous literature). 
882 See e.g. Robson 2011: 560 and Cavigneaux 1981 for the publication of this collection, consisting of 
some 130 texts. 
883 For a brief overview of this archive, see Jursa 2005: 127-128. 
884 Jursa 1999: 12-31, Finkel 2000. 
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education in this archive, e.g. after school training. A more systematic (museological) 
investigation of the presence of school texts in private archives is still outstanding.885  
Be that as it may, this observation is significant for the topic currently under 
examination, as it sheds light on a new dimension of family life and identity 
formation. If it is true that the scribal education in Neo-Babylonian times took place 
within the family, that is, transmitted from father to son, it follows that the concern of 
the paternal house did not only apply to real estate and prebendary titles. It was 
equally responsible for the preservation and transmission of scribal knowledge and 
the central concepts, symbols and values of Babylonian culture (i.e. cultural capital) 
from one generation to the next. The paternal house could thus be identified as the 
primary locus at which the new generation (during its formative years) was being 
submitted to and instilled with a very specific cultural identity that had been upheld 
among family members since time immemorial. In this light, the colophon on the 
dedicated school text of young Bēl-erība is self-evident and his concerns easily 
understandable: he asks the god Nabû for ‘the preservation of his offspring, the 
preservation of his house and the preservation of his paternal house (bīt-abi) – that the 
foundations of his house and that of his paternal house (bīt-abi) may remain firm’.886 
But who exactly enjoyed a scribal education and how widespread was (cuneiform) 
literacy in these communities? Even if this is a conundrum in modern times still, M. 
Jursa (2011: 191) postulated in a recent article that literacy in first millennium temple 
communities was certainly not only reserved for high administrators, temple clerks 
and ritual specialists, like temple-enterers, cultic singers, exorcists – for whom 
reading and writing must have been a professional necessity – but common among the 
lower ‘purveying’ priesthoods too. In fact most of the evidence we have for literacy 
among priests concerns prebendary families from this last group. Based on a survey 
of the available priestly family archives, Jursa informs us that for twenty-four of the 
thirty-five (well-preserved) archives there is evidence that at least one of the chief 
protagonists is explicitly attested as scribe.887 This implies that more than two-thirds 
                                                
885 Note, however, that the āšipu archives of Uruk (e.g. Iqīša) are usually explained as resulting from 
training as well as professional activities, see e.g. Clancier 2014, Clancier 2009: 81-101. 
886 Frahm 1995, ll. 11-12: gi nunuz-šú gi é-šú gi é [(lú)]ad-šú kun-nu suhuš-šú kun-nu suhuš é lúad-šú. 
887 Jursa 2011: 191. 




of the priestly families were literate.888 Moreover, the fact that it is uncommon for an 
archive to contain documents written by the archive holder himself suggest that this 
figure represents only a minimum. For a further number of archive holders literacy 
can be assumed based on their occupation (e.g. that of governor) or on the presence of 
literary (‘library’) texts found together with their administrative documents. We can 
be ‘virtually certain’, according to M. Jursa (2011: 191), ‘that many, if not most of the 
first millennium priests could read and write’.  
Even if most of the documentation we have on first millennium Babylonian socio-
economic history was produced by temple communities, which can be identified as 
the locus in which continuation, elaboration, and transmission of Babylonian religio-
intellectual culture was guaranteed until the final stages of cuneiform writing in the 
first century CE,889 priests did not have a monopoly on literacy. This transpires in the 
first place from cuneiform archives of non-priestly families who filed their business 
transactions and wrote their letters in cuneiform, the most extensive one being the 
Egibi family archive from Babylon, whose raison d’être would be moot if not 
pointless were the archive holders unable to read and write. A similar picture of a 
more dispersed (less exclusive) literacy can be drawn from taking a brief glimpse at 
the scribes attested in the Borsippa corpus itself. Of the circa 4,600 individuals 
mentioned in the archive sample of the Ea-ilūtu-bani, Gallābu, Ilia and Rē’i-alpi 
families, some 700 individuals (ca. 15 %) are attested as scribe. Even if this number is 
obviously lower than argued above – no doubt a reflection of the fact that scribes 
commonly figure as one out of about six participants to a contract and a result of the 
practice by Babylonians to rely on a selected number of scribes (see Ch. 4.2) – the 
filiation of the scribes clearly shows that advanced literacy was achieved by priestly 
families as well as non-priestly families, even if the latter are fewer in quantitative 
terms. Besides a handful of scribes who did not bear tripartite filiation at all, the latter 
group includes families like Babāya, Barihi, Banê-ša-ilia, Hulamišu, Iddināya, 
Iššakku, Maqartu, Nikkāya, Nūr-Sîn, Pappāya, Purkullu, Pūṣu, Raksu, Ša-haṭṭu-ēreš, 
Ṣillāya, Šabrû, Zērūtu. While we came across some of these families in earlier 
                                                
888 On the different levels of literacy during the third and second millennium BCE, see e.g. Veldhuis 
2011. Private archives such as the Nappāhu and Sîn-ilī archives from Babylon reveal the activities of 
scribes who seem to have dropped out of scribal training on a relatively low level, e.g. Baker 2004: 
16-17. 
889 See e.g. Beaulieu 2006, Beaulieu 2007a, Clancier 2011, Robson 2011. 
CHAPTER 6  
 
 238
chapters, others have left next to no trace in the documentation at hand and it should 
be clear that their primary locus of activity was not the temple institution.  
While writing was becoming more available to lower strata of society in first 
millennium Babylonia,890 much of day-to-day business in the suburbs and certainly in 
the countryside will not have necessitated written documentation, and in any event, 
many might have favoured the Aramaic script and language.891 In Neo-Babylonian 
society, one can therefore speak of a (highly) restricted spread of literacy. Besides, 
mastering the art of cuneiform was time-consuming and it can be taken as a given that 
this pursuit was largely reserved for those who commanded enough money and time. 
Cuneiform writing was very much a traditional urban affair, at a time when Aramaic 
was becoming increasingly prevalent.892 While Aramaic was becoming the dominant 
vernacular in Babylonia and the principal language of empire (especially under 
Persian rule, Kuhrt 2014), it did not supplant the use of local languages. The 
cuneiform script continued to be favoured in Neo-Babylonian temples and their 
communities.893 Owing to the use of perishable material like papyrus and leather, it 
must be said that the chances of recovering Aramaic administration are gravely 
diminished, but even so it is very likely that the families under investigation were no 
strangers to speaking, reading, and probably writing it. Still, so far the Borsippa 
corpus has not revealed any Aramaic endorsements, the absence of which points to a 
deliberate preference for cuneiform if not a rejection of the Aramaic alphabetic 
script.894  
                                                
890 Jursa et al. 2010: 265-266. 
891 Note, however, the use of cuneiform in the community of Neirabians (Dhorme 1928, and Tolini 
[forthcoming]) and similar foreign communities like the Judeans from Āl-Yāhūdu (Pearce & Wunsch 
2014). It is questionable whether these minorities could actually read the texts or whether they were 
simply kept by virtue of for instance their enduring legal importance. Evidence from Āl-Yāhūdu 
suggests that at least some individuals kept cuneiform records without actually being able to decipher 
them (C. Wunsch, personal communication). There are a few other archives that stem from a rural 
rather than city background, Jursa 2005: 149-151. 
892 Jursa 2014a, Beaulieu 2006. 
893 Jursa 2011. 
894 These Aramaic dockets are short summarising captions in Aramaic incised or inked on cuneiform 
tablets from first millennium Assyria and Babylonia. The contents, geographical spread and social 
implications of these dockets are the subject of a Leiden-based PhD thesis by R. Sonnevelt. Note, 
however, that BM 25636, a text rendering an alphabet in cuneiform script, and which, judging from 




In conclusion, it should be clear that the ability to read and write Babylonian 
cuneiform was not reserved for priests and their families alone; the wider urban elite 
shared the same cultural values and adhered to the same scribal traditions. Non-
priestly families produced scribes and kept cuneiform archives like their priestly 
counterparts. This is not to say that everyone was equally literate. However, one can 
assume that the majority of the elite families will have aspired to functional literacy, 
meaning that they had a rudimentary knowledge of cuneiform and were able to read a 
debt note and write their names, etc. Even if there is no proof that literacy was a 
precondition to integrate and operate in Neo-Babylonian high society, being at least 
functionally literate not only meant that a person was much less at the mercy of 
middlemen in terms of business and communication, but it must also have opened 
doors to more prestigious civic functions and public roles. For well-to-do families it 
can only have been a wise and desirable investment to provide their heirs with at least 
a rudimentary knowledge of cuneiform. The transmission of scribal knowledge 
presumably within the paternal house should be seen as an important means for these 
Babylonian families to pass on their cultural and professional identity to the next 
generation. Moreover, participation in this cuneiform culture not only nurtured a 
distinct esprit de corps based on a set of common norms and values, but also 
represented a vehicle through which the urban elite families were able to reproduce 
and consolidate their dominant and privileged position in society for the better part of 
the first millennium BCE. 
 
6.4. Language 
Berossus, the Babylonian priest of Marduk who wrote a historical account of his 
native culture and its age-old traditions for the new Greek audience in the beginning 
of the third century BCE, recounts that ‘in Babylonia there was a large number of 
people of different ethnic origins who had settled Chaldea [i.e. Babylonia]’.895 While 
he projects this situation back into primeval times we can take it as a reflection of the 
                                                                                                                                      
its presence in the 98-2-16 collection belongs to the Borsippa corpus (Waerzeggers 2005: 349), might 
indicate that local priests did engage with Aramaic, be it, perhaps, on a more intellectual level. For an 
edition of this text, see Geller 1997/2000. 
895 Verbrugghe & Wickersham 1996: 44. For a very recent re-evaluation of Berossus and his work 
known only through references of later historians, see the Groningen based PhD thesis by De 
Breucker 2012, in Dutch. 
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ethno-linguistic reality of the Late-Babylonian period. A very similar image is evoked 
in Genesis 11: 1-9, where the blasphemous construction of the Tower of Babel lead to 
the universal confusio linguarum. This episode in the Hebrew Bible was no doubt a 
reaction to the superabundance of different languages the Judeans encountered in first 
millennium Babylonia. Anyone entering the ancient capital of Babylon must have 
been welcomed with a veritable cacophony of languages including Babylonian, 
Aramaic, Egyptian, Arabic, and perhaps even some learned Sumerian, mixed up with 
the tongues of various deportees from distant areas such as Judea, Phoenicia, Lydia, 
Ionia among many others.896 This mixed linguistic bag can only have expanded with 
the conquest by Cyrus the Great in 539 and the establishment of the Persian Empire. 
In short, the linguistic landscape in Babylonian society of the first millennium can 
safely be described as highly diverse. 
Yet, the diversity of both population and language is not reflected faithfully in the 
existing documentation, which pertains largely to the urban upper strata of society. 
This has often led to a somewhat skewed representation of the Babylonian state as 
being governed by the interaction and negotiation between the monarchy and the old 
Babylonian towns, thereby leaving a highly influential third entity out of the equation: 
the Chaldean and Aramean groups. 897  During the late second and early first 
millennium Mesopotamia witnessed a massive influx of Arameans and Chaldeans 
from the West (i.e. Syria and beyond), who gradually infiltrated into the region and 
colonised the rural areas, according to the communis opinio.898 It is thought that the 
former settled mainly in North and along the Tigris in the East, whereas the latter 
could be found along the Euphrates from Babylon down to the Persian Gulf, 
effectively taking control of the countryside of the Babylonian heartland.899 Important 
for the present topic is that according to the (traditional) onomastic evidence, both 
peoples were Aramaic speaking, thereby complicating the linguistic landscape of the 
region.900  
Once settled, these groups could not easily be brushed aside. Between the ninth 
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and seventh centuries BCE the Chaldean armies formed the spearhead of resistance to 
Assyrian rule, compromising repeated attempts to incorporate Babylonia firmly in the 
imperial framework.901 Moreover, Chaldean leaders like Erība-Marduk and Marduk-
apla-iddin II, who occupied the Babylonian throne during the eight century, plainly 
demonstrated their successful bid for power. While we lose track of these entities 
almost completely with the collapse of the Assyrian empire and the abandonment of 
its invaluable state archives, there are indications that they were still wielding 
significant political or, at least, military power in the subsequent Neo-Babylonian 
period.902  The most striking testimony is the so-called Hofkalender. 903  This text, 
appended to a building inscription dated to the seventh year of Nebuchadnezzar II 
(598 BCE.), lists the chief dignitaries of the state, who had contributed to the 
construction of the palace. The list can be divided into the court officials, governors 
of Babylonian cities and territories in the alluvium, and vassal rulers of subjugated 
provinces in the West.904 As has been highlighted most recently by Beaulieu (2013: 
33-35), among the second group referred to as the ‘territorial leaders of the land of 
Akkad [i.e. Babylonia]’ (rabûtu ša māt Akkadi) one finds at least four (and probably 
more) leaders of Chaldean and Aramean groups, showing that these entities still 
played an important role in Babylonian state politics.905 However, more than just a 
secondary factor of power, there is increasing evidence that the Neo-Babylonian kings 
themselves all had a Chaldean or Aramaic background – from Nabopolassar and his 
supposed connection with the Chaldean people of Dakūru, and the usurper king 
Neriglissar, son of the leader of the Aramean Puqūdus, down to the last king 
Nabonidus, who, rather than being a native Babylonian had his origins in the region 
of Harrān through the maternal line and was presumably of Aramean stock, too.906 
 This brief sketch of the Aramean and Chaldean presence in Mesopotamia is of 
importance for the present topic as it helps us understand the complex dynamics of 
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the linguistic landscape of the long sixth century. It was as a result of the gradual 
infiltration of these people (besides massive deportations) that Assyria was starting to 
‘Aramaicise’ since at least the ninth century BCE, leading to the adoption of Aramaic 
in the eight and seventh centuries as the second administrative language in the 
empire.907 Styling itself as the natural successor of the Assyrian empire, the Neo-
Babylonian state administration was undoubtedly also bilingual, a practice that was 
not only facilitated by the high presence of Arameans and Chaldeans in Babylonia 
and the ‘ethnic’ background of its kings, but was further encouraged by the 
continuous influx of Aramaic-speaking deportees from especially the Levantine 
corridor.908 While it has been suggested that both the Assyrian and Babylonian states 
contributed much to the spread of a standardised form of Aramaic (dating between the 
seventh–third centuries BCE and known as Imperial or Official Aramaic), this process 
was accelerated with the establishment of the Persian Empire in 539 BCE.909 Having 
adopted Aramaic as the language of administration and imperial correspondence, the 
Persian rulers paved the way for Aramaic to disseminate at unprecedented speed 
within Babylonia and beyond, and to become the lingua franca from Bactria in the 
East to Egypt in the West.910 It is generally assumed that Aramaic was now also 
becoming the dominant vernacular in Mesopotamia, if this had not happened already 
before.911 Yet, being written on perishable material the Aramaic documentation from 
Babylonia has all but disappeared. The only traces left are a relatively small number 
of Aramaic endorsements on cuneiform tablets and the attestation of the so-called 
‘parchment-’ or ‘alphabetic-’ i.e. ‘Aramaic-scribe’ (sepīru) in the documentation. It is 
thus practically impossible to evaluate the prevalence of Aramaic in this society and 
very difficult to trace its development and interaction vis-à-vis the local Babylonian 
language. 
The vernacular language in Mesopotamia since at least the beginning of the second 
millennium BCE was Akkadian, an East-Semitic language that branched off into two 
main dialects, which are known as Assyrian and Babylonian according to their 
geographic distribution. Having gone through various stages of development in the 
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course of the millennia, the Akkadian rendered in the cuneiform documents of 
Borsippa’s priests from the long sixth century is commonly referred to by 
Assyriologists as Neo- or Late-Babylonian.912 In the light of the linguistic diversity 
and especially the increasing spread of Aramaic pictured above, Assyriologists 
traditionally relegated these language phases into the ‘limbo of spät-und-schlecht’.913 
The frequent occurrence of complicated orthography, frozen forms, incorrect 
morphology, and corrupt syntax were taken as signs of the general decline of spoken 
Babylonian, which would gradually have been turning into a hybrid-language.914 
Indeed some scholars even doubted whether (Late-)Babylonian was still a spoken 
language at all, recognising it merely as a ‘Schrift- und Gelehrtensprache’ (much like 
Latin in medieval times) while the population spoke Aramaic. 915  In a recent 
reassessment of the evidence, J. Hackl has challenged this idea and argued for a much 
longer existence of Babylonian as a living vernacular.916 Concentrating primarily on 
the letter corpus from the eight until the first centuries BCE – a genre that allowed for 
more freedom from formulaic conventions of the legal documents and presumably 
written in a language that comes closest to the actual spoken vernacular – Hackl 
detects various complex linguistic innovations which can best be explained as having 
taken place in a spoken environment, and propelled by the influence of native 
speakers. Moreover, quite the opposite from being an Aramaeo-Babylonian 
Mischprache, recent scholarship has refuted much of the previously assumed 
influence of Aramaic on Babylonian, which displays a rather remarkable resilience to 
its contact language.917 The question of when exactly Babylonian stopped being a 
spoken language and continued merely as a grapholect remains unresolved. 
Nevertheless, knowing the end result, one fact remains indisputable – Babylonian as a 
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spoken language was on the wane, gradually losing ground to Aramaic, which seems 
to have become the vernacular of Iraq at the turn of the millennium.918 
Be that as it may, Babylonian was undoubtedly still spoken by the priestly families 
under investigation and presumably represented their primary vernacular. What was 
the status of Babylonian during the increasingly bilingual long sixth century, and what 
did it signify in the identity formation of the Neo-Babylonian priests and the urban 
elite in general? These questions, incredibly difficult, are intimately linked to the use 
of cuneiform script discussed above and can in fact only be answered through the 
agency of the written word.  
We have seen throughout this study that the priestly families from Borsippa 
recorded their business in cuneiform. The composition of these priestly archives, like 
the archives of non-priestly families, comprises a wide (if not the entire) range of 
legal administrative genres; from property deeds and intimate family documents like 
marriage agreements, adoptions and inheritance divisions, to more ephemeral records 
such as debt notes, receipts and administrative memoranda, and of course letters919 – 
proof, in my opinion, that these old-stock Babylonian families aimed for a wholesale 
adoption of cuneiform as well as Babylonian, the language they spoke at home and 
presumably within their immediate social milieu. This custom – expressed through a 
communal and very conservative naming practice – was intrinsically linked to the 
scribal education that was pursued by these traditional families as outlined above. In 
the course of their education students learned how to read and draw up documents and 
came into contact with the masterpieces of the Akkadian literature, which proclaimed 
the central concepts, symbols and values of Babylonian culture.920 Moreover, some of 
the more advanced esoteric texts were classified as ‘restricted’ (niṣirtu) or ‘secret’ 
(pirišti) and were thought to have held a type of knowledge of which the 
dissemination should be restricted to the initiated only. 921  Possession of such 
documents and knowledge was undoubtedly a source of great pride but at the same 
time boosted the prestige of cuneiform culture and the Babylonian language, which 
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was not only ancient and very rich in literary traditions but also offered the key to 
understanding cosmic truths and the fundamental mechanisms of the universe. 
Needless to say, Babylonian was also the language of the religious institutions. The 
large temple archives of the Ebabbar in Sippar and Eanna in Uruk bear witness to the 
fact that cuneiform formed the major backbone of temple management, and was used 
for both internal administration as well as external communication.922 It stands to 
reason that Babylonian was also the official language of the temple assembly 
(kiništu), a hallmark that must have set it apart from other more inclusive civic 
assemblies (puhru) where Aramaic may have been more admissible. Even if Aramaic 
was gaining a foothold in the temple as an (auxiliary) administrative language, a 
quick look at the ritual texts from first millennium Uruk and Babylon reveals that cult 
and festivals remained exclusively Babylonian.923 As such the public festivals can be 
identified as an important locus at which Babylonian was being promulgated as the 
language of religion and prestige. Most pompous of all was the New Year (akītu) 
festival held in Babylon. Staged in the streets of the capital and its countryside, the 
general public got the chance to witness a series of spectacular processions, offerings, 
rituals and prayers, performed by the priests, the king and the gods. Indeed hearing 
the public recitation of the Epic of Creation, the Babylonian-speaking audience will 
not have failed to notice that they, in fact, were speaking the very same language that 
Marduk used to shape and create their universe.924 
I have already alluded to the fact that cuneiform, and by extension Babylonian as a 
language, was not only cultivated in the concealed domains of the temple but also 
actively promoted on the official state level. The Neo-Babylonian kings adopted this 
medium for the communication of the royal ideology, stressing their role as protectors 
and providers of the temples, teachers of native wisdom, and anointed champions of 
Babylonian civilisation. 925  This was done most effectively by commissioning 
(building) inscriptions, written in the contemporary as well as in a more archaising 
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monumental cuneiform script, which were put up in the old Babylonian towns but 
also in recently subdued regions in the West – the rock reliefs such as those at Wadi 
Brisa in Lebanon being a good example.926  Hence, under the patronage of these 
ambitious royal houses, cuneiform and the native Babylonian languages were being 
employed in the imperial ideology. 927  This ideological program is even more 
remarkable considering the ‘non-Babylonian’ background of the Neo-Babylonian 
kings. Nevertheless, the notion that these rulers fully embraced the Babylonian urban 
culture and its traditional religious constitution is reinforced by the fact that they all 
bore Babylonian names, usually commemorating Marduk or his son Nabû, the 
principal and most popular Babylonian gods respectively.928 One can perceive, in the 
words of P. -A. Beaulieu, ‘a very clear political will to impose the old civilisation of 
Sumer and Akkad and traditional cuneiform learning as the sole official culture of 
Babylonia’ (2006: 208).  
This also implies that participation in Babylonian (high) society required a degree 
of acculturation from the outsider’s point of view. And our sources seem to indicate 
that this is exactly what happened. The adoption of Babylonian customs by Aramaic-
speaking groups can be observed most clearly in naming practice. The great majority 
of the official Aramaic scribes (sepīrus) – before the fall of the Babylonian empire 
typically members of the royal administration – bore Babylonian names.929 The fact 
that we are not dealing with Babylonians who learned Aramaic, but rather with native 
Arameans who offered their services and know-how to the state might be drawn from 
YOS 3 19, a now famous letter from the Eanna temple in Uruk recently discussed by 
M. Jursa (2012). In this emotional correspondence written in Babylonian by the royal 
commissioner (bēl piqitti) Nabû-ahu-iddin, the latter describes his nerve-racking 
circumstances to the chief temple administrator (šatammu) of Eanna inserting in the 
heat of the moment the Aramaic curse ‘by the gods!’ (ba-‘elāhīn). Nabû-ahu-iddin is 
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presumably switching back to his native tongue in a moment of great perturbation.930 
While this is only one case of code-switching which, admittedly, does not even deal 
with a sepīru-scribe, it is a clear example of an official of Aramaic (or at least 
bilingual) background who had assimilated fully into Babylonian culture. Working for 
the king of Babylon in a Babylonian religious institution, he bore a Babylonian name 
and wrote his letters (mostly) in Babylonian. It should also serve as a reminder, 
indeed a warning, that many more ‘non-Babylonians’ remain hidden behind 
conventional Babylonian names in the equally conventional cuneiform 
documentation. In fact the Bible tells us as much in the Book of Daniel 1: 5-7. After 
having learned the local language931 and studied its script for three years in order to 
serve at the royal court, Daniel and his companions receive new Babylonian names – 
from now on Daniel would be known as Belteshazzar, or rather, Bēl-šarra-uṣur in the 
cuneiform sources. 932  Although circumstantial, this evidence suggests that the 
Babylonian culture was the dominant culture in the region, and that ‘ethnic’ groups 
felt encouraged to adopt Babylonian names and even master the Babylonian language 
and traditional script in order to pursue a career in the civic or royal institution.933  
Be that as it may, for the old-stock urban families speaking Babylonian not only 
symbolised their affiliation to a specific and socially dominant language community, 
but it also nurtured a sense of continuity with the past as the language formed an 
important aspect of their ancestry. By the sixth century, Babylonian boasted a long 
and esteemed history that went back to at least the late third millennium BCE and the 
famed Sargonic kings. It had become the primary language of the temple and its 
native religion and gave rise to an extensive literary corpus. Certainly no less 
significant was the large body of (astral and terrestrial) science,934 which would be 
among the most acclaimed intellectual traditions in later antiquity, especially known 
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for its astronomical and astrological findings.935 Babylonian was a language worthy of 
the gods and ambitiously adopted by their representatives on earth, the Babylonian 
kings. Even if Aramaic was gaining ground as an administrative and vernacular 
language, Babylonian retained much of its high status as a vehicle of native culture 
and traditions. All this can hardly have escaped the mind of the priests, who, in fact, 
were the propagators of the Babylonian language and its written tradition, and 
contributed to their survival (at least in written form) until the beginning of our era.  
It is a long-established fact that the language we use forms an important part of our 
sense of who we are, i.e. our identity.936 Moreover, language throughout history has 
functioned as an important marker of group membership.937  Accordingly, for the 
priestly families under investigation, Babylonian represented not only an instrumental 
tool (e.g. private record keeping), but also fulfilled a symbolic function as an emblem 
of groupness.  
 
Conclusion 
In the previous pages I tried to reconstruct the social identity of the Babylonian priests 
and their intimate circles by pinpointing and contextualising various elements that 
may have played a defining role in shaping their collective image. Identity is a fluid 
concept that is situationally contingent, multi-layered, constantly negotiated, and 
(re)produced through contact with significant others.938  Even if social anthropologists 
have therefore shifted their analytical study away from the contents of identity to the 
boundaries of identity, in this chapter I made an attempt to piece together the so-
called ‘cultural stuff’ that fostered a sense of collective identity among Babylonian 
priest and their fellow families.  
A fundamental element in the social organisation of the families under 
investigation was the bīt-abi or ‘house of the father’. Besides the notion of the 
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paternal house as a social unit of brotherhood, it was intrinsically linked to specific 
property, which served as its basis of existence and over which it retained the right of 
redemption. As such the bīt-abi inspired a sense of solidarity and emotional 
attachment among its members; it embodied a concrete locus of togetherness and 
shared identity, and represented a core feature around which much of their domestic 
and professional lives revolved. 
However, with regard to a collective identity shared by a larger social group, the 
bīt-abi takes up a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one hand, membership into 
specific paternal houses will have undermined rather than strengthened the basis for 
such a collective identity, as it fostered an attitude of solidarity and togetherness on a 
much lower level, geared towards one’s immediate relatives. Under the influence of 
bīt-abis, corporate kin-groups were thus effectively divided into smaller, discrete 
units based on close kinship. On the other hand, the transmission and distribution of 
important pieces of property like houses, land and prebends, as well as scribal 
knowledge among the individual members of the bīt-abi ensured that they were all 
equipped with the necessary means to participate in the social discourse of the elite 
and to uphold a corresponding identity. Even if this was not its primary aim, one can 
conclude that the institution of bīt-abi, or rather their collective efforts, paved the way 
for a collective identity to materialise and be maintained in the community.  
There can be no doubt that the core of what might be called a priestly identity 
found expression through the prebendary system. Ownership of priestly titles was of 
key importance to the self-image of the families concerned, since they gave ritually fit 
members access to the sanctified space of the temple. While most of their time and 
energy was put into perpetuating this daily worship in the sanctuary – and thereby 
effectively preserving the cosmic order – there were multiple occasions at which 
priests could broadcast their privileged position and collective identity to the outside 
world. Besides (bodily) markers of purity that were visible more or less permanently, 
priests distinguished themselves in the community by contributing to prestigious 
building projects and partaking in the temple assembly (kiništu). However, the most 
ostentatious display of a collective priestly identity materialised during public 
festivals. It was at these religious events that the priests emerged from the sacred 
enclosure to lead the liturgy into the open, while supervising and participating in 
spectacular processions alongside the gods. As the immediate servants of the gods, 
priests not only enjoyed physical proximity to the divine statues but were also granted 
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unique access to the person of the king. Together, god, king, and priest were bound in 
a delicate relationship of worship and power. 
While priestly families efficiently monopolised membership of the Babylonian 
priesthood, this was not the case for other aspects of their social identity, like the 
ownership of land, urban housing, literacy, and language. These domains saw the 
participation of a much larger section of (elite) society, and embodied a social, 
economic and cultural repertoire in which priestly and non-priestly families had an 
equal stake. The traditional naming pattern of hanšû land, for example, clearly 
revealed that priestly as well as ‘secular’ families benefitted from the eighth century 
BCE land schemes. The ownership of land provided the beneficiary families with a 
solid basis of subsistence and it is not surprising that it became an important landmark 
in the collective historical consciousness of later generations, recorded in, for 
example, sixth century chronicle-writings.  
Despite the fact that the distribution of land among upper stratum families across 
the board will have led to occasional frictions and rivalry in the community, I prefer 
to see it as a unifying factor. Owning land in the local countryside meant that these 
families shared very similar responsibilities and concerns, which, at least as much as 
competition, engendered cooperation. Hence, rather than directly contracting lower-
stratum tenants for the management of their landholdings, priestly families from 
Borsippa relied predominantly on individuals from within their own social stratum as 
lessors of their land. Landed property allowed elite families to lay claim to a very 
specific share in the local landscape and to participate in their collective history. This 
will have turned the native urban elite families into a powerful interest group that 
shared similar concerns, values and presumably political aspirations, too. 
The same stands for urban residential property. While it is likely that priestly 
families occupied large parts of the neighbourhoods surrounding the temple area, they 
were not the only residents in Borsippa. One can be virtually certain that most, if not 
all well-to-do families owned a house in the city. While the reason for this was 
certainly practical in nature – city walls offered protection against attackers from 
outside – living in town also had significant ideological implications. It inspired a 
sense of communal affiliation, which united the citizens on the basis of political 
identity and local belonging. It stands to reason that living in town, if not the actual 
ownership of a town house, facilitated admittance into this socio-political entity and 
enabled individuals to enjoy its communal rights and privileges. Needles to say, not 




only priests, but the urban upper stratum at large can be identified as the Babylonian 
citizens (mār-banê or short, māru). They wielded much of the local political power 
through neighbourhood connections, interlocking networks of patronage, the 
participation in various civic assemblies, and, most conspicuously, by filling the 
highest legal-administrative posts like that of chief temple administrator (šatammu) 
and city governor (šākin-tēmi). 
Besides comparable property portfolios, a shared sense of historical consciousness 
and local belonging, and similar political aspirations, priestly and non-priestly 
families were further linked through scribal education. While it stands to reason that 
compared to the rest of society, temple-based families strived for a more advanced 
level of literacy, they certainly did not hold a monopoly on education, which was 
open to a much wider (non-priestly) segment of society. Pupils of both priestly and 
non-priestly backgrounds were thus being familiarised and instilled with the 
fundamental concepts, symbols and values of Babylonian (high) culture in the course 
of their scribal training. Even if there is no proof that literacy was a precondition to 
operate in high society, being at least functionally literate gave an individual more 
independence and might even have opened doors to more prestigious civic functions. 
Participation in the ‘official’ cuneiform culture nurtured an esprit de corps among the 
literati, and represented a vehicle through which the native urban elites were able to 
reproduce and consolidate their dominant and privileged position in local society. 
Together with the adoption of the cuneiform script, these old-stock Babylonian 
families also shared the same native Babylonian language. This transpires from the 
distinct and shared onomasticon and the fact that their archives include a wide range 
of genres. Moreover, that it was actively spoken is supported by linguistic innovations 
found in the texts themselves. The use of Babylonian is an important feature of their 
collective identity for it clearly set these urban elite families apart from other 
segments of society, in which Aramaic (and other non-native languages) was 
presumably more common or even standard. Since at least the beginning of the first 
millennium BCE, the region between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates witnessed a 
process of Aramaisation. This language would eventually become the predominant 
vernacular of Iraq at the turn of the millennium.  
It is against this linguistic landscape that one should see the use of cuneiform and 
the native Babylonian language by priestly and other urban elite families. It is likely 
that for them speaking Babylonian symbolised affiliation to a specific community. It 
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will have nurtured a sense of continuity with the past, as the language formed an 
important aspect of their ancestry. Even if Aramaic was gaining ground, Babylonian 
retained much of its status as a vehicle of native culture and traditions, and as a 
language with legal authority. What is more, the fact that groups other than the old-
stock Babylonians adopted traditional Babylonian names and mastered the traditional 
script in order to pursue a career in the civic or royal institution suggests that 
Babylonian and cuneiform writing still represented the dominant culture in the urban 
milieu of the long sixth century. 
Once we integrate these findings with the concepts of homophily and social 
boundary, which formed our point of departure, the following picture could be drawn. 
For the social formation of the group that stands at the core of this study, the priestly 
families from Borsippa, membership to the priesthood, or, more generally, the 
affiliation to the temple and the concerns of ritual purity that came with it was a major 
deciding factor. Seeing that the majority and the most significant types of interactions 
materialised within the circle of temple-related families, one can safely conclude that 
this represented their primary in-group. However it goes without saying that beyond 
their affiliation to this social circle and the temple institution, priests were an integral 
part of the much wider and more diverse urban community, from which they should 
not be detached even if the one-sided documentation gives little evidence of 
interaction. A Babylonian priest was not only a devoted servant of the gods, but also a 
landholder, a town-dweller and a literatus versed in the cuneiform lore. He also spoke 
Babylonian and had legal responsibilities and political aspirations for the sake of his 
family, his fellow citizens and his community at large. This multiplex socio-economic 
repertoire with which Babylonian priests associated themselves, the so-called cultural 
stuff, was shared with a much wider, primarily elite, section of society. Here we touch 
very much on the grey area of the social boundary – who was in and who was out? 
While impossible to answer with certainty, this question can best be approached from 
a practical point of view through a close investigation of the actual interactional 
patterns, which is at the heart of this investigation. On a conceptual level, the 
principle of homophily poses that similarity leads to interaction. Hence, the more 
one’s symbolic attributes and material resources corresponded to the social identity 
claimed by and assigned to Babylonian priests the more likely it was to be drawn into 










In order to assess the findings of this study, I will start by summarising the major 
points raised in each chapter. The outcomes of this study will then be compared 
against the research questions outlined in the introduction in order to assess the degree 
to which these can be answered. Finally, the principal conclusions emerging from the 
thesis will be discussed and their significance highlighted. 
 
7.1. Summaries of individual chapters 
PART ONE of this thesis (Ch. 1 – 4) focussed on specific social events and 
interactions that took place within the priestly community of Borsippa. 
 
Chapter 1: The Hypergamous Marriage System 
Chapter 1 began this investigation by examining marriage alliances. With more than 
80% of all attested marriages contracted among priestly families, the preferred marital 
practice can be described as ‘sacerdotal endogamy’. However, by converting the 
marriage alliances into a directed graph, I was able to tease out a more complex 
underlying mechanism. As the resulting network followed a transitive and entirely 
acyclic organisation, the marriage system appeared to be hierarchised and non-
reciprocal. Moreover, the fact that marriages in this community entailed a strict 
unidirectional flow of both women and property from the family of the bride (wife-
giver) to the family of the groom (wife-taker), indicates that intermarriage involved a 
status difference in which wife-takers took precedence over their wife-givers. 
A major discovery of this investigation was that the properties of this marriage 
network matched a specific alliance model called ‘hypergamy’. In India, where we 
find the best-known examples of this model, marriage ideally follows the existing 




purity-based hierarchy of their priestly functions served as the framework for defining 
status in marriage.  
By placing the alliance system in its historical context, I was also able to consider 
the practical shortcomings inherent to this hypergamous model. I argued that while in 
its initial phase the local alliance system followed the temple hierarchy neatly, the 
community must soon have faced the flaws of the system, when participating families 
had problems finding suitable marriage partners. One of the resulting dynamics was a 
flattening of the social hierarchy in this community. This can be seen, for instance, in 
the inclusion of the brewers in the same rank as the temple-enterers (who were more 
highly placed in the temple hierarchy). Besides, I was able to identify various 
compromising marriage strategies, one of which suggests that among the lower 
priesthoods outsiders were welcomed in the alliance system. I concluded that there 
existed essentially two different hierarchies in connection with marriage in Borsippa: 
1) the temple hierarchy, independent of marriage; and 2) the wife-giver/wife-taker’s 
hierarchy, dependent on marriage.  
In the final part of this chapter I showed that priestly profession did not only 
influence the choice of marriage partner, but that marriage also influenced how priests 
interacted among each other in the cult. While collaboration in the cult was common 
between colleagues prior to intermarriage, once an alliance was forged between two 
families, cultic support was exclusively and without exception provided by the wife-
giver. This shows that in Borsippa marriage did not only entail a movement of brides 
and property in the form of the dowry, but also of labour in the form of cultic support.  
 
Chapter 2: Landholding 
In this chapter I explored various aspects of landownership in Borsippa. This 
investigation was subdivided into three parts. In the first part (Hanšû estates and the 
ancestral family) I looked into historical aspects of landownership in Borsippa. 
Based on a combination of legal, administrative and literary texts I traced the origins 
of hanšû land, literally ‘fifty’-land, in Borsippa back to the mid-eighth century BCE, 
when these estates came into being as royal land grants. Two Chaldean kings in 
particular relied on the policy of land (re)distribution: Erība-Marduk (ca. 770 BCE) 
and Marduk-apla-iddin II (ca. 721-710 BCE). The former was also remembered in 




The hanšû estates in Borsippa are usually identified by the family name of the 
original beneficiaries. This practice allows for an examination into the range of 
families that had benefitted from these royal land allotments in the eighth century. 
Based on this information, I could show that in Borsippa the ownership of hanšû land 
was not a specifically priestly prerogative, but one enjoyed by a much larger section 
of the urban upper stratum, including families with a royal or military background. 
This finding is important for reminding us that priests were not separate from urban 
society – as their near-exclusive endogamy could suggest – but that they participated 
in some of the same privileges as non-priestly elites. 
In conclusion of this section I considered which value the hanšû estates held for 
the descendants of the original beneficiaries, during the long sixth century BCE. The 
bond between the family and its eponymous land was very strong. Besides the fact 
that hanšû estates kept the names of the original families, their descendants usually 
still owned neighbouring plots and remained involved in matters concerning their 
land, even if they had been forced to sell some parts. Moreover, there are examples of 
families who attempted to buy back their land and re-accumulate the patrimony even 
a long time after they had parted from it. The same impression transpired from 
examining the composition of dowries. While there are relatively many instances of 
hanšû being used as dowry property, this hardly ever involved the family’s 
eponymous estate. 
In the second part of this chapter (Land sales and the circulation of property) I 
adopted a different approach to hanšû land and real estate in general. Delving deeper 
into the archives of Borsippa’s priests, I took a closer look at the patterns of property 
sales, specifically by investigating the influence marriage and professional solidarity 
had on these transactions. As it turned out there was extremely little overlap between 
the ties of marriage and ties of property sale. Families tended to acquire property 
from, and sell it to, families who did not belong to their direct or indirect marriage 
network. This suggests that in the priestly community of Borsippa marriage ties 
excluded property sales. The results from comparing property sales with professional 
affiliation were less clear. While most sales took place within the prebendary circle, 
which may point to an attitude of solidarity among priestly families, there is reason to 
believe that these figures result from the biased nature of our documentation, and can 




In the third and final part of this chapter (Tenancy and agricultural 
collaboration) I investigated on whom Borsippa’s priests relied for the cultivation 
and management of their landed estates. Priests did not cultivate their land themselves 
but instead outsourced this work to others. Even if priests could draw from various 
sources of manpower, they relied to a large extent (75%) on individuals from within 
their social stratum. While some of their tenants or collaborators came from non-
priestly families, the vast majority of these individuals belonged to local, temple-
based clans.  
The ensuing reconstruction of the pattern of tenancy showed that this followed the 
existing organisation of the community, as outlined first and foremost in the marriage 
system. Collaboration among the highest-ranking temple families (temple-enterers) 
was largely geared towards the prebendary in-group, while the lowest priestly 
families (reed-workers) recruited their tenants only from amongst kin or non-priestly 
‘outsider’ families. Moreover, marriage ties seem to have played an important role in 
tenancy, as priests often called upon individuals from direct and in-direct wife-giver 
families. 
 
Chapter 3: Silver Lending 
Silver lending represents one of the few businesses in which Babylonian priests 
invested their liquid capital. While occupation, family background, and individual 
circumstances generated a range of divergent lending profiles discrete to each family 
or even individual, credit operations among the highest priestly group could again be 
characterised by a high presence of temple-based families, especially from within 
their professional group and/or kin. The lowest ranking reed-workers, on the other 
hand, represented the only priestly family that interacted more with non-priestly 
‘outsiders’.  
The pattern of silver lending thus followed the same structure that I reconstructed 
for tenancy and marriage, but only partly so, as this trend could not be confirmed 
among the middle ranking prebendary groups. Part of the reason for this can be 
sought in the personal circumstances and background of the individuals used in the 
analysis, but also in the nature of the interaction itself. Loans may often have been 
contracted on an ad hoc basis. This notion finds support in the fact that many of the 
creditors and debtors resurfaced outside of these encounters, both with the 




the same extent for actors in other spheres of interaction. This seems to indicate that 
lending partners were generally found in a limited geographic space, and came from 
within the priests’ immediate environment. 
Finally, while it remained extremely difficult to qualify individual loans, one thing 
became clear once all documented loans were taken together: even if priests acted 
relatively often outside of the prebendary circles for the purpose of silver lending 
compared to other types of transactions, the majority of the loans (63%) were still 
contracted with members of fellow priestly families.  
 
Chapter 4: Circles of Trust and Intimacy 
While ‘friendship’ as a mutually confiding relationship with complex psycho-
emotional qualities falls beyond the scope of our legal documentation, in this chapter 
I approached the phenomenon through a set of structural features delineated in the 
social sciences and known as tie strength in order to reconstruct the priests’ most 
intimate social networks.  
Frequency of interaction is the most basic indicator for the strength of a 
relationship and it therefore served as the starting point of my formal quantification of 
the data. In an attempt to understand to which degree priests preferred friends over 
strangers in their legal transactions, I set out to compare the number of individuals 
mentioned only once in their archives and the number of intimate contacts attested 
five times or more. The underlying idea was that an individual’s lifestyle and specific 
mode of behaviour vis-à-vis the environment are reflected in his or her ego network, 
and vice versa. Persons interacting more often with the same people may be expected 
to have a different outlook on life, than those who interacted mostly with people they 
only met once. Unfortunately it proved difficult to interpret the figures obtained from 
this analysis. To a large extent, this is because the figures depend on the quality of the 
individual archives. It appeared that single- and multi-generation archives always 
yield results in the same general ranges, which indicates that structural features of the 
archive determine the results, rather than the properties of the actual historical 
networks. Also a comparison between the data from Borsippa and two archives from 
the city of Sippar, for which similar analyses are available, did little to better 
understand these results. Clearly, a more sensitive approach to the study of 





In the second part of this chapter I adopted a more descriptive qualitative approach 
to the study of trust and intimacy. In particular, I attempted to establish more 
precisely the identities of the priests’ most intimate contacts. Intimacy was defined on 
the basis of the following aspects of tie strength: multiplexity, duration, and frequency 
of interaction. While in social network analysis, multiplexity is commonly used as an 
indicator of the diversity of roles fulfilled by individuals, in this study I adopted it in a 
slightly modified way as ‘multiplexity of context’, i.e. the range of different social 
contexts in which an individual appears (e.g. marriage, land management, rentals, 
etc.).   
The first and major result of this investigation was that priests found the vast 
majority of their intimate contacts among the members of temple-based families; only 
a few came from non-priestly families. Strikingly, not a single intimate contact came 
from lower strata of society. It seemed unlikely that this trend could have manifested 
itself in such a rigid form without a conscious and collective attitude on the part of the 
priests. Secondly, based on the notion of intimacy adopted in this study, the priests’ 
most intimate contacts were usually found among their scribes and witnesses, 
especially those who were present at significant personal events such as marriage 
agreements, inheritance divisions, sales of property, etc. Moreover, it turned out that 
priests only very rarely engaged in formal business with these ‘friends’.  
 
In PART TWO (Ch. 5 – 6) of this thesis I took a step back from the individual 
interactions and examined the interactional pattern of the Borsippean priests as a 
whole. This was approached from a more structural and theoretical perspective and 
linked up with broader phenomena in Neo-Babylonian society. At the same time the 
scope of the analysis was broadened from its original focus on the priests of Borsippa 
to the Babylonian priest in general, in an attempt to situate this distinct social segment 
within wider society. 
 
Chapter 5: Homophily and Interaction 
Chapter 5 started by summarising the interactional pattern of the priestly community 
of Borsippa. As shown in Chapters 1–4, priests interacted predominantly within the 
circle of fellow temple-based families. While interaction with non-priestly families 
occurred not infrequently, these individuals were largely left out of more personal or 




were even entirely left out of significant forms of interaction.   
I proposed two different explanations for this pattern of interaction. The first took a 
very pragmatic stance on the matter and interpreted it as a natural outcome of the 
geographic or spatial situation of our priests in the demography and topography of the 
Babylonian city. Even if geographic space is an important factor for interaction, it 
could not explain adequately the salient features of the interactional landscape; more 
precisely, it failed to account for the varying degrees of in-group interaction among 
priests, which differed markedly from one domain of their lives to the other. The 
second scenario adopted a more theoretically informed interpretation by using the 
concept of homophily, which postulates that contact between people with similar 
socio-economic characteristics occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people. 
Seen in this light, I argued that the interactional pattern of the priests did not 
dependent so much on shared topographic space, as on the degree of perceived 
similarity. That homophily represented an important principle for the interaction of 
the priests transpires from the fact that significant forms of interactions occurred to a 
disproportionate degree within their social in-group. 
By building further on the concept of homophily a more fundamental and 
structural underpinning was provided of two socio-economic typologies recently 
applied to Neo-Babylonian society. Social scientists have insisted that human society 
knows two primary motives vis-à-vis (inter)action and resources: the first aims at 
protecting existing resources, the second at gaining new resources. These also lie at 
the basis of two typological economic mentalities found in Neo-Babylonian sources: 
the rentier and the entrepreneur. In Babylonian society the former mentality is 
embodied most clearly by priests. While rentiers and entrepreneurs have thus far been 
distinguished from other groups based on economic criteria, this investigation pointed 
out that they are in fact characterised by a fundamentally different mode of interaction 
with their social environment.  
 
Chapter 6: Social Boundary and Collective Identity 
While the concept of homophily told us that the patterns of interaction found in the 
priestly archives from Borsippa can be understood in the light of the priests’ 
perceived similarity and dissimilarity with other significant actors, this final chapter 
attempted to identify the markers of their collective social identity. I set out my 




Borsippa point to the existence of a social boundary. This implies a conceptual 
distinction made by social actors, one that allows them to separate themselves from 
other groups and generate feelings of similarity and cohesion. In our sources the 
outlines of this boundary emerge clearest from the ties of marriage and friendship. I 
argued that in order for priests to maintain such a tight control over their social 
environment, they must have been able to draw on a set of symbolic attributes and 
material resources, which besides fostering a strong cohesion among the in-group 
were also recognized by outsiders. 
As it turns out, the Babylonian priests cannot only be characterised as cultic agents 
who enjoyed a professional affiliation to the temple, the gods and the king, although 
this was arguably the strongest factor linking the in-group. The collective social 
identity I reconstructed was expressed by a multiplex social, cultural and economic 
repertoire, which included aspects ranging from the ownership of property, a shared 
historical consciousness, and naming patterns, to the adoption of a traditional set of 
concepts and values, citizenship, literacy, and language. The more an individual was 
able to identify with these symbolic attributes and material resources the more likely 
he or she was to be drawn into the exclusive social world of the Babylonian priests.  
 
7.2. Research questions revisited 
This thesis attempted to reconstruct the social world of the Babylonian priest. For this 
purpose the research aims were broken down into two principal points. The first was 
concerned with the impact of the temple fabric on the lives of priests. Since 
Babylonian priests were submitted to stringent rules of purity and organised according 
to a rigid hierarchy inside the temple, the first aim was to investigate to what extent 
these temple-based regulations influenced the priests’ behaviour and affected their 
lives outside of their cultic activities. In order to fully assess this matter, the first four 
chapters of this study focussed on particular spheres of interaction captured in the 
archives of Borsippa’s priestly families. The specific patterns of interaction were 
systematically evaluated in the light of the ideal temple regulations, but also dissected 
in their own rights. The second and related research aim was to examine whether 
priest can be identified as a distinct social group and whether it was possible to 
pinpoint the group more firmly in Babylonian society, by closely investigating how 
they interacted with the in-group and the out-group. Building further on the findings 




chapters. Taken all together, I believe that the evidence presented over the course of 
my investigation has allowed for a more sophisticated understanding of the Neo-
Babylonian priests, particularly in the ways they acted with their social environment 
and the basis on which they constructed their more or less exclusive group vis-à-vis 
outsiders, and thereby helped to elucidate some of the fundamental aspects of this 
ancient society.  
 
7.3. Outcomes of this study 
 
The impact of temple-based regulations 
The evidence presented throughout this study has shown that the temple left a great 
impression on the lives of priests. It informed their choices, affected their behaviour, 
and served as the ideal framework for their social organisation in society. The clearest 
example of this impact emerged from the study of marriages. While the preference by 
priests to take brides from fellow sacerdotal families already underlined the influence 
the temple fabric had on marital arrangements in this community, a methodical 
analysis of the data revealed that the marriage system was far more complex and the 
temple’s influence went much deeper. The system reconstructed for the priestly 
community of Borsippa corresponded neatly with the marriage model known as 
hypergamy. This ideal model is characterised by the marriage of lower status brides to 
a higher status grooms. In Borsippa, more than 70% of documented marriages were 
arranged between daughters of lower-ranking families and sons of higher-ranking 
priestly families. The families adopted the purity-based temple hierarchy as the 
principal ideological framework for their local alliance system. 
Marriage constituted a fundamental building block in this community. Besides 
allowing families and individuals to forge deep-rooted alliances and turn colleagues, 
neighbours, or acquaintances into kin, the arrangements of marriage resurfaced in 
various aspects of the priests’ daily lives. Marriage patterned the sales of property, led 
to specific service arrangements in agricultural and cultic organisations, and 
engendered a general attitude of solidarity and collaboration that was at times 
strikingly lacking among clans that were not joined by marriage. These dynamics 
were in the first place based on ties of marriage. And since marriage, in turn, hinged 
strongly on the ideal temple regulations, it can be argued that the latter influenced the 




The impact of the temple hierarchy also transpired from the particular ways in 
which the priesthood engaged with its social environment. It should be remembered 
that the priests of a Babylonian temple were ordered in a rigid hierarchy along an all-
embracing axis of relative purity and physical proximity to the gods. Priests who 
worked in close contact with divine statues had to comply with more stringent purity 
rules than those working in more peripheral areas of the temple. This principle was 
also visible in the general pattern of interaction. Hence, the social interaction of high-
ranking priests turned out to be structurally more inward-looking and geared towards 
close relatives and individuals with the same priestly status, while members of 
families located on the lower fringes of the temple hierarchy engaged with a much 
more diverse set of individuals, often relying less on fellow prebendaries and more on 
non-priestly outsiders. This emerged, for example, from the study of the local 
marriage system: temple-enterers, located at the very top of the temple hierarchy, 
intermarried primarily with families of the same (or similar) priestly rank, as opposed 
to the lower-ranking oxherds and reed-workers, which forged alliances with families 
that did not belong to the local prebendary circle. This trend also resurfaced in other 
spheres of interactions, such as the formation of friendship, agricultural collaboration, 
and silver lending. Hence, temple-enterers relied predominantly on fellow temple-
enterer families for the cultivation of their landholdings, while the reed-workers were 
the only priests who contracted more silver loans outside of the priestly circle than 
inside. It should be said, however, that this trend emerges most clearly from a 
comparison between the very highest and lowest edge-groups, and cannot always be 
traced as clearly among the middle-ranking priesthoods. 
These findings are important for our understanding of the social structure of the 
priestly community of Borsippa and its fundamental ordering principles. Firstly, we 
are left with little doubt that the purity-based hierarchy exerted a significant influence 
over the lives of priests outside of their cultic activities. However, it was shown that 
priests also actively tried to reproduce the temple’s ideal order within their social 
environment. Secondly, this study led to a more nuanced appreciation of the figure of 
the Babylonian priest as such. Even if priests can be identified as a distinct social 
group when analysing Babylonian society as a whole, the evidence presented in this 
study revealed that the internal variance of this group could be great. Priests were 
embedded in the temple’s sphere in greater or lesser degrees, which could, and 




priests and other members of society in different ways. It is essential to acknowledge 
this fact when talking about Babylonian priests. 
 
Priests as a distinct social group 
The evidence presented throughout this thesis demonstrates that priests can be 
identified as a distinct social group in Babylonian society. Despite the fact that each 
priest engaged in a unique way with his social environment, it was revealed that the 
interactional pattern of this social group as a whole followed a clear outline. It can be 
summarised in the following three points: firstly, the majority of their interactions 
took place with fellow priests and members of priestly families. Secondly, while they 
regularly interacted with members of non-priestly families, this occurred on a much 
smaller scale. Finally, individuals from lower strata of society, including foreign 
minorities, are almost entirely excluded from the day-to-day interactions and appear 
only on the fringes of the priests’ social world. While this pattern emerged sharply 
from ties of marriage and friendship, it was less clearly defined in sphere of silver 
lending or tenancy, which saw the participation of a more diverse group, including 
individuals from other strata of society. 
Since it was demonstrated that many of the priests’ contacts belonged to their 
immediate social environment, the interactional pattern could not simply be taken as a 
natural outcome of spatial and demographic factors. Much more helpful was to 
interpret it in the light of homophily, the principle postulating that interaction is most 
likely to occur among individuals that share similar lifestyles and socioeconomic 
characteristics. The engagement of priests in society could indeed be classified as 
largely homophilous, which matched the conservative economic mentality commonly 
ascribed to them as Babylonia’s archetypical rentiers. However, of greater importance 
for our understanding of priests as a distinct group was the fact that the significant 
types of their interaction such as marriage and friendship occurred to a 
disproportionate (homophilous) degree within the social in-group, to the near-
exclusion of others. This indicates that the priests from Borsippa maintained a social 
boundary, which allowed them to consciously separate from other elements in society.  
In order for this ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy to take shape, priests called on a set of 
common criteria, which defined the group’s collective social identity. These criteria 
included aspects ranging from their privileged affiliation to the temple and superior 




consciousness and naming pattern. Even if many aspects of this multiplex social, 
cultural and economic repertoire were shared by a larger, primarily elite section of 
society, the evidence indicates that Babylonian priests used the markers of their social 
identity both to delineate the group’s social boundary and as guideline for interaction. 
They provided priests with a very clear idea of what it meant to be a member of the 
in-group, which, while on the whole very rigidly defined, could in certain 
circumstances shift its boundary to include a slightly more or slightly less diverse 
range of individuals into their social world. 
These findings are crucial for our understanding of the Babylonian priests. The 
evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that priests perceived of, and, 
maintained themselves as a discrete social unit. By adhering to a collective social 
identity and holding on to a shared practice of interaction, priests retained control 
over their social environment and preserved the configuration of their in-group. Even 
if it goes without saying that priests were an integral part of the much wider and more 
diverse urban community, the fact that the majority and the most significant types of 
interactions occurred among temple-related families indicates that this circle 




The findings of this thesis demonstrate the benefits of taking social interaction as 
basic object of analysis and investigating Babylonian society from below. By 
focussing our attention on the interactions of Borsippa’s priests, it became possible to 
say more about how one specific group was structured internally and how it related to 
other segments in the community. Moreover, this empirical method gave us a good 
idea of what was the common, normative and preferred way of conduct, and what was 
uncommon, largely avoided and perhaps even considered undesirable in the priestly 
community of Borsippa.  
This study has also shown that our findings can be extrapolated successfully to 
more general social phenomena in Babylonian society. Hence, the interactional 
patterns of Borsippa’s priests could be described in the light of the economic 
mentalities of the rentier and the entrepreneur, and also helped us gain a more 
fundamental understanding of these typologies. At the same time, caution is 




be matched up adequately with those found in other units of observation, such as for 
example the priestly community of Sippar. The apparent reason behind this is that 
these facts arose from a very specific setting defined by their own particular 
dynamics, factors and parameters. Hence, the social structures reconstructed in 
Borsippa cannot be simply attributed wholesale to the burgeoning provincial town of 
Sippar, the capital of Babylon, or the southern city of Uruk, nor can they be expected 
to be found in the exact same shape elsewhere. While the findings of this thesis are 
thus of general relevance and transcend well beyond boundaries of the priestly 
community of Borsippa, only by recognising that they are embedded within a very 
specific context can they help us gain a more nuanced understanding of ancient 
Babylonian society. 
The focus of this study was almost exclusively on Borsippa’s priests, which could 
be studied in exceptional detail. However, I also showed that priests were part of a 
much larger and more diverse elite stratum of society. Unfortunately, the Borsippa 
corpus does not allow us to study this wider segment in detail as it remains largely 
outside the documentation. It would therefore be important, in order to fully assess the 
findings of this thesis, to expand the scope of future investigations by shifting the 
analysis to other social groups and other towns, such as the entrepreneurial families of 
Babylon or the priesthood of Uruk.  
Finally, I want to briefly address a general, and to my mind important aspect of the 
evidence that has been left largely undiscussed. The findings presented throughout 
this thesis proved to be very static and little susceptible to change over time, turning 
out to be diachronically flat. While this could be observed most visibly in the 
marriage network reconstructed at the beginning of this study, it actually applied to all 
spheres of their interaction. It therefore represents an inherent feature of the 
interactional pattern in general. While this might be a result of the specific 
methodology adopted in this thesis or the nature of our textual corpus, I believe that it 
can be explained differently. This study has made it abundantly clear that the local 
priestly families acted as a self-contained, socially exclusive group. Even if they were 
part of a much wider and rapidly changing society – experiencing wars, migrations, 
dynastic changes, state reforms, etc. – the evidence suggests that these families were 
affected very little by the local and imperial politics of the time. On the contrary, by 
maintaining a rigid pattern of interaction and adhering to a conservative social system, 




cohesive community that was effectively shielded off from outside influence through 
a deliberate act of auto-segregation. It seems therefore that the absence of clear 
diachronic developments in the study serve as an ultimate testimony to the successful 
organisation of Borsippa’s priests, who were able to keep their close-knit community 
and its intricate dynamics remarkably stable for the better part of the first millennium 






Quantitative analysis of priestly  





The Borsippa corpus yields 102 attestations in which marital unions are more or less 
explicitly expressed, i.e. ‘Y wife of X’ or ‘Y mother of Z, son of X’. However, not all of 
them can be used. For two unions the family name of the husband is missing, while for 
nineteen others the family name of the wife has been lost or simply omitted. One can only 
speculate about the nature of these unions and they have therefore not been incorporated 
into the analysis. We can be virtually sure, however, that it does not concern individuals 
from the lower strata of society, which lack ancestral family names altogether. These 
references do only identify the husband or wife by personal name and do not only omit the 
family but also the father’s name, suggesting that full filiation was simply not necessary 
and the individual were well known to the parties concerned. This leaves us with a dataset 
of 81 fully documented unions.  
In this analysis I will look into the marriage alliance of the individual priesthoods, 
taking special notice of the marriages arranged within the prebendary groups, those 
arranged with other prebendary groups, and those arranged with non-prebendary 
outsiders. Figures will be summarised at the end of each section. I will begin with the 
group that spawned most marital unions, the temple-enterer families, followed by the 
brewers, the bakers, the butchers, the oxherds and ending with the reed workers family for 
which there is only little information.  
 
1. Temple-enterers 
The corpus informs us on the marriage of seventeen male and twenty-two female 
members belonging to the temple-enterer clans. It should be noted that information on 




this group is quite abundant, considering the fact that we have only one archive from a 
temple-enterer family, namely the Ea-ilūtu-bani archive. For other temple-enterer 
families from Borsippa, see Ch. 0.7.1. 
 
1a. Intra-prebendary unions 
With eight alliances arranged within the group of temple-enterers, almost 50% of the 
male and almost 40% of the female members engaged in intra-prebendary marriages. 
These percentages are however somewhat misleading, since they are largely based on two 
marriage-chains from a single archive cluster. The first cycle consists of three 
consecutive marriages within the Ilī-bāni clan. According to TCL 12/13 85 man ‘Y’ of 
the Ilī-bāni clan was married to woman ‘X’ of the same kin group.939  This marriage was 
not blessed with longevity, seeing that only few months later the husband married his late 
wife’s sister, his sister-in-law. The last episode is described some fourteen years later, 
when the Ilī-bānis called upon the brother of the recently deceased husband ‘Y’ to uphold 
the alliance and marry his sister-in-law.  
The second chain is represented by two documents and concerns the alliance between 
the Ea-ilūtu-bani and the Ilī-bāni families. The case presents itself in TCL 12/13 174, 
when woman ‘X’ from the Ilī-bāni clan divided her entire property.940 She transferred the 
first half of the property to her son by man ‘Y’; the second half was assigned to man ‘Z’, 
her husband. It has been demonstrated by F. Joannès that ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ were related, the 
former being the older brother of the latter, and that the wife was thus previously married 
to her second husband’s older brother (1989: 41). The last testimony suggests that the 
wife divided her property in anticipation of her death since only two months later, man 
‘Z’ is married to a new woman, the paternal niece of his late wife ‘X’.  
 
1b. Inter-prebendary unions 
Almost 30%, or five out of the seventeen unions, were arranged between male temple-
enterers and women from other prebendary background. These marriages were usually 
arranged with prominent priestly groups that ranked just below the temple enterers: 
brewers (1x),941 butchers (1x),942 and bakers (2x).943 The notability of these families is 
                                                
939 Joannès 1989: 52. 
940 Joannès 1989: 41. 
941 Ea-ilūtu-bani ∞ Šikkûa (BM 26264) 
942 Kidin-Nanāya ∞ Ibnāya (BM 96151) 
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underlined when we look at the individuals in question. Šikkûa was a family of brewers 
that enjoyed a brief period of distinction when it provided two consecutive chief temple 
administrators (šatammu) of Ezida between 539-537 BCE.944 Prosopographical evidence 
suggests that the woman marrying into the Ea-ilūtu-bani family was indeed the grand- 
and great-granddaughter of these šatammus. 945  The wife from the butcher family 
belonged to a branch of the Ibnāya clan that had supplied at least one governor (šākin-
ṭēmi) of Borsippa.946 The two alliances with prebendary bakers were both arranged with 
the prominent Kidin-Sîn family. Temple-enterers thus married the most illustrious 
members of lower-ranking clans. One apparent exception is the marriage between a 
temple-enterer and a daughter from the Rēʾi-alpi clan.947  
Female members of temple-enterer families engaged far more often in this type of 
marriage. For them, 46%, or ten out of twenty-two marriages, were arranged with lower 
prebendary families. Temple-enterer families tended to marry their daughters to families 
that occupied the rung just below themselves: brewers (6x),948 butchers (1x),949 bakers 
(1x).950 Other marriages were arranged between a man of the Nappāhus and a woman 
from the Atkuppu family,951 and between man of the Arad-Ea family and a wife from the 
Rēʾi-alpi clan.952  
                                                                                                                                            
943 Kidin-Nanāya ∞ Kidin-Sîn (BM 25589); Ea-ilūtu-bani ∞ Kidin-Sîn (TuM 2/3 48). 
944 See Waerzeggers 2010: 73 for references. 
945 The woman in question is fŠaddinnātu/Nabû-šumu-iddin/Nabû-mukīn-zēri (šatammu)/Nabû-mukīn-apli 
(šatammu)/Šulā of the Šikkûa clan. 
946 Her grandfather (and perhaps also her great-grandfather) functioned in this position. The daughter in 
question is fGigītu/Nabû-šumu-ukīn/Nabû-nādin-šumi (governor)/Mušēzib-Marduk (governor) of the 
Ibnāya clan. See Waerzeggers 2010: 68 for references. For the Ibnāya (A) archive see Jursa 2005: 83-84 
and Waerzeggers 2010: 525ff. 
947 Arkāt-ilāni-damqā ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 96166). 
948 Huṣābu ∞ Ea-ilūtu-bani (BM 82640 = AH XV no. 45); Huṣābu ∞ Ilī-bāni (NBC 8404 and L 1627); Ilia 
∞ Arkāt-ilāni(-damqā) (BM 26473); Ilia ∞ Iddin-Papsukkal (BM 26473); Ilšu-abūšu ∞ Nūr-Papsukkal 
(Smith Coll. No. 92), Mannu-gērûšu ∞ Ša-diš-luh (BM 87308). 
949 Ilšu-abūšu ∞ Naggāru (BM 28863 = AH XV no. 115).  
950 Esagil-mansum ∞ Iddin-Papsukkal (BM 29379 published in Zadok 2005). 
951 OECT 12 A 158. 
952 Roth 1989 no. 22 and BM 26707. 





1c. Extra-prebendary unions 
There are four marriages (24%) between temple-enterers and women from families that 
have no prebendary background, or whose affiliation to the Ezida temple cannot presently 
be established: the Barihi, the Pahhāru, the Rab-banê and the Siātu families. The Barihi 
family is a local Borsippean clan with only very few attestations in the corpus;953 the 
three other clans occur repeatedly. Seeing that they were well connected, the Siātus may 
well have played an important role in Borsippa’s priestly community.954 The same can be 
said about the Pahhāru clan.955 The Rab-banê family provided a bride to the Naggāru 
family.956  
Turning to the alliances arranged for female members of the temple-enterer clans, we 
get a similar picture. Less than 20%, or four out of twenty-two women, were married into 
clans who did not belong to the prebendary circle of Borsippa: Bēl-eṭēru (2x),957 Rēʾi-sisê 
(1x),958 and an obscure family whose name ends on ‘[x]-zēri’ (1x).959 So far no member 
of the Bēl-eṭēru family is attested as priest of Ezida, but the family did occupy high 
positions in sanctuaries of other Babylonian towns.960 
                                                
953 The Barihis provided women to the Egibi family (Camb 315) and the temple-enterer family of the Nūr-
Papsukkals (Camb 120, Camb 338). 
954 The Siātu family gave brides to butcher and temple-enterer families, respectively Ibnāya (BM 96151; 
VS 5 25) and Iddin-Papsukkal (BM 94691; VS 4 70). The family itself received a wife from a prominent 
butcher branch of the Ilšu-abūšu family (BM 28865 = AH XV no. 116; VS 5 28). 
955 It received a wife from Esagil-mansum (BM 29067; BM 28861) and provided a bride to Arkāt-ilāni-
damqā (Wunsch 2002 no. 116). 
956 BM 94504. 
957 Bēl-eṭēru ∞ Ilī-bāni (BM 94548); Bēl-eṭēru ∞ Nappāhu (BM 94696). 
958 Rēʾi-sisê ∞ Nūr-Papsukkal (BM 27858). 
959 [x]-zēri ∞ Iddin-Papsukkal (Roth 1989 no. 21). 
960 Sippar: the temple-enterer’s prebend (cultic singer, nârūtu) of the sanctuary of Šarrat-Sippar seems to 
have been completely in their hands (Bongenaar 1997: 242ff., 289). Babylon: the family is attested selling 
an ērib-bītis/nârūtu prebend (Baker 2004 nos. 54, 55, 56 and 57). Dilbat: Bēl-eṭēru functioned as 
measurers (mādīdu) of Uraš in Eimbianu (VS 5 105 and VS 5 75). That they also took part in higher 
temple functions is clear from e.g. VS 5 108, an exchange of a piece of land against an ērib-bīti prebend 
in Dilbat involving the temple authorities. 







With nine archives the brewers of Borsippa are the best-attested group in the corpus (see 
Ch. 0.7.2.). Moreover, the archives appear to be a representative sample, informing us on 
both prominent and ‘peripheral’ brewer clans. This analysis includes the marriage of 
thirty-three brewers: nineteen male and fourteen female members. Note that more than 
one-third of these unions are attested in the Ilia archives.  
 
2a. Intra-prebendary unions 
The most striking feature of the marriage pattern of the brewers is the high number of 
unions within the professional group. Our data indicates that more than 60% of all their 
marriages were arranged within the professional group. Especially noteworthy is the bond 
between the Ilia (A) and the Ilšu-abūšu families, who engaged in a conscious alliance 
policy.961 In short, the Ilia family was made up by three branches, headed by the three 
sons of the first attested member, Ṣillā. In the third generation all three branches arranged 
a marriage with a daughter from the Ilšu-abūšu clan,962 thus joining the entire Ilia (A) 
                                                
961 Waerzeggers 2010: 95. 
962 The founder of the Ilia (A) branch, Ṣillā, had three sons: Šulā, (Itti-Nabû-)Balāṭu and Šāpik-zēri. Each 
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family to the Ilšu-abūšu clan. While the Ilia family widened its horizon to other brewer 
families during subsequent generations,963 the alliance with the Ilšu-abūšus was solidified 
with another marriage in the fifth generation.964  
Another interesting notion is that the marriages among brewers were concluded 
between families of similar status. For example, Lā-kuppuru, a clan that was only 
limitedly involved in the brewer’s process of Ezida, was married to a family whose role 
in this profession was equally marginal, the Allānus.965 On the other hand, prominent 
families like the Ilia gave and received wives from important clans such as Kudurrānu966 
and Ša-nāšīšu.967  
 
2b. Inter-prebendary unions 
Eight male and four female members of brewer clans were married to families of other 
prebendary groups – 42% and 29% respectively. With six out of seven arranged in this 
way, there was a clear tendency among the brewers to take their wives from the higher-
ranking temple-enterers. Two further unions were arranged with bakers968 and oxherds.969 
Turning to the opposite sex, our data seems to suggest that brewer families often gave 
their daughters in marriage to more junior prebendary families.970 
 
                                                                                                                                            
abūšu (VS 5 126), 2) Nabû-ušallim/Balāṭu/Ilia ∞ fTuqpītu//Ilšu-abūšu (BM 102308 = AH XV no. 18), 3) 
Marduk-nādin-ahi/Šāpik-zēri ∞ fQudāšu//Ilšu-abūšu (e.g. BM 87267). 
963 Marduk-šumu-ibni the main protagonist of the Ilia (A) archive married his daughter to the Kudurrānu 
family (BM 87265). 
964 BM 102261.  
965 Lā-kuppuru ∞ Allānu (BM 29385); the same document mentions a union within the Lā-kuppuru clan. 
966 BM 87265. 
967 E.g. BL 874. The remaining union are: Kudurrānu ∞ Ahiyaʾūtu (A 120, Joannès 1989: 62, 281) and Ilia 
∞ Ilia (BM 26544). 
968 Ilia ∞ Esagil-mansum (BM 26731). 
969 Kudurrānu ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 96259). 
970  1x into higher prebendary group: [ērib-bīti] Ea-ilūtu-bani ∞ Šikkûa (BM 26264). 3x into lower 
prebendary group: [baker] Bēliyaʾu ∞ Ilia (BM 26483); [barber] Gallābu ∞ Ilia (Zadok IOS 18 no. 1); 
[oxherd] Rēʾi-alpi ∞ Ardūtu (BM 29375). 
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2c. Extra-prebendary unions 
There is only one marriage between a brewer and non-prebendary outsider family. A son 
of the minor brewer clan of Lā-kuppuru married the daughter of the Rišāya family.971 
Note, however, that the latter seems to have originated from the nearby city of Dilbat, 














The corpus bears evidence to the marriages of ten male and eight female members of 
prebendary baker. For an overview of the local families of bakers and our main source on 
this group, see Ch. 0.7.3.  It is interesting to find a confirmation of the Kidin-Sîn’s central 
position among the prebendary bakers in the fact that they figure most prominent in our 
sample of marriages even though their family archive has not been recovered. 
 
                                                
971 BM 103458. 
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3a. Intra-prebendary unions 
Except for the Nabû-mukīn-apli clan, all baker families are known to have engaged in 
intra-prebendary marriages. The Kidin-Sîn clan figures most prominently in this respect. 
Two marriages were arranged within the clan,973 and one with the Šēpê-ilias.974 Another 
alliance within the prebendary group was forged between the Bēliyaʾu and the Esagil-
mansum clans.975 Due to the small quantity of this sample, these four marriages account 
for 40% of this group’s male and 50% of this group’s female marriages respectively. 
 
3b. Inter-prebendary unions 
There are in total six individuals – three men and three women – who married individuals 
from outside the own professional group. One baker was married to a woman from the 
prebendary barber, or Gallābu clan. 976 Others married individuals from brewer (2x)977 
and temple-enterer families (3x).978 
 
3c. Extra-prebendary unions 
Three men and one woman were married to individuals whose family background 
remains unknown. The three men received their wives from the Kāṣir,979 Nabûnnāya980 
and Ṣillāya families.981 Finally, a baker’s daughter was married to the Pahhāru family.982 
 
                                                
973 The first marriage is attested in BM 94697 and BM 82654, the second in BM 29021. 
974 BM 82608.  
975 Bēliyaʾu ∞ Esagil-mansum (e.g. VS 5 26 and BM 96102). 
976  Kidin-Sîn ∞ Gallābu (BM 85447). For the prebendary involvement of the Gallābu clan, see 
Waerzeggers 2010: 79+352. 
977 Male bakers: Bēliyaʾu ∞ Ilia (BM 26384). Female bakers: Ilia ∞ Esagil-mansum (BM 26731). 
978 Male bakers: Esagil-mansum ∞ Iddin-Papsukkal (BM 29379, cf. Zadok 2005). Female bakers: Ea-ilūtu-
bani ∞ Kidin-Sîn (TuM 2/3 48, Joannès 1989: 33.); Kidin-Nanāya ∞ Kidin-Sîn (BM 25589). 
979 Nabû-mukīn-apli ∞ Kāṣir (BM 25588). 
980 Kidin-Sîn ∞ Nabûnnāya (BM 25589). Note that the Kāṣir family might have had some links to the 
service of the prebendary baker, too. Bēl-iddin//Kāṣir, whose daughter was married to the Nabû-mukīn-
aplis, is attested on one earlier occasion in a document dealing with the prebendary income of 
Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u (BM 29512). 
981 Bēliyaʾu ∞ Ṣillāya (e.g. BM 96313 and BM 21976). 
982 Pahhāru ∞ Esagil-mansum (BM 29067; BM 28861). Note that the woman from the Esagil-mansum clan 
was previously married to Balassu//Bēliyaʾu; it thus represents her second marriage. 







Four families have so far been identified as butchers of Ezida: Eppēš-ilī, Eṭēru, Ibnāya 
and Ilšu-abūšu.983 While we have several smaller archives from the Ibnāya clan,984 there 
is only little information on marriage alliances. We know of the marriage of three male 
and four female members. 
 
4a. Intra-prebendary unions 
The union between two members of the Ibnāya clan is so far the only known marriage 
arranged within this professional group.985 
 
4b. Inter-prebendary unions 
Two unions were arranged with other prebendary groups. Once a woman was received 
from the Naggāru family in marriage.986 In the other instance, a woman from the Ibnāya 
                                                
983 Waerzeggers 2010: 79. The Eppēš-ilī and Eṭēru families seem to have owned butcher prebends in Ezida 
passively, performing the temple service through agents only (Waerzeggers 2010: 79+349). They probably 
had stronger ties to the temples in Babylon. Note that the Ilšu-abūšu is a family that had strong ties to the 
priesthood of the brewers, too. 
984 Jursa 2005: 83-84; Waerzeggers 2010: 19 and 525ff. 
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family and granddaughter of a governor of Borsippa, was married to the Kidin-
Nanāyas.987 
 
4c. Extra-prebendary unions 
It seems surprising that most marriages of this group were arranged with families that can 
be classified as non-prebendary (3x). The governor’s son of the Ibnāya clan married a 
woman from the Siātu family.988 The latter also received a woman from another butcher 
family, namely the Ilšu-abūšus.989 This must have been an important alliance since the 
woman was the daughter of the šāpiru-overseer of all the butchers of the Ezida temple.990 
A final marriage involved a woman from the Ibnāya and a man from the Ṣāhit-ginê clans. 
This family is thus far only attested as judge in Borsippa (VS 4 32).991  
 
    
 
                                                                                                                                            
986 Ilšu-abūšu ∞ Naggāru (BM 28863 = AH XV no. 115.) 
987 Kidin-Nanāya ∞ Ibnāya (BM 96151). 
988 Ibnāya ∞ Siātu (VS 5 25 and BM 96151). 
989 Siātu ∞ Ilšu-abūšu (BM 28865 = AH XV no. 116; VS 5 28). 
990  fIlāt was the daughter of Ezida-šumu-ukīn/Ilšu-abūšu who occupied the function of šāpiru of the 
butchers (ca. 583 BCE), see Waerzeggers 2010: 254+900. 
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5. Oxherds 
It has already been mentioned in the introduction that the prebend of the oxherds (rēʾi-
alpūtu) was entirely dominated by the Rēʾi-alpi clan (see Ch. 0.7.4.). This means that the 
marriages we take into consideration here belong to one clan only. There are in total ten 
marriages involving members of the Rēʾi-alpis. 
 
5a. Intra-prebendary unions 
There is no evidence that the Rēʾi-alpi clan arranged marriages within the prebendary 
group, or in this case among members of the same family.  
 
5b. Inter-prebendary unions 
There are five marriages (50%) with other prebendary families. The oxherds received 
brides from both the brewers992 and temple-enterers.993 The first woman came from the 
Ardūtu clan, a minor brewer clan that is attested only a couple of times in relation to this 
trade.994 The second woman came from the Arad-Ea family. While this clan appears as 
early as the Kassite period995 and occupied high positions in Borsippa during the eighth 
century BCE,996 it seemed to have lost its prominence in the local religious sphere by the 
time of this union.997 Families that obtained women from the Rēʾi-alpis are the Arkāti-
ilāni-damqā,998 Kudurrānu999 and Gallābu1000 families. These were prominent families 
belonging to the ranks of temple-enterers, brewers and barbers, respectively. 
 
                                                
992 Rēʾi-alpi ∞ Ardūtu (BM 29375). 
993 Rēʾi-alpi ∞ Arad-Ea (Roth 1989 no 22 and BM 26707). 
994 Waerzeggers 2010: 84. Note that in the three attestations the Ardūtu family works in close tandem with 
the Mannu-gērûšu clan, another rather peripheral family. 
995 Nielsen 2011: 73. 
996 VS 1 36. 
997 The Arad-Ea family might have been more successful in the royal administration. In Borsippa members 
worked in tandem with the local ‘canal inspector’ (VS 6 160, Dar 33). In Babylon they occupied the 
position of royal resident (qīpu) of the Esagil temple (VS 6 155, Dar 29), cf. Nielsen 2011: 73f. 
998 Arkāt-ilāni-damqā ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 94606 = AH XV no. 143). 
999 Kudurrānu ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 96259). 
1000 Gallābu ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 94696). 




5c. Extra-prebendary unions 
The Rēʾi-alpi family arranged relatively many marriages with families outside of the 
prebendary circle. Firstly, the family received a woman from the Mubannû clan.1001 
While it is not impossible that the latter was involved in the homonymous ‘arranger-of-
the-sacrificial-table’ (mubannūtu) prebend, this is not substantiated in the corpus. 
Secondly, families that obtained daughters from the Oxherd family were the 
Maqartus,1002 Rišāyas,1003 and Šarrahus.1004 





The information on this prebendary group is provided by the Atkuppu family archive (see 
Ch. 0.7.5.). Unfortunately there is very little known about the marriage alliances for this 
clan. The archive informs us only on the marriage of two male members. On the one 
hand, the reed-workers received a bride from the Adad-nāṣirs, a family with no apparent 
ties to the temple.1005 On the other hand, it received a daughter from the Nappāhus.1006 
                                                
1001 Rēʾi-alpi ∞ Mubannû (e.g. BM 94698). 
1002 Maqartu ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (BM 26487). 
1003 Rišāya ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (EAH 203). 
1004 Šarrahu ∞ Rēʾi-alpi (e.g. EAH 213 and BM 101980//BM 82607). 
1005 Atkuppu ∞ Adad-nāṣir (BM 82629, AfO 36/37 no. 13). 
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While this family is known to have provided two local temple-enterers of Ninlil in the 
past,1007 it is possible that it also was involved in the prebendary service of the smith 
(nappāhu). In that case the alliance between Atkuppu and Nappāhu would represent a 
marriage within the ranks of temple craftsmen. 
                                                














hanšû ša…1008  
1) bīt Abunāya (or, Adnāya): one hears of this estates in the famous case of high treason 
committed against Nebuchadnezzar II (Weidner 1956: 1-5), dated to Nbk 11. The Abunāya 
family seems to have lost this land already before the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II. The 
history recounted in this text tells us that this hanšû was taken from the traitor of the Rēš-
ummāni family and returned to the Ezida temple to which it had previously belonged. It 
was then given to an individual of the Šigûa clan.   
1b) Nabû-remēni//Abunāya (or, Adnāya): an individual of the Ša-ṭābtišu clan (and his 
uncle) sold a part of this hanšû estate to the Kidin-Sîn clan in the early Neo-Babylonian 
period (VS 5, 140; date lost).  
2) bīt Apkallu: this property is recorded between the reigns of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn and 
Nabonidus (ca. 664-548 BCE). The first attestation of this hanšû dates to Ššu 04 at the 
occasion of an inheritance division in the Aqar-Nabû family (A 83). This text probably 
entered the archive of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family as retroact when a member acquired the 
land; it is found in their possession between circa Nbk 21+ (YBC 9194) and Nbk 40 (YBC 
9189). At one point a share of this hanšû was held by the Ilī-bānis (a clan related to the Ea-
ilūtu-bani through marriage) as one can see from text BM 96263 (Nbn 08). Note that most 
documents dealing with this property do not use the term hanšû (e.g. TuM 2/3 151, TCL 
12 56; OECT 12 A 180).   
3) bīt Ašgandu (or, Šukandu): this property occurs for the first time in an inheritance 
division of the Ilia family in the reign of Nabonidus (BM 94587, Nbn 13, note that here the 
term hanšû is not used). Various texts record the subsequent management of this land by 
                                                
1008 Note that references to most of these hanšû units can be found in Zadok 2006.  




the family (e.g. BM 95042, HSM 1904.4.23, Zadok 2006: 440). The Ilias acquired an 
additional share from the Nappāhu family in Dar 06  (BM 95042).   
4) bīt Atkuppu: this hanšû is mentioned once in Nbk 11 (TCL 12 30). The text records the 
sale of three larger plots in this hanšû unit by the Nanāhus to a clan, whose name is 
unfortunately not preserved. Members of the Atkuppu family feature as neighbours of two 
of the sold plots. 
5) bīt Bābāya: this hanšû estate is only mentioned once in a cultivation contract from the 
Gallābu family archive (BM 96291, Nbn 12). Note that the scribe comes from the Babāya 
clan, suggesting that this clan kept an interest in their eponymous land.  
6) bīt mār Bā’iru: land in this land unit is bought by the Rē’i-alpis from an individual without 
family name in Dar 12 (BM 26510). The completion of payment was still due a year and a 
half later (BM 94540, Dar 14). The land might have been sold together with various other 
pieces of property to an unknown buyer in Dar 20 (BM 26576 = AH XV no. 192). 
7) bīt Banê-ša-ilia: in BM 93001 (Kan 07), two plots of land in this hanšû are exchanged 
between relatives of the Banê-ša-ilia clan. 
7b) Šumā//Banê-ša-ilia: this estate is mentioned once in a cultivation contract arranged 
within the Banê-ša-ilia family (BM 27854, Kan 19). 
8) Nabû-šumu-iškun//Bārû: a share in this hanšû was bought by the Adad-nāṣirs from the 
Barû clan sometimes before Nbk 14 (BM 26392). This field probably came into the 
possession of the Atkuppu family upon marrying a daughter of the Adad-nāṣir family. Cf. 
Abraham [forthcoming].  
9) bīt Basia: in Nbn 09 a woman from the Basia family donated her dowry field in this hanšû 
to her son, descendant of the same clan (BM 21975). At least one of the gardens in this 
hanšû was used as dowry property for a woman of the Ṣillāya family, married to 
Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u. The Basia family however still owned certain rights to the land, and 
members occasionally appear as co-owners or creditors in imittu texts. While the Bēliya’us 
seem to have had their own interest in this area (BM 28912, Dar 20), various texts bear 
witness to the fact that the dowry field of the Ṣillāyas came under management of the 
Bēliya’u family after marriage (e.g. BM 28961, Cam 07; BM 28952, Dar 10?; BM 96337, 
Dar 27). Ownership of this hanšû unit was obviously complex with as many as three clans 
holding rights to it simultaneously: Basia, Bēliya’u and Ṣillāya (e.g. BM 96389, date lost). 
10) bīt Bēlāya: a garden in this hanšû was held as a pledge for a debt of silver by the Gallābu 
family in Nbn 10 (BM 96239). Unfortunately, the family name of the debtor is lost. The 
Kudurrānu family might also have owned a piece of land in this unit as early as Nbn 13 
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(BM 22064, term hanšû not used), if indeed it concerns the same plot mentioned in BM 
22012 (Nbk IV 01, term hanšû used). 
11) bīt Bēliya’u: this estate is mentioned in BM 28904, dated to Nbk 33. It is thought to mark 
the arrival of the Bēliya’u family in the Borsippa milieu (Waerzeggers 2010: 207-208). 
The text records how the Bēliya’u clan receives lands in the hanšû [PN] ša Kidin-Sîn, from 
a fellow baker clan. While the designation of hanšû is not (yet) attached to this newly 
created property, called only bīt Bēliya’u, the text does seem to refer to it as ‘this hanšû’ 
(ll. 1-2: 11 ha.la.meš šá é men-ia-[ú...] ina 50-a4). Incidentally, the fact that the Bēliya’u 
clan, a newcomer in town and the latest addition to the prebendary bakers of Nabû, 
receives land in or next to estates held by other baker clans (Kidin-Sîn and Esagil-
mansum), suggests a link between hanšû property and professional identity. One wonders 
whether the allocation of hanšû land was not related to or conditional on the performance 
of certain services, at least in its original stage. This could also be inferred from the use of 
māru and aplu (‘son’ or even ‘member’) in the designation of hanšû units attached to 
various professional (family) names: e.g. hanšû ša mār Bā’iru (fisherman), hanšû ša mār 
Lāsimu (express messenger/scout) and hanšû ša apil Nappāhu (smith). 
12) bīt Bibbê: this unit is mentioned in TuM 2/3 137 (Camb 02). The owner is from the Ilī-
bāni family. The family name Bibbê is only attested three times in the corpus and is found 
more often as a personal name of Chaldean individuals like for example the royal magnate 
called Bibêa, son of Dakūru, in the Hofkalendar of king Nebuchadnezzar II (e.g. Beaulieu 
2013a: 34).  
13) bīt Bitahhi: BM 26504//BM 26481 (Cam [x]) documents the exchange of fields between 
two relatives of the Rē’i-alpi clan. A plot in the hanšû ša Rē’i-sisê and some additional 
silver were exchanged against a larger plot in the hanšû ša bīt Bitahhi. While the family 
name Bitahhi is only attested twice in the Borsippa corpus, there is prosopographical 
evidence suggesting that it was an alternative spelling for the somewhat better known 
family name of Barihi. 
14) Kāṣir//Ēdu-ēṭir: a plot in this unit was reclaimed by a member of the homonymous clan 
through the exchange of a field with the Išpāru family in BM 17599 (Npl 09). Note that the 
Ēdu-ēṭir clan still held neighbouring plots. 
15) bīt Esagil: in Nbk 39 a plot in this hanšû was owned by the Babāyas (VS 3, 24). This text 
records the payment of an amount of dates for the services to the local gugallu-official. 
The fact that this documents belongs to the Atkuppu archive suggests that this family had a 




stake in this land as well. That this hanšû refers to the Esagil temple and not to a family is 
suggested by the absence of a Personenkeil.  
16) bīt Esagil-mansum: this unit is found in two documents recording a transfer of property 
within the homonymous family. In BM 29379 (Cam 07) a woman donates a garden in bīt 
Esagil-mansum to her son. In BM 28902 (Dar 01) two individuals from the same family 
exchange date palm gardens (parts of the ancestral patrimony, bīt abišu). A share of this 
estate came into the possession of the Ea-ilūtu-bani family, in whose archive it is found in 
Nbk III 00 (YOS 17 8, see Joannès 1989: 326). Between Dar 09 and Dar 26, a plot in this 
hanšû (probably as part of the dowry of the Ṣillāya family, see hanšû bīt Basia above) was 
held by the Basia, Bēliya’u and Ṣillāya families (e.g. VS 3 104, 09; BM 28984, Dar 14; 
BM 29432, Dar 21; BM 28989, Dar 26; BM 96186, Dar x). 
17) bīt Gallābu: parts of this estate were already lost to the ancestral family during or even 
before the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II, when it was controlled by the Ea-ilūtu-banis (YBC 
9158). After being divided and partly sold to the Iddin-Papsukkal family, a member of the 
Gallābu clan was able to reclaim some of his ancestral land during the reign of Nabonidus 
(BM 96351). This land was subsequently sold off to the Mannu-gērûšus (BM 29401). 
According to Zadok 2006: 431, the Ilia family also owned a share of land in this hanšû 
unit. 
18) tamirtu humamātu: land in this hanšû was sold by a member of the Gallābu family to the 
Mudammiq-Marduk family. However, in BM 96267 (Nbn 06) this transaction was 
successfully contested and reclaimed by a brother of the seller.  
19) Ahu-ēreš//Huršanāya: this estate is mentioned in BM 87239 (Nbk 11). In this text, a 
member of the Nabû-šemê family sells two kur of land stretching over this hanšû and the 
hanšû ša-Nabû-ēṭir//Purattāya, for the staggering amount of seventy-two minas of silver to 
the Pahhāru family. The Huršanāya family is attested only once in the corpus (BM 28826). 
20) bīt Huṣābu: in the earliest documentation of this unit, the land is (temporarily) held by 
Banê-ša-ilia as collateral for a debt of silver due from a member of the Huṣābu family 
(TuM 2/3 106 Nbk 15). Another dossier documents the acquisition of a garden in this 
hanšû by the Rē’i-alpis. The first text shows that a member of the Adad-ibni clan bought 
part of this land from the Mubannû clan, who had previously bought it from the Asalluhi-
mansums (before Cam 06, VS 5 48). This share was then sold to a member of the Atkuppu 
family (BM 85239 and BM 26623, Dar 03). In a document dated one year later, it is, 
however, revealed that the Atkuppu acted only as a proxy for the actual buyer from the 
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Rē’i-alpi family (BM 82619). Documentation for this land continues until Dar 18 (e.g. BM 
82713, BM 94716, BM 102022). 
21) Iddin-Amurru: the earliest secured attestation of this hanšû comes from BM 26487 (Nbk 
22). Rēmūt-Gula//Rē’i-alpi requests his son-in-law from the Maqartu family to assign 
property to his wife. He assigns to her the ownership of a house and a garden on the nār-
Mihir in the hanšû ša Iddin-dx. While the reading of the name is unsure, this is one of the 
few hanšûs in Borsippa named after an individual without a family name. Contrary to, for 
example, Uruk where Iddin-Amurru can denote an ancestral name, in Borsippa it is only 
attested as a personal name. That it should be interpreted as such in this case too, is 
suggested by the lack of the term bīt, ‘house’ or ‘family’. Moreover, in Dar 00 Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi showed further interest in this (hanšû) area and exchanged three 
slaves with the Allānu family against a garden in the vicinity of the nār-Mihir in the Iddin-
Amurru area (BM 94546, hanšû not mentioned).  
22) bīt Iddin-Papsukkal: according to AB 241 (Cyr 06), a man from the Aqar-Nabû family 
and his wife from the Huṣābu family sell four plots in this hanšû to the Ahiya’ūtus. The 
text further specifies that the property was held undivided with the Nūr-Papsukkal and the 
Išparu families. Moreover, the Iddin-Papsukkal still owned neighbouring plots. Another 
neighbour is Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi, who would later buy this land from the 
Ahiya’ūtu family (BM 82764 Dar 02).  
22b) Saggillu//Iddin-Papsukkal: this hanšû is attested in BM 26493 (ca. Nbk 08). The 
Raksu family sold the land to an individual of the Adad-nāṣir clan. The buyer already 
owned a neighbouring plot. This text probably belongs to the Atkuppu archive and it is 
likely that this field entered into their possession through the marriage alliance with the 
Adad-nāṣir family. 
23) bīt (Ea-)ilūtu-bani: this hanšû is mentioned in two cultivation related contracts (NBC 
8362, AmM 02; BM 94780, Nbn 13) involving Zēru-Bābili//Ea-ilūtu-bani and his son, 
respectively. Some parts of this hanšû were presumably lost to the ancestral family at an 
earlier phase, since in Nbk 18 the Ilī-bāni family (linked to the Ea-ilūtu-banis by marriage) 
bought a plot in this hanšû from the Damēqu family (TuM 2/3 15). 
23b) Illûa//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani: this estate was kept largely within the Ea-ilūtu-bani family from 
the reign of Šamaš-šumu-ukīn until at least the reign of Cyrus. The first period of 
documentation is characterised by a series of sales of smaller shares between relatives (e.g. 
YBC 11426, Ššu 12; NBC 8297, Ššu 12; OECT 12 A 131; Ššu 12). The land was kept by 
Puhhuru//Ea-ilūtu-bani until the reign of Nabopolassar (note that in most texts the term 




hanšû is not used, e.g. TuM 2/3 133, Kan 04; TuM 2/3 134, Nbp 07). In Nbp 16 Puhhuru 
divided this property among his sons (TuM 2/3 5), who successfully passed it down to his 
grandson and great-grandson (e.g. TuM 2/3 195, Nbk 01; TuM 2/3 135, Ner 03; 94780, 
Nbn 13; BM 94692, Cyr 06). This dossier has been discussed extensively by Joannès 1989: 
65f. and Nielsen 2011: 91f.  
23c) Nādin-ahi//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani: evidence on this hanšû came into existence when the Ea-
ilūtu-bani family sold various plots to the Iddin-Papsukkal family around the 660s BCE 
(TuM 2/3 17, TCL 12 9, TuM 2/3 11). It was sold on to an individual of the Nappāhu clan 
only a short time later (TuM 2/3 12, Ššu 10). The land eventually ended up in the 
possession of the Gallābus. It was only sometime during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II, 
circa fifty years later, that the Ea-ilūtu-bani family re-assembled this property (A 163).  
23d) Suppê-Bēl//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani: in Ššu 12 Puhhuru//Ea-ilūtu-bani exchanged parts of this 
hanšû against a plot in the hanšû ša bīt Pahhāru owned by the šāpiru of the brewers from 
the Ilia family (TuM 2/3 23//MAH 16232; see edition Joannès 1989: 174 and corrections 
Nielsen 2011: 92+310). Puhhuru already owned a neighbouring field and it has been stressed 
previously that this transaction was part of a coherent strategy to assemble a bloc of several 
pieces of land (Joannès 1989: 66-67). However, that the ancestral family remained in 
control of most of the hanšû Suppê-Bēl//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani is clear from a later transaction. In 
TCL 12 16 (Kan 06), Puhhuru sold a plot in this unit to a relative; both owned 
neighbouring plots.  
24) bīt Iššakku: a garden in this hanšû was kept as pledge by the Kudurrānu family for a debt 
of silver against the Iššakkus in Dar 27 (BM 29007). The land was at that time held by 
members of the Iššakku and the Purkullu families. 
25) bīt Kidin-Sîn: an orchard located here was part of the property transferred by Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi to his grandson, and subsequently claimed by his own son, Rēmūt-
Nabû (e.g. BM 26514, Dar 05; BM 26492//BE 8 108, Dar 06). The land was held 
undivided with a member of the Kidin-Sîn clan. 
25b) Nabû-šumu-līšir (or, -ukīn)//Kidin-Sîn: this hanšû is mentioned first in a complicated 
division of dowry property in Cam 07 (BM 94697). In this document Nabû-šumu-
uṣur//Kidin-Sîn grants a garden in this unit to his daughter and her husband 
(Gimillu//Kidin-Sîn) as dowry. It is not exactly clear why, but a member of the Bēliya’u 
also receives a share in this hanšû. The story continues a year later when Gimillu sells part 
of his land to Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi (BM 82656). The presence of a royal scribe 
(ṭupšar šarri) suggests that this sale was not completely voluntary. The transaction dragged 
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on for another year when a re-confirmation of the sale was written (BM 82654). It seems, 
however, that Gimillu still owned some land in this hanšû (this time not belonging to his 
wife’s dowry), which he later sold to the same buyer in Dar 02 (EAH 212).  
25c)  [PN]//Kidin-Sîn: this is the estate where members of the Bēliya’u family received land 
from the Kidin-Sîns in Nbk 33, see hanšû ša bīt Bēliya’u (above). It might be identical to 
the hanšû discussed before (25b).  
26) bīt Kudurru u bīt fLe’itu: the dossier from the Ilia (A) family dealing with these units 
has been discussed by Jursa et al. 2010: 368-371. The four sons of Šulā//Ilia inherited land 
in this area in the reign of Nabonidus. The eldest brother sold part of this property to his 
siblings who initially kept it undivided (e.g. BM102289, Nbn 12; BM 26532, Nbn 13; BM 
17657, Nbn 13). The rest of the documentation concerns the management of this land by 
especially one of the three brothers, Marduk-šumu-ibni (e.g. BM 17641//VS 3, 196, Cam 
02; BM 25718, Dar 02; BM 102012, Dar 08; BM 102307, Dar 15). It is interesting to note 
that this unit is only explicitly called a hanšû once (BM 25718). The land is usually said to 
be located in the eblu (meaning unsure) ša bīt Kudurru u bīt fLe’itu.  
27) bīt Kurgarrê: based on parallel attestation this hanšû name has been restored by Zadok 
2006: 442. The first attestation of this estate comes from the marriage contract between the 
Arad-Ea and the Rē’i-alpi families dated to Dar 01 (Roth 1989: no. 22). This land is later 
said to be located on the canal (harru) of the bīt Kurgarrê and probably sold by the Rē’i-
alpi family to an unknown buyer in Dar 20 (BM 26576 = AH XV no. 192).  
28) bīt Lahāšu: this hanšû is mentioned only once in Nbk 11 (TCL 12 30) as a neighbouring 
estates of the hanšû ša bīt Atkuppu, see above. 
29) bīt mār Lāsimu: a garden here is sold by the Lāsimu clan to Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u in Dar 10 
(BM 96289). While the term hanšû is not used in this text, it can be restored from the 
imittu text BM 96299 (Dar 22). Šaddinnu only completed his payment in Dar 20, when the 
remainder was given to the Lāsimu family (BM 29113). There are thus far only two 
individuals attested with the family name Lāsimu in the Borsippa corpus. 
30) bīt Mubannû: a field belonging to the dowry of fNanā-bulliṭiš//Mubannû, wife of Nabû-
mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi, was located in this hanšû. It is only attested in a short period, 
between Dar 05 and Dar 09. In Dar 05 the couple assigned this plot first to their daughter 
fInbā (BM 101980//BM 82607) and then to their grandson Lābāši-Marduk (BM 26514). 
This transaction was later cancelled to the benefit Rēmūt-Nabû, their son (BM 26492//BE 
8 108 Dar 06). This land is mentioned once more when Rēmūt-Nabû used it as a pledge for 
5/6 minas of silver in Dar 09 (BM 82728). 




31) Nabû-mutakkil(?): this unit is mentioned in a very fragmented text in Cyr 06 (VS 5 36). 
It probably belonged to the Ilia (A) family.  
32) bīt Naggāru: land in this hanšû was held as a pledge by the Gallābu family for a debt of 
barley, dates and silver drawn against a member of the Maṣṣar-abulli family in Nbn 15 
(BM 85641). According to the imittu text BM 96315 (Dar 18) Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u owned a 
garden here as well. He also obtained ownership of another field here in return for the old-
age care of a member of the Kāṣiru clan (BM 25630//BM 25653, Dar 20). 
32b) Nummuru//Naggāru: three members of the Naggāru family sold this unit, apparently in 
its entirety to the Ilia family in Ššu 04 (RA 10 no. 46) for only 5 shekels of silver. It should 
be noted that no dimensions are given, however. 
33) bīt apil Nappāhu: land in this unit was used as dowry property of fAhattu//Arad-Ea, who 
married into the Rē’i-alpi clan in Dar 01 (Roth 1989: no. 22). The management of this plot 
(still held with some other members of the Arad-Ea family, according to e.g. BM 26707 
and BM 26561//BM 94879) is recorded until Dar 29 (e.g. BM 26335). This property was 
however temporarily pledged to the Ea-imbi family in Babylon around Dar 19 (BM 
26624//BM 102002 and BM 94685). 
34) bīt Nikkāya: this hanšû is mentioned as neighbouring estates of the hanšû ša bīt Atkuppu 
in Nbk 11 (TCL 12 30),  see above. 
35) bīt Pahhāru: land in this unit was originally bought from the Damēqu family by the 
šāpiru of brewers (Ilia family). The latter then exchanged it in Ššu 12 against a plot in 
hanšû Suppê-Bēl//(Ea-)ilūtu-bani, see above. 
36) mār Pa-ni-a-su-šu-du(?): this land was part of the dowry of fAhattu//Arad-Ea, who 
married into the Rē’i-alpi clan around Dar 01 (Roth 1989: no. 22). The reading of this 
name is unsure. 
37) Nabû-ēṭir//Purattāya: see hanšû ša Ahu-ēreš//Huršanāya above. 
38) Rabî: this hanšû is mentioned once in an imittu text from the Ilī-bāni archive (see Joannès 
1989: 87 and 269). 
39) bīt Rē’i-alpi: this hanšû is documented through numerous transfers of property within the 
Rē’i-alpi family, between Nbn 00 and Dar 29. It is first attested in Nbn 00 when an 
individual from the Arkāt-ilāni-damqā family bought land from fAmat-Ninlil//Rē’i-alpi, as 
proxy for Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi (BM 25627). A year later Nabû-mukīn-zēri made use 
of another proxy to buy a different plot of land here from his relatives (BM 26636 and BM 
109871). The presence of a royal scribe at the latter transaction suggests an involuntary 
sale, perhaps as a result of indebtedness. A final transaction is found in BM 26571 (= AH 
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XV no. 147, Nbn 08), which records the exchange of two days of the oxherd’s prebend 
against a field in this hanšû. This hanšû seems to have been kept firmly in the family until 
Dar 29 (BM 86442). 
39b) Nabû-zēru-ibni/Nabû-aplu-iddin/Rē’i-alpi: an orchard in this unit was sold in Nbn 04 
by Nabû-ušebši//Rē’i-alpi (perhaps the grandson of the individual, who gave his name to 
this hanšû) to fȚabātu//Maqartu (Rē’i-alpi from her mother’s side) in order to pay off a 
long-standing debt to the Ezida temple (BE 8 44//BM 94562). The fact that it was written 
in the presence of the royal scribe suggests that there was pressure from higher up. 
According to the quittance text BM 26687//BM 26656 fȚabātu paid the full price to Nabû-
ušebši in Nbn 05. However, a few years later disagreement arose about the exact 
boundaries of the field. Unfortunately, from the document that records its settlement it is 
not entirely clear, who the real owner was in Nbn 10 (BM 26648); it tells us that the land 
was bought by Nabû-mukīn-zēri//Rē’i-alpi and fȚabātu, jointly. 
40) bīt Rē’i-sisê: a plot in this hanšû was exchanged by a member of the Ēdu-ēṭir family 
against land in the hanšû ša Kāṣir//Ēdu-ēṭir owned by the Išparus in Npl 09 (BM 17599). 
In the reign of Nabonidus the Šagimmu family sold a share to the Huṣābus (BE 8 43). This 
transaction was later cancelled and the land was bought by another individual, whose name 
is lost (BM 26474). In the reign of Cambyses, shares in this hanšû came under control of 
the Rē’i-alpi family. BM 26504//BM 26481 (Cam [x]) records the exchange of two fields 
within Rē’i-alpi clan: a field in the hanšû ša Rē’i-sisê was exchanged against a plot in the 
hanšû ša bīt Bitahhi. The land was later sold to the Šarrahus, a family related to the Rē’i-
alpi family by marriage. 
41) bīt Rīšāya: this hanšû is attested as a dowry field in BM 29375 ([Ach?] 04), a document, 
which records the division of dowry gifts among three generations of the Ardūtu family. 
Seeing that one of the daughters married into the Rē’i-alpi family, it is likely that this land 
followed her into the new conjugal household. 
42) bīt Ṣillāya: land in this hanšû is attested in the Bēliya’u archive between Dar 09 (BM 
96309)  and Dar 18 (VS 3 119). It is very likely that the Ṣillāya clan held this land until it 
married one of its daughters to the Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u, sometime around the reign of 
Cambyses, using it as dowry property.  
43) Ša-Nabû-šū: a field in this hanšû was bought by the Egibis from Babylon in Nbn 08, 
perhaps from the Arad-Ea family (Wunsch 2000: no. 116). 
44) bīt Ṭābihu: Šaddinnu//Bēliya’u bought a date grove in this estate in Dar 20 from the 
Ibnāya family (VS 5 92). It is interesting to see that members of the Ibnāya family, who 




traditionally performed the function of the prebendary butcher of Nabû, also held land in 
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De Sociale Wereld van de Babylonische Priester 
Er is in de assyriologie reeds veel geschreven over de Babylonische tempel en haar 
cultische personeel. Priesters droegen de verantwoordelijkheid voor de correcte 
uitvoering van de eeuwenoude, en van de buitenwereld streng afgeschermde liturgie 
in tempels. Het Babylonische priesterschap was een bijzonder hiërarchisch instituut, 
gerangschikt volgens het principe van rituele reinheid en fysiek contact met de goden, 
en onderverdeeld in een hele reeks gespecialiseerde priesterdivisies – zoals brouwers, 
bakkers, oliepersers, tuiniers, ossenherders, poortwachters, rietwerkers, 
pottenbakkers, timmermannen, goudsmeden, zangers, acrobaten, etc. –  met eigen 
tijd-, plaats- en handelings-specifieke taken binnen de cultus. Door hun offergoederen 
en andere rituele bijdragen dag in dag uit nauwgezet te coördineren, droegen deze 
ingewijde dienaren collectief bij aan de verwezenlijking van één en het zelfde doel: de 
verering van de Babylonische goden. Terwijl de religieuze functies en inrichting van 
het priesterschap grondig zijn onderzocht, blijven andere belangrijke vragen nog 
steeds onbeantwoord. Babylonische priesters bekleedden de hoogste ambten in de 
plaatselijke religieuze en civiele instituties en wisten hun posities vaak over meerdere 
generaties succesvol te behouden. Maar hoe precies organiseerden de priesters zich 
buiten de tempels, en hoe was de omgang van deze lokale religieuze elite met andere 
elementen in de samenleving tussen de Eufraat en de Tigris? 
Mijn proefschrift presenteert een studie naar de Babylonische samenleving, met 
een speciale aandacht voor de priestergemeenschap van Borsippa tijdens het Nieuw-
Babylonische (ca. 620-539 v. Chr.) en het vroege Perzische bewind (ca. 538-484 v. 
Chr.), een periode die in de vakliteratuur bekend staat als de Nieuw-Babylonische 
Periode. Borsippa was de politieke en religieuze zusterstad van Babylon, het 
eeuwenoude en roemruchte centrum van Babylonië – het gebied dat het centrale en 




men te Birs-Nimrud, de site van het oude Borsippa, meerdere duizenden kleitabletten. 
Recent onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat het leeuwendeel van deze teksten – nog steeds 
grotendeels ongepubliceerd – eens deel uit maakten van de privé archieven van een 
twintigtal families die tussen de 7e en 5e eeuw v. Chr. verscheidene priesterlijke taken 
uitvoerden in de Ezida, de tempel van de Babylonische schrijvergod Nabû. Deze 
archieven bieden de voornaamste bronnen voor het voorliggende proefschrift. De 
politieke kenteringen die zich in de loop van deze ‘lange zesde eeuw’ voor deden in 
Borsippa en Babylonië in het algemeen vormen het raamwerk van mijn analyse.  
 
Methodologie en onderzoeksvragen 
De kern van dit proefschrift bestaat uit een analyse van de sociale interactie die 
plaatsvond tussen de priesterfamilies van Borsippa. Deze analyse heeft tot doel de 
onderliggende sociale dynamieken in deze oude gemeenschap aan het ligt te brengen 
en te ontrafelen.  
Deze studie maakt gebruik van een interdisciplinaire aanpak, die naast een 
intensive studie van de spijkerschrifttabletten berust op sociologische theorieën en 
antropologisch onderzoek, met name die onderzoeken en theorieën die betrekking 
hebben op de historische en hedendaagse Hindoeïstische samenleving die 
opmerkelijke overeenkomsten vertoond met het oude Babylonië. Daarnaast worden 
verscheidene handelingen uit de sociale netwerk analyse toegepast, die er toe dienen 
de onderliggende mechanismen van deze sociale gebeurtenissen verder te 
doorgronden en ons helpen deze te interpreteren. 
Het wezenlijke doel van dit proefschrift is om bij te dragen aan een beter begrip 
van het Babylonische priesterschap als een aparte sociale groep, en de interactie 
tussen haar afzonderlijke leden te onderzoeken evenals de manier waarop zij zich 
gedroegen ten aanzien van andere groepen in de samenleving. De nadruk van deze 
studie ligt op de priesters, maar ze hoopt eveneens  ook een dieper en geconsolideerd 
inzicht in de organisatie van de oude Babylonische maatschappij in haar geheel te 
bewerkstelligen. Een sociaal perspectief is onontbeerlijk voor de grondige ontleding 
van oude beschavingen en gemeenschappen, maar er moet echter geconstateerd 
worden,  dat zulk een perspectief helaas nog altijd grotendeels ontbreekt in de Nieuw-
Babylonische en verwante spijkerschrift studies. 
Dit proefschrift tracht verandering te brengen in deze stand van zaken door een 




zoals deze tot uiting komt in hun dagelijkse interacties buiten de tempel. 
Dientengevolge, kent deze studie twee primaire doelstellingen: 
 
1. Om de impact van de tempel op het sociale gedrag van de priesters in de 
samenleving te bepalen. Met andere woorden, om te onderzoeken in welke 
mate de tempel hiërarchie en de daarmee verband houdende 
reinheidsvoorschriften alsmede de professionele organisatie van de priesters, 
hun leven buiten het cultische gebeuren beïnvloedde en vormgaf. 
 
2. Om de priesters nauwkeurig te traceren in de Babylonische samenleving. 
Oftewel, om te toetsen of priesters, op de basis van een diepgaande analyse 
van hun interactiepatronen, geïdentificeerd kunnen worden als een 
afzonderlijk sociaal segment in de maatschappij, en onderzoeken hoe zij zich 
verhielden ten overstaan van andere sociale groepen. 
 
Structuur en hoofdstukindeling 
Deze studie is opgedeeld in twee delen. In DEEL EEN (Hfdst. 1–4) worden een reeks 
sociale relaties en interacties onderzocht waarin het priesterschap van Borsippa op een 
min of meer dagelijkse basis verwikkeld was. Hoofdstuk 1 is toegewijd aan de 
huwelijkspraktijk. Met behulp van sociale netwerk analyse zal het huwelijksnetwerk 
van Borsippa’s priesterfamilies in kaart gebracht worden. Daarbij zal worden 
aangetoond dat men zich in deze gemeenschap hield aan een uiterst complex 
huwelijkssysteem dat onder antropologen bekent staat als hypergamie. Het huwelijk 
fungeerde als een fundamentele bouwsteen die niet alleen diepgrijpende uitwerkingen 
had op de sociale organisatie van de betrokken families maar zelfs de uitvoering van 
hun cultische taken en andere dienstverbanden reguleerde. Hoofdstuk 2 verkent 
verschillende aspecten van het grondbezit. Ten eerste worden de achtergrond en 
oorsprong van het zogeheten hanšû-land nader bekeken. Deze grondstukken werden 
tijdens het vroege eerste millennium v. Chr. door verschillende koningen aan families 
uit Borsippa toegekend en speelden een belangrijke rol in de formatie van de lokale 
elite. Ook zal worden onderzocht welke waarde deze landschenkingen hadden voor de 
zesde-eeuwse nakomelingen van de oorspronkelijke begunstigden. Het tweede deel 
betreft de verkooppraktijken van grondbezit; deze zullen nader worden onderzocht in 




tempel. Dit hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met een analyse van de pachtovereenkomsten 
en agrarische samenwerkingsverbanden. Een nadere studie van de sociale achtergrond 
van de pachters in Borsippa zal duidelijk maken van wiens steun de priesters 
afhankelijk waren voor het beheer van hun landerijen. Hoofdstuk 3 biedt een 
beschouwing van de lokale zilverleningen. Door dit type interactie voor de 
verschillende priester divisies apart te analyseren, kan worden aangetoond dat 
ondanks dat het leningsgedrag van Borsippa’s priesters in eerste instantie werd 
bepaald door persoonlijke financiële situaties, de professionele betrekkingen hier ook 
een zekere invloed op uitoefende. Men hield bij het verstrekken van krediet in zekere 
zin de ordening van de tempel hiërarchie aan. Hoofdstuk 4 reconstrueert de kringen 
van vertrouwen en intimiteit, dat wil zeggen, de persoonlijke vriendschapsnetwerken 
van de priesters. Als eerste worden de relevante archieven onderworpen aan een 
eenvoudige kwantitatieve analyse, waarbij voornamelijk gekeken wordt naar het 
aantal individuen dat slechts eenmaal geattesteerd is en contacten die vaker 
voorkomen in de dagelijkse zaken van de priesters. Dit verschaft ons niet alleen 
informatie over de algemene structuur van deze persoonlijke netwerken in Borsippa, 
maar geeft ons tegelijkertijd de mogelijkheid om te toetsen of het sociale en 
economische gedrag van individuele priesters ook in kwantitatieve zin tot uiting 
komen. Ten tweede, wordt deze kwantitatieve methode gecomplementeerd door een 
kwalitatieve analyse met behulp van een concept uit de sociale wetenschappen, 
genaamd ‘tie strength’. Door in te zoomen op de contacten die het vaakst in de 
archieven voorkomen, sluit dit hoofdstuk af met een grondige ontleding van de 
persoonlijke netwerken, waarbij vooral aandacht wordt besteed aan de vragen wat 
voor individuen kunnen geclassificeerd worden als ‘vriend’ en welke rol speelden 
deze mensen precies in het leven van de priesters wiens archieven in deze studie 
onderzocht werden. 
De keuze om specifiek deze vier terreinen van interactie nader te onderzoeken – 
huwelijk, landbezit, zilverleningen en vriendschap – is beïnvloed door het feit dat ze 
tezamen een belangrijk deel van het dagelijkse leven van de Babylonische priesters 
omvatten. Ze presenteren gewichtige en alledaagse gebeurtenissen waarbij 
individuen, families en groepen met elkaar in formeel contact kwamen. Bovendien, 
terwijl er vele domeinen uit het dagelijkse leven in het oude Tweestromenland niet 
gedocumenteerd zijn, kunnen de bovengenoemde types van interactie adequaat 




In DEEL TWEE van deze studie (Hfdst. 5–6) zetten we een stapje terug en nemen 
we het gehele interactiepatroon van de priesters van Borsippa in beschouwing. Deze 
zal worden verklaard vanuit een theoretische perspectief en in verband worden 
gebracht met bredere sociale fenomenen in de Nieuw-Babylonische samenleving. 
Hoofdstuk 5 begint met een evaluatie van de mogelijke causaliteit die ten grondslag 
ligt aan het interactiepatroon dat gedetailleerd is gereconstrueerd in het eerste deel 
van de studie. Steunend op het concept van ‘homophily’, afkomstig uit de sociale 
wetenschappen, zal er een interpretatie voorgesteld worden die ruimte laat voor een 
zekere graad van zelfstandig handelen en bewuste keuze aan de kant van de priesters, 
zonder dat de factoren die een beperkende werking hebben op interactie, zoals 
geografische ruimte en demografie, worden ontkend. Bovendien, door het concept 
van ‘homophily’ verder uit te werken kan worden aangetoond dat het 
interactiepatroon van de priesters perfect aansluit bij de economische motivaties van 
deze sociale groep als zogeheten ‘rentiers’. Desalniettemin zal beargumenteerd 
worden dat classificaties zoals ‘rentier’ en ‘entrepreneur’ in Babylonië gekenmerkt 
werden door meer dan enkel economische aspecten. Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, is gewijd 
aan de reconstructie van de sociale identiteit van de Babylonische priester. De 
configuratie van het collectieve interactiepatroon duidt op het bestaan van een scherpe 
sociale afbakening, die de sociale groep van de priesters scheidde van de rest van de 
maatschappij. Wat volgt is een uiteenzetting van de symbolische en materiele 
attributen die de priesters aanwendden om hun besloten, sociale ‘ingroep’ vorm te 
geven en in stand te houden. Dit gebeurd middels een grondige analyse van de 
belangrijkste identiteitsmarkeringen, zoals het bezit van vastgoed, professionele 
betrekkingen, historisch bewustzijn, naamgeving, geletterdheid, en taal. 
 
Onderzoeksbevindingen en conclusies 
De bevindingen van dit proefschrift betuigen dat het buitengewoon nuttig is om de 
Babylonisceh samenleving van onderaf, dat wil zeggen vanuit het microniveau te 
doorgronden. Door de aandacht te vestigen op de dagelijkse interactie van Borsippa’s 
priesters en deze als het primaire object van analyse te nemen, werd het mogelijk om 
meer te zeggen over de sociale structuur van een specifieke en hoe deze zich verhield 
tot andere segmenten en groepen in de gemeenschap. Daarnaast verschafte deze 
empirische methode ons een goede indruk van wat gangbaar, normatief en het 




of zelfs algemeen afgekeurd werd. Daarnaast heeft deze studie laten zien dat de 
bevindingen ook succesvol geëxtrapoleerd kunnen worden en zo nieuw licht kunnen 
werpen op algemene sociale fenomenen in de Babylonische samenleving. 
De impact van de tempel. Het bewijs dat in de loop van dit proefschrift is 
voorgelegd heeft aangetoond dat de tempel een grote invloed heeft gehad op het leven 
van de Babylonische priesters. Het beïnvloedde hun keuzes, stuurde hun gedrag, en 
bood een ideaal model voor de sociale organisatie van deze groep buiten de tempel. 
De duidelijkste getuigenis van deze invloed kwam naar voren in de studie van het 
huwelijk. Terwijl de voorkeur van priesters om voornamelijk dochters uit andere 
priestergeslachten te huwen de invloed van de tempel op de echtelijke allianties in 
deze gemeenschap reeds onderstreept, bleek uit een systematische analyse van de 
gegevens dat het huwelijkssysteem veel complexer was, en dat de werkingen van de 
religieuze instantie diepgravender waren dan gedacht. Het systeem dat kon worden 
gereconstrueerd voor de priestergemeenschap van Borsippa stemt onmiskenbaar 
overeen met het huwelijksmodel dat bekend staat als hypergamie. Dit ideale model 
wordt gekenmerkt door huwelijken tussen bruiden van lagere status en bruidegoms 
van hogere status. In Borsippa werden meer dan 70% van de gedocumenteerde 
allianties afgesloten tussen dochters uit families van lagere rang en zonen uit 
priesterfamilies van een hogere orde. De families adopteerden dus de op reinheid 
gebaseerde tempel hiërarchie als ideologisch raamwerk voor het lokale 
huwelijkssysteem. 
Het huwelijk fungeerde als een fundamentele bouwsteen in deze gemeenschap. 
Behalve dat het families en individuen in de gelegenheid stelde om diepgewortelde 
allianties te smeden en collega’s, buren of bekenden tot verwanten te maken, zijn de 
huwelijksordeningen zichtbaar in verscheidene aspecten van het dagelijkse leven van 
de priesters. Het structureerde de verkoop van eigendommen, leidde tot specifieke 
dienstverleningen in de landbouw en de cultische organisatie, en schiep een algemene 
houding van solidariteit en coöperatie – opvallenderwijs, ontbrak dit laatste vaak 
tussen families die niet met elkaar gebonden waren door huwelijksallianties. Deze 
sociaaleconomische dynamieken waren in de eerste plaats gebaseerd op echtelijke 
verbanden. Maar, gezien het feit dat het huwelijk sterk steunde op de ideale tempel 
regeling, kan geargumenteerd worden dat het laatstgenoemde zeer uiteenlopende 





De draagwijdte van de tempelvoorschriften blijkt ook uit de specifieke wijze 
waarop het priesterschap met haar sociale omgeving omging. De priesters van een 
Babylonische tempel waren gerangschikt volgens een strikte hiërarchie die gebaseerd 
was op cultische reinheid en fysiek contact met de goden. Het cultische personeel dat 
in nauw contact met de goddelijke beelden opereerde, moest aan strengere 
reinheidsvoorwaarden voldoen dan priesters die in perifere zones van de tempel 
werkzaam waren. Dit principe is ook zichtbaar in het algemene interactiepatroon. 
Sociale interactie van hooggeplaatste priesters was structureel meer naar binnen 
gericht – waarbij de dagelijkse contacten vooral bestonden uit naaste verwanten en 
individuen van dezelfde priesterlijke status – terwijl leden van families die lagere 
echelons in de tempel hiërarchie bezetten doorgaans met een meer sociaal diverse 
groep verwikkeld waren – hier spelen niet-priesterlijke ‘buitenstaanders’ een grotere 
rol. Dit kwam bijvoorbeeld aan het licht in de analyse van het lokale 
huwelijksnetwerk: de hoogstgeplaatste priesters, de zogenaamde tempel-betreders, 
huwden voornamelijk binnen een kleine groep van families van dezelfde (of 
soortgelijke) priesterlijke rang, in tegenstelling tot laaggeplaatste families van de 
ossenherders of rietwerkers, die echtelijke allianties smeedden met families die niet 
tot het lokale priestercircuit behoorden. Deze trend is ook zichtbaar in andere sociale 
en economische relaties, zoals in de formatie van vriendschappen, agrarische 
samenwerkingen en geldleningen. Echter, het moet gezegd worden dat deze trend zich 
doorgaans het duidelijkste openbaart in een vergelijking tussen de hoogste en de 
laagste randgroepen, en kan niet altijd even duidelijk getraceerd worden bij het 
middelbare tempelpersoneel. 
Deze inzichten zijn belangrijk voor ons begrip van de sociale structuur van 
Borsippa’s priestergemeenschap en haar fundamentele ordeningsprincipes. Ten eerste 
bestaat er geen twijfel meer over het feit dat de tempel hiërarchie een significante 
invloed uitoefende op het leven van de priesters buiten hun cultische activiteiten. 
Daarbij kon worden aangetoond dat priesters de ideale ordening van de tempel ook 
actief gestalte trachtten te geven in hun sociale omgeving. Ten tweede heeft deze 
studie ook geleid tot een meer genuanceerde voorstelling van de Babylonische 
priester an sich. Zelfs als priesters geïdentificeerd kunnen worden als een 
afzonderlijke sociale groep wanneer men de Babylonische samenleving in haar geheel 
bestudeerd, zo heeft de voorliggende studie laten zien dat de interne diversiteit van 




tempelsfeer, en dit werkte op verschillende wijzen door op hun sociale gedrag en 
manier van omgaan met de omgeving. Het is essentieel dat dit gegeven wordt erkend 
wanneer men spreekt over de Babylonische priester. 
Priesters als een exclusieve sociale groep. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat 
priesters geïdentificeerd kunnen worden als een aparte sociale groep in de 
Babylonische samenleving. Ondanks dat natuurlijk elke priester op zijn eigen wijze 
met zijn omgeving vervlochten was, heeft deze studie laten zien dat het 
interactiepatroon van deze groep een duidelijke lijn volgde. Het kan als volgt worden 
samengevat: ten eerste, bestond het leeuwendeel van hun dagelijkse sociale en 
economische handelingen uit interacties met collega-priesters en leden van lokale 
priesterfamilies. Ten tweede, hoewel zij regelmatig met leden van niet-
priesterfamilies interageerden, is dit verhoudingsgewijs zelden gedocumenteerd in de 
beschikbare bronnen. En tenslotte, schijnen individuen van lagere sociale lagen, 
inclusief buitenlandse minderheden, nagenoeg volledig te zijn uitgesloten van de 
alledaagse interactie, en komen zij alleen voor aan de grenzen van de sociale wereld 
van de priesters. Terwijl dit patroon scherp naar voren kwam bij huwelijks- en 
vriendschapsverbanden, kon het minder duidelijk getraceerd worden in het domein 
van de kredietverleningen of de landpacht, waar een meer sociaal diverse groep 
mensen geëngageerd was. 
Gezien het feit dat het merendeel van de contacten van de priesters uit hun directe 
sociale omgeving kwam, kon het specifieke interactiepatroon niet simpelweg gezien 
worden als het natuurlijke resultaat van ruimtelijke en demografische factoren. Het is 
derhalve zinvoller om het te interpreteren in het licht van ‘homophily’, het 
theoretische principe dat poneert dat sociale interactie zich het waarschijnlijkste 
voordoet tussen individuen die een soortgelijke levensstijl en sociaaleconomische 
eigenschappen delen. De participatie van priesters in de samenleving kan zeker als 
‘homophilous’ geclassificeerd worden, wat geheel overeenkomt met de conservatieve 
mentaliteit die doorgaans aan hen wordt toeschreven in de vakliteratuur. Maar van 
nog groter gewicht voor ons begrip van de priesters als een aparte sociale groep, is het 
feit dat de meest beduidende vormen van interactie – huwelijk en vriendschap – in 
buitenproportioneel hoge mate plaatsvond binnen de sociale ingroep, met de vrijwel 
volledige uitsluiting van anderen. Dit duidt erop dat de Babylonische priesters een 




gelegenheid stelde zich bewust van andere elementen in de samenleving af te 
zonderen en de integriteit van hun eigen groep te waarborgen.  
Teneinde deze ‘wij’ en ‘zij’ dichotomie in het leven te roepen en een concrete 
vorm te geven, beriepen de Babylonische priesters zich op gemeenschappelijke 
criteria die de collectieve, sociale identiteit van de groep definieerden. Deze criteria 
omhelsden aspecten uiteenlopend van hun geprivilegieerde betrekkingen met de 
tempel, hun uitzonderlijke reinheid en specifieke leefregels, tot landbezit, historisch 
bewustzijn, geletterdheid, en taal. Zelfs als vele facetten van dit sociaal, cultureel en 
economisch veelvoudige repertoire gedeeld werden met een veel groter (elitair) deel 
van de samenleving, zo heeft deze studie laten zien dat Babylonische priesters de 
kentekeningen van hun sociale identiteit niet alleen gebruikten om de grenzen van de 
groep af te bakenen maar ook als algemene richtlijn voor hun dagelijkse interactie. Ze 
verschaften de priesters een duidelijk idee van wat het betekende om lid te zijn van 
deze exclusieve ingroep. Een sociale groep die, hoewel over het algemeen vrij rigide 
gedefinieerd, in bepaalde situaties haar grenzen kon verschuiven om een iets meer of 
iets minder diverse groep mensen in hun sociale wereld te betrekken. 
Deze bevindingen zijn beslissend voor een gesofisticeerde opvatting van de 
Babylonische priester. Het bewijsmateriaal dat in het voorliggende proefschrift is 
gepresenteerd, duidt erop dat priesters zich waarnamen en ook handhaafden als een 
aparte sociale eenheid. Door zich te vereenzelvigen met een collectieve identiteit en 
een gemeenschappelijke interactiepraktijk in acht te nemen, behielden de priesters als 
het ware de controle over hun sociale omgeving en de configuratie van de sociale in-
groep. Ondanks dat het voor zich spreekt dat priesters een integraal deel uitmaakten 
van een veel grotere en diverse stedelijke gemeenschap, geeft het feit dat het 
merendeel van de interacties en haar beduidendste vormen plaatvonden tussen priester 
families, duidelijk aan dat de leden van deze aloude inheemse geslachten  de primaire 
in-groep belichaamden. Deze sociale groep kan thans met grotere zekerheid 
getraceerd worden in de lang vergane samenleving van het Tweestromenland.
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